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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 26 Feb 2026, 14:49 UTC
Duration 60.6s
Version v26.26.30
Integrity cea8ead31c8dcd3ca58fe04b4461acc1fefcce4375b8ba8a36d7a36b745744a8ecf3614ca5b65aabe4d2ada32452f20a2e0e79ca54d448ac134884aa6e5ccb92
Subject Domain
hotmail.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

hotmail.com
26 Feb 2026, 14:49 UTC · 60.6s ·v26.26.30 · SHA-3-512: cea8✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Microsoft 365 1 SaaS Service
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Medium Risk
6 protocols configured, 2 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC monitoring phase with aggregate reporting enabled Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation 2 monitoring
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Good 85/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Good
DNS data is mostly current with minor gaps — good intelligence currency

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
NS 19001s 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 19001s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 1684s 1 hour (3600s) medium A TTL is below typical — observed 1684s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for hotmail.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS ns1-205.azure-dns.com
Serial 1
Admin azuredns-hostmaster.microsoft.com
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh3600s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry300sFraction of Refresh
Expire2419200s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)300s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 33.2s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Configured
Recommended
Move DMARC policy from 'none' to 'quarantine' or 'reject'
Monitoring
DMARC record has configuration warnings — review recommended, External domain dmarc.microsoft has not authorized hotmail.com to send DMARC reports (missing hotmail.com._report._dmarc.dmarc.microsoft TXT record)
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (with warnings), DKIM, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, CAA
Not Configured
BIMI, DNSSEC
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Priority Actions Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Upgrade DMARC from p=none

Your DMARC policy is monitor-only (p=none). Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing reports to actively prevent spoofing.

A quarantine or reject policy instructs receivers to take action on failing mail.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.hotmail.com (DMARC policy record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@hotmail.com
RFC 7489 §6.3
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
MarkMonitor Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Microsoft 365
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Microsoft Azure DNS
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:spf2.outlook.com -all
RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is monitoring only (p=none). -all provides some SPF-level protection, but DMARC isn't enforcing. Adding p=reject and considering ~all for compatibility would be far more effective.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Monitoring only
Warning p=none

DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.microsoft;ruf=mailto:ruf@dmarc.microsoft;fo=1:s:d
Policy p=none provides no protection - spoofed emails reach inboxes
Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
Advanced cryptographic posture detected. Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC monitoring phase with aggregate reporting enabled
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found

Found DKIM records for 1 selector(s)

selector1._domainkey Microsoft 365
v=DKIM1;k=rsa;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAvWyktrIL8DO/+UGvMbv7cPd/Xogpbs7pgVw8y9ldO6AAMmg8+ijENl/c7Fb1MfKM7uG3LMwAr0dVVKyM+mbkoX2k5L7lsROQr0Z9gGSpu7xrnZOa58+/pIhd2Xk/DFPpa5+TKbWodbsSZPRN8z0RY5x59jdzSclXlEyN9mEZdmOiKTsOP6A7vQxfSya9jg5N81dfNNvP7HnWejMMsKyIMrXptxOhIBuEYH67JDe98QgX14oHvGM2Uz53if/SW8MF09rYh9sp4ZsaWLIg6T343JzlbtrsGRGCDJ9JPpxRWZimtz+Up/BlKzT6sCCrBihb/Bi3pZiEBB4Ui/vruL5RCQIDAQAB;n=2048,1452627113,1468351913
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced
Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 1 mail server(s)

v=STSv1; id=20190225000000Z;
Policy Details:
  • Mode: enforce
  • Max Age: 7 days (604800 seconds)
  • MX Patterns: *.olc.protection.outlook.com

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1;rua=https://tlsrpt.azurewebsites.net/report

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Authorization missing
Warning

1 of 1 external reporting domains missing authorization

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
dmarc.microsoft Unauthorized —
External domain dmarc.microsoft has not authorized hotmail.com to send DMARC reports (missing hotmail.com._report._dmarc.dmarc.microsoft TXT record)

Third-Party Action Required

This authorization record must be created by the external reporting provider, not by you. Per RFC 7489 §7.1, the receiving domain must publish a TXT record to confirm it accepts DMARC reports from your domain.

What to do: Contact your DMARC reporting provider and ask them to publish the authorization TXT record shown above. If you use a managed DMARC service (e.g., Ondmarc, Dmarcian, Valimail), this is typically handled during onboarding — reach out to their support if the record is missing.

Impact if unresolved: Compliant receivers may silently discard aggregate or forensic reports destined for the unauthorized address, reducing your DMARC visibility.

