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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 2 Mar 2026, 14:30 UTC
Duration 18.1s
Version v26.28.42
Integrity 9af141140aee514a80d405a3072160551331a4de51833e05693d575021b147e2ca958ee154f6354bf4b8842817479d17160bed17c2f563bca910710a7ea9fb3c
Subject Domain
2911.us

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

2911.us
2 Mar 2026, 14:30 UTC · 18.1s ·v26.28.42 · SHA-3-512: 9af1✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint 3 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
6 protocols configured, 3 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
1 monitoring
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 69/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 59% Currency 81/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Good 81/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Adequate
DNS data is mostly current with minor gaps — good intelligence currency

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
NS 3570s 1 day (86400s) high NS TTL is below typical — observed 3570s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA 10 minutes (600s) 1 hour (3600s) medium SOA TTL is below typical — observed 10 minutes (600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA 451s 1 hour (3600s) medium AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 451s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for 2911.us
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: GoDaddy — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS pdns01.domaincontrol.com
Serial 2026021303
Admin dns.jomax.net
Provider GoDaddy
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh28800s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry7200sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)600s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s).
RFC 1912 §2.2

Independent RFC compliance assessment for GoDaddy. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

Minimum TTL enforced at 600s RFC 1035 §3.2.1

GoDaddy enforces a minimum TTL of 600 seconds (10 minutes). RFC 1035 defines TTL as a value between 0 and 2^31−1 seconds, with no mandated minimum. The 600-second floor prevents administrators from setting shorter TTLs that may be needed for ACME challenges or rapid failover scenarios.

Imposes restriction not required by RFCs
This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Configured
SPF, DMARC (reject), DKIM (inferred via Microsoft 365), MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, DNSSEC
Not Configured
BIMI, DANE, CAA
Priority Actions Achievable posture: Secure
Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

BIMI displays your verified brand logo next to your emails in supporting mail clients.
TypeTXT
Hostdefault._bimi.2911.us (BIMI default record)
Valuev=BIMI1; l=https://2911.us/brand/logo.svg
RFC 9495
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Host2911.us (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Registrar (WHOIS) OBSERVED LIVE
GoDaddy.com, LLC (Registrant: Jeremy Westby)
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Microsoft 365
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
GoDaddy
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 6/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 6/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:spf.intermedia.net include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:servers.mcsv.net include:spf.mandrillapp.com include:_spf.google.com include:mailgun.org ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC reject: the strongest compatible security stance, aligned with CISA and RFC guidance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; sp=reject; rua=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com; ruf=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=86400
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed sp=reject
Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Third-party only
Third-Party Only

Found DKIM for 3 selector(s) but none for primary mail platform (Microsoft 365)

DKIM verified for MailChimp only — no DKIM found for primary mail platform (Microsoft 365). The primary provider may use custom selectors not discoverable through standard checks. Try re-scanning with a custom DKIM selector if you know yours.
Know your DKIM selector? Re-scan with a custom selector to verify.
SPF authorizes Google Workspace alongside primary mail provider Microsoft 365. The Google Workspace SPF include likely supports ancillary services (e.g., calendar invitations, shared documents) rather than primary mailbox hosting.
k1._domainkey MailChimp
k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDbNrX2cY/GUKIFx2G/1I00ftdAj713WP9AQ1xir85i89sA2guU0ta4UX1Xzm06XIU6iBP41VwmPwBGRNofhBVR+e6WHUoNyIR4Bn84LVcfZE20rmDeXQblIupNWBqLXM1Q+VieI/eZu/7k9/vOkLSaQQdml4Cv8lb3PcnluMVIhQIDAQAB;
k2._domainkey MailChimp
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAv2aC2KjGKLOwTweBY5A9RpjsxaBXR9r7OAU6U8/zn92ivImI75naUujWbItRI/QmL1jy5PWGqLwoUA0b90ObWaLDc+i9MtTNmGeWO009hr20fIxhGg6XBT2kjZ1DTThopSe1nAndsupmcBwlQ5Q6LJ+ZAxLcujnPIxM0ZBLmgpkv8u6RfY4eFP8OLvdAW3oSuB0DyLDigQX4Sj8wBO4YIdQH6AAmBeOsidsKAFNFUCpc3vCxtBDR12U+cBg724l3sBkMQ8evnz6idnqxq9QAVYh8k4kJ+RP+6cqTdy7LjIm8xY/bQNpQIpGUAuDo2DjLcCDun9DAI4Q/3z+Q0o9QuQIDAQAB;
k3._domainkey MailChimp
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAsYGiMSn7fsUqSvfSX40x9R1OlRtbNiCY80lHRIlcKx3XDIR7257aUx+q9CSIARdfTL6KCuLGNFx5g9TgVr6png4ajcieSQGtOehBgxnkDN8aAA5TX0FmFrcefJU0JoxLOF09EKgXxhSSHCk/ekVb0PXSboHXoZ9+EI404F1qhcwXXIgHXTaUthHTut2P6BBZhIXIgvDe/w49GchR7MRJqjNb7neEBbYHbgWuBTvvHCg7Gy6m6n9krYK+ROWq3dVvXy9plAGK3ygM+HtjIiMt7arRGMOF0WgDTz7YdN9BGpt6BvXxLnjiQcgS5T9n+cIyPZgiWzDMXNlaEEdKTEKxrwIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced
Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 1 mail server(s)

