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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 26 Feb 2026, 14:37 UTC
Duration 60.0s
Version v26.26.30
Integrity b19de3a0bb333170324bd66392f0b4bd6b910b606e407d2f2665f37923fba50d0d13c1340ee66eaa5f2fb14edc9aa15936131b988d2a8b9564c4318effd0371c
Subject Domain
fredduval.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

fredduval.com
26 Feb 2026, 14:37 UTC · 60.0s ·v26.26.30 · SHA-3-512: b19d✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Microsoft 365 1 SaaS Service
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: High Risk
2 protocols configured, 6 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation 1 monitoring
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Good 83/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Good
DNS data is mostly current with minor gaps — good intelligence currency

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
NS 3569s 1 day (86400s) high NS TTL is below typical — observed 3569s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for fredduval.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: GoDaddy — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS ns21.domaincontrol.com
Serial 2024082701
Admin dns.jomax.net
Provider GoDaddy
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh28800s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry7200sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)600s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s).
RFC 1912 §2.2

Independent RFC compliance assessment for GoDaddy. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

Minimum TTL enforced at 600s RFC 1035 §3.2.1

GoDaddy enforces a minimum TTL of 600 seconds (10 minutes). RFC 1035 defines TTL as a value between 0 and 2^31−1 seconds, with no mandated minimum. The 600-second floor prevents administrators from setting shorter TTLs that may be needed for ACME challenges or rapid failover scenarios.

Imposes restriction not required by RFCs
This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 12 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 53.5s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
Publish a DMARC record starting with p=none and rua reporting
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Configured
SPF, DKIM (inferred via Microsoft 365)
Not Configured
DMARC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DNSSEC, CAA
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Moderate Risk
Critical Publish DMARC Record

Add a DMARC record to protect your domain against email spoofing and receive authentication reports.

DMARC tells receivers how to handle mail that fails SPF/DKIM checks.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.fredduval.com (DMARC policy record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@fredduval.com
RFC 7489 §6.3
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostfredduval.com (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.fredduval.com (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@fredduval.com
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.fredduval.com (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=fredduval.com
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
GoDaddy.com, LLC
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Microsoft 365
Limited Protection
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
GoDaddy
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Likely SPF alone cannot prevent spoofing

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:outlook.com ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? No policy published
Warning

No DMARC record found

RFC Stance: RFC 7489 is classified as Informational (not Standards Track). DMARC is a widely adopted industry practice but is not an IETF-mandated standard.
Operational Security: Without DMARC, receiving mail servers have no policy for handling SPF/DKIM failures. Spoofed messages may be delivered to recipients.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Provider-managed
Provider Verified

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

Microsoft 365 detected as primary mail platform — DKIM signing is managed by the provider. The primary provider may use custom selectors not discoverable through standard checks.
Know your DKIM selector? Re-scan with a custom selector to verify.
RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Microsoft 365

Microsoft 365 does not support DANE for inbound mail. Microsoft uses its own certificate pinning mechanism.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Yes No DMARC policy (RFC 7489) — attackers can send email appearing to be from this domain with no sender-authentication barrier

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns21.domaincontrol.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: ns21.domaincontrol.com, ns22.domaincontrol.com

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns21.domaincontrol.com No N/A N/A OK
ns22.domaincontrol.com No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 3600s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns21.domaincontrol.com: 2.024082701e+09
ns22.domaincontrol.com: 2.024082701e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix 2 Issues

Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for fredduval.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Findings:
  • ns21.domaincontrol.com: UDP unreachable on port 53
  • ns22.domaincontrol.com: UDP unreachable on port 53
Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns21.domaincontrol.com 97.74.100.11 2603:5:2141::b AS26496 2024082701
ns22.domaincontrol.com 173.201.68.11 2603:5:2241::b AS44273 2024082701
Unique ASNs
2
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
2
Diversity Score
Good

2 ASNs, 2 /24 prefixes across 2 nameservers

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Transport security inferred from 1 signal(s) — no enforcement policy active

Policy Assessment Primary
  • Microsoft 365 enforces TLS 1.2+ with DANE (GA Oct 2024) and valid certificates
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 0 unique ASN(s) across 2 IP address(es)

IPv4 Mappings:
76.223.105.230 → AS ()
13.248.243.5 → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 1 service

1 SaaS service detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Microsoft 365 MS=ms84868321
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Enterprise DNS Context: DNSSEC is the only standardized, DNS-verifiable mechanism that cryptographically authenticates responses between authoritative servers and resolvers (RFC 4033 §2, RFC 4035). Without it, DNS responses are technically vulnerable to in-transit tampering. Enterprise operators may employ compensating controls (anycast, DDoS mitigation, private peering, TSIG) — however, these do not provide DNS-layer data authentication to third-party resolvers and are not verifiable via DNS alone.
Visibility: DNS-only — network-layer compensating controls cannot be observed or verified through DNS queries. This assessment reflects what is provable from the DNS evidence available.

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns21.domaincontrol.com ns22.domaincontrol.com
Managed DNS
All 2 nameservers hosted by GoDaddy. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): GoDaddy
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

76.223.105.230
13.248.243.5
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

10 fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Microsoft 365

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 2 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962). The CT log server returned an error.
Re-Analyze to Retry CT Lookup
CT logs unavailable 2 current 0 expired 2 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
email.fredduval.com DNS Current email.secureserver.net — — —
ftp.fredduval.com DNS Current fredduval.com — — —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 2 / 2 records
76.223.105.230
76.223.105.230
13.248.243.5
13.248.243.5
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
10 fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com.
10 fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
ns21.domaincontrol.com.
ns21.domaincontrol.com.
ns22.domaincontrol.com.
ns22.domaincontrol.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns21.domaincontrol.com. dns.jomax.net. 2024082701 28800 7200 604800 600
ns21.domaincontrol.com. dns.jomax.net. 2024082701 28800 7200 604800 600
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
v=spf1 include:outlook.com ~all
MS=ms84868321
MS=ms84868321
v=spf1 include:outlook.com ~all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

b19de3a0bb333170324bd66392f0b4bd6b910b606e407d2f2665f37923fba50d0d13c1340ee66eaa5f2fb14edc9aa15936131b988d2a8b9564c4318effd0371c
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 26 Feb 2026, 14:37 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-fredduval.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-fredduval.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-fredduval.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-fredduval.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/4700/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for fredduval.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short fredduval.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.fredduval.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.fredduval.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.fredduval.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.fredduval.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.fredduval.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer fredduval.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd fredduval.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com:25 -servername fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.fredduval.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.fredduval.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.fredduval.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.fredduval.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/fredduval.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com:25 -servername fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.fredduval.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://fredduval.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://fredduval.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://fredduval.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 76.223.105.230 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 230.105.223.76.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 13.248.243.5 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 5.243.248.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4843 runs
DKIM
Verified 4662 runs
DMARC
Verified 4827 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4646 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4824 runs
BIMI
Verified 4661 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4664 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4666 runs
CAA
Verified 4658 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short fredduval.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.fredduval.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.fredduval.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.fredduval.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.fredduval.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.fredduval.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer fredduval.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd fredduval.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com:25 -servername fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.fredduval.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.fredduval.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.fredduval.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.fredduval.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer fredduval.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/fredduval.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com:25 -servername fredduval-com.mail.eo.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.fredduval.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://fredduval.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://fredduval.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://fredduval.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 76.223.105.230 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 230.105.223.76.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 13.248.243.5 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 5.243.248.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

fredduval.com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.