DNS Tool

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Generated 25 Feb 2026, 14:40 UTC
Duration 109.6s
Version v26.26.14
Integrity 1b627dba11be06b94a9fa3bb9da07a4a3d66f69abb0c2ffc932168a1a7c9c0e319026522382a6cd52b95781b2a8d51f86ad2110ed7990c0d42c2be07505bd6ac

TLP:AMBER

Limited disclosure — recipients may share within their organization only

Subject Domain

amazon.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

amazon.com

25 Feb 2026, 14:40 UTC · 109.6s ·v26.26.14 · SHA-3-512: 1b62✱✱✱✱ Verify

Executive Methodology

Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain

Footprint 8 SaaS Services

DNS Security & Trust Posture

Risk Level: Low Risk

4 protocols configured, 5 not configured Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC deployment phase — quarantine fully enforced with reporting, consider upgrading to reject Why we go beyond letter grades

1 recommendation 1 monitoring

Intelligence Currency

Data Currency: Adequate 72/100

ICuAE Details

Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded

DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type	Observed TTL	Typical TTL	Severity	Context
A	`599s`	`1 hour (3600s)`	medium	A TTL is below typical — observed 599s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS	`5057s`	`1 day (86400s)`	high	NS TTL is below typical — observed 5057s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
MX	`326s`	`1 hour (3600s)`	high	MX TTL is below typical — observed 326s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA	`15 minutes (900s)`	`1 hour (3600s)`	medium	SOA TTL is below typical — observed 15 minutes (900s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT	`15 minutes (900s)`	`1 hour (3600s)`	medium	TXT TTL is below typical — observed 15 minutes (900s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.

Tune TTL for amazon.com

Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.

Primary NS dns-external-master.amazon.com

Serial 2010197857

Admin hostmaster.amazon.com

Provider Unknown

Timer	Value	RFC 1912 Range
Refresh	`180s`	1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry	`60s`	Fraction of Refresh
Expire	`604800s`	1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)	`900s`	300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)

Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s).

RFC 1912 §2.2

Refresh: SOA Refresh is 3 minutes (180s), below the RFC 1912 recommended minimum of 1,200 seconds.

RFC 1912 §2.2

Email Spoofing

Protected

Brand Impersonation

Protected

DNS Tampering

Unsigned

Certificate Control

Open

Recommended

Upgrade DMARC policy from quarantine to reject (p=reject) for maximum spoofing protection

Monitoring

External domain dmarc.amazon.com has not authorized amazon.com to send DMARC reports (missing amazon.com._report._dmarc.dmarc.amazon.com TXT record)

Configured

SPF (hard fail), DMARC (quarantine, 100%), DKIM, BIMI

Not Configured

MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, DANE, DNSSEC, CAA

Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Secure

Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035

Medium Upgrade DMARC to Reject

Your DMARC policy is set to quarantine. Upgrade to p=reject for maximum protection — reject instructs receivers to discard spoofed mail entirely rather than quarantining it.

A reject policy provides the strongest protection against domain spoofing.

Field	Value
Type	`TXT`
Host	`_dmarc.amazon.com` (update existing DMARC record)
Value	`v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@amazon.com`

RFC 7489 §6.3

Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.

Field	Value
Type	`CAA`
Host	`amazon.com` (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value	`0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`

RFC 8659

Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.

Field	Value
Type	`TXT`
Host	`_smtp._tls.amazon.com` (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Value	`v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@amazon.com`

RFC 8460

Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

Field	Value
Type	`TXT`
Host	`_mta-sts.amazon.com` (MTA-STS policy record)
Value	`v=STSv1; id=amazon.com`

RFC 8461

Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE

MarkMonitor Inc.

Where domain was purchased

Email Service Provider

Unknown

Moderately Protected

Web Hosting

Unknown

Where website is hosted

DNS Hosting

Unknown

Where DNS records are edited

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes

Success -all 3/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 3/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:spf1.amazon.com include:spf2.amazon.com include:amazonses.com -all

RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked

RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.

RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.

Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC enforcement is partial (quarantine). -all may preempt DKIM/DMARC evaluation at some receivers. Consider p=reject for full enforcement; ~all is more DMARC-compatible.

Legacy Record — Safe to Delete This is a Sender ID record (spf2.0/pra) from a Microsoft experiment circa 2006 that was never standardized. RFC 7208 §A explicitly deprecates it. No modern mail receiver processes this record. It is safe to delete.

spf2.0/pra include:spf1.amazon.com include:spf2.amazon.com include:amazonses.com -all

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Quarantined, not rejected

Success p=quarantine

DMARC policy quarantine (100%) - good protection

v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;pct=100;rua=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com;ruf=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com

Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed

No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing

Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports

Advanced cryptographic posture detected. Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC deployment phase — quarantine fully enforced with reporting, consider upgrading to reject

RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.

Monitoring Posture Note: Quarantine sequesters authentication failures while preserving full DMARC forensic telemetry (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain quarantine rather than reject as a deliberate monitoring strategy — failed messages are processed and reported but sequestered from the inbox. See NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1 for enforcement tradeoffs.

DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.

Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable

Weak Keys

Found 2 DKIM selector(s) but some keys are revoked

Key revoked (p= empty)

zendesk1._domainkey Zendesk

v=DKIM1; p=

zendesk2._domainkey Zendesk

v=DKIM1; p=

RFC Stance: RFC 6376 (Internet Standard) defines the DKIM mechanism. DKIM selectors are not publicly enumerable — absence in a scan does not prove absence of signing.

Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented

Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting

Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Authorization missing

Warning

1 of 1 external reporting domains missing authorization

External Domain	Authorization	Auth Record
`dmarc.amazon.com`	Unauthorized	—

External domain dmarc.amazon.com has not authorized amazon.com to send DMARC reports (missing amazon.com._report._dmarc.dmarc.amazon.com TXT record)

Third-Party Action Required

This authorization record must be created by the external reporting provider, not by you. Per RFC 7489 §7.1, the receiving domain must publish a TXT record to confirm it accepts DMARC reports from your domain.

What to do: Contact your DMARC reporting provider and ask them to publish the authorization TXT record shown above. If you use a managed DMARC service (e.g., Ondmarc, Dmarcian, Valimail), this is typically handled during onboarding — reach out to their support if the record is missing.

Impact if unresolved: Compliant receivers may silently discard aggregate or forensic reports destined for the unauthorized address, reducing your DMARC visibility.

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No

RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 1 MX host)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).

This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC quarantine flags spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3) and BIMI with VMC provides verified brand identity in inboxes; upgrade to p=reject to block spoofed mail outright; adding CAA records (RFC 8659) would further restrict certificate issuance for lookalike domains

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Success VMC SVG

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? Yes

BIMI with VMC certificate (from Verified CA)

VMC certificate accessible (from Verified CA) - logo displays in Gmail, Apple Mail, and all major providers.

v=BIMI1;l=https://d3frv9g52qce38.cloudfront.net/amazondefault/order_1424920778_logo.svg;a=https://d3frv9g52qce38.cloudfront.net/amazondefault/amazon_web_services_inc_2026.pem

Logo validated (SVG) View full logo

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Partial RFC 9116

security.txt found with issues

Contact

https://hackerone.com/amazonvrp/reports/new

Expires

Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.5)

Policy

https://hackerone.com/amazonvrp

Hiring

Source: https://amazon.com/.well-known/security.txt

Missing required Expires field (RFC 9116 §2.5.5)

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org

Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No

No llms.txt found

No llms-full.txt found

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked

No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured

No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.

Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No

No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No

No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected

Evidence Log (1 item)

Type	Detail	Severity	Confidence
`robots_txt_no_ai_blocks`	robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives	low	Observed

Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.

