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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 3 Mar 2026, 06:18 UTC
Duration 21.3s
Version v26.32.59
Integrity ca8b4ec124a4a58fa1787728eef629f427a7089344b2d8bf25d54ab3b1333b0705ed7967a119f19cbea95f38ec6cd3c9fb6cda0457f356584aeeebf5703246c3
Subject Domain
sap.de

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

sap.de
3 Mar 2026, 06:18 UTC · 21.3s ·v26.32.59 · SHA-3-512: ca8b✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
3 protocols configured, 6 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
1 monitoring
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 70/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 66% Currency 75/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Adequate 75/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
A 570s 1 hour (3600s) medium A TTL is below typical — observed 570s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 21569s 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 21569s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT 14370s 1 hour (3600s) medium TXT TTL is above typical — observed 14370s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.
SOA 6 hours (21600s) 1 hour (3600s) high SOA TTL is above typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.
MX 4 hours (14400s) 1 hour (3600s) medium MX TTL is above typical — observed 4 hours (14400s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for sap.de
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS ns.sap-ag.de
Serial 2026013001
Admin dns.sap-ag.de
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh14400s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry5400sFraction of Refresh
Expire1814400s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)600s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (reject), DKIM (inferred via Proofpoint)
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, DNSSEC, CAA
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Secure
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

BIMI displays your verified brand logo next to your emails in supporting mail clients.
TypeTXT
Hostdefault._bimi.sap.de (BIMI default record)
Valuev=BIMI1; l=https://sap.de/brand/logo.svg
RFC 9495
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostsap.de (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.sap.de (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@sap.de
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.sap.de (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=sap.de
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
Unknown
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Proofpoint
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 2/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 2/10 lookups (via redirect: _spf.sap.com)

v=spf1 redirect=_spf.sap.com
SPF Redirect Chain RFC 7208 §6.1
This SPF record delegates policy via redirect= — the effective policy comes from the target domain.
_spf.sap.com
v=spf1 ip4:130.214.133.176/28 ip4:130.214.145.224/28 ip4:155.56.68.128/26 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=r; aspf=s; fo=1; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@sap.com
Alignment: SPF strict DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Provider-managed
Provider Verified

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

Proofpoint detected as primary mail platform — DKIM signing is managed by the provider. The primary provider may use custom selectors not discoverable through standard checks.
Know your DKIM selector? Re-scan with a custom selector to verify.
RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Yes — all authorized
Success

All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
sap.com Authorized v=DMARC1
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 2 MX hosts)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Partial RFC 9116

security.txt found but expired

Contact

https://www.sap.com/report-a-vulnerability

Expires

2026-01-30 Expired
Source: https://sap.de/.well-known/security.txt
File expired on 2026-01-30 (RFC 9116 §2.5.5)
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns1.sap.net — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Test inconclusive
Open Recursion Disabled Test inconclusive
Nameserver Identity Hidden Test inconclusive
Cache Snooping Protected Test inconclusive

Tested nameservers: ns1.sap.net, ns4.sap.asia, ns2.sap.de, ns3.sap.com

Delegation Consistency 2 Issues

Delegation consistency: 2 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • In-bailiwick NS ns2.sap.de has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Incomplete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns1.sap.net No N/A N/A OK
ns2.sap.de Missing
ns3.sap.com No N/A N/A OK
ns4.sap.asia No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns1.sap.net: 2.026013001e+09
ns2.sap.de: 2.026013001e+09
ns3.sap.com: 2.026013001e+09
ns4.sap.asia: 2.026013001e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for sap.de — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns3.sap.com 67.221.252.72 2607:fae0:f00d::72 AS8038 203993 2026013001
ns2.sap.de 195.253.90.7 2a01:5b0:12::7 AS8561 48519 50611 2026013001
ns1.sap.net 193.46.3.53 None AS3271 2026013001
ns4.sap.asia 169.145.112.153 None AS3271 2026013001
Unique ASNs
3
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
4
Diversity Score
Good

3 ASNs, 4 /24 prefixes across 4 nameservers

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Transport security inferred from 1 signal(s) — no enforcement policy active

Policy Assessment Primary
  • Cisco Email Security enforces TLS
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (HTTP 502) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 1 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS35039 US
IPv4 Mappings:
130.214.229.153 → AS35039 (130.214.228.0/23)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS services detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1.sap.net ns2.sap.de ns3.sap.com ns4.sap.asia
Enterprise DNS (Mixed Configuration)
1 of 4 nameservers are dedicated (sap.de-branded), 3 use external provider(s). This pattern is common in large organizations using split-horizon DNS or maintaining redundancy across internal and external infrastructure.
Dedicated (organization-branded): ns2.sap.de External provider: ns1.sap.net ns3.sap.com ns4.sap.asia
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

