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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 24 Feb 2026, 14:19 UTC
Duration 83.4s
Version v26.25.65
Integrity df47cb6505c5d9dedf354fb309aede4a232d7efc7f45fc20e3fcc944b2f9eb9268f6c87532445923a0fe604ad321fc60bf8ffc3ccd653070f098bc983655579d
Subject Domain
cia.gov

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

cia.gov
24 Feb 2026, 14:19 UTC · 83.4s ·v26.25.65 · SHA-3-512: df47✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
5 protocols configured, 4 not configured Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC deployment phase — quarantine fully enforced with reporting, consider upgrading to reject Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation 1 monitoring
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Good 77/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
DNS data is mostly current with minor gaps — good intelligence currency

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
A 20s 5 minutes (300s) high A TTL is below — observed 20s, typical value is 5 minutes (300s). Consider setting to 300 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.
AAAA 20s 5 minutes (300s) high AAAA TTL is below — observed 20s, typical value is 5 minutes (300s). Consider setting to 300 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.
TXT 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Consider setting to 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.
NS 6 hours (21600s) 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Consider setting to 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.
SOA 4 hours (14400s) 1 hour (3600s) medium SOA TTL is above — observed 4 hours (14400s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Consider setting to 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for cia.gov
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Configured
Recommended
Upgrade DMARC policy from quarantine to reject (p=reject) for maximum spoofing protection
Monitoring
External domain uce.cia.gov has not authorized cia.gov to send DMARC reports (missing cia.gov._report._dmarc.uce.cia.gov TXT record)
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (quarantine, 100%), DKIM, DNSSEC, CAA
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE
Priority Actions Achievable posture: Secure
Medium Upgrade DMARC to Reject

Your DMARC policy is set to quarantine. Upgrade to p=reject for maximum protection — reject instructs receivers to discard spoofed mail entirely rather than quarantining it.

A reject policy provides the strongest protection against domain spoofing.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.cia.gov (update existing DMARC record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@cia.gov
RFC 7489 §6.3
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.cia.gov (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@cia.gov
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.cia.gov (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=cia.gov
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
get.gov (Registrant: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY)
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Akamai
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 mx -all
RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC enforcement is partial (quarantine). -all may preempt DKIM/DMARC evaluation at some receivers. Consider p=reject for full enforcement; ~all is more DMARC-compatible.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Quarantined, not rejected
Success p=quarantine

DMARC policy quarantine (100%) - good protection

v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:demarcreports@uce.cia.gov; ruf=mailto:demarcfailures@uce.cia.gov; ri=86400; aspf=s; adkim=s; fo=1
Alignment: SPF strict DKIM strict sp=quarantine
Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
Advanced cryptographic posture detected. Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC deployment phase — quarantine fully enforced with reporting, consider upgrading to reject
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
Monitoring Posture Note: Quarantine sequesters authentication failures while preserving full DMARC forensic telemetry (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain quarantine rather than reject as a deliberate monitoring strategy — failed messages are processed and reported but sequestered from the inbox. See NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1 for enforcement tradeoffs.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found

Found DKIM records for 1 selector(s)

s1._domainkey
v=DKIM1; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDWKDG6o+aUX3ov7h3zsv1mjQ5oTy8kFUYXMtgRQxrk3BHfM7cEXysehX3MaOgf/1JuN1dzmbwTMG9WqY1ikhQTjWbi0qVP0LMw7QSXmkdpmGl/QXEKp5LJDNGTuE3yPtD/068WPe1wYI2Oqx/ODOkxF4LUx7tbhjBBgzXtl8/Z5QIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Authorization missing
Warning

1 of 1 external reporting domains missing authorization

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
uce.cia.gov Unauthorized —
External domain uce.cia.gov has not authorized cia.gov to send DMARC reports (missing cia.gov._report._dmarc.uce.cia.gov TXT record)

Third-Party Action Required

This authorization record must be created by the external reporting provider, not by you. Per RFC 7489 §7.1, the receiving domain must publish a TXT record to confirm it accepts DMARC reports from your domain.

What to do: Contact your DMARC reporting provider and ask them to publish the authorization TXT record shown above. If you use a managed DMARC service (e.g., Ondmarc, Dmarcian, Valimail), this is typically handled during onboarding — reach out to their support if the record is missing.

Impact if unresolved: Compliant receivers may silently discard aggregate or forensic reports destined for the unauthorized address, reducing your DMARC visibility.

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 2 MX hosts)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC quarantine flags but does not reject spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3), and no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes; CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4) but visual brand faking remains open

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success IODEF

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only DigiCert can issue certificates

Authorized CAs: DigiCert
0 iodef "mailto:caanotices@uce.cia.gov"
0 issue "digicert.com"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on a3-64.akam.net — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: a3-64.akam.net, a12-65.akam.net, a13-65.akam.net, a22-66.akam.net, a16-67.akam.net, a1-22.akam.net

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

No transport encryption policy detected — mail delivery relies on opportunistic TLS

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — SMTP port 25 not reachable from probe host — all MX servers rejected or timed out on port 25. Transport security assessed via DNS policy records.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS20940 Akamai International B.V. US
IPv4 Mappings:
23.220.144.153 → AS20940 (23.220.144.0/24)
23.220.144.132 → AS20940 (23.220.144.0/24)
IPv6 Mappings:
2600:1405:6400::17c3:5190 → AS20940 (2600:1405:6400::/48)
2600:1405:6400::17c3:519b → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS services detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed RSA/SHA-256 Adequate

