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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 8 Feb 2026, 23:17 UTC
Duration 13.9s
Integrity cb9982fb911f4441e28645bf9812f9e8c7a90f9079e2df69a27fe11cd90de5e642f715b9034641b4d1da7a4c1987ad740862d657b6fea714d83d7c2945962c89
Subject Domain
microsoft.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

microsoft.com
8 Feb 2026, 23:17 UTC · 13.9s · SHA-3-512: cb99✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Azure DNS Microsoft 365
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Secure
5 protocols configured, 2 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Enterprise
Certificate Control
Configured
Configured
DMARC (email spoofing protection), DKIM (1 selector(s), 2048-bit), CAA (certificate issuance restricted), MTA-STS (policy present), TLS-RPT (reporting configured)
Not Configured
DNSSEC (DNS response signing), BIMI (brand logo in inboxes)
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
Markmonitor Inc. (Registrant: Domain Administrator)
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Microsoft 365
Email: Enabled
Web Hosting
AWS / Amazon
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Azure DNS Enterprise
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No
Verdict: DMARC policy is reject - spoofed messages will be blocked by receiving servers. DKIM keys verified with strong cryptography.

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 5/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 5/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:_spf-a.microsoft.com include:_spf-b.microsoft.com include:_spf-c.microsoft.com include:_spf-ssg-a.msft.net include:_spf1-meo.microsoft.com -all
RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:itex-rua@microsoft.com; ruf=mailto:itex-ruf@microsoft.com; fo=1
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
Forensic reports (ruf) configured - many providers ignore these
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

selector2._domainkey Microsoft 365 2048-bit
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCPkb8bu8RGWeJGk3hJrouZXIdZ+HTp/azRp8IUOHp5wKvPUAi/54PwuLscUjRk4Rh3hjIkMpKRfJJXPxWbrT7eMLric7f/S0h+qF4aqIiQqHFCDAYfMnN6V3Wbke2U5EGm0H/cAUYkaf2AtuHJ/rdY/EXaldAm00PgT9QQMez66QIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced
Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 1 mail server(s)

v=STSv1; id=20190225000000Z;
Policy Details:
  • Mode: enforce
  • Max Age: 7 days (604800 seconds)
  • MX Patterns: *.mail.protection.outlook.com

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1;rua=https://tlsrpt.azurewebsites.net/report
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Microsoft 365

This domain uses legacy Microsoft 365 MX endpoints (*.mail.protection.outlook.com) which do not publish TLSA records. Microsoft supports DANE on newer *.mx.microsoft endpoints — migration is available. Microsoft does validate DANE/TLSA when sending outbound mail.

Recommended alternative: Migrate MX to *.mx.microsoft endpoints for inbound DANE, or use MTA-STS (already configured)

Note: Microsoft 365 does validate DANE/TLSA when sending mail to DANE-enabled recipients (outbound DANE).

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses MTA-STS — the best available option for Microsoft 365. Since Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE, MTA-STS is the strongest transport security this domain can deploy. MTA-STS enforces TLS via HTTPS-based policy, protecting against downgrade attacks (RFC 8461).

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: Certificate issuance is controlled but brand logo (BIMI) is not configured.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - specific CAs authorized

0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?
Verdict: Delegation is verified but DNS responses are unsigned and could be spoofed.

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Alternative Security: Azure DNS provides enterprise-grade DNS with DDoS protection and monitoring.
Azure DNS (enterprise DNS with DDoS protection), CAA records (certificate issuance control)

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1-39.azure-dns.com ns2-39.azure-dns.net ns3-39.azure-dns.org ns4-39.azure-dns.info
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 4 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

13.107.213.35
13.107.246.35
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2620:1ec:bdf::51
2620:1ec:46::51
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Microsoft 365

SRVServices

_sip._tls: 100 1 443 sipdir.online.lync.com.
_sipfederationtls._tcp: 100 1 5061 sipfed.online.lync.com.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: 2 endpoints
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon UNAVAILABLE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? Unavailable
How did we find these?

