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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 25 Feb 2026, 15:03 UTC
Duration 61.0s
Version v26.26.14
Integrity 45e128176330357470186b9afdbb7eff88f1a5c76d320bbaf32c6bad5c19eb75c23b453fc4df7e6bc657292e47afaa04ec84b6e12b9effffefa1581188f438d4
Subject Domain
usa.gov

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

usa.gov
25 Feb 2026, 15:03 UTC · 61.0s ·v26.26.14 · SHA-3-512: 45e1✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint 2 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
4 protocols configured, 5 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
2 monitoring
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Adequate 73/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
TXT 10769s 1 hour (3600s) medium TXT TTL is above typical — observed 10769s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.
AAAA 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 3 hours (10800s) 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 3 hours (10800s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA 10739s 1 hour (3600s) medium SOA TTL is above typical — observed 10739s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.
A 239s 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 239s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for usa.gov
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS dns.gsa.gov
Serial 790959631
Admin hostmaster.gsa.gov
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh3600s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry180sFraction of Refresh
Expire1209600s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)3600s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Monitoring
External domain gsa.gov has not authorized usa.gov to send DMARC reports (missing usa.gov._report._dmarc.gsa.gov TXT record), External domain dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov has not authorized usa.gov to send DMARC reports (missing usa.gov._report._dmarc.dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov TXT record)
Configured
SPF, DMARC (reject), DKIM, DNSSEC
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, CAA
Priority Actions Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Lock Down SPF for No-Mail Domain

This domain has no MX records and appears to be a website-only domain. Publishing a strict SPF record explicitly declares that no servers are authorized to send email, preventing attackers from spoofing your domain.

Explicitly declares no servers are authorized to send email from this domain.
TypeTXT
Hostusa.gov
Valuev=spf1 -all
RFC 7208
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostusa.gov (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
get.gov (Registrant: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY)
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 2/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 2/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:amazonses.com include:532040.spf10.hubspotemail.net ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC reject: the strongest compatible security stance, aligned with CISA and RFC guidance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; fo=1; ri=86400; rua=mailto:dmarcreports@gsa.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov; ruf=mailto:dmarcfailures@gsa.gov
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found

Found DKIM records for 3 selector(s)

hs1._domainkey HubSpot
k=rsa;t=s;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAz2EWvpNEByvLA+1gnXOTVGo80v7aMNCgCCHZrc9Dq3JS0rTLMDGqivp69F3JdmqZMaj9ZJ+hJ/6b/q61+KMkAA1DVwbK1Y7PicEp8vU3YREsBKiSZQxc+xDWGc4w/SDxVLPgATZhntcVJiRFdmQ5m9Z0ta1TikzkwGTEIrhU9QbyOj9WCcdZEvuE+KYxX/9Lrn7s7j6BHFod6vj/QcJ4ojesIziARhCrEtd/3FSXQcbCfaYbo5uuAXubxDzf9YDRSKwRbtnnH143zKczSQPeDRvUmadp91l/FjwnkHDKgSDtPG0Bp9DUH/UzkA9v0z956NjDddy2q+6oUzbctDyMSwIDAQAB
hs2._domainkey HubSpot
k=rsa;t=s;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAp78WpSu5v1e+0RzQ3mRBEZaSf9/t2qgAWmP/hSjfK9GIrdweiiWfd7NV9vN/R0hdo/emWjqsueAjSvYwWf3aWiNYeCq0oBIyWjpZBFpJpvW8IqaHNE+OPiLtF+JOnQJFsNc2hvDAY85nyBfKhG6SfCvzfur2ogARZhXfpEDMxZrMm8QfWNJlFTzPk6gTKfacRMGtEehO6jHx+wkgpcEjYOdSsQ8z5QbMRvWk4I3vSnSn6A+bfEYEYDZsuFMxu1BRXmEZmJ1iWxgkFEA9INfdxQUsNbdN0+npKVXUywramtN/iKIuufXqtv4vdZtti9BgZITmQcCfnFw0BdQyXRZ2EwIDAQAB
smtpapi._domainkey SendGrid
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDPtW5iwpXVPiH5FzJ7Nrl8USzuY9zqqzjE0D1r04xDN6qwziDnmgcFNNfMewVKN2D1O+2J9N14hRprzByFwfQW76yojh54Xu3uSbQ3JP0A7k8o8GutRF8zbFUA8n0ZH2y0cIEjMliXY4W4LwPA7m4q0ObmvSjhd63O9d8z1XkUBwIDAQAB
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Authorization missing
Warning

2 of 2 external reporting domains missing authorization

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
gsa.gov Unauthorized —
dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov Unauthorized —
External domain gsa.gov has not authorized usa.gov to send DMARC reports (missing usa.gov._report._dmarc.gsa.gov TXT record)
External domain dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov has not authorized usa.gov to send DMARC reports (missing usa.gov._report._dmarc.dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov TXT record)

Third-Party Action Required

This authorization record must be created by the external reporting provider, not by you. Per RFC 7489 §7.1, the receiving domain must publish a TXT record to confirm it accepts DMARC reports from your domain.

