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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 1 Mar 2026, 14:43 UTC
Duration 29.3s
Version v26.28.35
Integrity 1cf63e00136b9371a62d5914b5598496afab9e7379b2c7e560e35acbeae5456e299cf89f905c95338c645d94ee428aed70f43680dcde35c0ced0e8f95e7689b1
Subject Domain
pdcnet.org

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

pdcnet.org
1 Mar 2026, 14:43 UTC · 29.3s ·v26.28.35 · SHA-3-512: 1cf6✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Google Workspace 1 SaaS Service
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Medium Risk
3 protocols configured, 5 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC monitoring phase with aggregate reporting enabled Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation 2 monitoring
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 70/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 68% Currency 73/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Adequate 73/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
MX 269s 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is below typical — observed 269s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 269s 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 269s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 20480s 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 20480s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for pdcnet.org
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: Cloudflare — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS alex.ns.cloudflare.com
Serial 2394996095
Admin dns.cloudflare.com
Provider Cloudflare
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh10000s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry2400sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)1800s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s). Cloudflare's anycast architecture reduces the practical risk, but this value departs from the RFC recommendation.
RFC 1912 §2.2

Independent RFC compliance assessment for Cloudflare. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

SOA Expire below RFC 1912 recommendation RFC 1912 §2.2

Cloudflare sets SOA Expire to 604,800 seconds (7 days). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). This means secondary nameservers stop serving the zone sooner if the primary becomes unreachable. Cloudflare's position is that their anycast architecture makes traditional zone transfer semantics less relevant. SOA timers are not editable on Free, Pro, or Business plans.

Below RFC recommendation
Proxied record TTLs fixed at 300s RFC 2181 §5.2

Cloudflare overrides the zone administrator's TTL to 300 seconds for all proxied (orange-cloud) records. RFC 2181 §5.2 requires TTL uniformity within an RRset but does not mandate a specific value. As the authoritative server, Cloudflare is technically within its rights, but the administrator loses TTL control. This can affect ACME DNS-01 challenges and automation workflows that depend on rapid propagation.

Technically compliant, but overrides administrator intent
Non-standard SOA serial format RFC 1912 §2.2

RFC 1912 recommends YYYYMMDDNN format for SOA serial numbers (e.g., 2026022501). Cloudflare uses a proprietary serial number format that does not encode the date. RFC 1035 only requires the serial to increment on changes, so this is compliant with the mandatory standard but breaks the convention relied on by monitoring tools.

Compliant with RFC 1035, deviates from RFC 1912 convention
Negative cache TTL delays new records RFC 2308 §5

Cloudflare's SOA MINIMUM (negative cache TTL) is 1,800–3,600 seconds (30–60 minutes). This controls how long resolvers cache NXDOMAIN responses. Newly created DNS records — including ACME DNS-01 challenge TXT records for Let's Encrypt — may be invisible for up to 1 hour even after creation. This causes certificate issuance failures for automation tools like cert-manager and Traefik. Workaround: pre-create placeholder records before they're needed. This is RFC-compliant but aggressive compared to the 300–900 seconds common at other providers.

RFC-compliant, but causes real-world automation failures
Historical RFC 2181 §5.2 violation: TTL mismatch in CNAME RRsets RFC 2181 §5.2

In February 2022, Cloudflare's resolver (1.1.1.1) returned CNAME responses with mismatched TTLs within the same RRset — including cases where one TTL was zero and another was non-zero. RFC 2181 §5.2 explicitly states: 'the TTLs of all RRs in an RRSet must be the same.' systemd-resolved (used by Arch Linux, Ubuntu, Fedora, and most modern Linux distributions) correctly rejected these responses per the RFC, causing widespread DNS resolution failures. Cloudflare acknowledged the issue and it appears to have been fixed, but it demonstrated that Cloudflare's DNS infrastructure can deviate from RFC requirements in ways that break compliant resolver implementations.

Was a documented RFC violation — appears resolved
This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 32.1s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
Move DMARC policy from 'none' to 'quarantine' or 'reject'
Monitoring
DMARC record has configuration warnings — review recommended, DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (with warnings), DKIM (inferred via Google Workspace)
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DNSSEC, CAA
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Upgrade DMARC from p=none

Your DMARC policy is monitor-only (p=none). Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing reports to actively prevent spoofing.