Passive discovery using Certificate Transparency Logs — publicly auditable records of every TLS certificate ever issued. CT log query returned status 503

Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 2 / 0 records
13.107.213.35
—
13.107.246.35
—
AAAA 2 / 0 records
2620:1ec:bdf::51
—
2620:1ec:46::51
—
CAA RFC 8659 §4 1 / 0 records
0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"
—
DMARC _dmarc.microsoft.com RFC 7489 §6.3 1 / 0 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:itex-rua@microsoft.com; ruf=mailto:itex-ruf@microsoft.com; fo=1
—
MTA-STS _mta-sts.microsoft.com RFC 8461 §3 1 / 0 records
v=STSv1; id=20190225000000Z;
—
MX RFC 5321 1 / 0 records
10 microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
—
NS RFC 1035 4 / 0 records
ns2-39.azure-dns.net.
—
ns3-39.azure-dns.org.
—
ns4-39.azure-dns.info.
—
ns1-39.azure-dns.com.
—
SOA RFC 1035 1 / 0 records
ns1-39.azure-dns.com. azuredns-hostmaster.microsoft.com. 1 3600 300 2419200 300
—
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.microsoft.com RFC 8460 §3 1 / 0 records
v=TLSRPTv1;rua=https://tlsrpt.azurewebsites.net/report
—
TXT RFC 7208 §4 51 / 0 records
d365mktkey=JlXV17lfZjyvWxNje1qiP390ACSKzTxo5mGqZ3V2BmYx
—
v=spf1 include:_spf-a.microsoft.com include:_spf-b.microsoft.com include:_spf-c.microsoft.com include:_spf-ssg-a.msft.net include:_spf1-meo.microsoft.com -all
—
docusign=d5a3737c-c23c-4bd0-9095-d2ff621f2840
—
airtable-verification=79a09e4a8013ff5737798ffb4ea88eee
—
mixpanel-domain-verify=5803bc4c-5bb6-4ce1-8076-753800097373
—
zoom-domain-verification=ZOOM_verify_e97a3d385acb4c47b9b924609a280524
—
d365mktkey=6358r1b7e13hox60tl1uagv14
—
google-site-verification=uhh5_jbxpcQgnb-A7gDIjlrr5Ef34lA2t2_BAveYpnk
—
d365mktkey=heYmJ57sWrwMjCgIG1xRwTREJrQokUIDtBcNfGuxoWQx
—
anthropic-domain-verification-phksss=GZrrKDUR4klRLFCvxyOvqcNGE
—
google-site-verification=GfDnTUdATPsK1230J0mXbfsYw-3A9BVMVaKSd4DcKgI
—
d365mktkey=Fu49WtSTeClkHtK7S14227RIVpGwwGrzEsO6RVs1I2Ax
—
d365mktkey=j2qHWq9BHdaa3ZXZH8x64daJZxEWsFa0dxDeilxDoYYx
—
d365mktkey=PNcDqkW71x8VOUhcE96aGM4l5PYX1gnlRl6ieXUl5eMx
—
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=Asc8WWov6gsmCCzn4CSrwRuJIh5SqvaitKz/LlTW+SD54lLC52wzcnWhlTI416p2vw==
—
d365mktkey=3l6dste9txazu0Qd2zu4135PUB4E35txLxyzJxjkPbsx
—
google-site-verification=pjPOauSPcrfXOZS9jnPPa5axowcHGCDAl1_86dCqFpk
—
fg2t0gov9424p2tdcuo94goe9j
—
hcp-domain-verification=3ce174a8b9fba88909633ab13eb1d81ce0123454745d66e500052ed84b7248a1
—
ms-domain-verification=478640ad-6524-43d5-86c4-a914804b9e93
—
1password-site-verification=35ZTURTFFFDC5BW7GFQKRJ77QM
—
facebook-domain-verification=fwzwhbbzwmg5fzgotc2go51olc3566
—
_zx2p8gpzv720db2aqmozy4jhwk2nl43
—
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=A/Mf6IKdZzcHfBvpiVz9rkdPTIcCP5IbRDdEkeP3PgXEXF3mNjorahOwaYlMINBF5A==
—
hubspot-developer-verification=OTQ5NGIwYWEtODNmZi00YWE1LTkyNmQtNDhjMDMxY2JjNDAx
—
ms-domain-verification=d6545068-89f7-4432-b947-0b137e8a9fe3
—
ms-domain-verification=25524f4b-1476-489c-a086-30f4c5016ecc
—
google-site-verification=M--CVfn_YwsV-2FGbCp_HFaEj23BmT0cTF4l8hXgpvM
—
workplace-domain-verification=lK0QDLk73xymCYMKUXNpfKAT8TY5Mx
—
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=AqXeTHJ/1FCYeuvJ8dc1B+X3uHaa7m2W0s31vzL4opnrJlSaBdtbWTY8Ti5WiZnu9Q==
—
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=AoHTKEi2W8L2P8cf9CoDicIxYiuttTkwtIeFOqYCewBGoRZiiF+9/92saUkIDERGAA==
—
d365mktkey=wbU64GRacxVEQxwcLSQnx0zisXLYzgUbfvsufIqO9ZUx
—
linear-domain-verification=iuq6saifcnbe
—
google-site-verification=uFg3wr5PWsK8lV029RoXXBBUW0_E6qf1WEWVHhetkOY
—
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=As/XxnDWZFxFwHvRZj+HbG5/ImtAeabLkiOWu1h7wCJQFAR216E9HoYQ5Hy6o7StoQ==
—
d365mktkey=QDa792dLCZhvaAOOCe2Hz6WTzmTssOp1snABhxWibhMx
—
ms-domain-verification=65f91178-9dfb-41cd-929d-08d1a38ed607
—
t7sebee51jrj7vm932k531hipa
—
MS=ms79629062
—
ms-domain-verification=1c4e4677-e58f-4117-8d61-e5b2810388c2
—
ms-domain-verification=561512fc-b4ba-4ac7-a946-e464c8f49f1b
—
d365mktkey=SxDf1EZxLvMwx6eEZUxzjFFgHoapF8DvtWEUjwq7ZTwx
—
liveramp-site-verification=kxcV8fDH_FUNUZQEcAO6lwgim47f_hNLgMP4VG0PF_Q
—
google-site-verification=mEAmcTy1e8jIB9W6ENPk2GDg9hjuNytQQRGlK0hPm0c
—
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=An4mJIFLRys9h1EvjX18SJs5p1uEF5MHcs2JJLYPrI48C5Qt9FpaZEM0sQTV4JvNYw==
—
d365mktkey=ZGFU0tlXPekPusNHPo5QQQWpVf0gic0xpuKroNy3NQEx
—
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=A8qndBCDJGtFF2+3v/IPIMmM0SaVcrJBoSue7rKob6sUeK7QGeFuWkrtvze3AiqUDA==
—
d365mktkey=3uc1cf82cpv750lzk70v9bvf2
—
sitecore-domain-verification=1d46cb5467624e33a408d14324874088
—
atlassian-domain-verification=xvoaqRfxSg3PnlVnR4xCSOlKyw1Aln0MMxRiKXnwWroFG7vI76TUC8xYb03MwMXv
—
d365mktkey=8fEQahTresJms7tZGxGFr94T1zDz36oCbUt1LJc99mox
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

cb9982fb911f4441e28645bf9812f9e8c7a90f9079e2df69a27fe11cd90de5e642f715b9034641b4d1da7a4c1987ad740862d657b6fea714d83d7c2945962c89
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 8 Feb 2026, 23:17 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-microsoft.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-microsoft.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-microsoft.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-microsoft.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/423/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for microsoft.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short microsoft.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.microsoft.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.microsoft.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer microsoft.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd microsoft.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.microsoft.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.microsoft.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.microsoft.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.microsoft.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/microsoft.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.microsoft.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://microsoft.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://microsoft.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://microsoft.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 13.107.213.35 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 35.213.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 13.107.246.35 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 35.246.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4877 runs
DKIM
Verified 4695 runs
DMARC
Verified 4860 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4679 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4858 runs
BIMI
Verified 4694 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4697 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4699 runs
CAA
Verified 4691 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short microsoft.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.microsoft.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.microsoft.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer microsoft.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd microsoft.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.microsoft.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.microsoft.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.microsoft.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.microsoft.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/microsoft.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.microsoft.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://microsoft.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://microsoft.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://microsoft.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 13.107.213.35 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 35.213.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 13.107.246.35 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 35.246.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

microsoft.com

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DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.