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Microsoft 365

Microsoft 365 does not support DANE for inbound mail. Microsoft uses its own certificate pinning mechanism.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS (already configured)

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses MTA-STS — the best available option for Microsoft 365. Since Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE, MTA-STS is the strongest transport security this domain can deploy. MTA-STS enforces TLS via HTTPS-based policy, protecting against downgrade attacks (RFC 8461).

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only DigiCert, microsoft.com, GlobalSign can issue certificates

Authorized CAs: DigiCert microsoft.com GlobalSign
0 issue "digicert.com"
0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"
0 issue "microsoft.com"
0 issue "globalsign.com"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Partial RFC 9116

security.txt found but missing required fields

Contact

Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.3)

Expires

Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.5)
Source: https://hotmail.com/.well-known/security.txt
Missing required Contact field (RFC 9116 §2.5.3)
Missing required Expires field (RFC 9116 §2.5.5)
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? Yes

AI governance signals observed

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? Yes
llms.txt found — domain provides structured context for LLMs
llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context)
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (3 items)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
llms_txt_found llms.txt file found providing structured LLM context info Observed
llms_full_txt_found llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context) info Observed
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
Sources scanned (1)
  • https://hotmail.com/
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns3-205.azure-dns.org — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: ns3-205.azure-dns.org, ns1-205.azure-dns.com, ns4-205.azure-dns.info, ns2-205.azure-dns.net

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns1-205.azure-dns.com No N/A N/A OK
ns2-205.azure-dns.net No N/A N/A OK
ns3-205.azure-dns.org No N/A N/A OK
ns4-205.azure-dns.info No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 172800s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns1-205.azure-dns.com: 1
ns2-205.azure-dns.net: 1
ns3-205.azure-dns.org: 1
ns4-205.azure-dns.info: 1
Nameserver Fleet Matrix 3 Issues

Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for hotmail.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Findings:
  • ns1-205.azure-dns.com: UDP unreachable on port 53
  • ns2-205.azure-dns.net: UDP unreachable on port 53
  • ns3-205.azure-dns.org: UDP unreachable on port 53
Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns1-205.azure-dns.com 13.107.236.205 2603:1061:0:700::cd AS8075
Microsoft Corporation 		1
ns2-205.azure-dns.net 150.171.21.205 2620:1ec:8ec:700::cd AS8075
Microsoft Corporation 		1
ns4-205.azure-dns.info 208.84.5.205 2620:1ec:bda:700::cd AS8075
Microsoft Corporation 		1
ns3-205.azure-dns.org 204.14.183.205 2a01:111:4000:700::cd AS8075
Microsoft Corporation 		1
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
4
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 4 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery

Transport encryption enforced via DNS policy (3 signal(s))

Policy Assessment Primary
  • MTA-STS policy in enforce mode requires encrypted transport (RFC 8461)
  • TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures (RFC 8460)
  • Microsoft 365 enforces TLS 1.2+ with DANE (GA Oct 2024) and valid certificates
Telemetry
TLS-RPT configured — domain receives reports about TLS delivery failures from sending mail servers (RFC 8460)
Reporting to: https://tlsrpt.azurewebsites.net/report
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 0 unique ASN(s) across 1 IP address(es)

IPv4 Mappings:
204.79.197.212 → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 1 service

1 SaaS service detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Google Workspace google-site-verification=VdfSHp3aOmiGxd6jcbkRPFy6EERzln_hMR3byLjU__w
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Enterprise DNS Context: DNSSEC is the only standardized, DNS-verifiable mechanism that cryptographically authenticates responses between authoritative servers and resolvers (RFC 4033 §2, RFC 4035). Without it, DNS responses are technically vulnerable to in-transit tampering. Enterprise operators may employ compensating controls (anycast, DDoS mitigation, private peering, TSIG) — however, these do not provide DNS-layer data authentication to third-party resolvers and are not verifiable via DNS alone.
Visibility: DNS-only — network-layer compensating controls cannot be observed or verified through DNS queries. This assessment reflects what is provable from the DNS evidence available.

