Skip to main content

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

it-help.tech
10 Feb 2026, 09:22 UTC · 0.8s · SHA-3-512: a70e✱✱✱✱ Verify
Recon ModeRecon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Secure
8 protocols configured Why we go beyond letter grades
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Basic
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Configured
Configured
SPF, DMARC (reject), DKIM, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA, DNSSEC
Registrar (WHOIS) LIVE
Amazon Registrar, Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Google Workspace
Email: Enforced
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Amazon Route 53 Enterprise
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No
Verdict: DMARC policy is reject — spoofed messages will be blocked by receiving servers. DKIM keys verified with strong cryptography.

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:_u.it-help.tech._spf.smart.ondmarc.com ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC reject: the strongest compatible security stance, aligned with CISA and RFC guidance.
SPF flattened by OnDMARC (Red Sift)

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; sp=reject; rua=mailto:dc1e127b@inbox.ondmarc.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=3600
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed sp=reject
Reported to OnDMARC (Red Sift)
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found

Found DKIM records for 1 selector(s)

google._domainkey Google Workspace
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEApb3onIiQsLq6/SLBfl88zt4CsCwp56n2M3GgAENKfVPV3s68+d6gQduuQAO2VL1VaAJU3XAh9gravPqZqev6Lt/qrGKYXUUcXRQ9zE3+YcJIMNGyP9xaId43TZ3szC6Q2DNxqfOFNdnZfRv6plKSGRlzfWK4QaPxr66GRGKRvfaDGtZS6E8PhACYXgjshexZB76T9iUM4MC3WteUl1NTr1nUsJeY6RdJhxGr9NKi00qHJO8MHmA73d6dYDaf+eBE4BX90ZgbghKvA+CYws9WXVAwK4IUB3zj8a6Qh398tvhIEwivkwD7x65rZsMl32iHIdkp+alfQV4tFlc2wIm+hQIDAQAB
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced
Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 1 mail server(s)

v=STSv1; id=1741123722267
Policy Details:
  • Mode: enforce
  • Max Age: 14 days (1209600 seconds)
  • MX Patterns: smtp.google.com
Hosted by OnDMARC (Red Sift)

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:dc1e127b@inbox.ondmarc.com;
Reported to OnDMARC (Red Sift)

Email Security Management Actively Managed

Intelligence: This domain uses dedicated email security management — indicating continuous monitoring and professional oversight, not a "set and forget" configuration. Reporting destinations reveal the operational security partner network, and we extract that intelligence directly from DNS.
OnDMARC by Red Sift
DMARC TLS-RPT SPF flattening MTA-STS Dynamic services
DMARC aggregate reports (rua)
TLS-RPT delivery reports
SPF flattening (include:_u.it-help.tech._spf.smart.ondmarc.com)
MTA-STS policy hosting
Dynamic services (Dynamic MTA-STS, Dynamic TLS-RPT, Dynamic DMARC, Dynamic DKIM)
SPF flattening detected: Dynamic SPF management via OnDMARC — keeps include count within the 10-lookup limit automatically.

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Google Workspace

Google Workspace supports DANE for outbound mail verification but does not publish TLSA records for its MX hosts.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS (already configured)

Note: Google Workspace does validate DANE/TLSA when sending mail to DANE-enabled recipients (outbound DANE).


Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses MTA-STS — the best available option for Google Workspace. Since Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE, MTA-STS is the strongest transport security this domain can deploy. MTA-STS enforces TLS via HTTPS-based policy, protecting against downgrade attacks (RFC 8461).

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).


Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: Attackers cannot easily spoof your logo or obtain fraudulent TLS certificates.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Success No VMC SVG

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? Yes

BIMI configured - logo validated (VMC recommended for Gmail)

BIMI works without VMC! VMC (Verified Mark Certificate) requires a registered trademark. Small businesses can use BIMI with just a logo - it shows in Apple Mail and some providers. Gmail requires VMC.
v=BIMI1;l=https://www.it-help.tech/bimi-logo.svg
BIMI Logo
Logo validated (SVG) View full logo

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success IODEF

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only Amazon, Let's Encrypt can issue certificates (wildcard issuance: Let's Encrypt per RFC 8659 §4.3)

Authorized CAs: Amazon Let's Encrypt
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 iodef "mailto:hello@it-help.tech"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.


Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
12492 13 2 3F0538D5BA61D8D90ECBFBBF7B5B40508D00A794649CE949EA77FC8862E5531A

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns-1117.awsdns-11.org ns-1603.awsdns-08.co.uk ns-4.awsdns-00.com ns-529.awsdns-02.net
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (2 differences found)
Resolver Differences:
A: Cloudflare returned different results: [143.204.204.109 143.204.204.129 143.204.204.52 143.204.204.72]
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [75fb54a0-061c-11f0-a839-09712ee48904 facebook-domain-verification=76rq4jzu9l70hfw98qkma7lgsougsg google-site-verification=BnjqY2BGRiD4dDcPTYt235UM40y0QR3p_DX-OfVfXVg google-site-verification=FaC0aC3UvT7d88w-4Vg0lNH2WdCV4FQOmbf0_p25Nkc openai-domain-verification=dv-u60z0qkvBe135qAUQSKYKNDU v=spf1 include:_u.it-help.tech._spf.smart.ondmarc.com ~all]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

13.226.2.63
13.226.2.51
13.226.2.105
13.226.2.70
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2600:9000:21f8:4200:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:21f8:3e00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:21f8:c00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:21f8:5c00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:21f8:8e00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:21f8:a600:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:21f8:2800:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:21f8:6200:13:842a:58c0:93a1
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

1 smtp.google.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Google Workspace

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (4 IPv4, 8 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? None found
How did we find these?

