Skip to main content

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

2911.us
9 Feb 2026, 00:04 UTC · 14.7s · SHA-3-512: d51a✱✱✱✱ Verify
Recon ModeRecon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: SECURE (Monitoring)
4 protocols configured, 2 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Monitoring
DKIM (MailChimp only — not verified for Microsoft 365)
Configured
DMARC (email spoofing protection), DNSSEC (DNS responses signed), MTA-STS (policy present), TLS-RPT (reporting configured)
Not Configured
CAA (certificate authority control), BIMI (brand logo in inboxes)
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
GoDaddy.com, LLC
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Microsoft 365
Email: Enabled
Web Hosting
GoDaddy
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
GoDaddy
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No
Verdict: DMARC policy is reject - spoofed messages will be blocked by receiving servers. Note: DKIM found for MailChimp only — primary mail platform (Microsoft 365) DKIM not verified.

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; sp=reject; rua=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com; ruf=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=86400
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed sp=reject
Forensic reports (ruf) configured - many providers ignore these
Reported to Mailhardener
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Third-party only
Third-Party Only 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 2 selector(s) (2048-bit) but none for primary mail platform (Microsoft 365)

DKIM verified for MailChimp only — no DKIM found for primary mail platform (Microsoft 365). The primary provider may use custom selectors not discoverable through standard checks.
Know your DKIM selector? Re-scan with a custom selector to verify.
k1._domainkey MailChimp 2048-bit
k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDbNrX2cY/GUKIFx2G/1I00ftdAj713WP9AQ1xir85i89sA2guU0ta4UX1Xzm06XIU6iBP41VwmPwBGRNofhBVR+e6WHUoNyIR4Bn84LVcfZE20rmDeXQblIupNWBqLXM1Q+VieI/eZu/7k9/vOkLSaQQdml4Cv8lb3PcnluMVIhQIDAQAB;
k2._domainkey MailChimp
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAv2aC2KjGKLOwTweBY5A9RpjsxaBXR9r7OAU6U8/zn92ivImI75naUujWbItRI/QmL1jy5PWGqLwoUA0b90ObWaLDc+i9MtTNmGeWO009hr20fIxhGg6XBT2kjZ1DTThopSe1nAndsupmcBwlQ5Q6LJ+ZAxLcujnPIxM0ZBLmgpkv8u6RfY4eFP8OLvdAW3oSu" "B0DyLDigQX4Sj8wBO4YIdQH6AAmBeOsidsKAFNFUCpc3vCxtBDR12U+cBg724l3sBkMQ8evnz6idnqxq9QAVYh8k4kJ+RP+6cqTdy7LjIm8xY/bQNpQIpGUAuDo2DjLcCDun9DAI4Q/3z+Q0o9QuQIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced
Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 1 mail server(s)

v=STSv1; id=20260207191811
Policy Details:
  • Mode: enforce
  • Max Age: 14 days (1209600 seconds)
  • MX Patterns: 2911-us.mail.protection.outlook.com
Hosted by Mailhardener

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com
Reported to Mailhardener

Email Security Management Actively Managed

Intelligence: This domain uses dedicated email security management — indicating continuous monitoring and professional oversight, not a "set and forget" configuration. Reporting destinations reveal the operational security partner network, and we extract that intelligence directly from DNS.
Mailhardener
DMARC TLS-RPT MTA-STS
DMARC aggregate (rua) and forensic (ruf) reports
TLS-RPT delivery reports
MTA-STS policy hosting

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Microsoft 365

This domain uses legacy Microsoft 365 MX endpoints (*.mail.protection.outlook.com) which do not publish TLSA records. Microsoft supports DANE with DNSSEC on newer *.mx.microsoft.com endpoints (GA October 2024). Migrating MX records enables inbound DANE. Microsoft does validate DANE/TLSA when sending outbound mail.

Recommended alternative: Migrate MX to *.mx.microsoft.com endpoints for inbound DANE, or use MTA-STS (already configured)

Note: Microsoft 365 does validate DANE/TLSA when sending mail to DANE-enabled recipients (outbound DANE).


Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses MTA-STS — the best available option for Microsoft 365. Since Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE, MTA-STS is the strongest transport security this domain can deploy. MTA-STS enforces TLS via HTTPS-based policy, protecting against downgrade attacks (RFC 8461).

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).


Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: No brand protection controls - attackers could obtain certificates or impersonate visually.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates



Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?
Verdict: DNS responses are authenticated from the root downward. Delegation is verified.

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256

DNSSEC fully configured and validated - AD flag confirmed by resolver

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
40611 13 2 24284E985302282351AA791F81059E778C5B93ED4EA9536EB68832C9599CF6DB
17048 13 2 3FCCDEBAFA765AF4F6254CED78E58635944DC88C76A3E82FDDA2DF68A09ECF78

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: pdns01.domaincontrol.com pdns02.domaincontrol.com
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 4 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

23.185.0.3
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2620:12a:8000::3
2620:12a:8001::3
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

0 2911-us.mail.protection.outlook.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Microsoft 365

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon UNAVAILABLE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? Unavailable
How did we find these?

Passive discovery using Certificate Transparency Logs — publicly auditable records of every TLS certificate ever issued. CT log query returned status 502

Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 1 / 0 records
23.185.0.3
AAAA 2 / 0 records
2620:12a:8000::3
2620:12a:8001::3
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.2911.us RFC 7489 §6.3 1 / 0 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; sp=reject; rua=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com; ruf=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=86400
MTA-STS _mta-sts.2911.us RFC 8461 §3 1 / 0 records
v=STSv1; id=20260207191811
MX RFC 5321 1 / 0 records
0 2911-us.mail.protection.outlook.com.
NS RFC 1035 2 / 0 records
pdns01.domaincontrol.com.
pdns02.domaincontrol.com.
SOA RFC 1035 1 / 0 records
pdns01.domaincontrol.com. dns.jomax.net. 2026020703 28800 7200 604800 600
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.2911.us RFC 8460 §3 1 / 0 records
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com
TXT RFC 7208 §4 5 / 0 records
facebook-domain-verification=rtkwfzcjtrjgnz02y6nz0btld5a9q1
v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
MS=ms63238513
openai-domain-verification=dv-8fTZweKgrwn7udZbUlatxIuV
google-site-verification=cnKBmgtuqnLMn2LbH_RbjL3OfRZMzVJgA8YiGZwauJo
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

d51ae13f29cd0ee9888ad05b397cf76f536c416cbb38048e2d22162d6149584e29fc2e0bbce691dc86fe9fb7f5ca8f7f21ae009043273228e5dfc05c02013117
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 9 Feb 2026, 00:04 UTC.

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL)
cat dns-intelligence-2911.us.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-2911.us.json
Python 3 (cross-platform)
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-2911.us.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+)
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-2911.us.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/432/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for 2911.us. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer 2911.us A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer 2911.us AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer 2911.us MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer 2911.us NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer 2911.us TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208
dig +short 2911.us TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489
dig +short _dmarc.2911.us TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' RFC 6376
dig +short k1._domainkey.2911.us TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' RFC 6376
dig +short k2._domainkey.2911.us TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +noall +answer 2911.us DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035
dig +noall +answer 2911.us DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +cd 2911.us A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for 2911-us.mail.protection.outlook.com RFC 7672
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.2911-us.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (2911-us.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 6698
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect 2911-us.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername 2911-us.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461
dig +short _mta-sts.2911.us TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461
curl -sL https://mta-sts.2911.us/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460
dig +short _smtp._tls.2911.us TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft
dig +short default._bimi.2911.us TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659
dig +noall +answer 2911.us CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460
dig +noall +answer 2911.us HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344
dig +noall +answer 2911.us CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/2911.us' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (2911-us.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 3207
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect 2911-us.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername 2911-us.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.2911.us&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116
curl -sL https://2911.us/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt
curl -sI https://2911.us/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules
curl -s https://2911.us/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.185.0.3 (Team Cymru)
dig +short 3.0.185.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4850 runs
DKIM
Verified 4669 runs
DMARC
Verified 4834 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4653 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4831 runs
BIMI
Verified 4668 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4671 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4673 runs
CAA
Verified 4665 runs
Maturity: Development Verified Consistent Gold Gold Master
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

2911.us

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.