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Registry Zone Health Intelligence — com is a shared registry suffix.
This report focuses on zone infrastructure health: DNSSEC signing, nameserver diversity, certificate authority policy, and delegation security. Email authentication protocols (SPF, DMARC, DKIM) are not applicable to registry suffixes — they apply to domains registered under this zone.
Registry operators, ICANN, and ccTLD authorities can use this view to assess zone security posture.
DNS Tool
Registry Zone Health Report
Generated 2 Mar 2026, 14:38 UTC
Duration 6.6s
Version v26.28.42
Integrity 4b7157ea5864910f62b89cee2f8e7c76ea8f94fcfd903538497b7f440b51e2a440f6417865a145aebe35c1a57f8b55be14588470443b339797c3cb2bba69cfd9
Subject Domain
com

Registry Zone Health Report

com
2 Mar 2026, 14:38 UTC · 6.6s ·v26.28.42 · SHA-3-512: 4b71✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
LOW 38/100
Significant disagreement between resolvers undermines confidence in the analysis results.
Accuracy 21% Currency 68/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Adequate 68/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Stale Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
SOA 192s 1 hour (3600s) high SOA TTL is below typical — observed 192s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 6 hours (21600s) 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics)
Primary NS a.gtld-servers.net
Serial 1772461566
Admin nstld.verisign-grs.com
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh1800s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry900sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)900s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s).
RFC 1912 §2.2
Registry Zone Health
DNSSEC: Success 13 Nameservers
Zone infrastructure protocols applicable to registry suffixes
Email Spoofing
N/A — Registry
Brand Impersonation
N/A — Registry
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
N/A — Registry
Configured
DNSSEC
Registrar (RESTRICTED) LIVE
Registry Restricted
.com restricts public WHOIS
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Unprotected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on b.gtld-servers.net — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: b.gtld-servers.net, e.gtld-servers.net, i.gtld-servers.net, g.gtld-servers.net, f.gtld-servers.net, j.gtld-servers.net, m.gtld-servers.net, h.gtld-servers.net, d.gtld-servers.net, l.gtld-servers.net, k.gtld-servers.net, a.gtld-servers.net, c.gtld-servers.net

Delegation Consistency 4 Issues

Delegation consistency: 4 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone
  • SOA serial 1772462281 seen on: a.gtld-servers.net, e.gtld-servers.net, k.gtld-servers.net, i.gtld-servers.net, c.gtld-servers.net, j.gtld-servers.net, l.gtld-servers.net, b.gtld-servers.net, g.gtld-servers.net, h.gtld-servers.net, f.gtld-servers.net, m.gtld-servers.net
  • SOA serial 1772462296 seen on: d.gtld-servers.net
  • SOA serial inconsistency indicates zone data may not be fully synchronized across nameservers

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

DS Key TagDS AlgorithmDNSKEY Key TagDNSKEY Algorithm
19718 13 19718 13

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
a.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
b.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
c.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
d.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
e.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
f.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
g.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
h.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
i.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
j.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
k.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
l.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
m.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 172800s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency 2 Unique Serials

a.gtld-servers.net: 1.772462281e+09
b.gtld-servers.net: 1.772462281e+09
c.gtld-servers.net: 1.772462281e+09
d.gtld-servers.net: 1.772462296e+09
e.gtld-servers.net: 1.772462281e+09
f.gtld-servers.net: 1.772462281e+09
g.gtld-servers.net: 1.772462281e+09
h.gtld-servers.net: 1.772462281e+09
i.gtld-servers.net: 1.772462281e+09
j.gtld-servers.net: 1.772462281e+09
k.gtld-servers.net: 1.772462281e+09
l.gtld-servers.net: 1.772462281e+09
m.gtld-servers.net: 1.772462281e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix 2 Issues