No subdomains found via Certificate Transparency logs, DNS probing, or CNAME chain traversal for this domain. No TLS certificates have been issued and no common service names resolve for subdomains of it-help.tech.

Δ Changes Detected: A AAAA Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Propagating 4 / 4 records
13.226.2.63
13.226.251.125
13.226.2.51
13.226.251.106
13.226.2.105
13.226.251.45
13.226.2.70
13.226.251.104
AAAA Propagating 8 / 8 records
2600:9000:21f8:4200:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2201:c000:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:21f8:3e00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2201:c200:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:21f8:c00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2201:d000:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:21f8:5c00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2201:d800:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:21f8:8e00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2201:3800:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:21f8:a600:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2201:6000:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:21f8:2800:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2201:7a00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:21f8:6200:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2201:7600:13:842a:58c0:93a1
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 iodef "mailto:hello@it-help.tech"
0 iodef "mailto:hello@it-help.tech"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
DMARC _dmarc.it-help.tech RFC 7489 §6.3 1 / 0 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; sp=reject; rua=mailto:dc1e127b@inbox.ondmarc.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=3600
MTA-STS _mta-sts.it-help.tech RFC 8461 §3 1 / 0 records
v=STSv1; id=1741123722267
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
1 smtp.google.com.
1 smtp.google.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
ns-529.awsdns-02.net.
ns-1117.awsdns-11.org.
ns-1603.awsdns-08.co.uk.
ns-1603.awsdns-08.co.uk.
ns-1117.awsdns-11.org.
ns-4.awsdns-00.com.
ns-4.awsdns-00.com.
ns-529.awsdns-02.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns-529.awsdns-02.net. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
ns-529.awsdns-02.net. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.it-help.tech RFC 8460 §3 1 / 0 records
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:dc1e127b@inbox.ondmarc.com;
TXT RFC 7208 §4 8 / 0 records
facebook-domain-verification=76rq4jzu9l70hfw98qkma7lgsougsg
google-site-verification=qRV0IpeTmVGGCbCgy1bB4vsJpUXVSw1sXLSfPC01vgs
openai-domain-verification=dv-u60z0qkvBe135qAUQSKYKNDU
75fb54a0-061c-11f0-a839-09712ee48904
google-site-verification=FaC0aC3UvT7d88w-4Vg0lNH2WdCV4FQOmbf0_p25Nkc
apple-domain-verification=0Fr6C3CKU6a7VuF2KwsdLQpksMIPUrsSk8T6W-i5P3E
google-site-verification=BnjqY2BGRiD4dDcPTYt235UM40y0QR3p_DX-OfVfXVg
v=spf1 include:_u.it-help.tech._spf.smart.ondmarc.com ~all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

a70ece0aaf527a03748d635fae458e1a7c89e48436f9b9fcc4a8d2512c12cb9517462a157baad6de7509e10d86ed88b2d962bab7f80fb4613aea15835dd6759e
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 10 Feb 2026, 09:22 UTC.

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL)
cat dns-intelligence-it-help.tech.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-it-help.tech.json
Python 3 (cross-platform)
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-it-help.tech.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+)
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-it-help.tech.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/518/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for it-help.tech. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208
dig +short it-help.tech TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489
dig +short _dmarc.it-help.tech TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376
dig +short google._domainkey.it-help.tech TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +noall +answer it-help.tech DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +cd it-help.tech A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for smtp.google.com RFC 7672
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.smtp.google.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (smtp.google.com) RFC 6698
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect smtp.google.com:25 -servername smtp.google.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461
dig +short _mta-sts.it-help.tech TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461
curl -sL https://mta-sts.it-help.tech/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460
dig +short _smtp._tls.it-help.tech TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft
dig +short default._bimi.it-help.tech TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/it-help.tech' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (smtp.google.com) RFC 3207
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect smtp.google.com:25 -servername smtp.google.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.it-help.tech&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116
curl -sL https://it-help.tech/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt
curl -sI https://it-help.tech/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules
curl -s https://it-help.tech/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 13.226.2.63 (Team Cymru)
dig +short 63.2.226.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 13.226.2.51 (Team Cymru)
dig +short 51.2.226.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4850 runs
DKIM
Verified 4669 runs
DMARC
Verified 4834 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4653 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4831 runs
BIMI
Verified 4668 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4671 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4673 runs
CAA
Verified 4665 runs
Maturity: Development Verified Consistent Gold Gold Master
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

it-help.tech

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.