What to do: Contact your DMARC reporting provider and ask them to publish the authorization TXT record shown above. If you use a managed DMARC service (e.g., Ondmarc, Dmarcian, Valimail), this is typically handled during onboarding — reach out to their support if the record is missing.

Impact if unresolved: Compliant receivers may silently discard aggregate or forensic reports destined for the unauthorized address, reducing your DMARC visibility.

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No MX records available — DANE check skipped

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

Could not fetch security.txt

Fetch error: Get "https://usa.gov/.well-known/security.txt": context deadline exceeded (Clien
A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No significant AI surface findings

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? No directives
No robots.txt found
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on dns.gsa.gov — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: dns.gsa.gov, dns5.gsa.gov, dns4.gsa.gov, dns2.gsa.gov, dns3.gsa.gov

Delegation Consistency 2 Issues

Delegation consistency: 2 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • 3 DS record(s) at parent have no matching DNSKEY at child
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

DS Key TagDS AlgorithmDNSKEY Key TagDNSKEY Algorithm
445 8 445 8
Unmatched DS records (no corresponding DNSKEY):
Key Tag: 4292, Algorithm: 8
Key Tag: 39239, Algorithm: 8
Key Tag: 62996, Algorithm: 8

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
dns.gsa.gov No N/A N/A OK
dns2.gsa.gov No N/A N/A OK
dns3.gsa.gov No N/A N/A OK
dns4.gsa.gov No N/A N/A OK
dns5.gsa.gov No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 10800s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

dns.gsa.gov: 7.90959631e+08
dns2.gsa.gov: 7.90959631e+08
dns3.gsa.gov: 7.90959631e+08
dns4.gsa.gov: 7.90959631e+08
dns5.gsa.gov: 7.90959631e+08
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 5 nameserver(s) for usa.gov — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
dns3.gsa.gov 13.248.144.182 None AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		790959631
dns.gsa.gov 13.248.142.184 2600:1f16:8f2:d500::4 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		790959631
dns2.gsa.gov 76.223.24.135 None AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		790959631
dns4.gsa.gov 13.248.149.147 2600:1f14:653:bb00:b24e:739c:b87d:8fee AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		790959631
dns5.gsa.gov 76.223.9.162 None AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		790959631
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
5
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 5 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue

DNSSEC operational notes: 1 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:
  • Single KSK with no CDS/CDNSKEY automation — manual rollover required

DNSKEY Inventory 2 Keys

RoleKey TagAlgorithmKey Size
ZSK 60730 RSA/SHA-256 1056 bits
KSK 445 RSA/SHA-256 1056 bits

RRSIG Signatures 8 Signatures

TypeKey TagExpiryStatus
DNSKEY 445 2026-03-26T15:00:30Z Active
DNSKEY 60730 2026-03-26T15:00:30Z Active
AAAA 60730 2026-03-26T15:00:30Z Active
TXT 60730 2026-03-26T15:00:30Z Active
A 60730 2026-03-26T15:00:30Z Active
NS 60730 2026-03-26T15:00:30Z Active
SOA 60730 2026-03-26T15:00:30Z Active
NSEC3PARAM 60730 2026-03-26T15:00:30Z Active

Denial of Existence NSEC3

Iterations: 0
Salt Length: 0 bytes
Hash Algorithm: 1 (SHA-1)

Rollover Readiness Not_ready

Multiple KSKs:
CDS Published:
CDNSKEY Published:
Automation: none
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

No MX records found

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — No MX records found for this domain
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 2 unique ASN(s) across 2 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS14618 Amazon.com, Inc. US
AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc. US
IPv4 Mappings:
23.22.13.113 → AS16509 (23.20.0.0/14)
IPv6 Mappings:
2600:1f18:f88:4313:6df7:f986:f915:78d6 → AS14618 (2600:1f18::/35)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 2 services

2 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Microsoft 365 MS=ms45746088
Amazon SES amazonses:X5JKkKWosJlNPD8iJfPvNksuvQJzup3fDYEJtve9l20=
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed RSA/SHA-256 Adequate