Analyzed 13 nameserver(s) for com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Findings:
  • SOA serial 1772462281 on: c.gtld-servers.net, l.gtld-servers.net, h.gtld-servers.net, g.gtld-servers.net, i.gtld-servers.net, e.gtld-servers.net, d.gtld-servers.net, f.gtld-servers.net, a.gtld-servers.net, m.gtld-servers.net
  • SOA serial 1772462296 on: k.gtld-servers.net, j.gtld-servers.net, b.gtld-servers.net
Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
c.gtld-servers.net 192.26.92.30 2001:503:83eb::30 AS396549 396555 1772462281
l.gtld-servers.net 192.41.162.30 2001:500:d937::30 AS19836 22547 396566 397195 1772462281
k.gtld-servers.net 192.52.178.30 2001:503:d2d::30 AS19836 22547 396566 397195 1772462296
h.gtld-servers.net 192.54.112.30 2001:502:8cc::30 AS36631 397197 397203 1772462281
g.gtld-servers.net 192.42.93.30 2001:503:eea3::30 AS36631 397197 397203 1772462281
i.gtld-servers.net 192.43.172.30 2001:503:39c1::30 AS36631 397197 397203 1772462281
e.gtld-servers.net 192.12.94.30 2001:502:1ca1::30 AS396549 396555 1772462281
d.gtld-servers.net 192.31.80.30 2001:500:856e::30 AS396549 396555 1772462281
f.gtld-servers.net 192.35.51.30 2001:503:d414::30 AS36631 397197 397203 1772462281
j.gtld-servers.net 192.48.79.30 2001:502:7094::30 AS19836 22547 396566 397195 1772462296
a.gtld-servers.net 192.5.6.30 2001:503:a83e::2:30 AS396549 396555 1772462281
m.gtld-servers.net 192.55.83.30 2001:501:b1f9::30 AS19836 22547 396566 397195 1772462281
b.gtld-servers.net 192.33.14.30 2001:503:231d::2:30 AS36617 396658 396661 396707 396737 396747 396751 1772462296
Unique ASNs
4
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
13
Diversity Score
Good

4 ASNs, 13 /24 prefixes across 13 nameservers

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 4 Issues

DNSSEC operational notes: 4 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:
  • RRSIG for SOA (key tag 35511) expires in less than 7 days
  • RRSIG for NS (key tag 35511) expires in less than 7 days
  • RRSIG for NSEC3PARAM (key tag 35511) expires in less than 7 days
  • Single KSK with no CDS/CDNSKEY automation — manual rollover required

DNSKEY Inventory 2 Keys

RoleKey TagAlgorithmKey Size
ZSK 35511 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits
KSK 19718 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits

RRSIG Signatures 4 Signatures

TypeKey TagExpiryStatus
SOA 35511 2026-03-09T14:38:16Z Expiring Soon
NS 35511 2026-03-08T00:26:24Z Expiring Soon
NSEC3PARAM 35511 2026-03-08T00:26:23Z Expiring Soon
DNSKEY 19718 2026-03-13T15:02:35Z Active

Denial of Existence NSEC3

Iterations: 0
Salt Length: 0 bytes
Hash Algorithm: 1 (SHA-1)

Rollover Readiness Not_ready

Multiple KSKs:
CDS Published:
CDNSKEY Published:
Automation: none
Zone Signing & DNSSEC Methodology Is this zone cryptographically signed? YES DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 Modern

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 — MUST implement, recommended default (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
19718 13 2 8ACBB0CD28F41250A80A491389424D341522D946B0DA0C0291F2D3D771D7805A

NS Delegation Verified

13 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: a.gtld-servers.net b.gtld-servers.net c.gtld-servers.net d.gtld-servers.net e.gtld-servers.net f.gtld-servers.net g.gtld-servers.net h.gtld-servers.net i.gtld-servers.net j.gtld-servers.net k.gtld-servers.net l.gtld-servers.net m.gtld-servers.net
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Subdomain Discovery Not Applicable
Certificate Transparency subdomain enumeration is not applicable for registry suffixes. For com, CT logs would show registered domains under this zone rather than organizational subdomains. To analyze a specific domain's exposure, scan a registrable domain like example.com.
Δ Changes Detected: SOA Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 13 / 13 records
e.gtld-servers.net.
m.gtld-servers.net.
h.gtld-servers.net.
d.gtld-servers.net.
k.gtld-servers.net.
i.gtld-servers.net.
l.gtld-servers.net.
j.gtld-servers.net.
f.gtld-servers.net.
b.gtld-servers.net.
i.gtld-servers.net.
l.gtld-servers.net.
j.gtld-servers.net.
h.gtld-servers.net.
d.gtld-servers.net.
f.gtld-servers.net.
c.gtld-servers.net.
e.gtld-servers.net.
b.gtld-servers.net.
a.gtld-servers.net.
a.gtld-servers.net.
k.gtld-servers.net.
g.gtld-servers.net.
g.gtld-servers.net.
m.gtld-servers.net.
c.gtld-servers.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Propagating 1 / 1 records
a.gtld-servers.net. nstld.verisign-grs.com. 1772461566 1800 900 604800 900
a.gtld-servers.net. nstld.verisign-grs.com. 1772462296 1800 900 604800 900
TXT RFC 7208 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

4b7157ea5864910f62b89cee2f8e7c76ea8f94fcfd903538497b7f440b51e2a440f6417865a145aebe35c1a57f8b55be14588470443b339797c3cb2bba69cfd9
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 2 Mar 2026, 14:38 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/5335/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd com A @1.1.1.1

Brand & Trust

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4877 runs
DKIM
Verified 4695 runs
DMARC
Verified 4860 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4679 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4858 runs
BIMI
Verified 4694 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4697 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4699 runs
CAA
Verified 4691 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd com A @1.1.1.1

Brand & Trust

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.