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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 27 Feb 2026, 16:52 UTC
Duration 60.0s
Version v26.27.09
Integrity ac6bd11e3fa17e01bfe2c8e81944da51dabbfb3f054552834509b368ff127fb84de18c5503e40ff22b5dc1f8a90cbe7e3b9dc2756e8b9072d32b9321e967b4fc
Subject Domain
cisa.gov

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

cisa.gov
27 Feb 2026, 16:52 UTC · 60.0s ·v26.27.09 · SHA-3-512: ac6b✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Proofpoint 3 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
4 protocols configured, 4 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Why we go beyond letter grades
1 monitoring
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Adequate 63/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Adequate Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
AAAA 30s 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 30s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
MX 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 6 hours (21600s) 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 26s 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 26s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for cisa.gov
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS blue.foundationdns.com
Serial 2397605751
Admin dns.cloudflare.com
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh10000s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry2400sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)1800s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s).
RFC 1912 §2.2
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Monitoring
External domain hq.dhs.gov has not authorized cisa.gov to send DMARC reports (missing cisa.gov._report._dmarc.hq.dhs.gov TXT record)
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (reject), DKIM, DNSSEC
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Secure
Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

BIMI displays your verified brand logo next to your emails in supporting mail clients.
TypeTXT
Hostdefault._bimi.cisa.gov (BIMI default record)
Valuev=BIMI1; l=https://cisa.gov/brand/logo.svg
RFC 9495
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostcisa.gov (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.cisa.gov (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@cisa.gov
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.cisa.gov (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=cisa.gov
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
get.gov (Registrant: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY)
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Proofpoint
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 3/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 3/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:spf.dhs.gov include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf-00376703.gpphosted.com -all
RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:DMARC@hq.dhs.gov, mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. Many tools flag the absence of ruf= as a gap. It is not. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found

Found DKIM records for 1 selector(s)

Mail routed through Proofpoint (security gateway) — DKIM signed by Microsoft 365 (sending platform). This is a standard enterprise architecture.
selector1._domainkey Microsoft 365
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAv32BRAJaAOsxAp31ZqQwd7RYfbYowvb3F7lq8WQEyasI6w7Gm0bxPW57TFM04fM5flf1PYyCDSa3ckQzSQLYmMx9HiXYJYF1Dpk9PnjTarbdR9mm9fc7iBXT2pTFNJw+SRMH3NRrbkefv8GqqLdJotgCl2vWoyRlfKCANCFq5Bbq4qaztXqU/cHRurG8ZVSF7ZrhY4EBKvpzAyIisrf2g2Gky+vO4LTMrgZeNnA/OyHmWmvlUC58e06jBLSysYyh19O4MiU5eUhuT7MYTLWz6fIOl4PaT9HkmM0rH/fgcGSYc8ajCsrvxYA8LgoWR9IzYq5vYzDWLxSo/J0c+6pVWQIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Authorization missing
Warning

1 of 1 external reporting domains missing authorization

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
hq.dhs.gov Unauthorized —
External domain hq.dhs.gov has not authorized cisa.gov to send DMARC reports (missing cisa.gov._report._dmarc.hq.dhs.gov TXT record)

Third-Party Action Required

This authorization record must be created by the external reporting provider, not by you. Per RFC 7489 §7.1, the receiving domain must publish a TXT record to confirm it accepts DMARC reports from your domain.

What to do: Contact your DMARC reporting provider and ask them to publish the authorization TXT record shown above. If you use a managed DMARC service (e.g., Ondmarc, Dmarcian, Valimail), this is typically handled during onboarding — reach out to their support if the record is missing.

Impact if unresolved: Compliant receivers may silently discard aggregate or forensic reports destined for the unauthorized address, reducing your DMARC visibility.

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Proofpoint does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Proofpoint

Proofpoint is a security gateway with shared MX infrastructure. It does not publish per-customer TLSA records.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Proofpoint does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Yes RFC 9116

security.txt properly configured

Contact

mailto:IRT@cisa.dhs.gov
mailto:TOC@cisa.dhs.gov

Expires

2026-10-01 Valid

Encryption

https://www.cisa.gov/contact-us
Hiring
Source: https://cisa.gov/.well-known/security.txt
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on blue.foundationdns.org — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: blue.foundationdns.org, blue.foundationdns.net, blue.foundationdns.com

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

DS Key TagDS AlgorithmDNSKEY Key TagDNSKEY Algorithm
2371 13 2371 13

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
blue.foundationdns.com No N/A N/A OK
blue.foundationdns.net No N/A N/A OK
blue.foundationdns.org No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

blue.foundationdns.com: 2.397605751e+09
blue.foundationdns.net: 2.397605751e+09
blue.foundationdns.org: 2.397605751e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 3 nameserver(s) for cisa.gov — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
blue.foundationdns.org 108.162.198.61
172.64.40.61
162.159.60.61 		2a06:98c1:56::ac40:283d
2803:f800:52::a29f:3c3d
2606:4700:57::6ca2:c63d 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2397605751
blue.foundationdns.com 162.159.60.1
172.64.40.1
108.162.198.1 		2803:f800:52::a29f:3c01
2a06:98c1:56::ac40:2801
2606:4700:57::6ca2:c601 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2397605751
blue.foundationdns.net 172.64.40.31
162.159.60.31
108.162.198.31 		2803:f800:52::a29f:3c1f
2a06:98c1:56::ac40:281f
2606:4700:57::6ca2:c61f 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2397605751
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
3
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 3 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue

DNSSEC operational notes: 1 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:
  • CDS/CDNSKEY automation present but only single KSK — pre-publish second KSK before rollover

DNSKEY Inventory 2 Keys

RoleKey TagAlgorithmKey Size
ZSK 34505 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits
KSK 2371 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits

RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures

No RRSIG records found.

Denial of Existence NSEC

NSEC records expose zone contents via ordered names (zone walking). Consider NSEC3 for zone enumeration protection.

Rollover Readiness Partial

Multiple KSKs:
CDS Published:
CDNSKEY Published:
Automation: full
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Transport security inferred from 1 signal(s) — no enforcement policy active

Policy Assessment Primary
  • Proofpoint enforces TLS on managed mail transport
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 0 unique ASN(s) across 3 IP address(es)

IPv4 Mappings:
23.210.150.135 → AS ()
IPv6 Mappings:
2600:1407:7400:b80::3ff9 → AS ()
2600:1407:7400:b95::3ff9 → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 3 services

3 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Microsoft 365 MS=ms53160703
Adobe adobe-idp-site-verification=edfd88b4c2bdf65395c78b55da3580466eefa9aa874d5bcfb853...
Google Workspace google-site-verification=BNRBfY90BM54Mf_pgL4Eg07IkwbGvq5nsdZCOYadDlM
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 Modern

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 — MUST implement, recommended default (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
2371 13 2 5F15E517D7A353D755D9D3F8548A3475CE88A738E62B766F5E33CFC4163AB934

NS Delegation Verified

3 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: blue.foundationdns.com blue.foundationdns.net blue.foundationdns.org
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (2 differences found)
Resolver Differences:
A: DNS4EU returned different results: [2.18.140.150]
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [MS=ms36056523 MS=ms41452370 MS=ms53160703 _e01yoinuk3n6xrtnc8q3m9bdjyihdd7 _rr8gice4wv589e4uxop5zqhh6gbqh32 _tufdw17aa2wht723upz8w56htpvpgkw f188eb27-a746-4aa8-b160-eb68b0aab05d google-site-verification=BNRBfY90BM54Mf_pgL4Eg07IkwbGvq5nsdZCOYadDlM google-site-verification=wsLVyeZYgv0NLikdmfm2m3XPP-986Ylo8XxUkrjIOvA]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.

CDS / CDNSKEY (DNSSEC Automation) RFC 7344 Success CDS CDNSKEY

Full RFC 8078 automated DNSSEC key rollover signaling detected (CDS + CDNSKEY)

Key TagAlgorithmDigest TypeDigest
2371 ECDSAP256SHA256 2
CDNSKEY Records:
FlagsProtocolAlgorithmPublic Key
257 3 ECDSAP256SHA256
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

23.210.150.135
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2600:1407:7400:b80::3ff9
2600:1407:7400:b95::3ff9
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.
10 mxb-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Proofpoint

SRVServices

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 100 3600 5061 sipfed.online.lync.com.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: 1 endpoint
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 75 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
131 unique certificates 75 current 0 expired 1 CNAME Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Wildcard certificate detected: *.cisa.gov Active 2 certs 1 CA: Google Trust Services
Explicit SANs found on wildcard certificates: These hostnames were specifically listed alongside the wildcard — revealing infrastructure the operator intentionally secured.
*.access-dev.cisa.gov *.access-uat.cisa.gov *.access.cisa.gov *.lb.cisa.gov
DNS probing and CNAME chain traversal were used to discover additional subdomains below.
Certificate Authority Diversity (5 CAs observed across CT log history)
Certificate Authority Certs First Issued Last Issued Status
DigiCert Inc 88 2025-04-09 2026-02-24 Active
Google Trust Services 18 2025-12-18 2026-02-25 Active
Let's Encrypt 14 2025-12-12 2026-01-22 Active
Sectigo Limited 6 2025-12-14 2026-01-22 Active
Amazon 5 2025-08-04 2025-11-11 Active
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
access-dev.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-12T12:25:51 Google Trust Services
access-uat.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-12T12:25:51 Google Trust Services
access.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-12T12:25:51 Google Trust Services
cge.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 9 2025-07-22T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
ci.protectivedns.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 29 2026-01-22T22:27:58 Let's Encrypt, Amazon
confluence.protectivedns.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-09-14T00:00:00 Amazon
connect.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 16 2026-02-25T12:44:34 Google Trust Services, Sectigo Limited
csccust.development.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 3 2025-06-17T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
csccust.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 21 2025-11-04T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
cybermarketplace.cisa.gov CT Log Current cybermarketplace.cisa.gov.edgekey.net 33 2026-01-15T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
dashboard.development.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 3 2025-06-17T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
dashboard.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 33 2026-01-15T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
dev.protectivedns.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 11 2026-01-22T22:27:58 Let's Encrypt, Amazon
development.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 7 2026-02-04T17:25:13 Google Trust Services, DigiCert Inc
devlearning.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 19 2025-11-21T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
edit-preview.cisa.gov CT Log Current edit-preview.cisa.gov.edgekey.net 2 2025-10-30T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
edit-staging.cisa.gov
80/tcp AkamaiGHost 443/tcp AkamaiGHost
CT Log Current edit-staging.cisa.gov.edgekey-staging.net 2 2025-10-30T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
edit-testint.cisa.gov CT Log Current edit-testint.cisa.gov.edgekey-staging.net 2 2025-10-30T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
edit.cisa.gov CT Log Current edit.cisa.gov.edgekey.net 2 2025-10-30T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
eo13650.development.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 3 2025-06-17T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
eo13650.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 21 2025-11-04T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
esubmissions.pciims.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 9 2025-07-22T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
expo.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 6 2025-06-18T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 37 2026-02-04T17:25:13 Google Trust Services, DigiCert Inc
gitlab-launchpad.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 6 2025-06-18T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
gwids.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 30 2026-02-15T18:08:59 Google Trust Services, DigiCert Inc
gwypt1.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 9 2025-07-22T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
gwypt2.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 9 2025-07-22T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
gwypt3.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 9 2025-07-22T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
gwypt4.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 9 2025-07-22T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
idaas.cisa.gov CT Log Current ssp-msp.customdomains.okta-gov.com 2 2026-01-13T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
jira.protectivedns.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-09-08T00:00:00 Amazon
launchpad.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 6 2025-06-18T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
lb.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-12T12:25:51 Google Trust Services
learning.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 19 2025-11-21T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
login.access.cisa.gov
80/tcp Apache httpd 443/tcp Apache httpd
CT Log Current cisa-partner.customdomains.okta-dnssec.com 2 2025-04-29T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
login.cisa.gov DNS Current cisa-partner.customdomains.okta-dnssec.com 2 2026-01-12 Google Trust Services
malware-anonymous.cisa.gov CT Log Current mng-prd-anon-1475162682.us-gov-east-1.elb.amazonaws.com 1 2025-07-11T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
malware.cisa.gov CT Log Current mng-prd-app2-669847399.us-gov-east-1.elb.amazonaws.com 1 2025-07-11T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
management.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 9 2025-07-22T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
myservices.cisa.gov CT Log Current cisaex.servicenowservices.com 2 2026-01-02T21:30:41 Let's Encrypt
niccs.cisa.gov CT Log Current niccs.cisa.gov.edgekey.net 2 2025-10-21T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
pciims.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 34 2026-01-15T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
pciims.development.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 3 2025-06-17T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
pciims.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 12 2025-08-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
pciimspt4.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 9 2025-07-22T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
piv.access-dev.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-18T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
piv.access-uat.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-08-19T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
piv.access.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-08-19T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
piv.softwaresecurity.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 1 2026-01-23T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
presidentscup.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 12 2025-06-18T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
preview.cisa.gov CT Log Current preview.cisa.gov.edgekey.net 34 2026-02-09T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
protectivedns.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 78 2026-01-22T22:27:58 Let's Encrypt, Sectigo Limited, Google Trust Services, Amazon
registration.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 33 2026-01-15T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
registration.pciims.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 9 2025-07-22T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
sftp.gwids.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-08-21T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
softwaresecurity.cisa.gov
80/tcp Cloudflare http proxy 443/tcp Cloudflare http proxy
CT Log Current — 1 2026-01-23T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
sram.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 9 2025-07-22T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
stage.gateway.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-06-25T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
stage.tripwire.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-06-03T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
staging.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 34 2026-02-09T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
test-ci.protectivedns.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 21 2026-01-22T22:27:58 Let's Encrypt, Amazon
test.protectivedns.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 11 2026-01-22T22:27:58 Let's Encrypt, Amazon
testint.cisa.gov CT Log Current testint.cisa.gov.edgekey-staging.net 2 2025-10-30T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
tripwire.cisa.gov CT Log Current tripwire.cisa.gov.edgekey.net 35 2026-02-09T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
uat.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 4 2026-01-08T13:46:41 Google Trust Services
uat.gwids.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 18 2025-08-12T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
us-cert.cisa.gov CT Log Current us-cert.cisa.gov.edgekey.net 34 2026-02-09T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
www.cisa.gov CT Log Current www.cisa.gov.edgekey.net 41 2026-02-24T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
www.gwids.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 18 2025-08-12T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
www.login.access.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-04-24T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
www.malware.cisa.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-11T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
www.niccs.cisa.gov CT Log Current www.niccs.cisa.gov.edgekey.net 2 2025-10-21T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
www.ssp.cisa.gov CT Log Current ssp.customdomains.okta-gov.com 3 2025-09-12T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
www.us-cert.cisa.gov CT Log Current www.us-cert.cisa.gov.edgekey.net 34 2026-02-09T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ Changes Detected: AAAA Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
23.210.150.135
23.210.150.135
AAAA Propagating 2 / 2 records
2600:1407:7400:b80::3ff9
2600:1407:3c00:886::3ff9
2600:1407:7400:b95::3ff9
2600:1407:3c00:899::3ff9
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.cisa.gov RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:DMARC@hq.dhs.gov, mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:DMARC@hq.dhs.gov, mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
10 mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.
10 mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.
10 mxb-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.
10 mxb-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 3 / 3 records
blue.foundationdns.net.
blue.foundationdns.com.
blue.foundationdns.org.
blue.foundationdns.net.
blue.foundationdns.com.
blue.foundationdns.org.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
blue.foundationdns.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2397605751 10000 2400 604800 1800
blue.foundationdns.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2397605751 10000 2400 604800 1800
TXT RFC 7208 §4 12 / 0 records
MS=ms53160703
—
_e01yoinuk3n6xrtnc8q3m9bdjyihdd7
—
f188eb27-a746-4aa8-b160-eb68b0aab05d
—
censys-domain-verification=kSZxqevdrY_nf9ogHWhuUq2O39C9Lkj-pSfnrCzSOVxO
—
_rr8gice4wv589e4uxop5zqhh6gbqh32
—
_tufdw17aa2wht723upz8w56htpvpgkw
—
MS=ms36056523
—
adobe-idp-site-verification=edfd88b4c2bdf65395c78b55da3580466eefa9aa874d5bcfb853692813e80515
—
google-site-verification=BNRBfY90BM54Mf_pgL4Eg07IkwbGvq5nsdZCOYadDlM
—
v=spf1 include:spf.dhs.gov include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf-00376703.gpphosted.com -all
—
google-site-verification=wsLVyeZYgv0NLikdmfm2m3XPP-986Ylo8XxUkrjIOvA
—
MS=ms41452370
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

ac6bd11e3fa17e01bfe2c8e81944da51dabbfb3f054552834509b368ff127fb84de18c5503e40ff22b5dc1f8a90cbe7e3b9dc2756e8b9072d32b9321e967b4fc
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 27 Feb 2026, 16:52 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-cisa.gov.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-cisa.gov.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-cisa.gov.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-cisa.gov.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/4986/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for cisa.gov. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short cisa.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.cisa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.cisa.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer cisa.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd cisa.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mxb-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxb-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com:25 -servername mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.cisa.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.cisa.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.cisa.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.cisa.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/cisa.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com:25 -servername mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.cisa.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://cisa.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://cisa.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://cisa.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.210.150.135 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 135.150.210.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4893 runs
DKIM
Verified 4711 runs
DMARC
Verified 4876 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4695 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4874 runs
BIMI
Verified 4710 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4713 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4715 runs
CAA
Verified 4707 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short cisa.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.cisa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.cisa.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer cisa.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd cisa.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mxb-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxb-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com:25 -servername mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.cisa.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.cisa.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.cisa.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.cisa.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer cisa.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/cisa.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com:25 -servername mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.cisa.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://cisa.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://cisa.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://cisa.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.210.150.135 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 135.150.210.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

cisa.gov

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.