Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.
| Record Type | Observed TTL | Typical TTL | Severity | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TXT | 577s |
1 hour (3600s) |
medium | TXT TTL is below — observed 577s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Consider setting to 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. |
| MX | 24s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | MX TTL is below — observed 24s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Consider setting to 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. |
| NS | 3577s |
1 day (86400s) |
high | NS TTL is below — observed 3577s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Consider setting to 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. |
Big Picture Questions
- How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
- Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
- Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
- Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
| Parameter | Current | Suggested | Severity | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| timeout_seconds | 5s |
8s |
low | Average scan duration is 60.8s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures. RFC 8767 |
DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.
Your DMARC policy is set to quarantine. Upgrade to p=reject for maximum protection — reject instructs receivers to discard spoofed mail entirely rather than quarantining it.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _dmarc.telekom.de (update existing DMARC record) |
| Value | v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@telekom.de |
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | CAA |
| Host | telekom.de (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider) |
| Value | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" |
MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _mta-sts.telekom.de (MTA-STS policy record) |
| Value | v=STSv1; id=telekom.de |
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced
SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified
SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups
DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified
DMARC policy quarantine (100%) - good protection
pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified
Found DKIM records for 4 selector(s)
l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail),
weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3),
DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)
MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified
No MTA-STS record found
MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.
TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified
TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 3 MX hosts)
Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:
- DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
- MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC quarantine flags but does not reject spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3) — no BIMI or CAA (RFC 8659) reinforcement leaves brand impersonation largely unaddressed
BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning
No BIMI record found
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning
No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116
No security.txt found
/.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities.
See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No
No AI governance measures detected
llms.txt llmstxt.org
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it.
Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Evidence Log (1 item)
| Type | Detail | Severity | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks |
robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives | low | Observed |
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No
No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.
What type of scan is this?
This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.
Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.
Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.
DNS Server Security Hardened
No DNS server misconfigurations found on dns2.telekom.de — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.
| Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Zone Transfer (AXFR) | Denied | Zone transfer denied (correct configuration) |
| Open Recursion | Disabled | Recursion disabled (correct configuration) |
| Nameserver Identity | Hidden | No nameserver identity information disclosed |
| Cache Snooping | Protected | Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration) |
Tested nameservers: dns2.telekom.de, pns.dtag.de, ns1.telekom.net, dns1.telekom.de
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Partially TLS reporting is configured but no transport enforcement policy is active
Transport security inferred from 1 signal(s) — no enforcement policy active
Policy Assessment Primary
- TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures (RFC 8460)
Telemetry
mailto:dmarc@telekom.comLive Probe Supplementary
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct
ASN / Network Success
Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 3 IP address(es)
| ASN | Name | Country |
|---|---|---|
AS16509 |
Amazon.com, Inc. | US |
3.67.146.210 → AS16509 (3.64.0.0/12)63.176.75.230 → AS16509 (63.176.0.0/12)3.75.56.200 → AS16509 (3.64.0.0/10)Edge / CDN Success
Domain appears to use direct origin hosting
SaaS TXT Footprint Success 9 services
9 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records
Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.
| Service | Verification Record |
|---|---|
| Google Workspace | google-site-verification=3aMWAc5xlQdD9Sr5FbjOVk5ZWcXHz3FfuT1ykz7ovF8 |
| MongoDB Atlas | mongodb-site-verification=SVkEFwDo0PL5wQKGajdr2PeA7Tlr9Yn0 |
| DocuSign | docusign=6c675f35-a345-4def-8efa-8cde758ccc7e |
| Webex | webexdomainverification.IPJP=5d9af4ca-0ad4-401d-a88c-4828ffcf90b5 |
| Atlassian | atlassian-domain-verification=RYDBmArxP6DhrshwBcIZoo3ZF26BwxWI06Enb8LaC7YfF2d8cP... |
| Apple | apple-domain-verification=RAsXcbTcwd0x4STR |
| Adobe | adobe-idp-site-verification=22f64faf827865075c1f3f1d814848b67f1e2ebe012796f5b958... |
| Miro | miro-verification=089da153dee3b2bdebb4e4940c914abf39a26035 |
| Microsoft 365 | MS=ms35884038 |
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned
DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned
NS Delegation Verified
4 nameserver(s) configured
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?
