Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.
| Record Type | Observed TTL | Typical TTL | Severity | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAA | 5 minutes (300s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | CAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| AAAA | 5 minutes (300s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high |
AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.
|
| SOA | 5 minutes (300s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high |
SOA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: Cloudflare manages SOA timers automatically. Free/Pro/Business plans cannot modify SOA values. Observed TTL (5 minutes (300s)) is set by Cloudflare, not the zone administrator. See RFC 1912 §2.2 for recommended SOA timer values.
|
| TXT | 5 minutes (300s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | TXT TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| MX | 213s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | MX TTL is below typical — observed 213s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| NS | 6 hours (21600s) |
1 day (86400s) |
medium | NS TTL is below typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| A | 5 minutes (300s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high |
A TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.
|
Big Picture Questions
- How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
- Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
- Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
- Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
ns3.cloudflare.com
2397350190
dns.cloudflare.com
| Timer | Value | RFC 1912 Range |
|---|---|---|
| Refresh | 10000s | 1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs) |
| Retry | 2400s | Fraction of Refresh |
| Expire | 604800s | 1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days) |
| Minimum (Neg. Cache) | 300s | 300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day) |
Independent RFC compliance assessment for Cloudflare. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.
Cloudflare sets SOA Expire to 604,800 seconds (7 days). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). This means secondary nameservers stop serving the zone sooner if the primary becomes unreachable. Cloudflare's position is that their anycast architecture makes traditional zone transfer semantics less relevant. SOA timers are not editable on Free, Pro, or Business plans.
Cloudflare overrides the zone administrator's TTL to 300 seconds for all proxied (orange-cloud) records. RFC 2181 §5.2 requires TTL uniformity within an RRset but does not mandate a specific value. As the authoritative server, Cloudflare is technically within its rights, but the administrator loses TTL control. This can affect ACME DNS-01 challenges and automation workflows that depend on rapid propagation.
RFC 1912 recommends YYYYMMDDNN format for SOA serial numbers (e.g., 2026022501). Cloudflare uses a proprietary serial number format that does not encode the date. RFC 1035 only requires the serial to increment on changes, so this is compliant with the mandatory standard but breaks the convention relied on by monitoring tools.
Cloudflare's SOA MINIMUM (negative cache TTL) is 1,800–3,600 seconds (30–60 minutes). This controls how long resolvers cache NXDOMAIN responses. Newly created DNS records — including ACME DNS-01 challenge TXT records for Let's Encrypt — may be invisible for up to 1 hour even after creation. This causes certificate issuance failures for automation tools like cert-manager and Traefik. Workaround: pre-create placeholder records before they're needed. This is RFC-compliant but aggressive compared to the 300–900 seconds common at other providers.
In February 2022, Cloudflare's resolver (1.1.1.1) returned CNAME responses with mismatched TTLs within the same RRset — including cases where one TTL was zero and another was non-zero. RFC 2181 §5.2 explicitly states: 'the TTLs of all RRs in an RRSet must be the same.' systemd-resolved (used by Arch Linux, Ubuntu, Fedora, and most modern Linux distributions) correctly rejected these responses per the RFC, causing widespread DNS resolution failures. Cloudflare acknowledged the issue and it appears to have been fixed, but it demonstrated that Cloudflare's DNS infrastructure can deviate from RFC requirements in ways that break compliant resolver implementations.
TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _smtp._tls.cloudflare.com (SMTP TLS reporting record) |
| Value | v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@cloudflare.com |
MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _mta-sts.cloudflare.com (MTA-STS policy record) |
| Value | v=STSv1; id=cloudflare.com |
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced
SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified
SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 6/10 lookups
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.
DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified
DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection
pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified
Found DKIM records for 6 selector(s)
l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail),
weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3),
DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)
MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified
No MTA-STS record found
MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.
TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified
No TLS-RPT record found
DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1
1 of 1 external reporting domains missing authorization
| External Domain | Authorization | Auth Record |
|---|---|---|
dmarc.area1reports.com |
Unauthorized | — |
Third-Party Action Required
This authorization record must be created by the external reporting provider, not by you. Per RFC 7489 §7.1, the receiving domain must publish a TXT record to confirm it accepts DMARC reports from your domain.
