Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
This domain uses short TTLs across 3 record types (A record at 59s), consistent with DNS-based traffic management (GSLB). Enterprises operating large anycast networks intentionally use short TTLs to enable rapid failover, geographic steering, and load distribution. This is a deliberate infrastructure choice, not a misconfiguration. RFC 1035 §3.2.1 permits any TTL value the zone administrator selects. The findings below reflect deviation from typical values for reference, not necessarily actionable recommendations for this class of infrastructure.
The following DNS record TTLs deviate from typical values. For domains using DNS-based traffic management, short TTLs are expected and intentional.
| Record Type | Observed TTL | Typical TTL | Severity | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AAAA | 1 minute (60s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| NS | 539s |
1 day (86400s) |
high | NS TTL is below typical — observed 539s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| TXT | 1739s |
1 hour (3600s) |
medium | TXT TTL is below typical — observed 1739s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| CAA | 5 minutes (300s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | CAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| A | 59s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | A TTL is below typical — observed 59s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| MX | 16s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | MX TTL is below typical — observed 16s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
Big Picture Questions
- This domain runs short TTLs across multiple record types. Does it operate a global anycast network where DNS-based traffic steering justifies the query volume?
- Are the short TTLs enabling active failover, geographic routing, or load distribution — or are they leftover from a migration that was never reverted?
- Enterprise-grade DNS infrastructure (sub-5ms authoritative response times, globally distributed nameservers) absorbs short-TTL query volume. Would your authoritative DNS handle the same load?
ns-cloud-e1.googledomains.com
1415240977
support.wildcardcorp.com
| Timer | Value | RFC 1912 Range |
|---|---|---|
| Refresh | 600s | 1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs) |
| Retry | 1800s | Fraction of Refresh |
| Expire | 1209600s | 1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days) |
| Minimum (Neg. Cache) | 1800s | 300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day) |
Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | default._bimi.fbi.gov (BIMI default record) |
| Value | v=BIMI1; l=https://fbi.gov/brand/logo.svg |
TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _smtp._tls.fbi.gov (SMTP TLS reporting record) |
| Value | v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@fbi.gov |
MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _mta-sts.fbi.gov (MTA-STS policy record) |
| Value | v=STSv1; id=fbi.gov |
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced
SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified
SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 1/10 lookups
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.
DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified
DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection
pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified
DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)
l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail),
weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3),
DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)
MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified
No MTA-STS record found
MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.
TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified
No TLS-RPT record found
DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1
1 of 1 external reporting domains missing authorization
| External Domain | Authorization | Auth Record |
|---|---|---|
dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov |
Unauthorized | — |
Third-Party Action Required
This authorization record must be created by the external reporting provider, not by you. Per RFC 7489 §7.1, the receiving domain must publish a TXT record to confirm it accepts DMARC reports from your domain.
What to do: Contact your DMARC reporting provider and ask them to publish the authorization TXT record shown above. If you use a managed DMARC service (e.g., Ondmarc, Dmarcian, Valimail), this is typically handled during onboarding — reach out to their support if the record is missing.
Impact if unresolved: Compliant receivers may silently discard aggregate or forensic reports destined for the unauthorized address, reducing your DMARC visibility.
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 2 MX hosts)
Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:
- DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
- MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4), but no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes without visual proof of authenticity
BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning
No BIMI record found
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success
CAA configured - only entrust.net, DigiCert, Sectigo, pki.goog, Amazon, Let's Encrypt can issue certificates
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116
No security.txt found
/.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities.
See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No
No AI governance measures detected
llms.txt llmstxt.org
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it.
Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Evidence Log (1 item)
| Type | Detail | Severity | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks |
robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives | low | Observed |
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No
No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.
What type of scan is this?
This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.
Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.
Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.
DNS Server Security Hardened
No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns-cloud-e2.googledomains.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.
| Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Zone Transfer (AXFR) | Denied | Zone transfer denied (correct configuration) |
| Open Recursion | Disabled | Recursion disabled (correct configuration) |
| Nameserver Identity | Hidden | No nameserver identity information disclosed |
| Cache Snooping | Protected | Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration) |
Tested nameservers: ns-cloud-e2.googledomains.com, ns-cloud-e4.googledomains.com, ns-cloud-e3.googledomains.com, ns-cloud-e1.googledomains.com
Delegation Consistency 2 Issues
Delegation consistency: 2 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.
- DNSKEY records missing at child — DS records at parent have no matching keys
- Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone
DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Misaligned
Glue Record Completeness Complete
| Nameserver | In-Bailiwick | IPv4 Glue | IPv6 Glue | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
ns-cloud-e1.googledomains.com |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
ns-cloud-e2.googledomains.com |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
ns-cloud-e3.googledomains.com |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
ns-cloud-e4.googledomains.com |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
NS TTL Comparison Drift
SOA Serial Consistency Consistent
ns-cloud-e1.googledomains.com: 1.415240977e+09ns-cloud-e2.googledomains.com: 1.415240977e+09ns-cloud-e3.googledomains.com: 1.415240977e+09ns-cloud-e4.googledomains.com: 1.415240977e+09Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy
Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for fbi.gov — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.
| Nameserver | IPv4 | IPv6 | ASN / Operator | UDP | TCP | AA | SOA Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ns-cloud-e1.googledomains.com |
216.239.32.110 | 2001:4860:4802:32::6e |
AS15169
Google LLC |
1415240977 | |||
ns-cloud-e2.googledomains.com |
216.239.34.110 | 2001:4860:4802:34::6e |
AS15169
Google LLC |
1415240977 | |||
ns-cloud-e3.googledomains.com |
216.239.36.110 | 2001:4860:4802:36::6e |
AS15169
Google LLC |
1415240977 | |||
ns-cloud-e4.googledomains.com |
216.239.38.110 | 2001:4860:4802:38::6e |
AS15169
Google LLC |
1415240977 |
1 ASN(s), 4 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity
DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue
DNSSEC operational notes: 1 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.
- NSEC3 uses a non-empty salt; RFC 9276 recommends empty salt for new deployments
DNSKEY Inventory 4 Keys
| Role | Key Tag | Algorithm | Key Size |
|---|---|---|---|
| ZSK | 60304 | RSA/SHA-256 | 1056 bits |
| ZSK | 35349 | RSA/SHA-256 | 1056 bits |
| KSK | 5781 | RSA/SHA-256 | 2064 bits |
| KSK | 19010 | RSA/SHA-256 | 2088 bits |
RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures
No RRSIG records found.
Denial of Existence NSEC3
Rollover Readiness Ready
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
No transport encryption policy detected — mail delivery relies on opportunistic TLS
Policy Assessment Primary
No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).
Telemetry
Live Probe Supplementary
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct
ASN / Network