AIPv4 Address
AAAAIPv6 Address
MXMail Servers
SRVServices
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 43 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?| Subdomain | Source | Status | Provider / CNAME | Certificates | First Seen | Issuer(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
api.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current |
prod.spacegate.telekom.de
|
— | — | — |
app.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
apps.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
autodiscover.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current |
o365autodis.telekom.de
|
— | — | — |
cert.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
cloud.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
community.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
compliance.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
developer.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current |
developer.spacegate.telekom.de
|
— | — | — |
dns.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
dns1.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
dns2.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
download.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
email.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
event.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
ext.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
forum.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
gw1.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
gw2.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
hosting.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
hr.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
it.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
jira.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
learning.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
legal.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
link.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
mail.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
mail2.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
mdm.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
ocsp.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current |
ocsp.telesec.de
|
— | — | — |
owa.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
privacy.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
public.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
rss.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
services.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
shop.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current |
shop.telekom.de.cname.i22.de
|
— | — | — |
sip.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
stg.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current |
eg-stg-ext-56470332e7349b15.elb.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com
|
— | — | — |
web.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
webex.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
wiki.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
www.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
www2.telekom.de
|
DNS | Current |
d8ycftj0e2pjg.cloudfront.net
|
— | — | — |
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
3.67.146.210
3.67.146.210
63.176.75.230
3.75.56.200
3.75.56.200
63.176.75.230
v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;rua=mailto:dmarc@telekom.de;ruf=mailto:dmarc@telekom.de;
v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;rua=mailto:dmarc@telekom.de;ruf=mailto:dmarc@telekom.de;
100 mailin.ng.telekom.net.
100 mailin.ng.telekom.net.
200 mailin42.telekom.de.
200 mailin42.telekom.de.
200 mailin22.telekom.de.
200 mailin22.telekom.de.
pns.dtag.de.
dns2.telekom.de.
ns1.telekom.net.
ns1.telekom.net.
dns1.telekom.de.
pns.dtag.de.
dns2.telekom.de.
dns1.telekom.de.
dns1.telekom.de. dnsadmin.t-systems.com. 2019037887 10800 1800 604800 600
dns1.telekom.de. dnsadmin.t-systems.com. 2019037887 10800 1800 604800 600
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:dmarc@telekom.com;
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:dmarc@telekom.com;
figma-domain-verification=b9c1825057675ccb105df5798a5d27c8bd20a6c5d604e47d22e13bd8f05429fc-1742808147
google-site-verification=d1yVyM6bmOcSDJXc5ot_SrOyXXKqgEu8Ep6SSCHgJb4
5767dbc9e0bea7f45ca86eb79002a6da39a2b5ba6e6e6e7bfa69a4583acc2a9
atlassian-domain-verification=uGLUdpD2IVY19OJG5SQbVpV497SMTPJPSKYbkZRnWtMwczrdbHLwFVATrVgnlCOI
google-site-verification=3aMWAc5xlQdD9Sr5FbjOVk5ZWcXHz3FfuT1ykz7ovF8
WswlzVPlM/dCeERhN7//wzB6tFfJZ1XmYfNOWOrtejyjbMUHvprNl2q/aSJovjIIdeCUnaiIU+04M7Hy+OfbBw==
ZOOM_verify_jIbBUG459R326KhFKOX8uB
docusign=386bf6b9-1928-48c8-9f8a-c7b551459aa2
mongodb-site-verification=SVkEFwDo0PL5wQKGajdr2PeA7Tlr9Yn0
google-site-verification:syCIRr6VyoifbE6Wpg-dmA-LMXJwh5QE-Hm4eEDU8as
docusign=6c675f35-a345-4def-8efa-8cde758ccc7e
openai-domain-verification=dv-T5JfH1eMRERJ2s29zq4XiPTR
webexdomainverification.IPJP=5d9af4ca-0ad4-401d-a88c-4828ffcf90b5
atlassian-domain-verification=RYDBmArxP6DhrshwBcIZoo3ZF26BwxWI06Enb8LaC7YfF2d8cPno6tILbMv8SCVS
google-site-verification=DKA9MWpvwcF2sZXgChNZHK5K8s9GFaUJnomtQQoa83o
apple-domain-verification=RAsXcbTcwd0x4STR
jQ5A8b2Q7E4HyW43qxNGnwFURfay0p6vHBujf8d4fdIYmySsRB2prgHkNJFXQwD+wazvOVaY2l8FpABrA3E7qQ==
adobe-idp-site-verification=22f64faf827865075c1f3f1d814848b67f1e2ebe012796f5b958a206affdcbeb
docusign=386bf6b9-1928-48c8-9f8a-c7b551459aa2
webexdomainverification.BSJE=bff842e9-03f4-44ca-b219-082c41a93969
677d99f0f35f8908c36db37733460d077cefca982e1356c01f8dc9ab5fa3f3f
Dynatrace-site-verification=96bc3bd6-5d9d-453d-be69-504b23c4e472__e2jn5ah8dr7bql5njdq6ttdq0
atlassian-domain-verification=uGLUdpD2IVY19OJG5SQbVpV497SMTPJPSKYbkZRnWtMwczrdbHLwFVATrVgnlCOI
google-site-verification=d1yVyM6bmOcSDJXc5ot_SrOyXXKqgEu8Ep6SSCHgJb4
WswlzVPlM/dCeERhN7//wzB6tFfJZ1XmYfNOWOrtejyjbMUHvprNl2q/aSJovjIIdeCUnaiIU+04M7Hy+OfbBw==
miro-verification=089da153dee3b2bdebb4e4940c914abf39a26035
google-gws-recovery-domain-verification=43219657
MS=ms35884038
v=spf1 include:_spfa.telekom.com ~all
6f13fba4457ecc5c8e4a13ba55f5bcfd543188febf1506a8d1dc024621b3588
google-site-verification:syCIRr6VyoifbE6Wpg-dmA-LMXJwh5QE-Hm4eEDU8as
infoblox-domain-mastery=f82c526edce83ae0a49e379a8b7fc171e6910bf251ad85620177ac13f7759606f3
DNS History Timeline BETA
When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?