v=STSv1; id=20260211184716
Policy Details:
  • Mode: enforce
  • Max Age: 14 days (1209600 seconds)
  • MX Patterns: east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Yes — all authorized
Success

All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
in.mailhardener.com Authorized v=DMARC1;
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 1 MX host)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses MTA-STS without DANE. MTA-STS provides transport security through HTTPS-based policy (RFC 8461), but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use. Adding DANE (RFC 7672) would provide cryptographic certificate pinning independent of certificate authorities.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
Sources scanned (4)
  • http://2911.us/
  • https://2911.us/sites/default/files/js/js_kjb4GXCThegR_gSx7iOHPVIF27SJX-TbXq1XNivRqWY.js?scope=header&delta=0&language=en&theme=twenty_nine_eleven_drupal&include=eJyFkNFuwyAMRX8IwSchE24ImsEIk6Td1y9rt3ZS1O7FmMPxlcUsddAOlQI3P3urW7IqnKOZ3xgdaWXqbx3OaRlvjdCpRjUqUyb2BTGT51w_1J2RHQsKjF51oLhACjNJh6vSC3H-hBk76rj6mis8GBuqj31txC6xBGKzI8yH7X5O-11O8JgsR46NGJRZrdKGf6UhKfFrrUCV0rEwtTEtdN--4_f66P6wJHIk2gfwqC_jZ8YlyOX0PklponnANOqUOrVF3f1L7JPYtbY1cNYF0WwZu7pbtUXiyvgCVbDYKA
  • https://2911.us/sites/default/files/js/js_Mc_Rsxgty932RKN9P-jnU3V6Dxm1XqDssHTe68kWpn0.js?scope=header&delta=6&language=en&theme=twenty_nine_eleven_drupal&include=eJyFkNFuwyAMRX8IwSchE24ImsEIk6Td1y9rt3ZS1O7FmMPxlcUsddAOlQI3P3urW7IqnKOZ3xgdaWXqbx3OaRlvjdCpRjUqUyb2BTGT51w_1J2RHQsKjF51oLhACjNJh6vSC3H-hBk76rj6mis8GBuqj31txC6xBGKzI8yH7X5O-11O8JgsR46NGJRZrdKGf6UhKfFrrUCV0rEwtTEtdN--4_f66P6wJHIk2gfwqC_jZ8YlyOX0PklponnANOqUOrVF3f1L7JPYtbY1cNYF0WwZu7pbtUXiyvgCVbDYKA
  • https://2911.us/sites/default/files/js/js_0fifM94PtQrBzJM64DwrkANGG4b8KRoOce8n-jXvbd0.js?scope=footer&delta=0&language=en&theme=twenty_nine_eleven_drupal&include=eJyFkNFuwyAMRX8IwSchE24ImsEIk6Td1y9rt3ZS1O7FmMPxlcUsddAOlQI3P3urW7IqnKOZ3xgdaWXqbx3OaRlvjdCpRjUqUyb2BTGT51w_1J2RHQsKjF51oLhACjNJh6vSC3H-hBk76rj6mis8GBuqj31txC6xBGKzI8yH7X5O-11O8JgsR46NGJRZrdKGf6UhKfFrrUCV0rEwtTEtdN--4_f66P6wJHIk2gfwqC_jZ8YlyOX0PklponnANOqUOrVF3f1L7JPYtbY1cNYF0WwZu7pbtUXiyvgCVbDYKA
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on pdns01.domaincontrol.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: pdns01.domaincontrol.com, pdns02.domaincontrol.com

