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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 28 Feb 2026, 14:38 UTC
Duration 16.8s
Version v26.28.18
Integrity 9338fb39c480385471bfc677221f5be24d40d095389d175f3ce00031ee06462b8d781057305fbe135af4377a58642ed5be0722732ee03acf516edcff5cf767b0
Subject Domain
theojouvin.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

theojouvin.com
28 Feb 2026, 14:38 UTC · 16.8s ·v26.28.18 · SHA-3-512: 9338✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint 1 SaaS Service
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
3 protocols configured, 6 not configured Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC deployment phase — quarantine fully enforced with reporting, consider upgrading to reject Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 68/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 65% Currency 72/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Adequate 72/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
TXT 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 6 hours (21600s) 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.
A 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.
MX 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for theojouvin.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: Cloudflare — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS chan.ns.cloudflare.com
Serial 2397075547
Admin dns.cloudflare.com
Provider Cloudflare
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh10000s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry2400sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)1800s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s). Cloudflare's anycast architecture reduces the practical risk, but this value departs from the RFC recommendation.
RFC 1912 §2.2

Independent RFC compliance assessment for Cloudflare. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

SOA Expire below RFC 1912 recommendation RFC 1912 §2.2

Cloudflare sets SOA Expire to 604,800 seconds (7 days). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). This means secondary nameservers stop serving the zone sooner if the primary becomes unreachable. Cloudflare's position is that their anycast architecture makes traditional zone transfer semantics less relevant. SOA timers are not editable on Free, Pro, or Business plans.

Below RFC recommendation
Proxied record TTLs fixed at 300s RFC 2181 §5.2

Cloudflare overrides the zone administrator's TTL to 300 seconds for all proxied (orange-cloud) records. RFC 2181 §5.2 requires TTL uniformity within an RRset but does not mandate a specific value. As the authoritative server, Cloudflare is technically within its rights, but the administrator loses TTL control. This can affect ACME DNS-01 challenges and automation workflows that depend on rapid propagation.

Technically compliant, but overrides administrator intent
Non-standard SOA serial format RFC 1912 §2.2

RFC 1912 recommends YYYYMMDDNN format for SOA serial numbers (e.g., 2026022501). Cloudflare uses a proprietary serial number format that does not encode the date. RFC 1035 only requires the serial to increment on changes, so this is compliant with the mandatory standard but breaks the convention relied on by monitoring tools.

Compliant with RFC 1035, deviates from RFC 1912 convention
Negative cache TTL delays new records RFC 2308 §5

Cloudflare's SOA MINIMUM (negative cache TTL) is 1,800–3,600 seconds (30–60 minutes). This controls how long resolvers cache NXDOMAIN responses. Newly created DNS records — including ACME DNS-01 challenge TXT records for Let's Encrypt — may be invisible for up to 1 hour even after creation. This causes certificate issuance failures for automation tools like cert-manager and Traefik. Workaround: pre-create placeholder records before they're needed. This is RFC-compliant but aggressive compared to the 300–900 seconds common at other providers.

RFC-compliant, but causes real-world automation failures
Historical RFC 2181 §5.2 violation: TTL mismatch in CNAME RRsets RFC 2181 §5.2

In February 2022, Cloudflare's resolver (1.1.1.1) returned CNAME responses with mismatched TTLs within the same RRset — including cases where one TTL was zero and another was non-zero. RFC 2181 §5.2 explicitly states: 'the TTLs of all RRs in an RRSet must be the same.' systemd-resolved (used by Arch Linux, Ubuntu, Fedora, and most modern Linux distributions) correctly rejected these responses per the RFC, causing widespread DNS resolution failures. Cloudflare acknowledged the issue and it appears to have been fixed, but it demonstrated that Cloudflare's DNS infrastructure can deviate from RFC requirements in ways that break compliant resolver implementations.

Was a documented RFC violation — appears resolved
This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 13 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 52.8s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
Upgrade DMARC policy from quarantine to reject (p=reject) for maximum spoofing protection
Configured
SPF, DMARC (quarantine, 100%), DKIM
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, DNSSEC, CAA
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Secure
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Medium Upgrade DMARC to Reject

Your DMARC policy is set to quarantine. Upgrade to p=reject for maximum protection — reject instructs receivers to discard spoofed mail entirely rather than quarantining it.

A reject policy provides the strongest protection against domain spoofing.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.theojouvin.com (update existing DMARC record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@theojouvin.com
RFC 7489 §6.3
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hosttheojouvin.com (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.theojouvin.com (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@theojouvin.com
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.theojouvin.com (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=theojouvin.com
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
eNom, LLC
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Cloudflare
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 2/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 2/10 lookups

v=spf1 +mx +a +ip4:198.54.114.199 +include:spf.web-hosting.com +ip4:198.54.115.71 ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC quarantine — good protection. Moving to p=reject would achieve the strongest stance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Quarantined, not rejected
Success p=quarantine

DMARC policy quarantine (100%) - good protection

v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:db744f19ff9f4009b0dcc85a3d5e4011@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
Advanced cryptographic posture detected. Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC deployment phase — quarantine fully enforced with reporting, consider upgrading to reject
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
Monitoring Posture Note: Quarantine sequesters authentication failures while preserving full DMARC forensic telemetry (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain quarantine rather than reject as a deliberate monitoring strategy — failed messages are processed and reported but sequestered from the inbox. See NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1 for enforcement tradeoffs.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found

Found DKIM records for 1 selector(s)

default._domainkey
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA45O6RRG6Re2VnlceiSBgLKHJXP9q8cXmuC2Q4YNtF3/sToAcLYWMGxmcsKeNZImKNk66r9dhnVw+1CM3JOQwJuad0k8iQ01BcB67m7G+f6s7Q6YF+EReMwyFbjckalJhHzWe5y0e+ksAhTcMZIdYtCk2OuWBSjxCbv9dsxlFJCDeCGaw5ZRYnzU1ThUpMdgfrO955vEneZpdjN28ZyhrV6grd13/YuaC/VCuc/IehnyMcwS/dO6M7FJV83wgf7FpwHR3KTE701xqy+GXH/NQtHScz3Qid4qZE/MoFYjPwDxd4ubzG7NsDx+3z0veCIy2prIkAyNerbv+WTKRZ2fb3QIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Yes — all authorized
Success

All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net Authorized v=DMARC1;
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 1 MX host)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC quarantine flags but does not reject spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3) — no BIMI or CAA (RFC 8659) reinforcement leaves brand impersonation largely unaddressed

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
Sources scanned (2)
  • https://theojouvin.com/
  • https://theojouvin.com/wp-content/litespeed/js/4df4c4e2363738c4cab56199a20ff6b3.js?ver=3b646
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on newt.ns.cloudflare.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: newt.ns.cloudflare.com, chan.ns.cloudflare.com

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
chan.ns.cloudflare.com No N/A N/A OK
newt.ns.cloudflare.com No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

chan.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.397075547e+09
newt.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.397075547e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for theojouvin.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
newt.ns.cloudflare.com 173.245.59.212
108.162.193.212
172.64.33.212 		2a06:98c1:50::ac40:21d4
2803:f800:50::6ca2:c1d4
2606:4700:58::adf5:3bd4 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2397075547
chan.ns.cloudflare.com 108.162.192.82
173.245.58.82
172.64.32.82 		2606:4700:50::adf5:3a52
2a06:98c1:50::ac40:2052
2803:f800:50::6ca2:c052 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2397075547
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
6
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 6 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

0/1 servers support STARTTLS (direct probe)

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
MX Host STARTTLS TLS Version Cipher Certificate
business29.web-hosting.com N/A N/A Invalid
Unexpected SMTP banner
Multi-Vantage Probe Results
Unanimous: No TLS 2 probes, 2 responded
France - EU observed
No TLS detected
US-East (Boston) observed
No TLS detected
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS13335 Cloudflare, Inc. US
IPv4 Mappings:
104.21.29.202 → AS13335 (104.21.0.0/19)
172.67.149.199 → AS13335 (172.67.144.0/20)
IPv6 Mappings:
2606:4700:3037::ac43:95c7 → AS13335 (2606:4700:3037::/48)
2606:4700:3037::6815:1dca → AS13335 (2606:4700:3037::/48)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 1 service

1 SaaS service detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Google Workspace google-site-verification=qFNu_9ldPcBcrfyXRWtu51L-pBFfLUpWb1UHbiR31lw
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Enterprise DNS Context: DNSSEC is the only standardized, DNS-verifiable mechanism that cryptographically authenticates responses between authoritative servers and resolvers (RFC 4033 §2, RFC 4035). Without it, DNS responses are technically vulnerable to in-transit tampering. Enterprise operators may employ compensating controls (anycast, DDoS mitigation, private peering, TSIG) — however, these do not provide DNS-layer data authentication to third-party resolvers and are not verifiable via DNS alone.
Visibility: DNS-only — network-layer compensating controls cannot be observed or verified through DNS queries. This assessment reflects what is provable from the DNS evidence available.

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: chan.ns.cloudflare.com newt.ns.cloudflare.com
Managed DNS
All 2 nameservers hosted by Cloudflare. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Cloudflare
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (1 difference found)
Resolver Differences:
A: DNS4EU returned different results: [188.114.96.0 188.114.97.0]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.

HTTPS / SVCB Records RFC 9460 Success HTTPS HTTP/3 ECH

HTTPS records found, HTTP/3 supported, ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) enabled

PriorityTargetALPNECHRaw
1 . h3, h2 Yes theojouvin.com. 300 IN HTTPS 1 . alpn="h3,h2" ipv4hint="104.21.29.202,172.67.149.199" ech="AEX+DQBBmQAgACBqQTmCUB0c9CJH2crjLYyrg2NnEAhgD9xZ6oh4mRjhTAAEAAEAAQASY2xvdWRmbGFyZS1lY2guY29tAAA=" ipv6hint="2606:4700:3037::6815:1dca,2606:4700:3037::ac43:95c7"
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

104.21.29.202
172.67.149.199
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2606:4700:3037::ac43:95c7
2606:4700:3037::6815:1dca
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 business29.web-hosting.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 3 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
4 unique certificates 3 current 0 expired Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Wildcard certificate detected: *.theojouvin.com Active 4 certs 2 CAs: Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services
No explicit SANs found on wildcard certificates. Subdomains covered by this wildcard won't appear individually in CT logs (RFC 6962).
DNS probing and CNAME chain traversal were used to discover additional subdomains below.
Certificate Authority Diversity (2 CAs observed across CT log history)
Certificate Authority Certs First Issued Last Issued Status
Let's Encrypt 2 2025-12-22 2026-02-20 Active
Google Trust Services 2 2025-12-06 2026-02-03 Active
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
billing.theojouvin.com DNS Current — 4 2025-12-06 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services
clients.theojouvin.com DNS Current — 4 2025-12-06 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services
www.theojouvin.com DNS Current — 4 2025-12-06 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 2 / 2 records
104.21.29.202
104.21.29.202
172.67.149.199
172.67.149.199
AAAA Synchronized 2 / 2 records
2606:4700:3037::ac43:95c7
2606:4700:3037::ac43:95c7
2606:4700:3037::6815:1dca
2606:4700:3037::6815:1dca
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.theojouvin.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:db744f19ff9f4009b0dcc85a3d5e4011@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:db744f19ff9f4009b0dcc85a3d5e4011@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
10 business29.web-hosting.com.
10 business29.web-hosting.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
newt.ns.cloudflare.com.
chan.ns.cloudflare.com.
chan.ns.cloudflare.com.
newt.ns.cloudflare.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
chan.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2397075547 10000 2400 604800 1800
chan.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2397075547 10000 2400 604800 1800
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
google-site-verification=qFNu_9ldPcBcrfyXRWtu51L-pBFfLUpWb1UHbiR31lw
google-site-verification=qFNu_9ldPcBcrfyXRWtu51L-pBFfLUpWb1UHbiR31lw
v=spf1 +mx +a +ip4:198.54.114.199 +include:spf.web-hosting.com +ip4:198.54.115.71 ~all
v=spf1 +mx +a +ip4:198.54.114.199 +include:spf.web-hosting.com +ip4:198.54.115.71 ~all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

9338fb39c480385471bfc677221f5be24d40d095389d175f3ce00031ee06462b8d781057305fbe135af4377a58642ed5be0722732ee03acf516edcff5cf767b0
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 28 Feb 2026, 14:38 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-theojouvin.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-theojouvin.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-theojouvin.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-theojouvin.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/5051/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for theojouvin.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short theojouvin.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.theojouvin.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.theojouvin.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer theojouvin.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd theojouvin.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for business29.web-hosting.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.business29.web-hosting.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (business29.web-hosting.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect business29.web-hosting.com:25 -servername business29.web-hosting.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.theojouvin.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.theojouvin.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.theojouvin.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.theojouvin.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/theojouvin.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (business29.web-hosting.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect business29.web-hosting.com:25 -servername business29.web-hosting.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.theojouvin.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://theojouvin.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://theojouvin.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://theojouvin.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.21.29.202 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 202.29.21.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 172.67.149.199 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 199.149.67.172.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4877 runs
DKIM
Verified 4695 runs
DMARC
Verified 4860 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4679 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4858 runs
BIMI
Verified 4694 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4697 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4699 runs
CAA
Verified 4691 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short theojouvin.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.theojouvin.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.theojouvin.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer theojouvin.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd theojouvin.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for business29.web-hosting.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.business29.web-hosting.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (business29.web-hosting.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect business29.web-hosting.com:25 -servername business29.web-hosting.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.theojouvin.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.theojouvin.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.theojouvin.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.theojouvin.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer theojouvin.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/theojouvin.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (business29.web-hosting.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect business29.web-hosting.com:25 -servername business29.web-hosting.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.theojouvin.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://theojouvin.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://theojouvin.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://theojouvin.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.21.29.202 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 202.29.21.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 172.67.149.199 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 199.149.67.172.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

theojouvin.com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.