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: RSA/SHA-256 — MUST implement, widely deployed (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
4292 8 2 9C1D52E67A297D47056BE8647CEC0DEDDAF6757817AEC22A4A26D4FB9300AB53
62996 8 2 9F496F09690F4923E2B4D9336A3A0886CAC24DAEB44153E13F50543B9BA77977
445 8 2 5517C2B10E0CE87584293327971302E9781169313111D9D6C9C4064AEB4865BA

NS Delegation Verified

5 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: dns.gsa.gov dns2.gsa.gov dns3.gsa.gov dns4.gsa.gov dns5.gsa.gov
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

23.22.13.113
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2600:1f18:f88:4313:6df7:f986:f915:78d6
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

No MX records
Domain cannot receive email

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 1 IPv6) Mail: Not configured Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 55 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 55 current 0 expired 37 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
1.usa.gov CT Log Current 1.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-02T20:21:31 Let's Encrypt
analytics.usa.gov CT Log Current analytics.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-06T19:21:32 Let's Encrypt
answers.usa.gov CT Log Current answers.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-09T20:21:32 Let's Encrypt
api-proxy-dev.usa.gov CT Log Current api-proxy-dev.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-05T16:21:33 Let's Encrypt
api-proxy-stage.usa.gov CT Log Current api-proxy-stage.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-05T18:21:35 Let's Encrypt
api-proxy.usa.gov CT Log Current api-proxy.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-05T19:21:32 Let's Encrypt
api.usa.gov CT Log Current api-usa-gov.domains.api.data.gov 4 2026-02-11T19:20:38 Let's Encrypt
apps.usa.gov CT Log Current apps.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-09T20:21:32 Let's Encrypt
asis.search.usa.gov CT Log Current — 4 2025-12-16T01:01:57 Let's Encrypt
benefits-tool.usa.gov CT Log Current benefits-tool.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 2 2026-01-14T17:20:39 Let's Encrypt
beta-dev.usa.gov CT Log Current beta-dev.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 2 2025-12-29T19:21:17 Let's Encrypt
beta-dr.usa.gov CT Log Current beta-dr.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 2 2026-01-24T19:21:21 Let's Encrypt
beta-stage.usa.gov CT Log Current beta-stage.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-01-28T23:21:31 Let's Encrypt
beta.usa.gov CT Log Current beta.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 2 2026-01-18T22:20:35 Let's Encrypt
blog.usa.gov CT Log Current blog.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 5 2026-01-09T17:43:33 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services
business.usa.gov
80/tcp nginx 443/tcp AWS Elastic Load Balancing
CT Log Current business.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-09T19:21:32 Let's Encrypt
cms-dev.usa.gov CT Log Current cms-dev.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 2 2025-12-29T19:21:17 Let's Encrypt
cms-dr.usa.gov CT Log Current cms-dr.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 2 2026-01-24T19:21:20 Let's Encrypt
cms-stage.usa.gov CT Log Current cms-stage.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-01-28T23:21:31 Let's Encrypt
cms.usa.gov CT Log Current cms.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 2 2026-01-18T18:20:36 Let's Encrypt
components.standards.usa.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-09-28T00:00:00 Amazon
connect.usa.gov CT Log Current — 3 2025-12-25T00:02:56 Google Trust Services
dev.search.usa.gov CT Log Current — 3 2025-09-16T00:00:00 Amazon
elasticsearch-dev.search.usa.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-12-05T00:00:00 Amazon
go.usa.gov CT Log Current go.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-13T15:20:38 Let's Encrypt
gobierno.usa.gov
80/tcp nginx 443/tcp AWS Elastic Load Balancing
CT Log Current gobierno.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-10T02:21:33 Let's Encrypt
i14y.search.usa.gov CT Log Current — 8 2025-12-16T01:01:57 Let's Encrypt
i14y.usa.gov CT Log Current — 6 2025-12-16T01:01:57 Let's Encrypt
images.usa.gov DNS Current 285be84fb617dbd13607-633e79af86eef6fa3040b8a64f85b956.r50.cf2.rackcdn.com 2 2025-11-12 DigiCert Inc
kibana-dev.search.usa.gov CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-16T00:00:00 Amazon
kibana-staging.search.usa.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-12-24T00:00:00 Amazon
kibana.search.usa.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-12-05T00:00:00 Amazon
kids.usa.gov
80/tcp nginx 443/tcp AWS Elastic Load Balancing
CT Log Current kids.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-07T23:21:32 Let's Encrypt
m.usa.gov CT Log Current m.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-10T11:21:33 Let's Encrypt
my.usa.gov CT Log Current my.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-07T23:21:32 Let's Encrypt
notice.usa.gov CT Log Current notice.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-09T23:21:33 Let's Encrypt
notifications.usa.gov CT Log Current notifications.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-09T23:21:32 Let's Encrypt
open.usa.gov CT Log Current open.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-20T21:20:46 Let's Encrypt
prod-migration.search.usa.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-12-05T00:00:00 Amazon
promotions.usa.gov CT Log Current promotions.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-07T23:21:31 Let's Encrypt
publications.usa.gov CT Log Current publications.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-09T23:21:32 Let's Encrypt
rancher.non-prod.search.usa.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-12-05T00:00:00 Amazon
rancher.prod.search.usa.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-12-05T00:00:00 Amazon
registry.usa.gov CT Log Current registry.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-09T23:21:32 Let's Encrypt
search.usa.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-20T14:00:00 Let's Encrypt, Amazon
staging.search.usa.gov CT Log Current — 10 2026-02-05T00:00:00 Amazon
standards.usa.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-09-28T00:00:00 Amazon
tell-us.usa.gov CT Log Current tell-us.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-09T23:21:32 Let's Encrypt
tellus.usa.gov CT Log Current tellus.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-07T23:21:32 Let's Encrypt
vote.usa.gov CT Log Current vote.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-08T02:21:32 Let's Encrypt
www.gobierno.usa.gov CT Log Current — 4 2026-02-08T02:21:32 Let's Encrypt
www.my.usa.gov CT Log Current www.my.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-09T23:21:31 Let's Encrypt
www.promotions.usa.gov CT Log Current www.promotions.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-02-08T02:21:32 Let's Encrypt
www.search.usa.gov CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-20T14:00:00 Let's Encrypt
www.usa.gov CT Log Current www.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 2 2026-01-20T23:20:36 Let's Encrypt
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
23.22.13.113
23.22.13.113
AAAA Synchronized 1 / 1 records
2600:1f18:f88:4313:6df7:f986:f915:78d6
2600:1f18:f88:4313:6df7:f986:f915:78d6
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.usa.gov RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; fo=1; ri=86400; rua=mailto:dmarcreports@gsa.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov; ruf=mailto:dmarcfailures@gsa.gov
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; fo=1; ri=86400; rua=mailto:dmarcreports@gsa.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov; ruf=mailto:dmarcfailures@gsa.gov
MX RFC 5321 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 5 / 5 records
dns3.gsa.gov.
dns3.gsa.gov.
dns5.gsa.gov.
dns2.gsa.gov.
dns2.gsa.gov.
dns5.gsa.gov.
dns4.gsa.gov.
dns4.gsa.gov.
dns.gsa.gov.
dns.gsa.gov.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
dns.gsa.gov. hostmaster.gsa.gov. 790959631 3600 180 1209600 3600
dns.gsa.gov. hostmaster.gsa.gov. 790959631 3600 180 1209600 3600
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
v=spf1 include:amazonses.com include:532040.spf10.hubspotemail.net ~all
v=spf1 include:amazonses.com include:532040.spf10.hubspotemail.net ~all
MS=ms45746088
amazonses:X5JKkKWosJlNPD8iJfPvNksuvQJzup3fDYEJtve9l20=
d1rt4thgsoin5q.cloudfront.net
MS=ms45746088
amazonses:X5JKkKWosJlNPD8iJfPvNksuvQJzup3fDYEJtve9l20=
d1rt4thgsoin5q.cloudfront.net
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