What to do: Contact your DMARC reporting provider and ask them to publish the authorization TXT record shown above. If you use a managed DMARC service (e.g., Ondmarc, Dmarcian, Valimail), this is typically handled during onboarding — reach out to their support if the record is missing.
Impact if unresolved: Compliant receivers may silently discard aggregate or forensic reports destined for the unauthorized address, reducing your DMARC visibility.
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 4 MX hosts)
Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:
- DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
- MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? No DMARC reject policy enforced (RFC 7489 §6.3), BIMI brand verification active (BIMI Spec), and certificate issuance restricted by CAA (RFC 8659 §4) — all three brand-faking vectors addressed
BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Success VMC SVG
BIMI with VMC certificate (from Verified CA)
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success IODEF
CAA configured - only cansignhttpexchanges=yes, Let's Encrypt, Sectigo, DigiCert, ssl.com can issue certificates (wildcard issuance: Sectigo, Let's Encrypt, DigiCert, ssl.com, cansignhttpexchanges=yes per RFC 8659 §4.3)
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Partial RFC 9116
security.txt found with issues
Contact
Expires
Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.5)Policy
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No
No AI governance measures detected
llms.txt llmstxt.org
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it.
Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Evidence Log (1 item)
| Type | Detail | Severity | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks |
robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives | low | Observed |
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No
No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.
What type of scan is this?
This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.
Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.
Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.
DNS Server Security Hardened
No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns4.cloudflare.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.
| Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Zone Transfer (AXFR) | Denied | Zone transfer denied (correct configuration) |
| Open Recursion | Disabled | Recursion disabled (correct configuration) |
| Nameserver Identity | Hidden | No nameserver identity information disclosed |
| Cache Snooping | Protected | Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration) |
Tested nameservers: ns4.cloudflare.com, ns3.cloudflare.com, ns7.cloudflare.com, ns6.cloudflare.com, ns5.cloudflare.com
Delegation Consistency 6 Issues
Delegation consistency: 6 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.
- In-bailiwick NS ns3.cloudflare.com has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
- In-bailiwick NS ns4.cloudflare.com has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
- In-bailiwick NS ns5.cloudflare.com has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
- In-bailiwick NS ns6.cloudflare.com has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
- In-bailiwick NS ns7.cloudflare.com has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
- Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone
DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned
| DS Key Tag | DS Algorithm | DNSKEY Key Tag | DNSKEY Algorithm |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2371 | 13 | 2371 | 13 |
Glue Record Completeness Incomplete
| Nameserver | In-Bailiwick | IPv4 Glue | IPv6 Glue | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
ns3.cloudflare.com |
Missing | |||
ns4.cloudflare.com |
Missing | |||
ns5.cloudflare.com |
Missing | |||
ns6.cloudflare.com |
Missing | |||
ns7.cloudflare.com |
Missing |
NS TTL Comparison Drift
SOA Serial Consistency Consistent
ns3.cloudflare.com: 2.39735019e+09ns4.cloudflare.com: 2.39735019e+09ns5.cloudflare.com: 2.39735019e+09ns6.cloudflare.com: 2.39735019e+09ns7.cloudflare.com: 2.39735019e+09Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy
Analyzed 5 nameserver(s) for cloudflare.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.
| Nameserver | IPv4 | IPv6 | ASN / Operator | UDP | TCP | AA | SOA Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ns4.cloudflare.com |
162.159.8.55 162.159.1.33 |
2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:121 2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:837 |
AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. |
2397350190 | |||
ns3.cloudflare.com |
162.159.7.226 162.159.0.33 |
2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:7e2 2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:21 |
AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. |
2397350190 | |||
ns7.cloudflare.com |
162.159.6.6 162.159.4.8 |
2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:606 2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:408 |
AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. |
2397350190 | |||
ns5.cloudflare.com |
162.159.9.55 162.159.2.9 |
2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:209 2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:937 |
AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. |
2397350190 | |||
ns6.cloudflare.com |
162.159.3.11 162.159.5.6 |
2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:506 2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:30b |
AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. |
2397350190 |
1 ASN(s), 10 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity
DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue
DNSSEC operational notes: 1 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.