A quarantine or reject policy instructs receivers to take action on failing mail.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.pdcnet.org (DMARC policy record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@pdcnet.org
RFC 7489 §6.3
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostpdcnet.org (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.pdcnet.org (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@pdcnet.org
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.pdcnet.org (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=pdcnet.org
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
GoDaddy.com, LLC
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Google Workspace
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Cloudflare
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 ip4:213.216.6.0/24 ip4:213.216.4.224/28 ip4:213.216.10.176/28 ip4:192.169.214.136/32 ip4:23.25.108.241/32 ip4:52.3.114.89/32 include:_spf.google.com -all
RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is monitoring only (p=none). -all provides some SPF-level protection, but DMARC isn't enforcing. Adding p=reject and considering ~all for compatibility would be far more effective.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Monitoring only
Warning p=none

DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement

v=DMARC1;p=none;pct=100;rua=mailto:smg@pdcnet.org;ri=86400;fo=1
Policy p=none provides no protection - spoofed emails reach inboxes
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
Advanced cryptographic posture detected. Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC monitoring phase with aggregate reporting enabled
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Third-party only
Third-Party Only

Found DKIM for 2 selector(s) but none for primary mail platform (Google Workspace)

DKIM verified for SendGrid only — no DKIM found for primary mail platform (Google Workspace). The primary provider may use custom selectors not discoverable through standard checks. Try re-scanning with a custom DKIM selector if you know yours.
Know your DKIM selector? Re-scan with a custom selector to verify.
s1._domainkey SendGrid
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAumFN4rK+BhbnRjmFXi7ZO9Fu2WbocrxENpebdNn/QErIqktSi4hhuTiw53GYA17O00Wv6uGWZ/bB6JgCm2fL780GDulqF9bW4ME/o6ydYvORs5SjQfAW4QDv28IzUnAPe3/iTwcF25TqZ3dva/wC/xzAmTmlrtKmWAgKlprkgXwSy5ND7De7qtzz/GR0gCFMdeKLb26rB+E4CR8zQ/ErpvOkbVHO3ScQIstvut6fD9nWp8OJ/IsCu73Soc/NvEtzQ85t860WUlz2d+No7kr2L/Su7V+t7wAGFYCExjI559A1g+Cb+u6feSxmbeZ4ST6+vj8pykroA7crwm+6LBCReQIDAQAB
s2._domainkey SendGrid
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA3ur++lssi3xpLS4rVol6J1Be6AhXX9kxXAnJAyyaCFGnk+X0cCMHrZx6w0rVzTbouLklijl/hFa1cjULr+H/Gm2efXxrYclC/ktCrJ5xdTj4WNyj5B7y8ShOIk5N6RwgKcScHLxKxjjOIQ1AcRGcV0FbhNWdWsUx5LzTLb2ixv949qo6QQ5lF5W6JWZ46VEPBBM9XuzVGNQnBRfIw3EqGgyiAucYRHYa6NjFUbt7lQ5yzkP8Tf9klRjc8hVGJDvxR8BwglOEd6vd0PzVIOFK0HTYH12diZ+fIacH1K7mM/+wwVq5JA8+xecyBaBwzD6bwC1VsN4mNzZEQ0cXJdINPwIDAQAB
RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Google Workspace

Google Workspace supports DANE for outbound mail verification but does not publish TLSA records for its MX hosts.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Note: Google Workspace does validate DANE/TLSA when sending mail to DANE-enabled recipients (outbound DANE).

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on iris.ns.cloudflare.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: iris.ns.cloudflare.com, alex.ns.cloudflare.com

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
alex.ns.cloudflare.com No N/A N/A OK
iris.ns.cloudflare.com No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

alex.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.394996095e+09
iris.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.394996095e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for pdcnet.org — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
iris.ns.cloudflare.com 173.245.58.118
108.162.192.118
172.64.32.118 		2a06:98c1:50::ac40:2076
2803:f800:50::6ca2:c076
2606:4700:50::adf5:3a76 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2394996095
alex.ns.cloudflare.com 108.162.193.100
172.64.33.100
173.245.59.100 		2a06:98c1:50::ac40:2164
2803:f800:50::6ca2:c164
2606:4700:58::adf5:3b64 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2394996095
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
6
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 6 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Transport security inferred from 1 signal(s) — no enforcement policy active

Policy Assessment Primary
  • Google Workspace enforces TLS 1.2+ with valid certificates on all inbound/outbound mail
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS13335 Cloudflare, Inc. US
IPv4 Mappings:
172.66.134.230 → AS13335 (172.66.128.0/20)
172.66.139.86 → AS13335 (172.66.128.0/20)
IPv6 Mappings:
2606:4700:10::ac42:86e6 → AS13335 (2606:4700:10::/44)
2606:4700:10::ac42:8b56 → AS13335 (2606:4700:10::/44)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 1 service

1 SaaS service detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Google Workspace google-site-verification=0tSHdMNUQlaBcajPJRXX1AAvTwMaoOIFbgbECnZ84Kk
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Enterprise DNS Context: DNSSEC is the only standardized, DNS-verifiable mechanism that cryptographically authenticates responses between authoritative servers and resolvers (RFC 4033 §2, RFC 4035). Without it, DNS responses are technically vulnerable to in-transit tampering. Enterprise operators may employ compensating controls (anycast, DDoS mitigation, private peering, TSIG) — however, these do not provide DNS-layer data authentication to third-party resolvers and are not verifiable via DNS alone.
Visibility: DNS-only — network-layer compensating controls cannot be observed or verified through DNS queries. This assessment reflects what is provable from the DNS evidence available.

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: alex.ns.cloudflare.com iris.ns.cloudflare.com
Managed DNS
All 2 nameservers hosted by Cloudflare. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Cloudflare
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records

HTTPS / SVCB Records RFC 9460 Success HTTPS

HTTPS records found

PriorityTargetALPNECHRaw
1 . h2 No pdcnet.org. 300 IN HTTPS 1 . alpn="h2" ipv4hint="172.66.134.230,172.66.139.86" ipv6hint="2606:4700:10::ac42:86e6,2606:4700:10::ac42:8b56"
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

172.66.134.230
172.66.139.86
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2606:4700:10::ac42:86e6
2606:4700:10::ac42:8b56
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com.
10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com.
1 aspmx.l.google.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Google Workspace

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 5 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 18 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 18 current 0 expired 5 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
e.pdcnet.org DNS Current email.secureserver.net 6 2026-01-07 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services, GoDaddy.com, Inc.
ecom-dev.pdcnet.org CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-06T15:36:42 Let's Encrypt
ecom-staging.pdcnet.org CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-11T06:59:41 Let's Encrypt
ecommerce.pdcnet.org CT Log Current — 4 2026-02-25T08:41:47 Let's Encrypt
edptest-2025.pdcnet.org CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-04T15:14:40 Let's Encrypt
email.pdcnet.org DNS Current email.secureserver.net 6 2026-01-07 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services, GoDaddy.com, Inc.
ftp.pdcnet.org DNS Current — 6 2026-01-07 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services, GoDaddy.com, Inc.
hub.pdcnet.org DNS Current — 6 2026-01-07 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services, GoDaddy.com, Inc.
imap.pdcnet.org DNS Current imap.secureserver.net 6 2026-01-07 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services, GoDaddy.com, Inc.
mail.pdcnet.org DNS Current — 6 2026-01-07 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services, GoDaddy.com, Inc.
mx.pdcnet.org DNS Current — 6 2026-01-07 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services, GoDaddy.com, Inc.
pop.pdcnet.org DNS Current pop.secureserver.net 6 2026-01-07 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services, GoDaddy.com, Inc.
sandbox.pdcnet.org DNS Current — 6 2026-01-07 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services, GoDaddy.com, Inc.
secure.pdcnet.org DNS Current — 6 2026-01-07 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services, GoDaddy.com, Inc.
smtp.pdcnet.org DNS Current smtp.secureserver.net 6 2026-01-07 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services, GoDaddy.com, Inc.
webmail.pdcnet.org DNS Current — 6 2026-01-07 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services, GoDaddy.com, Inc.
www.pdcnet.org CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-27T14:45:59 Let's Encrypt
www1.pdcnet.org DNS Current — 6 2026-01-07 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services, GoDaddy.com, Inc.
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 2 / 2 records
172.66.134.230
172.66.134.230
172.66.139.86
172.66.139.86
AAAA Synchronized 2 / 2 records
2606:4700:10::ac42:86e6
2606:4700:10::ac42:8b56
2606:4700:10::ac42:8b56
2606:4700:10::ac42:86e6
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.pdcnet.org RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1;p=none;pct=100;rua=mailto:smg@pdcnet.org;ri=86400;fo=1
v=DMARC1;p=none;pct=100;rua=mailto:smg@pdcnet.org;ri=86400;fo=1
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 5 / 5 records
10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com.
1 aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com.
10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com.
10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com.
10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com.
1 aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
iris.ns.cloudflare.com.
alex.ns.cloudflare.com.
alex.ns.cloudflare.com.
iris.ns.cloudflare.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
alex.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2394996095 10000 2400 604800 1800
alex.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2394996095 10000 2400 604800 1800
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 3 / 3 records
google-site-verification=0tSHdMNUQlaBcajPJRXX1AAvTwMaoOIFbgbECnZ84Kk
google-site-verification=0tSHdMNUQlaBcajPJRXX1AAvTwMaoOIFbgbECnZ84Kk
google-site-verification=7GEtVAEDxr2hlZ_qYJAtIdWzwNRCDbZCaOoj974pGCg
google-site-verification=7GEtVAEDxr2hlZ_qYJAtIdWzwNRCDbZCaOoj974pGCg
v=spf1 ip4:213.216.6.0/24 ip4:213.216.4.224/28 ip4:213.216.10.176/28 ip4:192.169.214.136/32 ip4:23.25.108.241/32 ip4:52.3.114.89/32 include:_spf.google.com -all
v=spf1 ip4:213.216.6.0/24 ip4:213.216.4.224/28 ip4:213.216.10.176/28 ip4:192.169.214.136/32 ip4:23.25.108.241/32 ip4:52.3.114.89/32 include:_spf.google.com -all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

