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Organizational domain for com.au could not be determined — the Public Suffix List compiled into this build does not recognize the suffix. Email-security scope below is not determinable; this is not a finding that the domain is or is not a subdomain. Re-run when the PSL snapshot is updated.
Registry Zone Health Intelligence — com.au is a shared registry suffix.
This report focuses on zone infrastructure health: DNSSEC signing, nameserver diversity, certificate authority policy, and delegation security. Email authentication protocols (SPF, DMARC, DKIM) are not applicable to registry suffixes — they apply to domains registered under this zone.
Registry operators, ICANN, and ccTLD authorities can use this view to assess zone security posture.
DNS Tool
Registry Zone Health Report
Generated 23 Feb 2026, 14:21 UTC
Duration 108.2s
Version v26.25.28
Integrity b46ca52e24f9eef50a943c47babadb654f427fdeb569e9fdcacc0e167db57b89095adbdb66e5deaf2088d6ca3e1118e1ac648face4e6b36b00f3e62b7224aa97
Subject Domain
com.au

Registry Zone Health Report

com.au
23 Feb 2026, 14:21 UTC · 108.2s ·v26.25.28 · SHA-3-512: b46c✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology Replay
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Engineer workspace · evidence preserved

Read the verdict first. Descend only as far as the incident requires.

This report keeps the complete technical record while separating decision, interpretation, evidence, and raw reproduction into a stable disclosure gradient.

L0PostureL1InterpretationL2EvidenceL3Raw & reproduce
Hurry path
MX & Routing Subdomains DNSSEC What changed
KEYBOARD !1@2#3$4%5^6 jump to that section · esc back to the verdict
Sorted by severity — worst first
Email Spoofing
Vulnerable
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Monitoring
Not Setup
DANE
Not Deployed
TRACE L0 · Email Spoofing — Vulnerable L1 · 01 · Email Security · SPF/DMARC L3 · Reproduce commands
Action Required
No SPF and no DMARC — domain is completely unprotected against email spoofing
Not Configured
SPF, DMARC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, CAA
Recommended
Publish an SPF record to authorize legitimate mail senders, Publish a DMARC record starting with p=none and rua reporting
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Configured
DKIM (inferred via Unknown), DNSSEC
Priority Actions Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Add DMARC Reject for No-Mail Domain

This domain has no MX records and appears to be a website-only domain. A DMARC reject policy tells receiving mail servers to reject any email claiming to be from your domain.

RFC 7489
High Lock Down SPF for No-Mail Domain

This domain has no MX records and appears to be a website-only domain. Publishing a strict SPF record explicitly declares that no servers are authorized to send email, preventing attackers from spoofing your domain.

RFC 7208
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

RFC 8659
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
auDA Internal (9999)
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Unprotected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Footprint
01 Identity & policy · L1 Email Security Can this domain be impersonated by email? SPF DMARC DKIM MTA-STS TLS-RPT MX & Routing Vulnerable
02 Chain of authority · L1 Domain Security Can DNS answers and certificate issuance be trusted? DANE / TLSA CAA Delegation DNSSEC & NS Open

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Gold Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Zone Signing & DNSSEC Methodology Is this zone cryptographically signed? YES DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Gold Signed RSA/SHA-256 Adequate

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: RSA/SHA-256 — MUST implement, widely deployed (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are cryptographically authenticated and tamper-evident.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
14185 8 2 9394BEA09F5EBD91384AA5CD0397A6B395FD2B299C7912979243CD689BA387DB

NS Delegation Verified Match

NS delegation verified - 5 nameserver(s) match parent zone

Parent zone delegation matches domain's NS records. No delegation drift detected.
Nameservers: a.au q.au r.au s.au t.au
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
03 Delivery path · L1 Transport Security Will mail transport resist downgrade and interception? STARTTLS MTA-STS policy TLS-RPT
04 Human-visible identity · L1 Brand & Trust Can this brand be convincingly faked? BIMI & VMC CAA · see Domain Security Not Setup
05 Ownership & attack surface · L1 Infrastructure Intelligence Who operates this domain, and what is exposed? Registrar / RDAP security.txt AI Surface Subdomains
DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on t.au — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: t.au, a.au, q.au, r.au, s.au

Subdomain Discovery Not Applicable
Certificate Transparency subdomain enumeration is not applicable for registry suffixes. For com.au, CT logs would show registered domains under this zone rather than organizational subdomains. To analyze a specific domain's exposure, scan a registrable domain like example.com.au.
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
06 Raw records & reproducibility · L2–L3 Evidence & Verification Can another engineer reproduce every material claim? Analysis Confidence Intelligence Currency What changed Raw record diff Integrity seal Reproduce
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Stale Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Adequate
ICuAE Details
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 51.8s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Registry Zone Health
DNSSEC: Success CAA: Not Set 0 Nameservers
Zone infrastructure protocols applicable to registry suffixes
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 5 / 5 records
r.au.
q.au.
s.au.
r.au.
a.au.
t.au.
t.au.
s.au.
q.au.
a.au.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
q.au. hostmaster.donuts.email. 1771856232 7200 900 1209600 3600
q.au. hostmaster.donuts.email. 1771856232 7200 900 1209600 3600
TXT RFC 7208 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

b46ca52e24f9eef50a943c47babadb654f427fdeb569e9fdcacc0e167db57b89095adbdb66e5deaf2088d6ca3e1118e1ac648face4e6b36b00f3e62b7224aa97
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 23 Feb 2026, 14:21 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3) Cross-Reference Verification

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-com.au.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-com.au.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-com.au.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-com.au.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/3817/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for com.au. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com.au A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com.au AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com.au MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com.au NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com.au TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short com.au TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.com.au TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.com.au TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.com.au TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.com.au TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.com.au TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer com.au DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer com.au DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd com.au A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.com.au TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.com.au/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.com.au TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.com.au TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer com.au CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer com.au HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer com.au CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/com.au' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.com.au&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://com.au/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://com.au/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://com.au/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Gold · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Gold 15673 runs
DKIM
Gold 15463 runs
DMARC
Gold 15654 runs
DANE/TLSA
Gold 15445 runs
DNSSEC
Gold 15632 runs
BIMI
Gold 15460 runs
MTA-STS
Gold 15481 runs
TLS-RPT
Gold 15496 runs
CAA
Gold 15493 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com.au A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com.au AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com.au MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com.au NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com.au TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short com.au TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.com.au TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.com.au TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.com.au TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.com.au TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.com.au TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer com.au DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer com.au DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd com.au A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.com.au TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.com.au/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.com.au TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.com.au TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer com.au CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer com.au HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer com.au CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/com.au' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.com.au&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://com.au/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://com.au/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://com.au/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

0s

Running Real-Time Scan Telemetry

Most scans complete in less than one minute. Some may take longer.

Markers represent known resolver locations. Anycast routing selects the nearest node — exact routing is internal to each provider.

Pipeline nodes reflect live data as each analysis phase completes.

Telemetry Log 0 polls