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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 26 Feb 2026, 14:53 UTC
Duration 60.0s
Version v26.26.30
Integrity 3ac5e82a5907e25412a1c397e03c5e2d7d124fe5249f44fd5209377d67e0840d39c4e0f6d1fa329b93040159910935a2cab74c40b4e49f8d4d9380d3f68d68f9
Subject Domain
nsa.gov

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

nsa.gov
26 Feb 2026, 14:53 UTC · 60.0s ·v26.26.30 · SHA-3-512: 3ac5✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
5 protocols configured, 4 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
2 monitoring
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Good 75/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Adequate
DNS data is mostly current with minor gaps — good intelligence currency

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
NS 21539s 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 21539s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 20s 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 20s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA 21539s 1 hour (3600s) high SOA TTL is above typical — observed 21539s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for nsa.gov
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS w000-dsid-u05.nsa.gov
Serial 2025050618
Admin hostmaster.nsa.gov
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh3600s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry1080sFraction of Refresh
Expire2419200s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)900s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 32.1s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector, External domain mail.mil has not authorized nsa.gov to send DMARC reports (missing nsa.gov._report._dmarc.mail.mil TXT record)
Configured
SPF, DMARC (reject), DKIM (inferred via Unknown), DANE, DNSSEC
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Secure
Medium Upgrade From Legacy DNSSEC Algorithm

This domain uses RSA/SHA-1 (algorithm 5 or 7) which is NOT RECOMMENDED per RFC 8624. While still operational, plan migration to ECDSAP256SHA256 (algorithm 13) or Ed25519 (algorithm 15) for improved security and smaller signatures.

RFC 8624 §3.1
Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

BIMI displays your verified brand logo next to your emails in supporting mail clients.
TypeTXT
Hostdefault._bimi.nsa.gov (BIMI default record)
Valuev=BIMI1; l=https://nsa.gov/brand/logo.svg
RFC 9495
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostnsa.gov (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

Your domain has DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest email transport security available. TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.nsa.gov (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@nsa.gov
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.nsa.gov (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=nsa.gov
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
get.gov (Registrant: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY)
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Akamai
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 2/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 2/10 lookups

v=spf1 ip4:214.29.60.2/32 ip4:214.29.60.3/32 ip4:214.80.121.17/32 ip4:214.80.121.18/32 include:_spf.eemsg.mail.mil include:amazonses.com ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC reject: the strongest compatible security stance, aligned with CISA and RFC guidance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;fo=1;rua=mailto:DMARC_REPORTING@nsa.gov,mailto:DMARC_reports@mail.mil;ruf=mailto:DMARC_REPORTING@nsa.gov,mailto:DMARC_reports@mail.mil;rf=afrf;pct=100
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed sp=reject
Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Not Discoverable

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Authorization missing
Warning

1 of 1 external reporting domains missing authorization

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
mail.mil Unauthorized —
External domain mail.mil has not authorized nsa.gov to send DMARC reports (missing nsa.gov._report._dmarc.mail.mil TXT record)

Third-Party Action Required

This authorization record must be created by the external reporting provider, not by you. Per RFC 7489 §7.1, the receiving domain must publish a TXT record to confirm it accepts DMARC reports from your domain.

What to do: Contact your DMARC reporting provider and ask them to publish the authorization TXT record shown above. If you use a managed DMARC service (e.g., Ondmarc, Dmarcian, Valimail), this is typically handled during onboarding — reach out to their support if the record is missing.

Impact if unresolved: Compliant receivers may silently discard aggregate or forensic reports destined for the unauthorized address, reducing your DMARC visibility.

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? Yes
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 2/6 MX

DANE partially configured — TLSA records on 2/6 MX hosts

MX Host Usage Selector Match Certificate Data
pri-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil 2 DANE-TA (Trust anchor) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 c5b8c936ff91232aac9d346561b4dbe99997863c0e284a6767f32f98a422db1f
pri-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 c5b8c936ff91232aac9d346561b4dbe99997863c0e284a6767f32f98a422db1f
sec-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil 2 DANE-TA (Trust anchor) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 c5b8c936ff91232aac9d346561b4dbe99997863c0e284a6767f32f98a422db1f
sec-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 c5b8c936ff91232aac9d346561b4dbe99997863c0e284a6767f32f98a422db1f
Missing DANE for: emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil, w455-emsm-u11.ncsc.mil, w455-emsm-u10.ncsc.mil
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest cryptographic transport security. DANE binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, creating a verifiable chain of trust from root to mail server (RFC 7672 §1.3). MTA-STS could complement this for senders that don't validate DNSSEC, but DANE alone provides the highest level of protection available.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No significant AI surface findings