Sources scanned (1)

https://amazon.com/

What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns2.amzndns.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check	Result	Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR)	Denied	Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion	Disabled	Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity	Hidden	No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping	Protected	Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: ns2.amzndns.com, ns1.amzndns.org, ns1.amzndns.co.uk, ns1.amzndns.net, ns2.amzndns.org, ns1.amzndns.com, ns2.amzndns.co.uk, ns2.amzndns.net

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:

Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

Nameserver	In-Bailiwick	IPv4 Glue	IPv6 Glue	Status
`ns1.amzndns.co.uk`	No	N/A	N/A	OK
`ns1.amzndns.com`	No	N/A	N/A	OK
`ns1.amzndns.net`	No	N/A	N/A	OK
`ns1.amzndns.org`	No	N/A	N/A	OK
`ns2.amzndns.co.uk`	No	N/A	N/A	OK
`ns2.amzndns.com`	No	N/A	N/A	OK
`ns2.amzndns.net`	No	N/A	N/A	OK
`ns2.amzndns.org`	No	N/A	N/A	OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 7200s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns1.amzndns.co.uk: 2.010197857e+09

ns1.amzndns.com: 2.010197857e+09

ns1.amzndns.net: 2.010197857e+09

ns1.amzndns.org: 2.010197857e+09

ns2.amzndns.co.uk: 2.010197857e+09

ns2.amzndns.com: 2.010197857e+09

ns2.amzndns.net: 2.010197857e+09

ns2.amzndns.org: 2.010197857e+09

Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 8 nameserver(s) for amazon.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver	IPv4	IPv6	ASN / Operator	SOA Serial
`ns2.amzndns.net`	156.154.69.10	2610:a1:1017::10	AS12008	2010197857
`ns2.amzndns.co.uk`	204.74.120.1	2610:a1:32d1::53	AS399156 399160 399163 399167	2010197857
`ns2.amzndns.com`	156.154.68.10	2610:a1:1016::10	AS12008	2010197857
`ns1.amzndns.com`	156.154.64.10	2001:502:f3ff::10	AS12008	2010197857
`ns1.amzndns.co.uk`	156.154.67.10	2001:502:4612::10	AS12008	2010197857
`ns2.amzndns.org`	156.154.150.1	2610:a1:31d1::53	AS399153 399155 399158 399167	2010197857
`ns1.amzndns.net`	156.154.65.10	2610:a1:1014::10	AS12008	2010197857
`ns1.amzndns.org`	156.154.66.10	2610:a1:1015::10	AS12008	2010197857

Unique ASNs

Unique Operators

Unique /24 Prefixes

Diversity Score

Good

3 ASNs, 8 /24 prefixes across 8 nameservers

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

No transport encryption policy detected — mail delivery relies on opportunistic TLS

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry

TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders

Live Probe Supplementary

Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 2 unique ASN(s) across 3 IP address(es)

ASN	Name	Country
`AS14618`	Amazon.com, Inc.	US
`AS16509`	Amazon.com, Inc.	US

IPv4 Mappings:

98.87.170.74 → AS14618 (98.80.0.0/13)

98.87.170.71 → AS16509 (98.80.0.0/12)

98.82.161.185 → AS14618 (98.80.0.0/13)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 8 services

8 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Service	Verification Record
Canva	`canva-site-verification=WhUvTbfe6tUQWmIXnQifGA`
Stripe	`stripe-verification=26EFABF97D624D7F4F3C062366A04C4B1399841F23F275DD81E58D00A981...`
Google Workspace	`google-site-verification=14WGW2MdNMxchG8PlinF7LgqqE0OwwHqOq0HKhb7rDQ`
Cisco Umbrella	`cisco-ci-domain-verification=1b256bd11daa486ba2fa405d2d5de70f75feb6757dd8993ca8d...`
Facebook / Meta	`facebook-domain-verification=d9u57u52gylohx845ogo1axzpywpmq`
Apple	`apple-domain-verification=_j3fIZD8uuYetbG64YKTEpz-8mwyvYrLRqM5CoVZVTk`
Microsoft 365	`MS=4B600B22799EB2CAC0D8FF0A3A3CAECA5EE2BF3A`
Atlassian	`atlassian-domain-verification=ZT4AapXgobCpXIWoNcd7gtMjZyOUdr4EDFMnFUWrqqqgdaQVbD...`