1cf63e00136b9371a62d5914b5598496afab9e7379b2c7e560e35acbeae5456e299cf89f905c95338c645d94ee428aed70f43680dcde35c0ced0e8f95e7689b1
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 1 Mar 2026, 14:43 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-pdcnet.org.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-pdcnet.org.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-pdcnet.org.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-pdcnet.org.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/5159/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for pdcnet.org. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short pdcnet.org TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.pdcnet.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' RFC 6376 
dig +short s1._domainkey.pdcnet.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' RFC 6376 
dig +short s2._domainkey.pdcnet.org TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer pdcnet.org DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd pdcnet.org A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for alt3.aspmx.l.google.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt3.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt2.aspmx.l.google.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt2.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt1.aspmx.l.google.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt1.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt4.aspmx.l.google.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt4.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for aspmx.l.google.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (alt3.aspmx.l.google.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect alt3.aspmx.l.google.com:25 -servername alt3.aspmx.l.google.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.pdcnet.org TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.pdcnet.org/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.pdcnet.org TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.pdcnet.org TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/pdcnet.org' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (alt3.aspmx.l.google.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect alt3.aspmx.l.google.com:25 -servername alt3.aspmx.l.google.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.pdcnet.org&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://pdcnet.org/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://pdcnet.org/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://pdcnet.org/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 172.66.134.230 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 230.134.66.172.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 172.66.139.86 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 86.139.66.172.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4851 runs
DKIM
Verified 4670 runs
DMARC
Verified 4835 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4654 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4832 runs
BIMI
Verified 4669 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4672 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4674 runs
CAA
Verified 4666 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short pdcnet.org TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.pdcnet.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s1._domainkey.pdcnet.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s2._domainkey.pdcnet.org TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer pdcnet.org DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd pdcnet.org A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for alt3.aspmx.l.google.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt3.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt2.aspmx.l.google.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt2.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt1.aspmx.l.google.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt1.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt4.aspmx.l.google.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt4.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for aspmx.l.google.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (alt3.aspmx.l.google.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect alt3.aspmx.l.google.com:25 -servername alt3.aspmx.l.google.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.pdcnet.org TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.pdcnet.org/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.pdcnet.org TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.pdcnet.org TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer pdcnet.org CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/pdcnet.org' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (alt3.aspmx.l.google.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect alt3.aspmx.l.google.com:25 -servername alt3.aspmx.l.google.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.pdcnet.org&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://pdcnet.org/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://pdcnet.org/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://pdcnet.org/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 172.66.134.230 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 230.134.66.172.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 172.66.139.86 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 86.139.66.172.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

pdcnet.org

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.