45e128176330357470186b9afdbb7eff88f1a5c76d320bbaf32c6bad5c19eb75c23b453fc4df7e6bc657292e47afaa04ec84b6e12b9effffefa1581188f438d4
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 25 Feb 2026, 15:03 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-usa.gov.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-usa.gov.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-usa.gov.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-usa.gov.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/4443/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for usa.gov. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short usa.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.usa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'hs1' RFC 6376 
dig +short hs1._domainkey.usa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'hs2' RFC 6376 
dig +short hs2._domainkey.usa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'smtpapi' RFC 6376 
dig +short smtpapi._domainkey.usa.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer usa.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd usa.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.usa.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.usa.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.usa.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.usa.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/usa.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.usa.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://usa.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://usa.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://usa.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.22.13.113 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 113.13.22.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4874 runs
DKIM
Verified 4692 runs
DMARC
Verified 4857 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4676 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4855 runs
BIMI
Verified 4691 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4694 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4696 runs
CAA
Verified 4688 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short usa.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.usa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'hs1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short hs1._domainkey.usa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'hs2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short hs2._domainkey.usa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'smtpapi' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short smtpapi._domainkey.usa.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer usa.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd usa.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.usa.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.usa.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.usa.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.usa.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer usa.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/usa.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.usa.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://usa.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://usa.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://usa.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.22.13.113 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 113.13.22.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

usa.gov

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.