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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 25 Feb 2026, 21:10 UTC
Duration 57.2s
Version v26.26.14
Integrity 3f24b0b1312ac20dd39d60fcae15c7a83389d2dd3270a0cacc4a503d08a6e3c0a4731fcc45c2ac7a6de9eb87ba0988c274e0bdcee5de9a2c933b7772d8f458a6
Subject Domain
franklinroadacademy.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

franklinroadacademy.com
25 Feb 2026, 21:10 UTC · 57.2s ·v26.26.14 · SHA-3-512: 3f24✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Barracuda 2 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
3 protocols configured, 5 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC deployment phase — quarantine fully enforced with reporting, consider upgrading to reject Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Adequate 75/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
MX 1 minute (60s) 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 1 minute (60s) 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 1 minute (60s) 1 day (86400s) high NS TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for franklinroadacademy.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS dns2.cloudns.net
Serial 2025112003
Admin steveninnashville.gmail.com
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh7200s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry1800sFraction of Refresh
Expire1209600s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)3600s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 18 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 50.9s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
Upgrade DMARC policy from quarantine to reject (p=reject) for maximum spoofing protection
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (quarantine, 100%), DKIM
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DNSSEC, CAA
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Secure
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Medium Upgrade DMARC to Reject

Your DMARC policy is set to quarantine. Upgrade to p=reject for maximum protection — reject instructs receivers to discard spoofed mail entirely rather than quarantining it.

A reject policy provides the strongest protection against domain spoofing.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.franklinroadacademy.com (update existing DMARC record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@franklinroadacademy.com
RFC 7489 §6.3
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostfranklinroadacademy.com (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.franklinroadacademy.com (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@franklinroadacademy.com
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.franklinroadacademy.com (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=franklinroadacademy.com
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
Network Solutions, LLC
Registrar for franklinroadacademy.com
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Barracuda
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 4/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 4/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf.renweb.com include:sender.ultracamp.com include:mailgun.org -all
RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC enforcement is partial (quarantine). -all may preempt DKIM/DMARC evaluation at some receivers. Consider p=reject for full enforcement; ~all is more DMARC-compatible.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Quarantined, not rejected
Success p=quarantine

DMARC policy quarantine (100%) - good protection

v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;pct=100;rua=mailto:comptons@franklinroadacademy.com;ruf=mailto:comptons@franklinroadacademy.com;ri=86400;fo=1
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
Advanced cryptographic posture detected. Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC deployment phase — quarantine fully enforced with reporting, consider upgrading to reject
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
Monitoring Posture Note: Quarantine sequesters authentication failures while preserving full DMARC forensic telemetry (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain quarantine rather than reject as a deliberate monitoring strategy — failed messages are processed and reported but sequestered from the inbox. See NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1 for enforcement tradeoffs.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found

Found DKIM records for 2 selector(s)

Mail routed through Barracuda (security gateway) — DKIM signed by Microsoft 365 (sending platform). This is a standard enterprise architecture.
selector1._domainkey Microsoft 365
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDTcNihHjw2jXVMpDTTDv1JYUiyjJAY1vrxgaT0qEV4PyCyOlvyuU3LNOpp5ny5NHkOkpK2rPjfqd/JMtpUvMe8rzpN0ancHdp0k+gyVP1KA6pedMAHvFQE9ZewiWQHjd7dZvc2vm7kjIWk+kTeiptWXPlagJ7gqjznakyUStAJhQIDAQAB; n=1024,1453273121,1468997921
selector2._domainkey Microsoft 365
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAvWVPkk1VyGyKUJVDbI1+Tpc+n/FSsWK3i+wageMLl181uysq6ujiVuW4mncevCElKXFUYy0bL95lyxw3sSsyNfCz6zsJI0l8Z9mjFyQqZD68ayNMNzLpZ2fIaoEE4OM+dR3OBxIiGxgdqpwwYUhtggyB/plau0zGKKdE+l2hHLzAyiBZtIQKKXWEVvF+H18Vw6NahWYpwICaDf2JmuJ+HvCCtC0+5QDNH4TvTxZ8LdFyad0B8XwnJLvFwESIph5BB13WoI39unKJQsm1cZpEhXplWbJZDQqCfuO7Inr5MW4Ycol2QoXST9JeGzkSgtOW2asLb/S54p6oaCLi+Twl2QIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Barracuda does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Barracuda

Barracuda is a security gateway with shared MX infrastructure. It does not publish per-customer TLSA records.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Barracuda does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC quarantine flags but does not reject spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3) — no BIMI or CAA (RFC 8659) reinforcement leaves brand impersonation largely unaddressed

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Partial RFC 9116

security.txt found but missing required fields

Contact

Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.3)

Expires

Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.5)
Source: https://franklinroadacademy.com/.well-known/security.txt
Missing required Contact field (RFC 9116 §2.5.3)
Missing required Expires field (RFC 9116 §2.5.5)
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? Yes

AI governance signals observed

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? Yes
llms.txt found — domain provides structured context for LLMs
llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context)
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (3 items)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
llms_txt_found llms.txt file found providing structured LLM context info Observed
llms_full_txt_found llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context) info Observed
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on dns6.cloudns.net — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: dns6.cloudns.net, dns1.cloudns.net, dns2.cloudns.net

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
dns1.cloudns.net No N/A N/A OK
dns2.cloudns.net No N/A N/A OK
dns6.cloudns.net No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 60s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

dns1.cloudns.net: 2.025112003e+09
dns2.cloudns.net: 2.025112003e+09
dns6.cloudns.net: 2.025112003e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 3 nameserver(s) for franklinroadacademy.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
dns6.cloudns.net 185.136.99.77 2a06:fb00:1::4:77 AS203391 2025112003
dns1.cloudns.net 185.136.96.77 2a06:fb00:1::1:77 AS203391 2025112003
dns2.cloudns.net 185.136.97.77 2a06:fb00:1::2:77 AS203391 2025112003
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
3
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 3 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

All 2 server(s) verified: encrypted transport confirmed via direct SMTP probe and DNS policy

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
MX Host STARTTLS TLS Version Cipher Certificate
d131868a.ess.barracudanetworks.com TLSv1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 Valid
Expires: 2026-11-03 (251 days)
Issuer: DigiCert Inc
d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com N/A N/A Invalid
TLS handshake failed: read tcp 76.13.61.227:58516->209.222.82.253:25: i/o timeout
Multi-Vantage Probe Results
Split verdict 2 probes, 2 responded
US-East (Kali/02) observed
Partial TLS support
8.97562114s
US-East (Boston) observed
All servers support TLS
12.11s
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 1 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS13335 Cloudflare, Inc. US
IPv4 Mappings:
104.17.71.73 → AS13335 (104.17.64.0/20)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 2 services

2 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Apple apple-domain-verification=WRnrbpxqvMH68zw1
Google Workspace google-site-verification=xdCCLv3FsqsxK-fE7FD77vbM3loQtqW97ux0MZ16jk0
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

3 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: dns1.cloudns.net dns2.cloudns.net dns6.cloudns.net
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

104.17.71.73
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

1 d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com.
0 d131868a.ess.barracudanetworks.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Barracuda

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 3 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
4 unique certificates 3 current 0 expired 1 CNAME Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Certificate Authority Diversity (1 CA observed across CT log history)
Certificate Authority Certs First Issued Last Issued Status
Let's Encrypt 4 2026-01-09 2026-01-10 Active
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
autodiscover.franklinroadacademy.com
80/tcp Microsoft IIS httpd
DNS Current autodiscover.outlook.com — — —
helpdesk.franklinroadacademy.com DNS Current — — — —
www.franklinroadacademy.com
80/tcp Cloudflare http proxy 443/tcp Cloudflare http proxy
CT Log Current franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com 4 2026-01-10T09:55:55 Let's Encrypt
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
104.17.71.73
104.17.71.73
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.franklinroadacademy.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;pct=100;rua=mailto:comptons@franklinroadacademy.com;ruf=mailto:comptons@franklinroadacademy.com;ri=86400;fo=1
v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;pct=100;rua=mailto:comptons@franklinroadacademy.com;ruf=mailto:comptons@franklinroadacademy.com;ri=86400;fo=1
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
1 d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com.
0 d131868a.ess.barracudanetworks.com.
0 d131868a.ess.barracudanetworks.com.
1 d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 3 / 3 records
dns1.cloudns.net.
dns6.cloudns.net.
dns6.cloudns.net.
dns2.cloudns.net.
dns2.cloudns.net.
dns1.cloudns.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
dns2.cloudns.net. steveninnashville.gmail.com. 2025112003 7200 1800 1209600 3600
dns2.cloudns.net. steveninnashville.gmail.com. 2025112003 7200 1800 1209600 3600
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 3 / 3 records
v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf.renweb.com include:sender.ultracamp.com include:mailgun.org -all
apple-domain-verification=WRnrbpxqvMH68zw1
apple-domain-verification=WRnrbpxqvMH68zw1
google-site-verification=xdCCLv3FsqsxK-fE7FD77vbM3loQtqW97ux0MZ16jk0
google-site-verification=xdCCLv3FsqsxK-fE7FD77vbM3loQtqW97ux0MZ16jk0
v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf.renweb.com include:sender.ultracamp.com include:mailgun.org -all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

3f24b0b1312ac20dd39d60fcae15c7a83389d2dd3270a0cacc4a503d08a6e3c0a4731fcc45c2ac7a6de9eb87ba0988c274e0bdcee5de9a2c933b7772d8f458a6
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 25 Feb 2026, 21:10 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-franklinroadacademy.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-franklinroadacademy.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-franklinroadacademy.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-franklinroadacademy.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/4544/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for franklinroadacademy.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short franklinroadacademy.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.franklinroadacademy.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd franklinroadacademy.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for d131868a.ess.barracudanetworks.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.d131868a.ess.barracudanetworks.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com:25 -servername d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.franklinroadacademy.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.franklinroadacademy.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/franklinroadacademy.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com:25 -servername d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.franklinroadacademy.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://franklinroadacademy.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://franklinroadacademy.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://franklinroadacademy.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.17.71.73 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 73.71.17.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4850 runs
DKIM
Verified 4669 runs
DMARC
Verified 4834 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4653 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4831 runs
BIMI
Verified 4668 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4671 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4673 runs
CAA
Verified 4665 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short franklinroadacademy.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.franklinroadacademy.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd franklinroadacademy.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for d131868a.ess.barracudanetworks.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.d131868a.ess.barracudanetworks.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com:25 -servername d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.franklinroadacademy.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.franklinroadacademy.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer franklinroadacademy.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/franklinroadacademy.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com:25 -servername d131868b.ess.barracudanetworks.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.franklinroadacademy.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://franklinroadacademy.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://franklinroadacademy.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://franklinroadacademy.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.17.71.73 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 73.71.17.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

franklinroadacademy.com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.