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? No directives
No robots.txt found
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on a11-66.akam.net — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: a11-66.akam.net, a5-66.akam.net, a12-67.akam.net, a24-65.akam.net, a2-64.akam.net, a1-107.akam.net

Delegation Consistency 2 Issues

Delegation consistency: 2 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • DNSKEY records missing at child — DS records at parent have no matching keys
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Misaligned

Unmatched DS records (no corresponding DNSKEY):
Key Tag: 29356, Algorithm: 7

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
a1-107.akam.net No N/A N/A OK
a11-66.akam.net No N/A N/A OK
a12-67.akam.net No N/A N/A OK
a2-64.akam.net No N/A N/A OK
a24-65.akam.net No N/A N/A OK
a5-66.akam.net No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 28800s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

a1-107.akam.net: 2.025050618e+09
a11-66.akam.net: 2.025050618e+09
a12-67.akam.net: 2.025050618e+09
a2-64.akam.net: 2.025050618e+09
a24-65.akam.net: 2.025050618e+09
a5-66.akam.net: 2.025050618e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 6 nameserver(s) for nsa.gov — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
a11-66.akam.net 84.53.139.66 2600:1480:1::42 AS20940
Akamai International B.V. 		2025050618
a5-66.akam.net 95.100.168.66 2600:1480:b000::42 AS21342 2025050618
a1-107.akam.net 193.108.91.107 2600:1401:2::6b AS20940
Akamai International B.V. 		2025050618
a24-65.akam.net 2.16.130.65 2600:1480:9800::41 AS21342 2025050618
a12-67.akam.net 184.26.160.67 2600:1480:f000::43 AS21342 2025050618
a2-64.akam.net 95.100.174.64 2600:1480:7000::40 AS21342 2025050618
Unique ASNs
2
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
6
Diversity Score
Good

2 ASNs, 6 /24 prefixes across 6 nameservers

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification

Transport encryption enforced via DNS policy (1 signal(s))

Policy Assessment Primary
  • DANE/TLSA records published — mail servers pin TLS certificates via DNSSEC (RFC 7672)
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 0 unique ASN(s) across 1 IP address(es)

IPv4 Mappings:
23.198.152.131 → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS services detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 Legacy

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 — NOT RECOMMENDED for signing (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
29356 7 2 17C346B94BE3BDA883BC22D195B3A8AA4CCDADFC43B26B5C659D70AF58E8FD5C

NS Delegation Verified

6 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: a1-107.akam.net a11-66.akam.net a12-67.akam.net a2-64.akam.net a24-65.akam.net a5-66.akam.net
Managed DNS
All 6 nameservers hosted by Akamai. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Akamai
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (2 differences found)
Resolver Differences:
A: Cloudflare returned different results: [23.11.22.154]
A: DNS4EU returned different results: [23.43.128.110]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