Confirm Your Email Configuration
This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.
DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY
All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.
Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.
Intelligence Sources
This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below
This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.
8063fab7172821c861eb1595d97c4f55d0c2b38ae15ddc438114444be2b6bc15410f4b4be1577bdee94845b5bb8a791b1b2b67dc27dbf6e0db68a3e5afaecb0a
Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.
After downloading, verify with any of these commands:
Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).
cat dns-intelligence-telekom.de.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-telekom.de.jsonpython3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-telekom.de.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-telekom.de.json.sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/4064/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).
Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for telekom.de. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer telekom.de Adig +noall +answer telekom.de AAAAdig +noall +answer telekom.de MXdig +noall +answer telekom.de NSdig +noall +answer telekom.de TXTEmail Authentication
dig +short telekom.de TXT | grep -i spfdig +short _dmarc.telekom.de TXTdig +short k1._domainkey.telekom.de TXTdig +short k2._domainkey.telekom.de TXTdig +short k3._domainkey.telekom.de TXTdig +short mandrill._domainkey.telekom.de TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer telekom.de DNSKEYdig +noall +answer telekom.de DSdig +dnssec +cd telekom.de A @1.1.1.1Transport Security
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mailin.ng.telekom.net TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mailin42.telekom.de TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mailin22.telekom.de TLSAopenssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mailin.ng.telekom.net:25 -servername mailin.ng.telekom.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -datesdig +short _mta-sts.telekom.de TXTcurl -sL https://mta-sts.telekom.de/.well-known/mta-sts.txtdig +short _smtp._tls.telekom.de TXTBrand & Trust
dig +short default._bimi.telekom.de TXTdig +noall +answer telekom.de CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer telekom.de HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer telekom.de CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/telekom.de' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50Transport Security
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mailin.ng.telekom.net:25 -servername mailin.ng.telekom.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5Infrastructure Intelligence
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.telekom.de&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20curl -sL https://telekom.de/.well-known/security.txt | head -20AI Surface
curl -sI https://telekom.de/llms.txt | head -5curl -s https://telekom.de/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'Infrastructure Intelligence
dig +short 210.146.67.3.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig +short 230.75.176.63.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Appendix: Verification Commands
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer telekom.de Adig +noall +answer telekom.de AAAAdig +noall +answer telekom.de MXdig +noall +answer telekom.de NSdig +noall +answer telekom.de TXTEmail Authentication
dig +short telekom.de TXT | grep -i spfdig +short _dmarc.telekom.de TXTdig +short k1._domainkey.telekom.de TXTdig +short k2._domainkey.telekom.de TXTdig +short k3._domainkey.telekom.de TXTdig +short mandrill._domainkey.telekom.de TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer telekom.de DNSKEYdig +noall +answer telekom.de DSdig +dnssec +cd telekom.de A @1.1.1.1Transport Security
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mailin.ng.telekom.net TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mailin42.telekom.de TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mailin22.telekom.de TLSAopenssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mailin.ng.telekom.net:25 -servername mailin.ng.telekom.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -datesdig +short _mta-sts.telekom.de TXTcurl -sL https://mta-sts.telekom.de/.well-known/mta-sts.txtdig +short _smtp._tls.telekom.de TXTBrand & Trust
dig +short default._bimi.telekom.de TXTdig +noall +answer telekom.de CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer telekom.de HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer telekom.de CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/telekom.de' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50Transport Security
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mailin.ng.telekom.net:25 -servername mailin.ng.telekom.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5Infrastructure Intelligence
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.telekom.de&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20curl -sL https://telekom.de/.well-known/security.txt | head -20AI Surface
curl -sI https://telekom.de/llms.txt | head -5curl -s https://telekom.de/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'Infrastructure Intelligence
dig +short 210.146.67.3.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig +short 230.75.176.63.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT