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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 10 Feb 2026, 08:42 UTC
Duration 10.2s
Integrity dd58156f63303472f28ca551b7e876e6a7b545e6b3b683bf3fd2e76b7e11d159f88048aa7f278292f538bca64e3786ea88af78e3eebd8c09eed9d7c9c21bce85
Subject Domain
apple.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

apple.com
10 Feb 2026, 08:42 UTC · 10.2s · SHA-3-512: dd58✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
5 protocols configured, 3 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 34.4s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Protected
DNS Tampering
Enterprise
Certificate Control
Configured
Configured
SPF, DMARC (quarantine), DKIM, BIMI, CAA
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, DNSSEC
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.yourdomain.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.yourdomain.com TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
RFC 8461 §3
Low Upgrade DMARC to reject policy

Your DMARC policy is quarantine — spoofed messages are flagged. Upgrading to p=reject blocks them entirely. Review aggregate reports to confirm legitimate senders are aligned.

_dmarc.yourdomain.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@yourdomain.com"
RFC 7489 §6.3
Low Configure TLS-RPT reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain. Helps diagnose MTA-STS and STARTTLS issues.

_smtp._tls.yourdomain.com TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@yourdomain.com"
RFC 8460 §3
Low Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions) cryptographically signs DNS responses, preventing attackers from forging DNS answers. Contact your DNS hosting provider to enable DNSSEC signing.

RFC 4033 §2
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
Nom-iq Ltd. dba COM LAUDE
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Email: Enforced
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown Enterprise
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Mostly No
Verdict: DMARC policy is quarantine — spoofed messages will be flagged as spam by receiving servers. DKIM keys verified with strong cryptography.

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 2/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 2/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:_spf.apple.com include:_spf-txn.apple.com ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC quarantine — good protection. Moving to p=reject would achieve the strongest stance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Quarantined, not rejected
Success p=quarantine

DMARC policy quarantine (100%) - good protection

v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=reject; rua=mailto:d@rua.agari.com; ruf=mailto:d@ruf.agari.com;
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed sp=reject
Forensic reports (ruf) configured - many providers ignore these
Reported to Agari (Fortra (HelpSystems))
Upgrade DMARC to reject policy:
_dmarc.yourdomain.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@yourdomain.com"
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
Monitoring Posture Note: Quarantine sequesters authentication failures while preserving full DMARC forensic telemetry (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain quarantine rather than reject as a deliberate monitoring strategy — failed messages are processed and reported but sequestered from the inbox. See NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1 for enforcement tradeoffs.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found

Found DKIM records for 2 selector(s)

selector1._domainkey
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDGh555cVTGrCFyGsKqZyAehAhyNLVzwSCNdtgBSol5e/KboxA6edyqdfl1EL279hNdHM9UWcXcgk/HhKPQdmgzMTA927ZXxrsHxMHjVl7Bid78qOIebr75prj3jxuH8KrZfNe14l/dh6TJZt/SkEncmhbVx/tNy9lrHkN5T7LXjQIDAQAB; n=1024,1483209771,1498848171
selector2._domainkey
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCw9ZicGGW3gn0iKQfcnOsMVy+uLl+YMFonHmEslnpniYxIZ8z0Fn5nY2Gx/m69EHq05WQ8zQ0hRP8d/B0lrPIm6O3c2hiO1sQrJUnwH3jo0/asN6kRFXjTiU/PdlmWhyLdYSv80zNlKpq7qWnsvtlTfJhatEJATM1gZOtspjqLzQIDAQAB; n=1024,1483209771,1
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No valid MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

Email Security Management Actively Managed

Intelligence: This domain uses dedicated email security management — indicating continuous monitoring and professional oversight, not a "set and forget" configuration. Reporting destinations reveal the operational security partner network, and we extract that intelligence directly from DNS.
Agari by Fortra (HelpSystems)
DMARC
DMARC aggregate reports (rua)
DMARC forensic reports (ruf)
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 6 MX hosts)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: Attackers cannot easily spoof your logo or obtain fraudulent TLS certificates.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Success VMC SVG

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? Yes

BIMI with VMC certificate (from Verified CA)

VMC certificate accessible (from Verified CA) - logo displays in Gmail, Apple Mail, and all major providers.
v=BIMI1;l=https://www.apple.com/bimi/v2/apple.svg;a=https://www.apple.com/bimi/v2/apple.pem;
BIMI Logo
Logo validated (SVG) View full logo

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success IODEF

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only pki.apple.com can issue certificates (wildcard issuance: pki.apple.com per RFC 8659 §4.3)

Authorized CAs: pki.apple.com
0 issue "pki.apple.com"
0 issuewild "pki.apple.com"
0 iodef "mailto:contact_pki@apple.com"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: a.ns.apple.com b.ns.apple.com c.ns.apple.com d.ns.apple.com
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (1 difference found)
Resolver Differences:
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [77a4a6de-da14-449c-83c4-85366e0f55f9 ValidationTokenValue=77a4a6de-da14-449c-83c4-85366e0f55f9 apple-domain-verification=X5Jt76bn3Dnmgzjj cerner-client-id=22dd1d8a-5e8b-4e1e-80ef-39bcdfd42798 cerner-client-id=ce3abf18-ee87-43b9-9927-9eb24b4bac4a facebook-domain-verification=n6cqjfucq6plswmtfbwnbbeu1qiq3v miro-verification=2494d255c4c50b1e521650a0659cbf3fa08b0072]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

17.253.144.10
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2620:149:af0::10
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

20 mx-in-sg.apple.com.
20 mx-in-hfd.apple.com.
20 mx-in-rn.apple.com.
20 mx-in-vib.apple.com.
20 mx-in-ma.apple.com.
10 mx-in.g.apple.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

_sip._tls: 5 5 5060 gslb-b2b-ext.v.aaplimg.com.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 1 IPv6) Mail: 6 servers Services: 1 endpoint
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? Unavailable
How did we find these?

Passive discovery using Certificate Transparency Logs — publicly auditable records of every TLS certificate ever issued. Certificate Transparency lookup failed

Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
17.253.144.10
17.253.144.10
AAAA Synchronized 1 / 1 records
2620:149:af0::10
2620:149:af0::10
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 3 / 3 records
0 iodef "mailto:contact_pki@apple.com"
0 iodef "mailto:contact_pki@apple.com"
0 issue "pki.apple.com"
0 issue "pki.apple.com"
0 issuewild "pki.apple.com"
0 issuewild "pki.apple.com"
DMARC _dmarc.apple.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=reject; rua=mailto:d@rua.agari.com; ruf=mailto:d@ruf.agari.com;
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=reject; rua=mailto:d@rua.agari.com; ruf=mailto:d@ruf.agari.com;
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 6 / 6 records
20 mx-in-sg.apple.com.
10 mx-in.g.apple.com.
20 mx-in-hfd.apple.com.
20 mx-in-ma.apple.com.
20 mx-in-rn.apple.com.
20 mx-in-rn.apple.com.
20 mx-in-vib.apple.com.
20 mx-in-sg.apple.com.
20 mx-in-ma.apple.com.
20 mx-in-hfd.apple.com.
10 mx-in.g.apple.com.
20 mx-in-vib.apple.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
c.ns.apple.com.
a.ns.apple.com.
a.ns.apple.com.
b.ns.apple.com.
b.ns.apple.com.
c.ns.apple.com.
d.ns.apple.com.
d.ns.apple.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns-ext-prod.jackfruit.apple.com. dnscontact.apple.com. 2026021001 300 300 3628800 300
ns-ext-prod.jackfruit.apple.com. dnscontact.apple.com. 2026021001 300 300 3628800 300
TXT RFC 7208 §4 19 / 0 records
json:eyJ3aHkiOiJUaGlzIGlzIHRvIHRydW5jYXRlIFVEUCByZXNwb25zZXMgZm9yIFRYVCBxdWVyaWVzIHRvIGFwcGxlLmNvbSIsInBhZGRpbmciOiJxdWFoMGVpamFhNGVlajh0aWVkYWlnaG9jZWljaGFlOGVUb3ppZTVmdTVhaFRoMldlaU00aWsyaHVxdThpZXBoaWVxdW9oc2hlaXBhZWdoOUthZWw3b2NoaWVuZ2llem9lc2g1In0K
—
apple-domain-verification=X5Jt76bn3Dnmgzjj
—
v=spf1 include:_spf.apple.com include:_spf-txn.apple.com ~all
—
google-site-verification=zBSq1mG5ssu2If-C17UAz_MzSZDcx03MVxmeDwMNc5w
—
facebook-domain-verification=n6cqjfucq6plswmtfbwnbbeu1qiq3v
—
cisco-ci-domain-verification=6f3bfb849796a518061f8e8c4356f687a138502d86db742791685059176547dd
—
yahoo-verification-key=Ay+djyw0qWQgXKWGA/jstjYryTMrKb+PBXI5l8u5/jw=
—
miro-verification=2494d255c4c50b1e521650a0659cbf3fa08b0072
—
cerner-client-id=ce3abf18-ee87-43b9-9927-9eb24b4bac4a
—
google-site-verification=8M6XjQCzydT62jk8HY3VXPAG-nKDllTRV-JpA3-Ktyw
—
ValidationTokenValue=77a4a6de-da14-449c-83c4-85366e0f55f9
—
json:eyJ3aHkiOiJUaGlzIGlzIHRvIHRydW5jYXRlIFVEUCByZXNwb25zZXMgZm9yIFRYVCBxdWVyaWVzIHRvIGFwcGxlLmNvbSIsInBhZGRpbmciOiJpZW4wYWVHaGF0aG9oNmhhaHZpZWphaTNlYXkwYWh2YWhjaGFocXVhZWxlZTBZdWw0cGhpZXRoMHNvNXZpZXllZWNvaDRpZThzaGVlcGllVDNwYWVjaGVpVjZqb2h3aWVwaG82In0K
—
cerner-client-id=22dd1d8a-5e8b-4e1e-80ef-39bcdfd42798
—
webexdomainverification.8C462=b728ec3f-dfc9-42f9-92cb-9ba8853cbee8
—
adobe-idp-site-verification=6bd5e74c-a3a0-4781-b2e1-e95399b5e11c
—
77a4a6de-da14-449c-83c4-85366e0f55f9
—
atlassian-domain-verification=mLabq99iaT8kquJechF6l31FAYoNUe3WB7tLpLFUiUYVJCse9SKq83hOJzFkwqrh
—
google-site-verification=L5kkMdiFI8npvb6KlHui84fJaCw5G64DWhaDRIAT4_c
—
Dynatrace-site-verification=7d881a7c-c13f-4146-9d27-2731459e2509__iqls0105tagglcsaul0m16ibrf
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

dd58156f63303472f28ca551b7e876e6a7b545e6b3b683bf3fd2e76b7e11d159f88048aa7f278292f538bca64e3786ea88af78e3eebd8c09eed9d7c9c21bce85
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 10 Feb 2026, 08:42 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-apple.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-apple.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-apple.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-apple.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/506/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for apple.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer apple.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer apple.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer apple.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer apple.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer apple.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short apple.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.apple.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.apple.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.apple.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer apple.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer apple.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd apple.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx-in-sg.apple.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-in-sg.apple.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx-in-hfd.apple.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-in-hfd.apple.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx-in-rn.apple.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-in-rn.apple.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx-in-vib.apple.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-in-vib.apple.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx-in-ma.apple.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-in-ma.apple.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx-in.g.apple.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-in.g.apple.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx-in-sg.apple.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx-in-sg.apple.com:25 -servername mx-in-sg.apple.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.apple.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.apple.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.apple.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.apple.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer apple.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer apple.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer apple.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/apple.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx-in-sg.apple.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx-in-sg.apple.com:25 -servername mx-in-sg.apple.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.apple.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://apple.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://apple.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://apple.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 17.253.144.10 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 10.144.253.17.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4850 runs
DKIM
Verified 4669 runs
DMARC
Verified 4834 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4653 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4831 runs
BIMI
Verified 4668 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4671 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4673 runs
CAA
Verified 4665 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer apple.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer apple.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer apple.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer apple.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer apple.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short apple.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.apple.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.apple.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.apple.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer apple.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer apple.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd apple.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx-in-sg.apple.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-in-sg.apple.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx-in-hfd.apple.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-in-hfd.apple.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx-in-rn.apple.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-in-rn.apple.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx-in-vib.apple.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-in-vib.apple.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx-in-ma.apple.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-in-ma.apple.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx-in.g.apple.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-in.g.apple.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx-in-sg.apple.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx-in-sg.apple.com:25 -servername mx-in-sg.apple.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.apple.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.apple.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.apple.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.apple.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer apple.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer apple.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer apple.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/apple.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx-in-sg.apple.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx-in-sg.apple.com:25 -servername mx-in-sg.apple.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.apple.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://apple.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://apple.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://apple.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 17.253.144.10 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 10.144.253.17.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

apple.com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.