Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
| Parameter | Current | Suggested | Severity | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| timeout_seconds | 5s |
8s |
low | Average scan duration is 75.8s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures. RFC 8767 |
SPF (Sender Policy Framework) tells receiving mail servers which IP addresses are authorized to send email for your domain. Without SPF, any server can claim to send as your domain.
DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance) tells receivers how to handle messages that fail SPF/DKIM checks. Without DMARC, failed authentication checks are ignored. Start with p=none and rua reporting to monitor, then escalate to p=quarantine and p=reject.
DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) adds a cryptographic signature to outgoing emails, proving they haven't been tampered with. Enable DKIM in your email provider's settings.
Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com).
Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.yourdomain.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain. Helps diagnose MTA-STS and STARTTLS issues.
DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions) cryptographically signs DNS responses, preventing attackers from forging DNS answers. Contact your DNS hosting provider to enable DNSSEC signing.
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes
SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified
No SPF record found
DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified
No DMARC record found
pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified
DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)
l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail),
weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3),
DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)
MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified
No MTA-STS record found
MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.
TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified
No TLS-RPT record found
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 1 MX host)
Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:
- DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
- MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning
No BIMI record found
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning
No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?
DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned
DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned
NS Delegation Verified
4 nameserver(s) configured
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?
AIPv4 Address
AAAAIPv6 Address
MXMail Servers
SRVServices
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? Unavailable
How did we find these?Passive discovery using Certificate Transparency Logs — publicly auditable records of every TLS certificate ever issued. CT log returned HTTP 502
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
165.160.13.20
165.160.13.20
165.160.15.20
165.160.15.20
10 custmx.cscdns.net.
10 custmx.cscdns.net.
ns5.netnames.net.
ns1.netnames.net.
ns6.netnames.net.
ns2.netnames.net.
ns1.netnames.net.
ns5.netnames.net.
ns2.netnames.net.
ns6.netnames.net.
ns1.netnames.net. hostmaster.cscdns.net. 2019060602 28800 7200 604800 14400
ns1.netnames.net. hostmaster.cscdns.net. 2019060602 28800 7200 604800 14400
DNS History Timeline BETA
When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?
Confirm Your Email Configuration
This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.
DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY
All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.
Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.
Intelligence Sources
This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below
This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.
79fb4c5358535f5c1477e53f1c872da18e88c478992447cbffaa66a3cf42eef593c9cfdf2cb9f331911ba64ea2528b779d687b6807d8b90ed416ec57c485fb12
Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.
After downloading, verify with any of these commands:
Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).
cat dns-intelligence-natashabedingfield.co.uk.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-natashabedingfield.co.uk.jsonpython3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-natashabedingfield.co.uk.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-natashabedingfield.co.uk.json.sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/542/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).
Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for natashabedingfield.co.uk. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk Adig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk AAAAdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk MXdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk NSdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTEmail Authentication
dig +short natashabedingfield.co.uk TXT | grep -i spfdig +short _dmarc.natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTdig +short default._domainkey.natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTdig +short google._domainkey.natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTdig +short selector1._domainkey.natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTdig +short selector2._domainkey.natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk DNSKEYdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk DSdig +dnssec +cd natashabedingfield.co.uk A @1.1.1.1Transport Security
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.custmx.cscdns.net TLSAopenssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect custmx.cscdns.net:25 -servername custmx.cscdns.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -datesdig +short _mta-sts.natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTcurl -sL https://mta-sts.natashabedingfield.co.uk/.well-known/mta-sts.txtdig +short _smtp._tls.natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTBrand & Trust
dig +short default._bimi.natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/natashabedingfield.co.uk' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50Transport Security
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect custmx.cscdns.net:25 -servername custmx.cscdns.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5Infrastructure Intelligence
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.natashabedingfield.co.uk&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20curl -sL https://natashabedingfield.co.uk/.well-known/security.txt | head -20AI Surface
curl -sI https://natashabedingfield.co.uk/llms.txt | head -5curl -s https://natashabedingfield.co.uk/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'Infrastructure Intelligence
dig +short 20.13.160.165.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig +short 20.15.160.165.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Appendix: Verification Commands
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk Adig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk AAAAdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk MXdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk NSdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTEmail Authentication
dig +short natashabedingfield.co.uk TXT | grep -i spfdig +short _dmarc.natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTdig +short default._domainkey.natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTdig +short google._domainkey.natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTdig +short selector1._domainkey.natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTdig +short selector2._domainkey.natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk DNSKEYdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk DSdig +dnssec +cd natashabedingfield.co.uk A @1.1.1.1Transport Security
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.custmx.cscdns.net TLSAopenssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect custmx.cscdns.net:25 -servername custmx.cscdns.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -datesdig +short _mta-sts.natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTcurl -sL https://mta-sts.natashabedingfield.co.uk/.well-known/mta-sts.txtdig +short _smtp._tls.natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTBrand & Trust
dig +short default._bimi.natashabedingfield.co.uk TXTdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.co.uk CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/natashabedingfield.co.uk' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50Transport Security
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect custmx.cscdns.net:25 -servername custmx.cscdns.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5Infrastructure Intelligence
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.natashabedingfield.co.uk&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20curl -sL https://natashabedingfield.co.uk/.well-known/security.txt | head -20AI Surface
curl -sI https://natashabedingfield.co.uk/llms.txt | head -5curl -s https://natashabedingfield.co.uk/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'Infrastructure Intelligence
dig +short 20.13.160.165.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig +short 20.15.160.165.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT