Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
TLP:AMBER
Limited disclosure — recipients may share within their organization only
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
spjslatina.ro
Footprint
1 SaaS Service
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level:
Low Risk
4 protocols configured, 5 not configured
Why we go beyond letter grades
Currentness Excellent
TTL Compliance Excellent
Completeness Degraded
Source Credibility Excellent
TTL Relevance Stale
ICuAE Details
Enterprise Traffic Engineering Detected
DNS-based Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB)
This domain uses short TTLs across 3 record types (A record at 120s), consistent with DNS-based traffic management (GSLB). Enterprises operating large anycast networks intentionally use short TTLs to enable rapid failover, geographic steering, and load distribution. This is a deliberate infrastructure choice, not a misconfiguration. RFC 1035 §3.2.1 permits any TTL value the zone administrator selects. The findings below reflect deviation from typical values for reference, not necessarily actionable recommendations for this class of infrastructure.
The following DNS record TTLs deviate from typical values. For domains using DNS-based traffic management, short TTLs are expected and intentional.
| Record Type | Observed TTL | Typical TTL | Severity | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 2 minutes (120s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | A TTL is below typical — observed 2 minutes (120s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| NS | 6 hours (21600s) |
1 day (86400s) |
medium | NS TTL is below typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| TXT | 2 minutes (120s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | TXT TTL is below typical — observed 2 minutes (120s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| SOA | 6 hours (21600s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | SOA TTL is above typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. |
| MX | 2 minutes (120s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | MX TTL is below typical — observed 2 minutes (120s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
Big Picture Questions
- This domain runs short TTLs across multiple record types. Does it operate a global anycast network where DNS-based traffic steering justifies the query volume?
- Are the short TTLs enabling active failover, geographic routing, or load distribution — or are they leftover from a migration that was never reverted?
- Enterprise-grade DNS infrastructure (sub-5ms authoritative response times, globally distributed nameservers) absorbs short-TTL query volume. Would your authoritative DNS handle the same load?
Primary NS
ns11.globehosting.net
Serial
2026020701
Admin
techteam.instra.com
Provider
Unknown
| Timer | Value | RFC 1912 Range |
|---|---|---|
| Refresh | 3600s | 1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs) |
| Retry | 1800s | Fraction of Refresh |
| Expire | 1209600s | 1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days) |
| Minimum (Neg. Cache) | 86400s | 300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day) |
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
Suggested Scanner Configuration
High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
| Parameter | Current | Suggested | Severity | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| timeout_seconds | 5s |
8s |
low | Average scan duration is 30.0s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures. RFC 8767 |
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
Upgrade DMARC policy from quarantine to reject (p=reject) for maximum spoofing protection, Add DMARC aggregate reporting (rua) for visibility into email authentication
Configured
SPF, DMARC (quarantine, 100%), DKIM, TLS-RPT
Not Configured
MTA-STS, BIMI, DANE, DNSSEC, CAA
Priority Actions
5 total
Achievable posture: Secure
Medium
Add DMARC Aggregate Reporting
Add a rua= tag to receive aggregate DMARC reports. Without reporting, you cannot monitor authentication failures.
Aggregate reports show who is sending mail as your domain and whether it passes authentication.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _dmarc.spjslatina.ro (add to existing DMARC record) |
| Value | rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@spjslatina.ro |
Medium
Enable DNSSEC
DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.
Medium
Upgrade DMARC to Reject
Your DMARC policy is set to quarantine. Upgrade to p=reject for maximum protection — reject instructs receivers to discard spoofed mail entirely rather than quarantining it.
A reject policy provides the strongest protection against domain spoofing.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _dmarc.spjslatina.ro (update existing DMARC record) |
| Value | v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@spjslatina.ro |
Low
Add CAA Records
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.
CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | CAA |
| Host | spjslatina.ro (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider) |
| Value | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" |
Low
Deploy MTA-STS
MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.
MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _mta-sts.spjslatina.ro (MTA-STS policy record) |
| Value | v=STSv1; id=spjslatina.ro |
Registrar (RDAP)
LIVE
Unknown
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced
SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Consistent
Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf?
Yes
Success
~all
4/10 lookups
SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 4/10 lookups
v=spf1 +mx +a +ip4:185.33.180.137 +include:mail.hostingww.com +include:_spf.globehosting.net +include:relay.mailchannels.net ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs:
CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing),
CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation),
CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard.
Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made.
This domain uses ~all + DMARC quarantine — good protection. Moving to p=reject would achieve the strongest stance.
DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Consistent
Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined?
Quarantined, not rejected
Success
p=quarantine
DMARC policy quarantine (100%) - good protection
v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400
Alignment:
SPF relaxed
DKIM relaxed
sp=none
Subdomains unprotected (sp=none while p=quarantine)
No aggregate reporting (rua) configured — you won't receive reports about authentication results and potential abuse
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct.
Many tools flag the absence of ruf= as a gap. It is not. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice.
RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
Monitoring Posture Note: Quarantine sequesters authentication failures while preserving full DMARC forensic telemetry (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain quarantine rather than reject as a deliberate monitoring strategy — failed messages are processed and reported but sequestered from the inbox. See NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1 for enforcement tradeoffs.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace
pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.Related CVEs:
CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing),
CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)
DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Consistent
Are outbound emails cryptographically signed?
Yes — verified
Found
Found DKIM records for 1 selector(s)
default._domainkey
k=rsa; p=MHwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADawAwaAJhALjQY1adQ0/+Pz2R28RcEfwePeUlacJXd54VbYD9xIdvTzpB02vVsoY10i9/X0J5uWSFFL8Lq+apw7HZ1BIO6j15drnVlsO675t1lUXKVDnWq9hXXc8gtkO4qXT8xgph3wIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities:
DKIM
l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail),
weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3),
DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)