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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 9 Feb 2026, 18:28 UTC
Duration 25.9s
Version v26.10.87
Integrity 77e20b9af681c621ca2782759455d9d8c501c50b947c2ca474118b17fbba699768ee3dc2bea038bba385f46a1a9bdd50ee45ab8c39c31b7b04b99235a7187f99
Subject Domain
cloudflare.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

cloudflare.com
9 Feb 2026, 18:28 UTC · 25.9s ·v26.10.87 · SHA-3-512: 77e2✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Cloudflare
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: SECURE (Monitoring)
4 protocols configured, 3 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
1 monitoring
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Protected
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Configured
Monitoring
DKIM (MailChimp, MailChimp (Mandrill), SendGrid, Zendesk only — not verified for Google Workspace)
Configured
DMARC (email spoofing protection), DNSSEC (DNS responses signed), CAA (certificate issuance restricted), BIMI (brand logo configured)
Not Configured
DANE/TLSA (certificate pinning for mail transport), MTA-STS (email TLS policy), TLS-RPT (TLS delivery reporting)
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: SECURE
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.yourdomain.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.yourdomain.com TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
RFC 8461
Medium Enable DKIM for Google Workspace

DKIM is only configured for third-party services, not your primary email platform (Google Workspace). Enable DKIM signing in Google Workspace settings to cover all outbound mail.

RFC 6376 §2.1
Medium Upgrade DKIM keys to 2048-bit

Rotate your DKIM keys to use 2048-bit RSA. Most email providers support this in their admin console.

RFC 6376 §3.3.3
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
Cloudflare, Inc. (Registrant: DATA REDACTED)
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Cf-Emailsecurity.Net
Email: Enabled
Web Hosting
Cloudflare
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Cloudflare Enterprise
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No
Verdict: DMARC policy is reject - spoofed messages will be blocked by receiving servers. Note: DKIM found for MailChimp, MailChimp (Mandrill), SendGrid, Zendesk only — primary mail platform (Google Workspace) DKIM not verified.

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 6/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 6/10 lookups

v=spf1 ip4:199.15.212.0/22 ip4:173.245.48.0/20 include:_spf.google.com include:spf1.mcsv.net include:spf.mandrillapp.com include:mail.zendesk.com include:stspg-customer.com include:_spf.salesforce.com -all
RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:rua@cloudflare.com,mailto:cloudflare@dmarc.area1reports.com; ruf=mailto:cloudflare@dmarc.area1reports.com
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
Forensic reports (ruf) configured - many providers ignore these
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Third-party only
Third-Party Only 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 5 selector(s) (2048-bit) but none for primary mail platform (Google Workspace)

DKIM verified for MailChimp, MailChimp (Mandrill), SendGrid, Zendesk only — no DKIM found for primary mail platform (Google Workspace). The primary provider may use custom selectors not discoverable through standard checks.
Know your DKIM selector? Re-scan with a custom selector to verify.
1024-bit key (weak, upgrade to 2048)
k1._domainkey MailChimp 2048-bit
k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDbNrX2cY/GUKIFx2G/1I00ftdAj713WP9AQ1xir85i89sA2guU0ta4UX1Xzm06XIU6iBP41VwmPwBGRNofhBVR+e6WHUoNyIR4Bn84LVcfZE20rmDeXQblIupNWBqLXM1Q+VieI/eZu/7k9/vOkLSaQQdml4Cv8lb3PcnluMVIhQIDAQAB;
mandrill._domainkey MailChimp (Mandrill) 2048-bit
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCrLHiExVd55zd/IQ/J/mRwSRMAocV/hMB3jXwaHH36d9NaVynQFYV8NaWi69c1veUtRzGt7yAioXqLj7Z4TeEUoOLgrKsn8YnckGs9i3B3tVFB+Ch/4mPhXWiNfNdynHWBcPcbJ8kjEQ2U8y78dHZj1YeRXXVvWob2OaKynO8/lQIDAQAB
s1._domainkey SendGrid
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA1m74n5R+xcz+ICbNBWRIlQeHI65Hjp67+P59XSe71jItafrcJ4/5y/UvU+uNg7KNeOcEsotGo7QvLN87hqZSZqfzVyyGnQuEUXoKPdKokD6Pa5KmJSqbA5Y/f977HpikU9Xtd7Orc7ctRLK6H5QFvGwRi+oC9NRkgNB55UUnLbbkKK+LGeTw4Ghmr5gupw7iYzFXZ" "1qlFNqV6s9Pmgb+b7oDv+OfQxB/MJyUzQ5eWdKlJWfmW3s77J3fHFfysUbKKUBxEXPxNiMFRG1ClllZ4+AYRh1jrFpjbvZ5j43kqahKXeHDNkF+Gpptd7ufWIevAPTQDSVdKB9vyJQN6wfcQQIDAQAB
zendesk1._domainkey Zendesk 1024-bit
v=DKIM1;t=s;n=core;k=rsa;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA9IqdLrO3Zr2/56MHt8oQVCQorP0Bl2Fz9sM2tFBnJCdB/HogQmuudEg2xAovCN2PYpw44UijIvPuBoT9vxiv6ZCBJTLJXa82r6ke5rE4tbe9" "NKFIrVIb9S306cJDrnKFMDb8p0dU/Su0+eUR5gVAOtCuz2L8HAzs5edvsEvD/Fb4ny1RLNSEPZkIQLfGhVxQeWANm3+1Jwb/OBVXV9k0nKpWrpgqcmO7NzroJirp014RQY7rGi60JLUubc6XhvoFQBQrtOAdVlZC5wvfS1bgpq5kQpdP7cajIqWCeqxPTeo0ZUpey2ZcaygEsZz0Z3Gs5wDzyuqd7/ADpr2jNF7ozwIDAQAB
zendesk2._domainkey Zendesk
v=DKIM1; t=s; n=core; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAmiSFNkgXrO3I8aOaPONDZWHv027rkiGIwb838OyXPgvFDEkCV/qGcdXSjZnaVAadrTm/oKnL8WOltP9zB1FLEuKt0fTi5zRyKPE4oIYCnEzXwrGqzjUcCABQBawQV" "qvXjDOaYh9Lhp8W5PYOLo905vRW7ipyIMDhuzBOJls91/WWXnNK0OwP3RghiisZjA3K2KqtRwf7w6GjNeNuAMNhvcmgAN15d/mhK+dev/hcRbal66RoYyTD8c0F0isahWH0envEX8aj+SBhheNk0/U37dGE+4nFaY5yP9CUlYjFKDSIKZgHzG4Hci3t/RubU58pi6BCrQQdAFvIOeDFeCZ0ywIDAQAB
RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 4 MX hosts)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: Attackers cannot easily spoof your logo or obtain fraudulent TLS certificates.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Success VMC SVG

