Skip to main content
DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 9 Feb 2026, 18:50 UTC
Duration 18.0s
Version v26.10.88
Integrity c15604d61a3042facf38f551d27c844bae80ed3209d306bd031f1299cea4d45ac6025b54b500d5c907ad7d60f11c82931e3f18824074e54d3fab2365202c1faa
Subject Domain
example.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

example.com
9 Feb 2026, 18:50 UTC · 18.0s ·v26.10.88 · SHA-3-512: c156✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Cloudflare
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: SECURE (Monitoring)
3 protocols configured, 1 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
1 monitoring
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Monitoring
DKIM (some keys revoked)
Configured
DMARC (email spoofing protection), SPF (no mail allowed - domain declares it sends no email), DNSSEC (DNS responses signed)
Not Configured
CAA (certificate authority control)
Priority Actions Achievable posture: SECURE
Medium Add DMARC aggregate reporting

Add a rua= tag to your DMARC record to receive aggregate reports about authentication results.

RFC 7489 §7.1
Low Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com).

yourdomain.com CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
RESERVED-Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
No Mail (Null MX)
No-Mail: Verified
Web Hosting
Cloudflare
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Cloudflare Enterprise
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No
No-Mail: Verified 3/3 controls
This domain is fully hardened against email abuse. All three layers of no-mail protection are configured per RFC best practices.
DMARC p=reject (RFC 7489) Null MX (RFC 7505) SPF v=spf1 -all (RFC 7208)
Verdict: Non-mail domain with full anti-spoofing protection. SPF -all rejects all senders, DMARC reject blocks spoofed messages. Null MX (RFC 7505) confirms no inbound mail.

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all

Valid SPF (no mail allowed) - domain declares it sends no email

v=spf1 -all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject - excellent anti-spoofing protection for non-mail domain

v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;adkim=s;aspf=s
Alignment: SPF strict DKIM strict sp=reject
Add DMARC aggregate reporting: Without reporting, you cannot see who is sending email as your domain or whether legitimate mail is failing authenticati...
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Weak Keys

Found 37 DKIM selector(s) but some keys are revoked

Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
amazonses._domainkey Amazon SES
v=DKIM1; p=
cm._domainkey Campaign Monitor
v=DKIM1; p=
default._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
dkim._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
email._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
everlytickey1._domainkey Everlytic
v=DKIM1; p=
fm1._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
fm2._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
fm3._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
google._domainkey Google Workspace
v=DKIM1; p=
google2048._domainkey Google Workspace
v=DKIM1; p=
k1._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
k2._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
mail._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
mailchimp._domainkey MailChimp
v=DKIM1; p=
mailer._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
mailgun._domainkey Mailgun
v=DKIM1; p=
mailjet._domainkey Mailjet
v=DKIM1; p=
mandrill._domainkey MailChimp (Mandrill)
v=DKIM1; p=
mimecast._domainkey Mimecast
v=DKIM1; p=
mx._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
postmark._domainkey Postmark
v=DKIM1; p=
proofpoint._domainkey Proofpoint
v=DKIM1; p=
protonmail._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
protonmail2._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
protonmail3._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
s1._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
s2._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
selector1._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
selector2._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
sendgrid._domainkey SendGrid
v=DKIM1; p=
sendinblue._domainkey Brevo (Sendinblue)
v=DKIM1; p=
sig1._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
smtp._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=
sparkpost._domainkey SparkPost
v=DKIM1; p=
zendesk1._domainkey Zendesk
v=DKIM1; p=
zendesk2._domainkey Zendesk
v=DKIM1; p=
RFC Stance: RFC 6376 (Internet Standard) defines the DKIM mechanism. DKIM selectors are not publicly enumerable — absence in a scan does not prove absence of signing.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No valid MX hosts — DANE check skipped

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: No brand protection controls - attackers could obtain certificates or impersonate visually.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?
Verdict: DNS responses are authenticated from the root downward. Delegation is verified.

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256

DNSSEC fully configured and validated - AD flag confirmed by resolver

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
2371 13 2 C988EC423E3880EB8DD8A46FE06CA230EE23F35B578D64E78B29C3E1C83D245A

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: elliott.ns.cloudflare.com hera.ns.cloudflare.com
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 4 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

104.18.26.120
104.18.27.120
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2606:4700::6812:1b78
2606:4700::6812:1a78
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

0 .
Null MX RFC 7505
Domain explicitly does not accept email

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: Null MX (no mail) Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 5 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962).
Re-Analyze to Retry CT Lookup
47 certificates analyzed 1 current 4 expired Source: Certificate Transparency Logs + DNS Probing
Combines CT log certificates (RFC 6962) with DNS probing of common service names. Does not include internal-only names or uncommon subdomain prefixes.
Wildcard certificate detected: *.example.com Active 0 cert
No explicit SANs found on wildcard certificates. Subdomains covered by this wildcard won't appear individually in CT logs (RFC 6962).
DNS probing and CNAME chain traversal were used to discover additional subdomains below.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
www.example.com CT Log Current — 28 2014-11-06 DigiCert Global G2 TLS RSA SHA256 2020 CA1, DigiCert SHA2 High Assurance Server CA, DigiCert SHA2 Secure Server CA
dev.example.com CT Log Expired — 1 2016-07-14 Symantec Class 3 Secure Server CA - G4
m.example.com CT Log Expired — 1 2016-07-14 thawte SSL CA - G2
products.example.com CT Log Expired — 1 2016-07-14 Symantec Class 3 Secure Server CA - G4
support.example.com CT Log Expired — 1 2016-07-14 Symantec Class 3 Secure Server CA - G4
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 2 / 0 records
104.18.26.120
—
104.18.27.120
—
AAAA 2 / 0 records
2606:4700::6812:1b78
—
2606:4700::6812:1a78
—
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.example.com RFC 7489 §6.3 1 / 0 records
v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;adkim=s;aspf=s
—
MTA-STS _mta-sts.example.com RFC 8461 §3 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 1 / 0 records
0 .
—
NS RFC 1035 2 / 0 records
hera.ns.cloudflare.com.
—
elliott.ns.cloudflare.com.
—
SOA RFC 1035 1 / 0 records
elliott.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2395194487 10000 2400 604800 1800
—
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.example.com RFC 8460 §3 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
TXT RFC 7208 §4 2 / 0 records
_k2n1y4vw3qtb4skdx9e7dxt97qrmmq9
—
v=spf1 -all
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

c15604d61a3042facf38f551d27c844bae80ed3209d306bd031f1299cea4d45ac6025b54b500d5c907ad7d60f11c82931e3f18824074e54d3fab2365202c1faa
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 9 Feb 2026, 18:50 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-example.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-example.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-example.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-example.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/473/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for example.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer example.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer example.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer example.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer example.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer example.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short example.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'amazonses' RFC 6376 
dig +short amazonses._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'cm' RFC 6376 
dig +short cm._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim' RFC 6376 
dig +short dkim._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'email' RFC 6376 
dig +short email._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'everlytickey1' RFC 6376 
dig +short everlytickey1._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'fm1' RFC 6376 
dig +short fm1._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'fm2' RFC 6376 
dig +short fm2._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'fm3' RFC 6376 
dig +short fm3._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google2048' RFC 6376 
dig +short google2048._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' RFC 6376 
dig +short k1._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' RFC 6376 
dig +short k2._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mail' RFC 6376 
dig +short mail._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mailchimp' RFC 6376 
dig +short mailchimp._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mailer' RFC 6376 
dig +short mailer._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mailgun' RFC 6376 
dig +short mailgun._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mailjet' RFC 6376 
dig +short mailjet._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mandrill' RFC 6376 
dig +short mandrill._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mimecast' RFC 6376 
dig +short mimecast._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mx' RFC 6376 
dig +short mx._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'postmark' RFC 6376 
dig +short postmark._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'proofpoint' RFC 6376 
dig +short proofpoint._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail' RFC 6376 
dig +short protonmail._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail2' RFC 6376 
dig +short protonmail2._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail3' RFC 6376 
dig +short protonmail3._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' RFC 6376 
dig +short s1._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' RFC 6376 
dig +short s2._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sendgrid' RFC 6376 
dig +short sendgrid._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sendinblue' RFC 6376 
dig +short sendinblue._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sig1' RFC 6376 
dig +short sig1._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'smtp' RFC 6376 
dig +short smtp._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sparkpost' RFC 6376 
dig +short sparkpost._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk1' RFC 6376 
dig +short zendesk1._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk2' RFC 6376 
dig +short zendesk2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer example.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer example.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd example.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.example.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.example.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.example.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.example.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer example.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer example.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer example.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/example.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.example.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://example.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://example.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.18.26.120 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 120.26.18.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 104.18.27.120 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 120.27.18.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4841 runs
DKIM
Verified 4660 runs
DMARC
Verified 4825 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4644 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4822 runs
BIMI
Verified 4659 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4662 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4664 runs
CAA
Verified 4656 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer example.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer example.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer example.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer example.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer example.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short example.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'amazonses' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short amazonses._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'cm' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short cm._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short dkim._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'email' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short email._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'everlytickey1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short everlytickey1._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'fm1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short fm1._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'fm2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short fm2._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'fm3' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short fm3._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google2048' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google2048._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k1._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k2._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mail' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mail._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mailchimp' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mailchimp._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mailer' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mailer._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mailgun' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mailgun._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mailjet' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mailjet._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mandrill' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mandrill._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mimecast' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mimecast._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mx' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mx._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'postmark' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short postmark._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'proofpoint' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short proofpoint._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short protonmail._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short protonmail2._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail3' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short protonmail3._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s1._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s2._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sendgrid' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short sendgrid._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sendinblue' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short sendinblue._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sig1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short sig1._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'smtp' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short smtp._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sparkpost' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short sparkpost._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short zendesk1._domainkey.example.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short zendesk2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer example.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer example.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd example.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.example.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.example.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.example.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.example.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer example.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer example.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer example.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/example.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.example.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://example.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://example.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.18.26.120 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 120.26.18.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 104.18.27.120 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 120.27.18.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

example.com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.