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1-205.azure-dns.com ns2-205.azure-dns.net ns3-205.azure-dns.org ns4-205.azure-dns.info
Managed DNS
All 4 nameservers hosted by Microsoft Azure DNS. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Microsoft Azure DNS
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

204.79.197.212
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

2 hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Microsoft 365

SRVServices

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 10 2 5061 federation.messenger.msn.com.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: 1 endpoint
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 12 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
13 unique certificates 12 current 0 expired 3 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Wildcard certificate detected: *.hotmail.com Active 3 certs 1 CA: DigiCert Inc
No explicit SANs found on wildcard certificates. Subdomains covered by this wildcard won't appear individually in CT logs (RFC 6962).
DNS probing and CNAME chain traversal were used to discover additional subdomains below.
Certificate Authority Diversity (2 CAs observed across CT log history)
Certificate Authority Certs First Issued Last Issued Status
DigiCert Inc 11 2025-03-29 2026-02-15 Active
Microsoft Corporation 2 2025-12-23 2026-02-06 Active
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
autodiscover.hotmail.com DNS Current eas.outlook.com 3 2025-03-29 DigiCert Inc
m.hotmail.com DNS Current eas.outlook.com 3 2025-03-29 DigiCert Inc
mail.hotmail.com DNS Current — 3 2025-03-29 DigiCert Inc
mta-sts.hotmail.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-02-06T12:49:13 Microsoft Corporation
mx1.hotmail.com DNS Current — 3 2025-03-29 DigiCert Inc
mx2.hotmail.com DNS Current — 3 2025-03-29 DigiCert Inc
mx3.hotmail.com DNS Current — 3 2025-03-29 DigiCert Inc
mx4.hotmail.com DNS Current — 3 2025-03-29 DigiCert Inc
pamx1.hotmail.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-08-27T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
postmaster.hotmail.com CT Log Current — 4 2025-05-23T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
www.hotmail.com DNS Current outlook-fd-0010.live.com 3 2025-03-29 DigiCert Inc
xmrar.hotmail.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-02-15T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
204.79.197.212
204.79.197.212
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"
0 issue "digicert.com"
0 issue "globalsign.com"
0 issue "globalsign.com"
0 issue "digicert.com"
0 issue "microsoft.com"
0 issue "microsoft.com"
0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"
DMARC _dmarc.hotmail.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.microsoft;ruf=mailto:ruf@dmarc.microsoft;fo=1:s:d
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.microsoft;ruf=mailto:ruf@dmarc.microsoft;fo=1:s:d
MTA-STS _mta-sts.hotmail.com RFC 8461 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=STSv1; id=20190225000000Z;
v=STSv1; id=20190225000000Z;
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
2 hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com.
2 hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
ns1-205.azure-dns.com.
ns1-205.azure-dns.com.
ns2-205.azure-dns.net.
ns2-205.azure-dns.net.
ns3-205.azure-dns.org.
ns3-205.azure-dns.org.
ns4-205.azure-dns.info.
ns4-205.azure-dns.info.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns1-205.azure-dns.com. azuredns-hostmaster.microsoft.com. 1 3600 300 2419200 300
ns1-205.azure-dns.com. azuredns-hostmaster.microsoft.com. 1 3600 300 2419200 300
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.hotmail.com RFC 8460 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=TLSRPTv1;rua=https://tlsrpt.azurewebsites.net/report
v=TLSRPTv1;rua=https://tlsrpt.azurewebsites.net/report
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 3 / 3 records
v=spf1 include:spf2.outlook.com -all
google-site-verification=gqFmgDKSUd3XGU_AzWWdojRHtW3_66W_PC3oFvQVZEw
google-site-verification=VdfSHp3aOmiGxd6jcbkRPFy6EERzln_hMR3byLjU__w
google-site-verification=VdfSHp3aOmiGxd6jcbkRPFy6EERzln_hMR3byLjU__w
google-site-verification=gqFmgDKSUd3XGU_AzWWdojRHtW3_66W_PC3oFvQVZEw
v=spf1 include:spf2.outlook.com -all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

cea8ead31c8dcd3ca58fe04b4461acc1fefcce4375b8ba8a36d7a36b745744a8ecf3614ca5b65aabe4d2ada32452f20a2e0e79ca54d448ac134884aa6e5ccb92
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 26 Feb 2026, 14:49 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-hotmail.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-hotmail.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-hotmail.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-hotmail.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/4802/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for hotmail.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short hotmail.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.hotmail.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.hotmail.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer hotmail.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd hotmail.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.hotmail.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.hotmail.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.hotmail.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.hotmail.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/hotmail.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.hotmail.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://hotmail.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://hotmail.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://hotmail.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 204.79.197.212 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 212.197.79.204.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4850 runs
DKIM
Verified 4669 runs
DMARC
Verified 4834 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4653 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4831 runs
BIMI
Verified 4668 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4671 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4673 runs
CAA
Verified 4665 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short hotmail.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.hotmail.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.hotmail.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer hotmail.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd hotmail.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.hotmail.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.hotmail.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.hotmail.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.hotmail.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer hotmail.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/hotmail.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername hotmail-com.olc.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.hotmail.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://hotmail.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://hotmail.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://hotmail.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 204.79.197.212 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 212.197.79.204.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

hotmail.com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.