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? Yes

BIMI with VMC certificate (from Verified CA)

VMC certificate accessible (from Verified CA) - logo displays in Gmail, Apple Mail, and all major providers.
v=BIMI1; l=https://www.cloudflare.com/cloudflare_1171114652.svg; a=https://www.cloudflare.com/cloudflare_1171114652.pem
BIMI Logo
Logo validated (SVG) View full logo

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success IODEF

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only Sectigo, Let's Encrypt, DigiCert, ssl.com, cansignhttpexchanges=yes can issue certificates (including wildcards)

Authorized CAs: Sectigo Let's Encrypt DigiCert ssl.com cansignhttpexchanges=yes
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
0 iodef "mailto:tls-abuse@cloudflare.com"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?
Verdict: DNS responses are authenticated from the root downward. Delegation is verified.

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256

DNSSEC fully configured and validated - AD flag confirmed by resolver

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
2371 13 2 32996839A6D808AFE3EB4A795A0E6A7A39A76FC52FF228B22B76F6D63826F2B9

NS Delegation Verified

5 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns3.cloudflare.com ns4.cloudflare.com ns5.cloudflare.com ns6.cloudflare.com ns7.cloudflare.com
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 4 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

104.16.133.229
104.16.132.229
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2606:4700::6810:84e5
2606:4700::6810:85e5
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net.
10 mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net.
5 mxa-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net.
5 mxb-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Cf-Emailsecurity.Net

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 4 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? Unavailable
How did we find these?
Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962).
Re-Analyze to Retry CT Lookup

Passive discovery using Certificate Transparency Logs — publicly auditable records of every TLS certificate ever issued. CT log service was slow or unavailable — showing DNS-probed subdomains only

Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 2 / 0 records
104.16.133.229
—
104.16.132.229
—
AAAA 2 / 0 records
2606:4700::6810:84e5
—
2606:4700::6810:85e5
—
CAA RFC 8659 §4 11 / 0 records
0 iodef "mailto:tls-abuse@cloudflare.com"
—
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
—
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
—
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
—
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
—
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
—
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
—
0 issue "comodoca.com"
—
0 issue "ssl.com"
—
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
—
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
—
DMARC _dmarc.cloudflare.com RFC 7489 §6.3 1 / 0 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:rua@cloudflare.com,mailto:cloudflare@dmarc.area1reports.com; ruf=mailto:cloudflare@dmarc.area1reports.com
—
MTA-STS _mta-sts.cloudflare.com RFC 8461 §3 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 4 / 0 records
10 mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net.
—
10 mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net.
—
5 mxa-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net.
—
5 mxb-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net.
—
NS RFC 1035 5 / 0 records
ns4.cloudflare.com.
—
ns6.cloudflare.com.
—
ns5.cloudflare.com.
—
ns7.cloudflare.com.
—
ns3.cloudflare.com.
—
SOA RFC 1035 1 / 0 records
ns3.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2395431159 10000 2400 604800 300
—
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.cloudflare.com RFC 8460 §3 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
TXT RFC 7208 §4 25 / 0 records
v=spf1 ip4:199.15.212.0/22 ip4:173.245.48.0/20 include:_spf.google.com include:spf1.mcsv.net include:spf.mandrillapp.com include:mail.zendesk.com include:stspg-customer.com include:_spf.salesforce.com -all
—
logmein-verification-code=b3433c86-3823-4808-8a7e-58042469f654
—
ZOOM_verify_7LFBvOO9SIigypFG2xRlMA
—
docker-verification=c578e21c-34fb-4474-9b90-d55ee4cba10c
—
google-site-verification=C7thfNeXVahkVhniiqTI1iSVnElKR_kBBtnEHkeGDlo
—
_neqmkgaq1lq9it5s8qmetrhbnu121wb
—
canva-site-verification=oOyaVnHC-OiFoR1BPvetNA
—
miro-verification=bdd7dfa0a49adfb43ad6ddfaf797633246c07356
—
google-site-verification=ZdlQZLBBAPkxeFTCM1rpiB_ibtGff_JF5KllNKwDR9I
—
stripe-verification=bf1a94e6b16ace2502a4a7fff574a25c8a45291054960c883c59be39d1788db9
—
atlassian-domain-verification=WxxKyN9aLnjEsoOjUYI6T0bb5vcqmKzaIkC9Rx2QkNb751G3LL/cus8/ZDOgh8xB
—
_wkjc0fot0d7qrvrdt78bxkj2e2o67d2
—
_saml-domain-challenge.2dc00405-79cd-457b-b288-a119c6f0c7b7.71996d53-d178-4ba9-bef4-7f7e46edab74.cloudflare.com=1c8736fd-84b2-4197-985f-3fb2852f2457
—
apple-domain-verification=DNnWJoArJobFJKhJ
—
drift-domain-verification=f037808a26ae8b25bc13b1f1f2b4c3e0f78c03e67f24cefdd4ec520efa8e719f
—
status-page-domain-verification=r14frwljwbxs
—
MS=ms70274184
—
creatopy-domain-verification=97d2ca50-9b6f-4a21-9bdb-fbb630e4cec7
—
asv=894f6d1f9f83bcf44e4b1bc40bc1c4aa
—
uber-domain-verification=58086039-150a-42a4-a4be-b4032921aa0f
—
onetrust-domain-verification=bd5cd08a1e9644799fdb98ed7d60c9cb
—
cisco-ci-domain-verification=27e926884619804ef987ae4aa1c4168f6b152ada84f4c8bfc74eb2bd2912ad72
—
stripe-verification=5096d01ff2cf194285dd51cae18f24fa9c26dc928cebac3636d462b4c6925623
—
facebook-domain-verification=h9mm6zopj6p2po54woa16m5bskm6oo
—
liveramp-site-verification=EhH1MqgwbndTWl1AN64hOTKz7hc1s80yUpchLbgpfY0
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

77e20b9af681c621ca2782759455d9d8c501c50b947c2ca474118b17fbba699768ee3dc2bea038bba385f46a1a9bdd50ee45ab8c39c31b7b04b99235a7187f99
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 9 Feb 2026, 18:28 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-cloudflare.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-cloudflare.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-cloudflare.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-cloudflare.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/472/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for cloudflare.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short cloudflare.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.cloudflare.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' RFC 6376 
dig +short k1._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mandrill' RFC 6376 
dig +short mandrill._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' RFC 6376 
dig +short s1._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk1' RFC 6376 
dig +short zendesk1._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk2' RFC 6376 
dig +short zendesk2._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer cloudflare.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd cloudflare.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net TLSA
Check TLSA record for mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net TLSA
Check TLSA record for mxa-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxa-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net TLSA
Check TLSA record for mxb-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxb-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net:25 -servername mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.cloudflare.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.cloudflare.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.cloudflare.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.cloudflare.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/cloudflare.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net:25 -servername mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.cloudflare.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://cloudflare.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://cloudflare.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://cloudflare.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.16.133.229 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 229.133.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 104.16.132.229 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 229.132.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4853 runs
DKIM
Verified 4672 runs
DMARC
Verified 4837 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4656 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4834 runs
BIMI
Verified 4671 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4674 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4676 runs
CAA
Verified 4668 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short cloudflare.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.cloudflare.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k1._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mandrill' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mandrill._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s1._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short zendesk1._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short zendesk2._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer cloudflare.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd cloudflare.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net TLSA
Check TLSA record for mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net TLSA
Check TLSA record for mxa-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxa-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net TLSA
Check TLSA record for mxb-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxb-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net:25 -servername mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.cloudflare.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.cloudflare.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.cloudflare.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.cloudflare.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/cloudflare.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net:25 -servername mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.cloudflare.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://cloudflare.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://cloudflare.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://cloudflare.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.16.133.229 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 229.133.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 104.16.132.229 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 229.132.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

cloudflare.com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.