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

8 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1.amzndns.co.uk ns1.amzndns.com ns1.amzndns.net ns1.amzndns.org ns2.amzndns.co.uk ns2.amzndns.com ns2.amzndns.net ns2.amzndns.org

Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (1 difference found)

Resolver Differences:

TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [00DcX000002xu6h=1TBcX00000000Xt MS=4B600B22799EB2CAC0D8FF0A3A3CAECA5EE2BF3A TS1760027 ZOOM_verify_6OUC1znUonKMCoyMMGyFfX ZOOM_verify_ARI4AiKALCcjulAUZNwR8S apple-domain-verification=4wbNaeWvAH0pU1yi apple-domain-verification=dVkKZnu17XS0EN2X brevo-code:9be7f7c39958d253a31de6593fa831bc canva-site-verification=Hksh9WEUPWP13_SEU1mPMA]

This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

98.87.170.74

98.87.170.71

98.82.161.185

Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records

IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

5 amazon-smtp.amazon.com.

Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

No SRV records

No service-specific routing configured

Web: Reachable (3 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: None

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 177 subdomains discovered

How did we find these?

Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962). The CT log server returned an error.

Re-Analyze to Retry CT Lookup

CT logs unavailable 177 current 0 expired 37 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence

Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.

Subdomain	Source	Status	Provider / CNAME	Certificates	First Seen	Issuer(s)
`achieve-gamma.aka.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`admiral-iad.ec2.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`admiral-sfo.ec2.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`aleta-iad.iad.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`aleta-pdx.pdx.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`amazonlantern-beta.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`amazonpay-investigation-widgets-na.integ.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`analytics.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`midway-gateway-4.aea.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`anvil.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`api.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`arsenal.integ.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`atocha-sandbox.integ.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`atochadp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`atom.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`midway-gateway-3.aea.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`atv-sonata-service-na-prod-iad.iad.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`autodiscover.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`axzile.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`bdt-intranet-analytics-iad.iad.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`beta.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`bindles-gamma.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`blackfriday.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`build.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`midway-gateway-2-1.aea.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`c.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`midway-gateway-2-1.aea.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`cal.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`rewrite.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`catalog.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`gio-catalog.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`chat.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`tp.61ab546a0-frontier.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`checkout.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`rewrite.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`cloud.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`cloudforge-build.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`cm-preprod.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`cm.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`cmet-gamma.aka.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`code.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`midway-gateway-1.aea.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`community.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`conference.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`midway-gateway-2-2.aea.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`connect.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`midway-gateway-2-1.aea.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`corporate.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`www.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`csanalytics-beta.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`cybermonday.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`data.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`data-na.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`deals.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`developer.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`developers.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`dmc-tools.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`docs.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`drive-render.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`drive.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`email.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`events.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`d17hi4dtmgqd44.cloudfront.net`	—	—	—
`explore.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`fa-payroll-payrolllocker.aka.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`fclm-portal.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`fcmenu-nrt-regionalized.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`feeds.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`forums.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`rewrite.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`fosportal-fe.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`ftt-beta-iad.iad.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`ftt-iad.iad.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`gamtools-na.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`gcs-legacy-tools-iad.iad.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`go.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`gsdev.integ.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`hbo-iad.iad.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`health.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`help.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`henry.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`hire2.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`hiring.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`hr.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`midway-gateway-2-2.aea.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`hub.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`hunnguye-alpha.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`identity.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`ihmmormont-gamma-tcp-pdx.pdx.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`ihmmormont-pdx.pdx.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`images.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`d12yb4rynyn0ps.cloudfront.net`	—	—	—
`is-preprod-aea.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`it.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`midway-gateway-1.aea.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`k2.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`kingpin-beta.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`kitchen.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`lab.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`midway-gateway-2-3.aea.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`lbs.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`learn.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`legal.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`link.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`midway-gateway-1.aea.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`live.oa.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`login.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`tp.81a0edd7b-frontier.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`m.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`manto-iad.ec2.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`maxis-file-service-prod-dub.dub.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`maxis-file-service-prod-iad.iad.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`mega.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`minions-gamma-iad.iad.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`minions-gamma-nrt.nrt.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`minions-gamma-syd.syd.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`minions-gru.gru.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`minions-syd.syd.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`mobile.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`rewrite.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`mobility.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`modelrepoui-dub.dub.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`modelrepoui-gamma-iad.iad.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`modelrepoui-pdx.pdx.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`modelrepoui.iad.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`monitor.amazon.com` 80/tcp AWS Elastic Load Balancing 443/tcp Server	DNS	Current	`midway-gateway-2-1.aea.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`mx1.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`mx2.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`mx3.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`my.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`neuropa-pdx.aka.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`newworld-schnapps-devo.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`newworld-schnapps-gamma.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`newworld-schnapps-prod.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`nluconsole-gamma-dub.dub.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`nluconsole-gamma-iad.iad.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`nluconsole-gamma-pdx.pdx.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`nluconsole-prod-dub.dub.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`nluconsole-prod-iad.iad.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`nluconsole-prod-pdx.pdx.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`notifications.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`oasis-backend.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`odyssey-gamma.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`opscentral-onebox.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`orders.amazon.com` 80/tcp AWS Elastic Load Balancing 443/tcp awselb/2.0	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`panel.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`partner-identity-master.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`pay.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`tp.32437f578-frontier.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`payment.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`payments.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`payments.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`photos.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`pki.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`d37kbx9sr9gyo3.cloudfront.net`	—	—	—
`policy.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`privacy.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`tp.c92832d2e-frontier.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`r.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`rapwa-eu-dub.dub.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`rds.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`realtime.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`recruit.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`midway-gateway-2-1.aea.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`register.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`relay.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`tp.b1190b3a2-frontier.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`s3.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`a8ae13f5f7373cd00.awsglobalaccelerator.com`	—	—	—
`s9-dra-bidder-beta-sin.aka.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`s9-dra-bidder-onebox-iad.aka.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`s9-dra-bidder-onebox-pdx.aka.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`sba-simulator-gamma-na-iad.iad.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`scip-gamma.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`scip.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`scip.integ.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`secure.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`selection-gamma.iad.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`services.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`shop.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`s1.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`shrub-us.aka.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`sidekick-preprod-dub.dub.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`sim-ticketing-fleet-dub.dub.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`sim-ticketing-graphql-fleet-dub.dub.proxy.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`smt-eu-gamma.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`store.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`s1.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`stuff.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`support.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`t3.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`theia-redash.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`translate.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`traveltracking.aka.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`ucms-2.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`uda.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`us.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`www.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`vendormaster.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`video.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`visionloop.aka.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`wiki.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`midway-gateway-1.aea.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`ws.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`ws-na.assoc-amazon.com`	—	—	—
`www.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`tp.47cf2c8c9-frontier.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`www.kitchen.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`xml.amazon.com`	DNS	Current	`webservices.amazon.com`	—	—	—
`yoda-insights.corp.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`your-account.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—
`your-orders.amazon.com`	Nmap SAN	Current	—	—	—	—

Export Recon (CSV)

Δ Changes Detected: TXT Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)

Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL

DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)

Authoritative Records (Source of truth)

A Synchronized 3 / 3 records

98.87.170.74

98.82.161.185

98.87.170.71

98.87.170.74

98.82.161.185

98.87.170.71

AAAA 0 / 0 records

No records

CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records

No records

DMARC _dmarc.amazon.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;pct=100;rua=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com;ruf=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com

MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

5 amazon-smtp.amazon.com.

NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 8 / 8 records

ns1.amzndns.com.

ns1.amzndns.co.uk.

ns2.amzndns.com.

ns1.amzndns.com.

ns2.amzndns.co.uk.

ns1.amzndns.net.

ns2.amzndns.org.

ns1.amzndns.org.

ns1.amzndns.net.

ns2.amzndns.co.uk.

ns2.amzndns.net.

ns2.amzndns.com.

ns1.amzndns.org.

ns2.amzndns.net.

ns1.amzndns.co.uk.

ns2.amzndns.org.

SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

dns-external-master.amazon.com. hostmaster.amazon.com. 2010197857 180 60 604800 900

TXT RFC 7208 §4 Propagating 57 / 1 records

canva-site-verification=WhUvTbfe6tUQWmIXnQifGA

TS1760027

canva-site-verification=Hksh9WEUPWP13_SEU1mPMA

—

stripe-verification=26EFABF97D624D7F4F3C062366A04C4B1399841F23F275DD81E58D00A981979C

—

sending_domain1003771=199bc63a54ace5d8d5c5d08286af86d7049b4afacb5ef7decd6b22cf9e8d5efb

—

google-site-verification=14WGW2MdNMxchG8PlinF7LgqqE0OwwHqOq0HKhb7rDQ

—

dell-technologies-domain-verification=amazon.com_2dc4b285-482d-4948-bf92-16e698f2cab9_1738858526

—

autodesk-domain-verification=dmryiygGOGBJFJFVo5Bl

—

cisco-ci-domain-verification=1b256bd11daa486ba2fa405d2d5de70f75feb6757dd8993ca8de685a7dfea1df

—

stripe-verification=C7ABA7B41F5AC26E3C397015A34CD46ACD2130DC8DAAFA7F59AAEFEDBC3FA517

—

v=spf1 include:spf1.amazon.com include:spf2.amazon.com include:amazonses.com -all

—

ZOOM_verify_6OUC1znUonKMCoyMMGyFfX

—

uber-domain-verification=01e9f567-7b84-45dd-9326-53992a028b40

—

facebook-domain-verification=d9u57u52gylohx845ogo1axzpywpmq

—

pendo-domain-verification=ecbe1a51-954d-4202-ab86-d15e04b96769

—

docker-verification=1779f74e-699a-4d8b-acdc-ce242d73559f

—

liveramp-site-verification=jZJKgMEQ_1mdjMhKj02iqNACZ-NJHRWhCEQdQ_OuCMo

—

google-site-verification=G_-mXb0ZYjjGkQVGjpOOB2deSOaVdxVj4i4vozJTREs

—

sending_domain949422=99a7b44052aefc4dec2abf56189160824664d2fdac00ca962f4455be62b51d56

—

stripe-verification=35A865E5A20C09CD0288F87ACA29DE73FF8A704D21F7310A5AAFF4CB63062E81

—

apple-domain-verification=_j3fIZD8uuYetbG64YKTEpz-8mwyvYrLRqM5CoVZVTk

—

sending_domain229492=341509a116ea4311fcb2e489303bf09a139b10ce9b90e5029d2677055cb4dc89

—

google-site-verification=NV91qEfNgqDZOPzwlhXE-KtDUfCBSNgAsdxaFebyh80

—

spf2.0/pra include:spf1.amazon.com include:spf2.amazon.com include:amazonses.com -all

—

00DcX000002xu6h=1TBcX00000000Xt

—

lucidlink-verification=QG752KJ3CMZAZTZ3ERMX1AXMCG

—

box-domain-verification=ffea95cd0e0d61c302198367155b07e74fd534fa1d867662dc9bf9969b6f535d

—

stripe-verification=B0AD8DC1918B8A717E5B6A29C2E04594A9872AB05F8DA24CB762BBA0A0487BC6

—

sending_domain608861=81b0d52095dae60d604e7cbea5e58e1d842f7d950d6673a43feae339b664ca31

—

stripe-verification=76924B623B7105057C67D4F5EAE19F65EE8BD92635581BCACA2CCACA4D38FE1B

—

stripe-verification=79C640ED20153B836A623F16A3DCF65E2072948FB80C42D19300514DADF94EC5

—

stripe-verification=8E217BE0FF12B50596BD78EEA3F81E62C6C7A2AC78FBD46DAD95B7D21BA2F8BF

—

brevo-code:9be7f7c39958d253a31de6593fa831bc

—

apple-domain-verification=4wbNaeWvAH0pU1yi

—

MS=4B600B22799EB2CAC0D8FF0A3A3CAECA5EE2BF3A

—

sending_domain1003771=f1303d8ee3b86e39db2703b11feb83e1e8b712a9ffc64c3d56505192e5b3bf4f