130.214.229.153
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

100 mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com.
100 mx1.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Proofpoint

SRVServices

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 0 1 5061 video-exchange.sap.de.
_sipfederationtls._tcp: 50 1 5061 video-exchange2.sap.de.
_sip._tls: 0 1 5061 video-exchange.sap.de.
_sip._tls: 0 1 5061 video-exchange2.sap.de.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: 4 endpoints
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 19 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 19 current 0 expired 7 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
community.sap.de DNS Current — — — —
ctcauthmon.sap.de CT Log Current — 1 2025-04-28T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
ftp.sap.de DNS Current news.sap.com — — —
gw1.sap.de DNS Current — — — —
gw2.sap.de DNS Current — — — —
help.sap.de DNS Current redirect.sdn.sap.com — — —
m.sap.de DNS Current — — — —
news.sap.de DNS Current news.sap.com — — —
ns.sap.de DNS Current — — — —
ns1.sap.de DNS Current — — — —
ns2.sap.de DNS Current — — — —
ns3.sap.de DNS Current — — — —
ns4.sap.de DNS Current — — — —
relay.sap.de DNS Current — — — —
roombooker-test.sap.de CT Log Current roombooker-test.mail.net.sap 1 2025-09-29T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
roombooker.sap.de CT Log Current — 1 2025-09-29T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
service.sap.de DNS Current service.sap.com — — —
www.sap.de CT Log Current sap.de 2 2025-04-16T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
www2.sap.de DNS Current www.sap.com — — —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
130.214.229.153
130.214.229.153
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.sap.de RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=r; aspf=s; fo=1; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@sap.com
v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=r; aspf=s; fo=1; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@sap.com
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
100 mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com.
100 mx1.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com.
100 mx1.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com.
100 mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
ns1.sap.net.
ns2.sap.de.
ns4.sap.asia.
ns4.sap.asia.
ns3.sap.com.
ns1.sap.net.
ns2.sap.de.
ns3.sap.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns.sap-ag.de. dns.sap-ag.de. 2026013001 14400 5400 1814400 600
ns.sap-ag.de. dns.sap-ag.de. 2026013001 14400 5400 1814400 600
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
v=spf1 redirect=_spf.sap.com
p8fkqwj5509y8vsxzylpvkv3gt28skgh
p8fkqwj5509y8vsxzylpvkv3gt28skgh
v=spf1 redirect=_spf.sap.com
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

ca8b4ec124a4a58fa1787728eef629f427a7089344b2d8bf25d54ab3b1333b0705ed7967a119f19cbea95f38ec6cd3c9fb6cda0457f356584aeeebf5703246c3
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 3 Mar 2026, 06:18 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-sap.de.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-sap.de.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-sap.de.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-sap.de.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/5425/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for sap.de. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer sap.de A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer sap.de AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer sap.de MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer sap.de NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer sap.de TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short sap.de TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.sap.de TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.sap.de TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.sap.de TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.sap.de TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.sap.de TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer sap.de DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer sap.de DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd sap.de A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx1.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx1.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com:25 -servername mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.sap.de TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.sap.de/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.sap.de TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.sap.de TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer sap.de CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer sap.de HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer sap.de CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/sap.de' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com:25 -servername mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.sap.de&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://sap.de/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://sap.de/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://sap.de/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 130.214.229.153 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 153.229.214.130.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4858 runs
DKIM
Verified 4677 runs
DMARC
Verified 4842 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4661 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4839 runs
BIMI
Verified 4676 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4679 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4681 runs
CAA
Verified 4673 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer sap.de A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer sap.de AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer sap.de MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer sap.de NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer sap.de TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short sap.de TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.sap.de TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.sap.de TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.sap.de TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.sap.de TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.sap.de TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer sap.de DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer sap.de DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd sap.de A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx1.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx1.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com:25 -servername mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.sap.de TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.sap.de/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.sap.de TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.sap.de TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer sap.de CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer sap.de HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer sap.de CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/sap.de' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com:25 -servername mx2.sap.c3s2.iphmx.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.sap.de&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://sap.de/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://sap.de/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://sap.de/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 130.214.229.153 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 153.229.214.130.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

sap.de

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.