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

DS Key TagDS AlgorithmDNSKEY Key TagDNSKEY Algorithm
17048 13 17048 13
40611 13 40611 13

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
pdns01.domaincontrol.com No N/A N/A OK
pdns02.domaincontrol.com No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 3600s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

pdns01.domaincontrol.com: 2.026021303e+09
pdns02.domaincontrol.com: 2.026021303e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for 2911.us — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
pdns01.domaincontrol.com 97.74.110.50 2603:5:21e0::32 AS44273 2026021303
pdns02.domaincontrol.com 173.201.78.50 2603:5:22e0::32 AS44273 2026021303
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
2
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 2 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive Healthy

DNSSEC operations healthy — keys, signatures, and denial-of-existence all nominal — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

DNSKEY Inventory 4 Keys

RoleKey TagAlgorithmKey Size
ZSK 49275 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits
ZSK 21309 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits
KSK 17048 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits
KSK 40611 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits

RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures

No RRSIG records found.

Denial of Existence NSEC

NSEC records expose zone contents via ordered names (zone walking). Consider NSEC3 for zone enumeration protection.

Rollover Readiness Ready

Multiple KSKs:
CDS Published:
CDNSKEY Published:
Automation: full
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery

Transport encryption enforced via DNS policy (2 signal(s))

Policy Assessment Primary
  • MTA-STS policy in enforce mode requires encrypted transport (RFC 8461)
  • TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures (RFC 8460)
Telemetry
TLS-RPT configured — domain receives reports about TLS delivery failures from sending mail servers (RFC 8460)
Reporting to: mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 3 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS54113 Fastly, Inc. US
IPv4 Mappings:
23.185.0.3 → AS54113 (23.185.0.0/24)
IPv6 Mappings:
2620:12a:8001::3 → AS54113 (2620:12a:8000::/44)
2620:12a:8000::3 → AS54113 (2620:12a:8000::/44)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 3 services

3 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Google Workspace google-site-verification=cnKBmgtuqnLMn2LbH_RbjL3OfRZMzVJgA8YiGZwauJo
Microsoft 365 MS=ms63238513
Facebook / Meta facebook-domain-verification=rtkwfzcjtrjgnz02y6nz0btld5a9q1
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 Modern

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 — MUST implement, recommended default (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
40611 13 2 24284E985302282351AA791F81059E778C5B93ED4EA9536EB68832C9599CF6DB
17048 13 2 3FCCDEBAFA765AF4F6254CED78E58635944DC88C76A3E82FDDA2DF68A09ECF78

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: pdns01.domaincontrol.com pdns02.domaincontrol.com
Managed DNS
All 2 nameservers hosted by GoDaddy. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): GoDaddy
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records

CDS / CDNSKEY (DNSSEC Automation) RFC 7344 Success CDS CDNSKEY

Full RFC 8078 automated DNSSEC key rollover signaling detected (CDS + CDNSKEY)

Key TagAlgorithmDigest TypeDigest
17048 ECDSAP256SHA256 2
40611 ECDSAP256SHA256 2
CDNSKEY Records:
FlagsProtocolAlgorithmPublic Key
257 3 ECDSAP256SHA256
257 3 ECDSAP256SHA256
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

