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Email Security Scope: SPF: Local Record DMARC: Local Record MX Records Present

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

dnstool.it-help.tech
8 Feb 2026, 23:17 UTC · 9.0s · SHA-3-512: 5ca4✱✱✱✱ Verify
Recon ModeRecon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: SECURE
4 protocols configured, 1 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Configured
DMARC (email spoofing protection), SPF (no mail allowed - domain declares it sends no email), DNSSEC (inherited from parent zone), TLS-RPT (reporting configured)
Not Configured
CAA (certificate authority control)
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
Amazon Registrar, Inc.
Registrar for it-help.tech
Email Service Provider
No Mail (Null MX)
No-Mail: Verified
Web Hosting
Google Cloud
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Standard
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No
No-Mail: Verified 3/3 controls
This domain is fully hardened against email abuse. All three layers of no-mail protection are configured per RFC best practices.
DMARC p=reject (RFC 7489) Null MX (RFC 7505) SPF v=spf1 -all (RFC 7208)
Verdict: Non-mail domain with full anti-spoofing protection. SPF -all rejects all senders, DMARC reject blocks spoofed messages. Null MX (RFC 7505) confirms no inbound mail.

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all Local

Valid SPF (no mail allowed) - domain declares it sends no email

v=spf1 -all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject Local

DMARC policy reject - excellent anti-spoofing protection for non-mail domain

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; adkim=s; aspf=s;
Alignment: SPF strict DKIM strict
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Not Discoverable

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

MTA-STS DNS record found but policy file inaccessible

v=STSv1; id=20260208
Policy file: Connection failed

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@it-help.tech

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No valid MX hosts — DANE check skipped

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).


Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: No brand protection controls - attackers could obtain certificates or impersonate visually.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates



Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?
Verdict: DNS responses are authenticated via parent zone DNSSEC. Subdomain within a signed zone.

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Inherited ECDSA P-256/SHA-256

DNSSEC inherited from parent zone (it-help.tech) - DNS responses are authenticated

This subdomain is protected by the parent zone's DNSSEC signing. DNSSEC at it-help.tech covers all records in the zone.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures

NS Delegation Subdomain

Subdomain within it-help.tech zone - no separate delegation needed

DNS records managed within the it-help.tech zone. No separate NS delegation required.
Parent zone nameservers (it-help.tech): ns-1117.awsdns-11.org ns-1603.awsdns-08.co.uk ns-4.awsdns-00.com ns-529.awsdns-02.net
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 4 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

34.111.179.208
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

0 .
Null MX RFC 7505
Domain explicitly does not accept email

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: Null MX (no mail) Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? None found
How did we find these?
dnstool.it-help.tech is itself a subdomain of it-help.tech.

Certificate Transparency logs record certificates by fully qualified domain name (RFC 8499). This search queried for names beneath dnstool.it-help.tech in the DNS hierarchy (RFC 1034 §3.1), which found no issued certificates.

To discover sibling subdomains (e.g., mail.it-help.tech, www.it-help.tech), scan the registered domain instead:

Scan it-help.tech
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 1 / 0 records
34.111.179.208
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.dnstool.it-help.tech RFC 7489 §6.3 1 / 0 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; adkim=s; aspf=s;
MTA-STS _mta-sts.dnstool.it-help.tech RFC 8461 §3 1 / 0 records
v=STSv1; id=20260208
MX RFC 5321 1 / 0 records
0 .
NS RFC 1035 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
SOA RFC 1035 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.dnstool.it-help.tech RFC 8460 §3 1 / 0 records
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@it-help.tech
TXT RFC 7208 §4 2 / 0 records
replit-verify=f2c73519-b3f3-4c33-90b1-699f833acae8
v=spf1 -all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

5ca435f0eb6ac49508ed527bcedaaae2b57176e4c4b244ee9e834ec271bff4304fb0be8c502cf1007e98a4e3a1d20b8f7d7cfd56d89991e7040c10e40d9f1895
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 8 Feb 2026, 23:17 UTC.

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL)
cat dns-intelligence-dnstool.it-help.tech.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-dnstool.it-help.tech.json
Python 3 (cross-platform)
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-dnstool.it-help.tech.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+)
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-dnstool.it-help.tech.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/425/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for dnstool.it-help.tech. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer dnstool.it-help.tech A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer dnstool.it-help.tech AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer dnstool.it-help.tech MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer dnstool.it-help.tech NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer dnstool.it-help.tech TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208
dig +short dnstool.it-help.tech TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489
dig +short _dmarc.dnstool.it-help.tech TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376
dig +short default._domainkey.dnstool.it-help.tech TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376
dig +short google._domainkey.dnstool.it-help.tech TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376
dig +short selector1._domainkey.dnstool.it-help.tech TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376
dig +short selector2._domainkey.dnstool.it-help.tech TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +noall +answer dnstool.it-help.tech DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035
dig +noall +answer dnstool.it-help.tech DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +cd dnstool.it-help.tech A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461
dig +short _mta-sts.dnstool.it-help.tech TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461
curl -sL https://mta-sts.dnstool.it-help.tech/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460
dig +short _smtp._tls.dnstool.it-help.tech TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft
dig +short default._bimi.dnstool.it-help.tech TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659
dig +noall +answer dnstool.it-help.tech CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460
dig +noall +answer dnstool.it-help.tech HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344
dig +noall +answer dnstool.it-help.tech CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/dnstool.it-help.tech' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.dnstool.it-help.tech&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116
curl -sL https://dnstool.it-help.tech/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt
curl -sI https://dnstool.it-help.tech/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules
curl -s https://dnstool.it-help.tech/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 34.111.179.208 (Team Cymru)
dig +short 208.179.111.34.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4877 runs
DKIM
Verified 4695 runs
DMARC
Verified 4860 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4679 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4858 runs
BIMI
Verified 4694 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4697 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4699 runs
CAA
Verified 4691 runs
Maturity: Development Verified Consistent Gold Gold Master
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

dnstool.it-help.tech

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.