—

pardot326621=b26a7b44d7c73d119ef9dfd1a24d93c77d583ac50ba4ecedd899a9134734403b

—

uber-domain-verification=0ddb4c64-175c-4e7a-8a7a-f552034222e8

—

ZOOM_verify_ARI4AiKALCcjulAUZNwR8S

—

wrike-verification=MzI3NzM2ODo2NDk5MjE4NjQ2MWJmOTEwMGMxM2MzNzJmNWJlY2U5ZDU4MmVlNzQ2NWU4MTY5OWJjMjlmYjQ4Mjc5M2JiMzky

—

atlassian-domain-verification=ZT4AapXgobCpXIWoNcd7gtMjZyOUdr4EDFMnFUWrqqqgdaQVbDvoGpRaIwj/tgPH

—

stripe-verification=a5c01aa4d732f4b93154d67983d77982ef1a2db73fecfd4bcd64e224d3ab4075

—

stripe-verification=a27edc0da55836ea6bb7eac592bf2ca8e246eb652608d54493119df7df005afc

—

sending_domain197572=555e96ed2e576ced81c89f7001740cb72f9c66aeb136d0d05734aad625766bc1

—

stripe-verification=1D421397AAEC571CCBD9F25DDC90F00EDEBC3E74F4047270EC9A13B784579E34

—

stripe-verification=6a5d107aa37465eac2101bb1c725b02072689a4fa7bd38b455970baac4979a17

—

sending_domain229492=7cde83fbc5246557c64d9d9ba79f0d11f7ba9eb6127f60451a9aa6f8dead4381

—

sending_domain949422=43d714838567583460e7720e6049505edb8e25c1ef4321419d41bc5255db7ba5

—

uber-domain-verification=5f5cc242-4dbe-4871-b726-bbbe085ff053

—

stripe-verification=45f746e3b195198f419af3f685fdf217532ce552b4b47070b3caefe325559a67

—

sending_domain608861=d33a88e8540c33a1217138cf8a25879734bd35673bb7cfbd639f95c550b33ec4

—

neat-pulse-domain-verification-QgvLWLN=f37f2998-0bb3-493b-a3aa-c4ff8f3dce08

—

uber-domain-verification=7a35217f-6956-41a0-be5c-a28ea2646964

—

sending_domain1014172=003846595520e80ec84e8cc47c07e3a71afb855fc743bb92cdec93f88c7a4029

—

stripe-verification=65883709F0B36AB2B73FFC870338AE9F817315DDBB1CAB28910F074F4A8DE1EC

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TS1760027

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google-site-verification=D0RwRb_QApkpApKTFaFlRwbm_yrkey0uokKw0wQUIdk

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apple-domain-verification=dVkKZnu17XS0EN2X

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DNS History Timeline BETA

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Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

1b627dba11be06b94a9fa3bb9da07a4a3d66f69abb0c2ffc932168a1a7c9c0e319026522382a6cd52b95781b2a8d51f86ad2110ed7990c0d42c2be07505bd6ac

Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 25 Feb 2026, 14:40 UTC.

Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL)

cat dns-intelligence-amazon.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-amazon.com.json

Python 3 (cross-platform)

python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-amazon.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"

sha3sum (coreutils 9+)

sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-amazon.com.json

Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/4403/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for amazon.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer amazon.com A

Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer amazon.com AAAA

Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer amazon.com MX

Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer amazon.com NS

Query TXT records RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer amazon.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208

dig +short amazon.com TXT | grep -i spf

Check DMARC policy RFC 7489

dig +short _dmarc.amazon.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk1' RFC 6376

dig +short zendesk1._domainkey.amazon.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk2' RFC 6376

dig +short zendesk2._domainkey.amazon.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035

dig +dnssec +noall +answer amazon.com DNSKEY

Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035

dig +noall +answer amazon.com DS

Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035

dig +dnssec +cd amazon.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for amazon-smtp.amazon.com RFC 7672

dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.amazon-smtp.amazon.com TLSA

Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (amazon-smtp.amazon.com) RFC 6698

openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect amazon-smtp.amazon.com:25 -servername amazon-smtp.amazon.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates

Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461

dig +short _mta-sts.amazon.com TXT

Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461

curl -sL https://mta-sts.amazon.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt

Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460

dig +short _smtp._tls.amazon.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft

dig +short default._bimi.amazon.com TXT

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659

dig +noall +answer amazon.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460

dig +noall +answer amazon.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344

dig +noall +answer amazon.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083

curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/amazon.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (amazon-smtp.amazon.com) RFC 3207

openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect amazon-smtp.amazon.com:25 -servername amazon-smtp.amazon.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962

curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.amazon.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20

Check security.txt RFC 9116

curl -sL https://amazon.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt

curl -sI https://amazon.com/llms.txt | head -5

Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules

curl -s https://amazon.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 98.87.170.74 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 74.170.87.98.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

ASN lookup for 98.87.170.71 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 71.170.87.98.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.

Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated

How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.

SPF

Verified 4857 runs

DKIM

Verified 4676 runs

DMARC

Verified 4841 runs

DANE/TLSA

Verified 4660 runs

DNSSEC

Verified 4838 runs

BIMI

Verified 4675 runs

MTA-STS

Verified 4678 runs

TLS-RPT

Verified 4680 runs

CAA

Verified 4672 runs

Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer amazon.com A

Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer amazon.com AAAA

Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer amazon.com MX

Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer amazon.com NS

Query TXT records (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer amazon.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208)

dig +short amazon.com TXT | grep -i spf

Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489)

dig +short _dmarc.amazon.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short zendesk1._domainkey.amazon.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short zendesk2._domainkey.amazon.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035)

dig +dnssec +noall +answer amazon.com DNSKEY

Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035)

dig +noall +answer amazon.com DS

Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035)

dig +dnssec +cd amazon.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for amazon-smtp.amazon.com (RFC 7672)

dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.amazon-smtp.amazon.com TLSA

Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (amazon-smtp.amazon.com) (RFC 6698)

openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect amazon-smtp.amazon.com:25 -servername amazon-smtp.amazon.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates

Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461)

dig +short _mta-sts.amazon.com TXT

Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461)

curl -sL https://mta-sts.amazon.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt

Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460)

dig +short _smtp._tls.amazon.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft)

dig +short default._bimi.amazon.com TXT

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659)

dig +noall +answer amazon.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460)

dig +noall +answer amazon.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344)

dig +noall +answer amazon.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083)

curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/amazon.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (amazon-smtp.amazon.com) (RFC 3207)

openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect amazon-smtp.amazon.com:25 -servername amazon-smtp.amazon.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962)

curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.amazon.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20

Check security.txt (RFC 9116)

curl -sL https://amazon.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt

curl -sI https://amazon.com/llms.txt | head -5

Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules

curl -s https://amazon.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 98.87.170.74 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 74.170.87.98.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

ASN lookup for 98.87.170.71 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 71.170.87.98.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Partial RFC 9116

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

llms.txt llmstxt.org

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Evidence Log (1 item)

Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

DNS Server Security Hardened

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Policy Assessment Primary

Telemetry

Live Probe Supplementary

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 177 subdomains discovered

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

DNS History Timeline BETA

Intelligence Sources

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

Download & Verify Intelligence SHA-3-512

Reproduce the Evidence Transparency Source-Verifiable

Appendix: Verification Commands

Rules of Engagement

What You May Do

What You May Not Do

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Intelligence Dissemination

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Partial RFC 9116

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

llms.txt llmstxt.org

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Evidence Log (1 item)

Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

DNS Server Security Hardened

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Policy Assessment Primary

Telemetry

Live Probe Supplementary

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 177 subdomains discovered

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

DNS History Timeline BETA

Intelligence Sources

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

Download & Verify Intelligence SHA-3-512

Reproduce the Evidence Transparency Source-Verifiable

Appendix: Verification Commands

RFC Reference