- CDS/CDNSKEY automation present but only single KSK — pre-publish second KSK before rollover
DNSKEY Inventory 2 Keys
| Role | Key Tag | Algorithm | Key Size |
|---|---|---|---|
| ZSK | 34505 | ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 | 256 bits |
| KSK | 2371 | ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 | 256 bits |
RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures
No RRSIG records found.
Denial of Existence NSEC
NSEC records expose zone contents via ordered names (zone walking). Consider NSEC3 for zone enumeration protection.
Rollover Readiness Partial
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
All 4 server(s) verified: encrypted transport confirmed via direct SMTP probe and DNS policy
Policy Assessment Primary
No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).
Telemetry
Live Probe Supplementary
| MX Host | STARTTLS | TLS Version | Cipher | Certificate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net |
TLSv1.3 | TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
Valid
Expires: 2026-08-12 (168 days) Issuer: DigiCert Inc |
|
mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net |
TLSv1.3 | TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | Invalid | |
mxa-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net |
TLSv1.3 | TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | Invalid | |
mxb-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net |
TLSv1.3 | TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | Invalid |
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct
ASN / Network Success
Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)
| ASN | Name | Country |
|---|---|---|
AS13335 |
Cloudflare, Inc. | US |
104.16.133.229 → AS13335 (104.16.128.0/20)104.16.132.229 → AS13335 (104.16.128.0/20)2606:4700::6810:85e5 → AS13335 (2606:4700::/44)2606:4700::6810:84e5 → AS13335 (2606:4700::/44)Edge / CDN Success
Domain appears to use direct origin hosting
SaaS TXT Footprint Success 9 services
9 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records
Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.
| Service | Verification Record |
|---|---|
| Canva | canva-site-verification=oOyaVnHC-OiFoR1BPvetNA |
| Microsoft 365 | MS=ms70274184 |
| Cisco Umbrella | cisco-ci-domain-verification=27e926884619804ef987ae4aa1c4168f6b152ada84f4c8bfc74... |
| Stripe | stripe-verification=bf1a94e6b16ace2502a4a7fff574a25c8a45291054960c883c59be39d178... |
| Miro | miro-verification=bdd7dfa0a49adfb43ad6ddfaf797633246c07356 |
| Atlassian | atlassian-domain-verification=WxxKyN9aLnjEsoOjUYI6T0bb5vcqmKzaIkC9Rx2QkNb751G3LL... |
| Apple | apple-domain-verification=DNnWJoArJobFJKhJ |
| Google Workspace | google-site-verification=ZdlQZLBBAPkxeFTCM1rpiB_ibtGff_JF5KllNKwDR9I |
| Facebook / Meta | facebook-domain-verification=h9mm6zopj6p2po54woa16m5bskm6oo |
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 Modern
DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)
NS Delegation Verified
5 nameserver(s) configured
HTTPS / SVCB Records RFC 9460 Success HTTPS HTTP/3
HTTPS records found, HTTP/3 supported
| Priority | Target | ALPN | ECH | Raw |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | . |
h3, h2 | No | cloudflare.com. 300 IN HTTPS 1 . alpn="h3,h2" ipv4hint="104.16.132.229,104.16.133.229" ipv6hint="2606:4700::6810:84e5,2606:4700::6810:85e5" |
CDS / CDNSKEY (DNSSEC Automation) RFC 7344 Success CDS CDNSKEY
Full RFC 8078 automated DNSSEC key rollover signaling detected (CDS + CDNSKEY)
| Key Tag | Algorithm | Digest Type | Digest |
|---|---|---|---|
2371 |
ECDSAP256SHA256 | 2 | |
| Flags | Protocol | Algorithm | Public Key |
|---|---|---|---|
257 |
3 | ECDSAP256SHA256 | |
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?
