Skip to main content
Organizational domain for me could not be determined — the Public Suffix List compiled into this build does not recognize the suffix. Email-security scope below is not determinable; this is not a finding that the domain is or is not a subdomain. Re-run when the PSL snapshot is updated.
Registry Zone Health Intelligence — me is a shared registry suffix.
This report focuses on zone infrastructure health: DNSSEC signing, nameserver diversity, certificate authority policy, and delegation security. Email authentication protocols (SPF, DMARC, DKIM) are not applicable to registry suffixes — they apply to domains registered under this zone.
Registry operators, ICANN, and ccTLD authorities can use this view to assess zone security posture.
DNS Tool
Registry Zone Health Report
Generated 24 Feb 2026, 14:29 UTC
Duration 11.4s
Version v26.25.65
Integrity 56360571ea43ae70be2c1d5ba7c9aa4d16a65b76e3afdca07870185184165381c41713f5d5fe500306938a6e93783bc648403771703a45d2ad45d51d266b9914
Subject Domain
me

Registry Zone Health Report

me
24 Feb 2026, 14:29 UTC · 11.4s ·v26.25.65 · SHA-3-512: 5636✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology Replay
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Engineer workspace · evidence preserved

Read the verdict first. Descend only as far as the incident requires.

This report keeps the complete technical record while separating decision, interpretation, evidence, and raw reproduction into a stable disclosure gradient.

L0PostureL1InterpretationL2EvidenceL3Raw & reproduce
Hurry path
MX & Routing Subdomains DNSSEC What changed
KEYBOARD !1@2#3$4%5^6 jump to that section · esc back to the verdict
Sorted by severity — worst first
Email Spoofing
N/A — Registry
Brand Impersonation
N/A — Registry
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
N/A — Registry
Monitoring
N/A — Registry
DANE
N/A — Registry
TRACE L0 · Email Spoofing — N/A — Registry L1 · 01 · Email Security · SPF/DMARC L3 · Reproduce commands
Action Required
No SPF and no DMARC — domain is completely unprotected against email spoofing
Not Configured
SPF, DMARC, DKIM, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, CAA
Recommended
Publish an SPF record to authorize legitimate mail senders, Publish a DMARC record starting with p=none and rua reporting, Configure DKIM signing to cryptographically authenticate outgoing email
Configured
DNSSEC
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Add DMARC Reject for No-Mail Domain

This domain has no MX records and appears to be a website-only domain. A DMARC reject policy tells receiving mail servers to reject any email claiming to be from your domain.

RFC 7489
High Lock Down SPF for No-Mail Domain

This domain has no MX records and appears to be a website-only domain. Publishing a strict SPF record explicitly declares that no servers are authorized to send email, preventing attackers from spoofing your domain.

RFC 7208
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

RFC 8659
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (RESTRICTED) LIVE
Registry Restricted
.me restricts public WHOIS
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Unprotected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Footprint
01 Identity & policy · L1 Email Security Can this domain be impersonated by email? SPF DMARC DKIM MTA-STS TLS-RPT MX & Routing N/A — Registry
02 Chain of authority · L1 Domain Security Can DNS answers and certificate issuance be trusted? DANE / TLSA CAA Delegation DNSSEC & NS N/A — Registry

CAA RFC 8659 §4 N/A

CAA records on a TLD zone do not constrain certificate issuance for domains registered under this suffix. Per RFC 8659 §3, CAs process CAA by climbing the DNS tree from the requested FQDN — a CAA record on the TLD itself would only affect certificates for the bare TLD, not for child domains like example.me. No major TLD publishes CAA records.

Zone Signing & DNSSEC Methodology Is this zone cryptographically signed? YES DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Gold Signed RSA/SHA-256 Adequate

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: RSA/SHA-256 — MUST implement, widely deployed (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are cryptographically authenticated and tamper-evident.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
45352 8 2 7708C8A6D5D72B63214BBFF50CB54553F7E07A1FA5E9074BD8D63C43102D8559

NS Delegation Verified

5 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: a0.nic.me a2.nic.me b0.nic.me b2.nic.me c0.nic.me
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
03 Delivery path · L1 Transport Security Will mail transport resist downgrade and interception? STARTTLS MTA-STS policy TLS-RPT
04 Human-visible identity · L1 Brand & Trust Can this brand be convincingly faked? BIMI & VMC CAA · see Domain Security N/A — Registry
05 Ownership & attack surface · L1 Infrastructure Intelligence Who operates this domain, and what is exposed? Registrar / RDAP security.txt AI Surface Subdomains
DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on b2.nic.me — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: b2.nic.me, a0.nic.me, b0.nic.me, a2.nic.me, c0.nic.me

Subdomain Discovery Not Applicable
Certificate Transparency subdomain enumeration is not applicable for registry suffixes. For me, CT logs would show registered domains under this zone rather than organizational subdomains. To analyze a specific domain's exposure, scan a registrable domain like example.me.
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
06 Raw records & reproducibility · L2–L3 Evidence & Verification Can another engineer reproduce every material claim? Analysis Confidence Intelligence Currency What changed Raw record diff Integrity seal Reproduce
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Stale Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Adequate
ICuAE Details
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
NS 1 hour (3600s) 1 day (86400s) high NS TTL is below — observed 1 hour (3600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Consider setting to 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for me
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics)
Registry Zone Health
DNSSEC: Success 0 Nameservers
Zone infrastructure protocols applicable to registry suffixes
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 5 / 5 records
a2.nic.me.
b2.nic.me.
b2.nic.me.
a0.nic.me.
b0.nic.me.
c0.nic.me.
a0.nic.me.
b0.nic.me.
c0.nic.me.
a2.nic.me.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
a0.nic.me. hostmaster.donuts.email. 1771942723 7200 900 1209600 3600
a0.nic.me. hostmaster.donuts.email. 1771942723 7200 900 1209600 3600
TXT RFC 7208 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

56360571ea43ae70be2c1d5ba7c9aa4d16a65b76e3afdca07870185184165381c41713f5d5fe500306938a6e93783bc648403771703a45d2ad45d51d266b9914
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 24 Feb 2026, 14:29 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3) Cross-Reference Verification

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-me.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-me.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-me.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-me.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/4099/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for me. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer me A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer me AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer me MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer me NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer me TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer me DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer me DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd me A @1.1.1.1

Brand & Trust

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer me CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer me HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer me CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/me' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Gold · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Gold 15673 runs
DKIM
Gold 15463 runs
DMARC
Gold 15654 runs
DANE/TLSA
Gold 15445 runs
DNSSEC
Gold 15632 runs
BIMI
Gold 15460 runs
MTA-STS
Gold 15481 runs
TLS-RPT
Gold 15496 runs
CAA
Gold 15493 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer me A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer me AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer me MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer me NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer me TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer me DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer me DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd me A @1.1.1.1

Brand & Trust

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer me CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer me HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer me CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/me' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

0s

Running Real-Time Scan Telemetry

Most scans complete in less than one minute. Some may take longer.

Markers represent known resolver locations. Anycast routing selects the nearest node — exact routing is internal to each provider.

Pipeline nodes reflect live data as each analysis phase completes.

Telemetry Log 0 polls