23.198.152.131
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

30 emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil.
30 w455-emsm-u11.ncsc.mil.
10 pri-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil.
20 sec-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil.
30 w455-emsm-u10.ncsc.mil.
30 emsm-gh1-uea11.ncsc.mil.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 6 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 10 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 10 current 0 expired 7 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
apps.nsa.gov CT Log Current www.nsa.gov.edgekey.net 2 2026-01-25T20:28:21 Let's Encrypt
cesp.nsa.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-01T00:00:00 Amazon
code.nsa.gov
80/tcp Varnish 443/tcp Varnish
CT Log Current nationalsecurityagency.github.io 4 2026-02-22T00:38:09 Let's Encrypt
cybercenter.nsa.gov CT Log Current cybercenter.nsa.gov.edgekey.net 2 2026-01-25T20:28:21 Let's Encrypt
m.nsa.gov
80/tcp AkamaiGHost 443/tcp AkamaiGHost
CT Log Current nsa.gov.edgekey.net 6 2026-02-19T17:12:39 Let's Encrypt
museum.nsa.gov CT Log Current museum.nsa.gov.edgekey.net 2 2026-01-25T20:28:21 Let's Encrypt
oig.nsa.gov
80/tcp AkamaiGHost 443/tcp AkamaiGHost
CT Log Current oig.nsa.gov.edgekey.net 6 2026-02-19T17:12:39 Let's Encrypt
smtp.nsa.gov DNS Current — — — —
vpn.nsa.gov DNS Current — — — —
www.nsa.gov CT Log Current nsa.gov.edgekey.net 6 2026-02-19T17:12:39 Let's Encrypt
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ Changes Detected: A Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Propagating 1 / 1 records
23.198.152.131
184.27.230.2
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.nsa.gov RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;fo=1;rua=mailto:DMARC_REPORTING@nsa.gov,mailto:DMARC_reports@mail.mil;ruf=mailto:DMARC_REPORTING@nsa.gov,mailto:DMARC_reports@mail.mil;rf=afrf;pct=100
v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;fo=1;rua=mailto:DMARC_REPORTING@nsa.gov,mailto:DMARC_reports@mail.mil;ruf=mailto:DMARC_REPORTING@nsa.gov,mailto:DMARC_reports@mail.mil;rf=afrf;pct=100
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 6 / 6 records
30 emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil.
30 w455-emsm-u10.ncsc.mil.
30 w455-emsm-u11.ncsc.mil.
30 emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil.
10 pri-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil.
10 pri-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil.
20 sec-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil.
20 sec-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil.
30 w455-emsm-u10.ncsc.mil.
30 w455-emsm-u11.ncsc.mil.
30 emsm-gh1-uea11.ncsc.mil.
30 emsm-gh1-uea11.ncsc.mil.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 6 / 6 records
a24-65.akam.net.
a24-65.akam.net.
a1-107.akam.net.
a12-67.akam.net.
a5-66.akam.net.
a1-107.akam.net.
a2-64.akam.net.
a11-66.akam.net.
a11-66.akam.net.
a5-66.akam.net.
a12-67.akam.net.
a2-64.akam.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
w000-dsid-u05.nsa.gov. hostmaster.nsa.gov. 2025050618 3600 1080 2419200 900
w000-dsid-u05.nsa.gov. hostmaster.nsa.gov. 2025050618 3600 1080 2419200 900
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
ms=ms92230317
v=spf1 ip4:214.29.60.2/32 ip4:214.29.60.3/32 ip4:214.80.121.17/32 ip4:214.80.121.18/32 include:_spf.eemsg.mail.mil include:amazonses.com ~all
v=spf1 ip4:214.29.60.2/32 ip4:214.29.60.3/32 ip4:214.80.121.17/32 ip4:214.80.121.18/32 include:_spf.eemsg.mail.mil include:amazonses.com ~all
ms=ms92230317
DNS History Timeline BETA
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DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

3ac5e82a5907e25412a1c397e03c5e2d7d124fe5249f44fd5209377d67e0840d39c4e0f6d1fa329b93040159910935a2cab74c40b4e49f8d4d9380d3f68d68f9
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 26 Feb 2026, 14:53 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-nsa.gov.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-nsa.gov.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-nsa.gov.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-nsa.gov.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/4835/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for nsa.gov. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short nsa.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.nsa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.nsa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.nsa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.nsa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.nsa.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer nsa.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd nsa.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil TLSA
Check TLSA record for w455-emsm-u11.ncsc.mil RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.w455-emsm-u11.ncsc.mil TLSA
Check TLSA record for pri-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.pri-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil TLSA
Check TLSA record for sec-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.sec-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil TLSA
Check TLSA record for w455-emsm-u10.ncsc.mil RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.w455-emsm-u10.ncsc.mil TLSA
Check TLSA record for emsm-gh1-uea11.ncsc.mil RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.emsm-gh1-uea11.ncsc.mil TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil:25 -servername emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.nsa.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.nsa.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.nsa.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.nsa.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/nsa.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil:25 -servername emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.nsa.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://nsa.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://nsa.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://nsa.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.198.152.131 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 131.152.198.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4850 runs
DKIM
Verified 4669 runs
DMARC
Verified 4834 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4653 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4831 runs
BIMI
Verified 4668 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4671 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4673 runs
CAA
Verified 4665 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short nsa.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.nsa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.nsa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.nsa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.nsa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.nsa.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer nsa.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd nsa.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil TLSA
Check TLSA record for w455-emsm-u11.ncsc.mil (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.w455-emsm-u11.ncsc.mil TLSA
Check TLSA record for pri-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.pri-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil TLSA
Check TLSA record for sec-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.sec-jeemsg.eemsg.mail.mil TLSA
Check TLSA record for w455-emsm-u10.ncsc.mil (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.w455-emsm-u10.ncsc.mil TLSA
Check TLSA record for emsm-gh1-uea11.ncsc.mil (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.emsm-gh1-uea11.ncsc.mil TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil:25 -servername emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.nsa.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.nsa.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.nsa.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.nsa.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer nsa.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/nsa.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil:25 -servername emsm-gh1-uea10.ncsc.mil </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.nsa.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://nsa.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://nsa.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://nsa.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.198.152.131 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 131.152.198.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

nsa.gov

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.