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: RSA/SHA-256 — MUST implement, widely deployed (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
48959 8 2 DEB2A237884DDCFD20BDFF8E8FA81F4A4B7ED069E1E4E2ED79CAE7707D1CFFFC
62599 8 2 E51AE54018E41619F97076A56C969D10A71B4D0050DBF1E6AB8DE2F8CF023AE5
25534 8 2 4F6E9F886A649976127D3A4746108C2461E2D9198F1D24C869CFD9E91E2CF5B3

NS Delegation Verified

6 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: a1-22.akam.net a12-65.akam.net a13-65.akam.net a16-67.akam.net a22-66.akam.net a3-64.akam.net
Managed DNS
All 6 nameservers hosted by Akamai. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Akamai
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (1 difference found)
Resolver Differences:
A: DNS4EU returned different results: [23.44.111.195 23.44.111.208]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

23.220.144.153
23.220.144.132
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2600:1405:6400::17c3:5190
2600:1405:6400::17c3:519b
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 mail4.cia.gov.
10 mail3.cia.gov.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 4 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
8 unique certificates 4 current 0 expired Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Certificate Authority Diversity (1 CA observed across CT log history)
Certificate Authority Certs First Issued Last Issued Status
DigiCert Inc 8 2025-03-24 2025-08-13 Active
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
mail3.cia.gov CT Log Current — 3 2025-03-25T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
mail4.cia.gov CT Log Current — 3 2025-03-25T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
relay1.cia.gov DNS Current — — — —
www.cia.gov CT Log Current cia.gov.edgekey.net 6 2025-08-13T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 2 / 2 records
23.220.144.153
23.220.144.132
23.220.144.132
23.220.144.153
AAAA Synchronized 2 / 2 records
2600:1405:6400::17c3:5190
2600:1405:6400::17c3:5190
2600:1405:6400::17c3:519b
2600:1405:6400::17c3:519b
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
0 issue "digicert.com"
0 issue "digicert.com"
0 iodef "mailto:caanotices@uce.cia.gov"
0 iodef "mailto:caanotices@uce.cia.gov"
DMARC _dmarc.cia.gov RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:demarcreports@uce.cia.gov; ruf=mailto:demarcfailures@uce.cia.gov; ri=86400; aspf=s; adkim=s; fo=1
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:demarcreports@uce.cia.gov; ruf=mailto:demarcfailures@uce.cia.gov; ri=86400; aspf=s; adkim=s; fo=1
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
10 mail4.cia.gov.
10 mail4.cia.gov.
10 mail3.cia.gov.
10 mail3.cia.gov.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 6 / 6 records
a3-64.akam.net.
a13-65.akam.net.
a1-22.akam.net.
a16-67.akam.net.
a12-65.akam.net.
a1-22.akam.net.
a22-66.akam.net.
a12-65.akam.net.
a13-65.akam.net.
a22-66.akam.net.
a16-67.akam.net.
a3-64.akam.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
a1-22.akam.net. monrpt.cia.gov. 2015111807 7200 3600 2419200 14400
a1-22.akam.net. monrpt.cia.gov. 2015111807 7200 3600 2419200 14400
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=spf1 mx -all
v=spf1 mx -all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

df47cb6505c5d9dedf354fb309aede4a232d7efc7f45fc20e3fcc944b2f9eb9268f6c87532445923a0fe604ad321fc60bf8ffc3ccd653070f098bc983655579d
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 24 Feb 2026, 14:19 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-cia.gov.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-cia.gov.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-cia.gov.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-cia.gov.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/4063/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for cia.gov. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short cia.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.cia.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' RFC 6376 
dig +short s1._domainkey.cia.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer cia.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd cia.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mail4.cia.gov RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail4.cia.gov TLSA
Check TLSA record for mail3.cia.gov RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail3.cia.gov TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mail4.cia.gov) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail4.cia.gov:25 -servername mail4.cia.gov 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.cia.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.cia.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.cia.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.cia.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/cia.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mail4.cia.gov) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail4.cia.gov:25 -servername mail4.cia.gov </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.cia.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://cia.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://cia.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://cia.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.220.144.153 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 153.144.220.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 23.220.144.132 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 132.144.220.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4850 runs
DKIM
Verified 4669 runs
DMARC
Verified 4834 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4653 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4831 runs
BIMI
Verified 4668 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4671 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4673 runs
CAA
Verified 4665 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short cia.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.cia.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s1._domainkey.cia.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer cia.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd cia.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mail4.cia.gov (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail4.cia.gov TLSA
Check TLSA record for mail3.cia.gov (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail3.cia.gov TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mail4.cia.gov) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail4.cia.gov:25 -servername mail4.cia.gov 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.cia.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.cia.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.cia.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.cia.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/cia.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mail4.cia.gov) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail4.cia.gov:25 -servername mail4.cia.gov </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.cia.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://cia.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://cia.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://cia.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.220.144.153 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 153.144.220.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 23.220.144.132 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 132.144.220.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

cia.gov

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.