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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 10 Feb 2026, 03:04 UTC
Duration 22.6s
Version v26.10.88
Integrity da30ebf5d50b005aee251bc8dff3ba52dea3065eb9412f11174897d5e5fd5839aab5e2df9b356866bd5dbc1fc3b93a14dc39416a16d4549133268eba997772ff
Subject Domain
usa.gov

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

usa.gov
10 Feb 2026, 03:04 UTC · 22.6s ·v26.10.88 · SHA-3-512: da30✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint U.S. Government
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: SECURE
2 protocols configured, 5 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Configured
DMARC (email spoofing protection), DNSSEC (DNS responses signed)
Not Configured
DANE/TLSA (certificate pinning for mail transport), CAA (certificate authority control), MTA-STS (email TLS policy), TLS-RPT (TLS delivery reporting), BIMI (brand logo in inboxes)
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: SECURE
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.yourdomain.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.yourdomain.com TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
RFC 8461
Low Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com).

yourdomain.com CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT reporting

Publish a TLS-RPT DNS record to receive reports about TLS delivery failures to your domain.

_smtp._tls.yourdomain.com TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@yourdomain.com"
RFC 8460
Low Configure BIMI brand logo

Publish a BIMI DNS record pointing to your brand logo (SVG Tiny PS format). For full support in Gmail, you will also need a Verified Mark Certificate (VMC).

default._bimi.yourdomain.com TXT "v=BIMI1; l=https://yourdomain.com/logo.svg"
RFC 9495
Low Deploy DANE/TLSA for mail transport

Since DNSSEC is already active, you can add TLSA records for your MX hosts to enable DANE. This cryptographically pins TLS certificates for mail delivery.

RFC 6698
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
get.gov (Registrant: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY)
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Email: Ambiguous
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Standard Gov Enterprise
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No
Email: Ambiguous
SPF authorizes senders but no MX records exist. This domain may send email but cannot receive it reliably. Configuration is inconsistent.
If this domain should not send email, add these DNS records:
Null MX — Explicitly refuses inbound mail delivery (RFC 7505)
SPF v=spf1 -all — Declares no servers are authorized to send email (RFC 7208)
Verdict: DMARC policy is reject - spoofed messages will be blocked by receiving servers.

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 2/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 2/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:amazonses.com include:532040.spf10.hubspotemail.net ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC reject: the strongest compatible security stance, aligned with CISA and RFC guidance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; fo=1; ri=86400; rua=mailto:dmarcreports@gsa.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov; ruf=mailto:dmarcfailures@gsa.gov
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
Forensic reports (ruf) configured - many providers ignore these
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Provider-managed
Provider Verified

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

Amazon SES detected as primary mail platform — DKIM signing is managed by the provider. The primary provider may use custom selectors not discoverable through standard checks.
Know your DKIM selector? Re-scan with a custom selector to verify.
RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No MX records available — DANE check skipped

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: No brand protection controls - attackers could obtain certificates or impersonate visually.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?
Verdict: DNS responses are authenticated from the root downward. Delegation is verified.

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed RSA/SHA-256

DNSSEC fully configured and validated - AD flag confirmed by resolver

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
445 8 2 5517C2B10E0CE87584293327971302E9781169313111D9D6C9C4064AEB4865BA
4292 8 2 9C1D52E67A297D47056BE8647CEC0DEDDAF6757817AEC22A4A26D4FB9300AB53
62996 8 2 9F496F09690F4923E2B4D9336A3A0886CAC24DAEB44153E13F50543B9BA77977

NS Delegation Verified

5 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: dns.gsa.gov dns2.gsa.gov dns3.gsa.gov dns4.gsa.gov dns5.gsa.gov
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 4 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

23.22.13.113
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2600:1f18:f88:4313:6df7:f986:f915:78d6
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

No MX records
Domain cannot receive email

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 1 IPv6) Mail: Not configured Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? Unavailable
How did we find these?
Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962).
Re-Analyze to Retry CT Lookup

Passive discovery using Certificate Transparency Logs — publicly auditable records of every TLS certificate ever issued. CT log service was slow or unavailable — showing DNS-probed subdomains only

Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 1 / 0 records
23.22.13.113
—
AAAA 1 / 0 records
2600:1f18:f88:4313:6df7:f986:f915:78d6
—
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.usa.gov RFC 7489 §6.3 1 / 0 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; fo=1; ri=86400; rua=mailto:dmarcreports@gsa.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov; ruf=mailto:dmarcfailures@gsa.gov
—
MTA-STS _mta-sts.usa.gov RFC 8461 §3 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
NS RFC 1035 5 / 0 records
dns4.gsa.gov.
—
dns2.gsa.gov.
—
dns5.gsa.gov.
—
dns3.gsa.gov.
—
dns.gsa.gov.
—
SOA RFC 1035 1 / 0 records
dns.gsa.gov. hostmaster.gsa.gov. 789057669 3600 180 1209600 3600
—
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.usa.gov RFC 8460 §3 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
TXT RFC 7208 §4 4 / 0 records
d1rt4thgsoin5q.cloudfront.net
—
amazonses:X5JKkKWosJlNPD8iJfPvNksuvQJzup3fDYEJtve9l20=
—
MS=ms45746088
—
v=spf1 include:amazonses.com include:532040.spf10.hubspotemail.net ~all
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

da30ebf5d50b005aee251bc8dff3ba52dea3065eb9412f11174897d5e5fd5839aab5e2df9b356866bd5dbc1fc3b93a14dc39416a16d4549133268eba997772ff
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 10 Feb 2026, 03:04 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-usa.gov.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-usa.gov.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-usa.gov.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-usa.gov.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/490/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for usa.gov. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short usa.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.usa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.usa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.usa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.usa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.usa.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer usa.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd usa.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.usa.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.usa.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.usa.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.usa.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/usa.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.usa.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://usa.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://usa.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://usa.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.22.13.113 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 113.13.22.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4874 runs
DKIM
Verified 4692 runs
DMARC
Verified 4857 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4676 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4855 runs
BIMI
Verified 4691 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4694 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4696 runs
CAA
Verified 4688 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short usa.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.usa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.usa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.usa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.usa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.usa.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer usa.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd usa.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.usa.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.usa.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.usa.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.usa.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/usa.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.usa.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://usa.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://usa.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://usa.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.22.13.113 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 113.13.22.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

usa.gov

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.