AIPv4 Address
AAAAIPv6 Address
MXMail Servers
SRVServices
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 44 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?| Subdomain | Source | Status | Provider / CNAME | Certificates | First Seen | Issuer(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
api.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
auth.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current |
cloudflareauth.cloudflareaccess.com
|
— | — | — |
blog.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
community.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
containers.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
content.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current |
mkto-ab130037.com
|
— | — | — |
crl.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
developer.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
developers.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
dns.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
dns2.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
docs.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
email.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
es.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
events.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
grafana.cloudflare.com
80/tcp
Cloudflare http proxy
443/tcp
Cloudflare http proxy
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
graphql.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
id.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
investors.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
it.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
labs.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
learn.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
live.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
logs.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
notifications.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
notify.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
ns.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
ns1.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
ns2.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
ns3.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
ns4.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
ns5.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
ns6.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
ocsp.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
partners.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
realtime.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
registry.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
sandbox.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
staging.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
stream.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
support.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
teams.cloudflare.com
80/tcp
Cloudflare http proxy
443/tcp
Cloudflare http proxy
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
www.cloudflare.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
ztx-bff.teams.cloudflare.com
|
Nmap SAN | Current | — | — | — | — |
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
104.16.133.229
104.16.132.229
104.16.132.229
104.16.133.229
2606:4700::6810:85e5
2606:4700::6810:84e5
2606:4700::6810:84e5
2606:4700::6810:85e5
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 iodef "mailto:tls-abuse@cloudflare.com"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 iodef "mailto:tls-abuse@cloudflare.com"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:rua@cloudflare.com,mailto:cloudflare@dmarc.area1reports.com; ruf=mailto:cloudflare@dmarc.area1reports.com
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:rua@cloudflare.com,mailto:cloudflare@dmarc.area1reports.com; ruf=mailto:cloudflare@dmarc.area1reports.com
10 mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net.
10 mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net.
10 mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net.
10 mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net.
5 mxa-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net.
5 mxa-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net.
5 mxb-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net.
5 mxb-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net.
ns5.cloudflare.com.
ns3.cloudflare.com.
ns3.cloudflare.com.
ns4.cloudflare.com.
ns6.cloudflare.com.
ns5.cloudflare.com.
ns4.cloudflare.com.
ns6.cloudflare.com.
ns7.cloudflare.com.
ns7.cloudflare.com.
ns3.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2397350190 10000 2400 604800 300
ns3.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2397350190 10000 2400 604800 300
uber-domain-verification=58086039-150a-42a4-a4be-b4032921aa0f
docker-verification=c578e21c-34fb-4474-9b90-d55ee4cba10c
_neqmkgaq1lq9it5s8qmetrhbnu121wb
drift-domain-verification=f037808a26ae8b25bc13b1f1f2b4c3e0f78c03e67f24cefdd4ec520efa8e719f
liveramp-site-verification=EhH1MqgwbndTWl1AN64hOTKz7hc1s80yUpchLbgpfY0
onetrust-domain-verification=bd5cd08a1e9644799fdb98ed7d60c9cb
canva-site-verification=oOyaVnHC-OiFoR1BPvetNA
asv=894f6d1f9f83bcf44e4b1bc40bc1c4aa
MS=ms70274184
cisco-ci-domain-verification=27e926884619804ef987ae4aa1c4168f6b152ada84f4c8bfc74eb2bd2912ad72
_saml-domain-challenge.2dc00405-79cd-457b-b288-a119c6f0c7b7.71996d53-d178-4ba9-bef4-7f7e46edab74.cloudflare.com=1c8736fd-84b2-4197-985f-3fb2852f2457
stripe-verification=bf1a94e6b16ace2502a4a7fff574a25c8a45291054960c883c59be39d1788db9
miro-verification=bdd7dfa0a49adfb43ad6ddfaf797633246c07356
creatopy-domain-verification=97d2ca50-9b6f-4a21-9bdb-fbb630e4cec7
stripe-verification=5096d01ff2cf194285dd51cae18f24fa9c26dc928cebac3636d462b4c6925623
ZOOM_verify_7LFBvOO9SIigypFG2xRlMA
v=spf1 ip4:199.15.212.0/22 ip4:173.245.48.0/20 include:_spf.google.com include:spf1.mcsv.net include:spf.mandrillapp.com include:mail.zendesk.com include:stspg-customer.com include:_spf.salesforce.com -all
status-page-domain-verification=r14frwljwbxs
atlassian-domain-verification=WxxKyN9aLnjEsoOjUYI6T0bb5vcqmKzaIkC9Rx2QkNb751G3LL/cus8/ZDOgh8xB
logmein-verification-code=b3433c86-3823-4808-8a7e-58042469f654
_wkjc0fot0d7qrvrdt78bxkj2e2o67d2
apple-domain-verification=DNnWJoArJobFJKhJ
google-site-verification=ZdlQZLBBAPkxeFTCM1rpiB_ibtGff_JF5KllNKwDR9I
google-site-verification=C7thfNeXVahkVhniiqTI1iSVnElKR_kBBtnEHkeGDlo
facebook-domain-verification=h9mm6zopj6p2po54woa16m5bskm6oo
DNS History Timeline BETA
When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?