23.185.0.3
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2620:12a:8001::3
2620:12a:8000::3
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

0 east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Microsoft 365

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 4 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 4 current 0 expired 4 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
autodiscover.2911.us DNS Current autodiscover.outlook.com — — —
email.2911.us CT Log Current mailgun.org 4 2026-02-26T16:10:38 Let's Encrypt
mta-sts.2911.us CT Log Current 2911.us.mta-sts.mailhardener.com 2 2025-12-11T14:31:43 Let's Encrypt
www.2911.us DNS Current 2911.us — — —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ Changes Detected: MTA-STS Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
23.185.0.3
23.185.0.3
AAAA Synchronized 2 / 2 records
2620:12a:8001::3
2620:12a:8000::3
2620:12a:8000::3
2620:12a:8001::3
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.2911.us RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; sp=reject; rua=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com; ruf=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=86400
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; sp=reject; rua=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com; ruf=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=86400
MTA-STS _mta-sts.2911.us RFC 8461 §3 Propagating 1 / 1 records
v=STSv1; id=20260211184716
2911.us._mta-sts.mailhardener.com.
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
0 east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net.
0 east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
pdns02.domaincontrol.com.
pdns01.domaincontrol.com.
pdns01.domaincontrol.com.
pdns02.domaincontrol.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
pdns01.domaincontrol.com. dns.jomax.net. 2026021303 28800 7200 604800 600
pdns01.domaincontrol.com. dns.jomax.net. 2026021303 28800 7200 604800 600
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.2911.us RFC 8460 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 5 / 5 records
google-site-verification=cnKBmgtuqnLMn2LbH_RbjL3OfRZMzVJgA8YiGZwauJo
openai-domain-verification=dv-8fTZweKgrwn7udZbUlatxIuV
MS=ms63238513
google-site-verification=cnKBmgtuqnLMn2LbH_RbjL3OfRZMzVJgA8YiGZwauJo
facebook-domain-verification=rtkwfzcjtrjgnz02y6nz0btld5a9q1
v=spf1 include:spf.intermedia.net include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:servers.mcsv.net include:spf.mandrillapp.com include:_spf.google.com include:mailgun.org ~all
openai-domain-verification=dv-8fTZweKgrwn7udZbUlatxIuV
facebook-domain-verification=rtkwfzcjtrjgnz02y6nz0btld5a9q1
v=spf1 include:spf.intermedia.net include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:servers.mcsv.net include:spf.mandrillapp.com include:_spf.google.com include:mailgun.org ~all
MS=ms63238513
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

9af141140aee514a80d405a3072160551331a4de51833e05693d575021b147e2ca958ee154f6354bf4b8842817479d17160bed17c2f563bca910710a7ea9fb3c
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 2 Mar 2026, 14:30 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-2911.us.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-2911.us.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-2911.us.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-2911.us.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/5317/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for 2911.us. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short 2911.us TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.2911.us TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' RFC 6376 
dig +short k1._domainkey.2911.us TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' RFC 6376 
dig +short k2._domainkey.2911.us TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k3' RFC 6376 
dig +short k3._domainkey.2911.us TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer 2911.us DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd 2911.us A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net:25 -servername east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.2911.us TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.2911.us/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.2911.us TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.2911.us TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/2911.us' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net:25 -servername east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.2911.us&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://2911.us/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://2911.us/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://2911.us/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.185.0.3 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 3.0.185.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4850 runs
DKIM
Verified 4669 runs
DMARC
Verified 4834 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4653 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4831 runs
BIMI
Verified 4668 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4671 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4673 runs
CAA
Verified 4665 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short 2911.us TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.2911.us TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k1._domainkey.2911.us TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k2._domainkey.2911.us TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k3' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k3._domainkey.2911.us TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer 2911.us DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd 2911.us A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net:25 -servername east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.2911.us TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.2911.us/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.2911.us TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.2911.us TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/2911.us' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net:25 -servername east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.2911.us&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://2911.us/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://2911.us/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://2911.us/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.185.0.3 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 3.0.185.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

2911.us

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.