Confirm Your Email Configuration
This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.
DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY
All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.
Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.
Intelligence Sources
This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below
This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.
3ded4bca92f0e44673f39c245f06c2ab423ae674adccd13a7cf2bcbea63b5f3600a9502f762938ac69f8d2850bbbed82698bc2f89b55f1d137ed42ea11f6b895
Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.
After downloading, verify with any of these commands:
Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).
cat dns-intelligence-cloudflare.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-cloudflare.com.jsonpython3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-cloudflare.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-cloudflare.com.json.sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/4512/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).
Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for cloudflare.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com Adig +noall +answer cloudflare.com AAAAdig +noall +answer cloudflare.com MXdig +noall +answer cloudflare.com NSdig +noall +answer cloudflare.com TXTEmail Authentication
dig +short cloudflare.com TXT | grep -i spfdig +short _dmarc.cloudflare.com TXTdig +short k1._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXTdig +short mandrill._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXTdig +short s1._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXTdig +short smtpapi._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXTdig +short zendesk1._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXTdig +short zendesk2._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer cloudflare.com DNSKEYdig +noall +answer cloudflare.com DSdig +dnssec +cd cloudflare.com A @1.1.1.1Transport Security
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxa-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxb-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net TLSAopenssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net:25 -servername mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -datesdig +short _mta-sts.cloudflare.com TXTcurl -sL https://mta-sts.cloudflare.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txtdig +short _smtp._tls.cloudflare.com TXTBrand & Trust
dig +short default._bimi.cloudflare.com TXTdig +noall +answer cloudflare.com CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/cloudflare.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50Transport Security
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net:25 -servername mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5Infrastructure Intelligence
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.cloudflare.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20curl -sL https://cloudflare.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20AI Surface
curl -sI https://cloudflare.com/llms.txt | head -5curl -s https://cloudflare.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'Infrastructure Intelligence
dig +short 229.133.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig +short 229.132.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Appendix: Verification Commands
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com Adig +noall +answer cloudflare.com AAAAdig +noall +answer cloudflare.com MXdig +noall +answer cloudflare.com NSdig +noall +answer cloudflare.com TXTEmail Authentication
dig +short cloudflare.com TXT | grep -i spfdig +short _dmarc.cloudflare.com TXTdig +short k1._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXTdig +short mandrill._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXTdig +short s1._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXTdig +short smtpapi._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXTdig +short zendesk1._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXTdig +short zendesk2._domainkey.cloudflare.com TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer cloudflare.com DNSKEYdig +noall +answer cloudflare.com DSdig +dnssec +cd cloudflare.com A @1.1.1.1Transport Security
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxa.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxa-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxb-canary.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net TLSAopenssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net:25 -servername mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -datesdig +short _mta-sts.cloudflare.com TXTcurl -sL https://mta-sts.cloudflare.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txtdig +short _smtp._tls.cloudflare.com TXTBrand & Trust
dig +short default._bimi.cloudflare.com TXTdig +noall +answer cloudflare.com CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer cloudflare.com CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/cloudflare.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50Transport Security
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net:25 -servername mxb.global.inbound.cf-emailsecurity.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5Infrastructure Intelligence
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.cloudflare.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20curl -sL https://cloudflare.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20AI Surface
curl -sI https://cloudflare.com/llms.txt | head -5curl -s https://cloudflare.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'Infrastructure Intelligence
dig +short 229.133.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig +short 229.132.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT