Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
| Parameter | Current | Suggested | Severity | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| timeout_seconds | 5s |
8s |
low | Average scan duration is 30.6s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures. RFC 8767 |
DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.
Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | default._bimi.natashabedingfield.com (BIMI default record) |
| Value | v=BIMI1; l=https://natashabedingfield.com/brand/logo.svg |
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | CAA |
| Host | natashabedingfield.com (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider) |
| Value | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" |
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced
SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified
SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups
DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified
DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection
pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified
DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)
l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail),
weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3),
DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)
MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified
MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 6 mail server(s)
- Mode:
enforce - Max Age: 7 days (604800 seconds)
- MX Patterns: aspmx.l.google.com, alt1.aspmx.l.google.com, alt2.aspmx.l.google.com, alt3.aspmx.l.google.com, alt4.aspmx.l.google.com, 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.google.com
MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.
TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified
TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports
DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1
All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized
| External Domain | Authorization | Auth Record |
|---|---|---|
in.mailhardener.com |
Authorized |
v=DMARC1;
|
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
DANE not available — Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure
Google Workspace supports DANE for outbound mail verification but does not publish TLSA records for its MX hosts.
Recommended alternative: MTA-STS (already configured)
Note: Google Workspace does validate DANE/TLSA when sending mail to DANE-enabled recipients (outbound DANE).
Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:
- DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
- MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Unlikely DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing, but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction — visual and certificate-based brand faking remains possible
BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning
No BIMI record found
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning
No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116
No security.txt found
/.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities.
See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No
No AI governance measures detected
llms.txt llmstxt.org
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it.
Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Evidence Log (1 item)
| Type | Detail | Severity | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks |
robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives | low | Observed |
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No
No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.
What type of scan is this?
This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.
Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.
Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery
Transport encryption enforced via DNS policy (3 signal(s))
Policy Assessment Primary
- MTA-STS policy in enforce mode requires encrypted transport (RFC 8461)
- TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures (RFC 8460)
- Google Workspace enforces TLS 1.2+ with valid certificates on all inbound/outbound mail
Telemetry
mailto:tlsrpt@in.mailhardener.comLive Probe Supplementary
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct
ASN / Network Success
Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)
| ASN | Name | Country |
|---|---|---|
AS53831 |
US |
198.49.23.145 → AS53831 (198.49.23.0/24)198.49.23.144 → AS53831 (198.49.23.0/24)198.185.159.145 → AS53831 (198.185.159.0/24)198.185.159.144 → AS53831 (198.185.159.0/24)Edge / CDN Success
Domain appears to use direct origin hosting
SaaS TXT Footprint Success
No SaaS services detected
Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned
DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned
NS Delegation Verified
4 nameserver(s) configured
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?
AIPv4 Address
AAAAIPv6 Address
MXMail Servers
SRVServices
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 2 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?| Certificate Authority | Certs | First Issued | Last Issued | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Let's Encrypt |
151 | 2016-10-12 | 2026-01-15 | Active |
GeoTrust, Inc. |
1 | 2012-01-25 | 2012-01-25 | Historical |
COMODO CA Limited |
1 | 2012-09-18 | 2012-09-18 | Historical |
| Subdomain | Source | Status | Provider / CNAME | Certificates | First Seen | Issuer(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
mta-sts.natashabedingfield.com
|
CT Log | Current |
natashabedingfield.com.mta-sts.mailhardener.com
|
28 | 2026-01-01T17:33:09 | Let's Encrypt |
www.natashabedingfield.com
|
CT Log | Current |
ext-cust.squarespace.com
|
121 | 2026-01-15T08:31:53 | Let's Encrypt, GeoTrust, Inc., COMODO CA Limited |
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
198.49.23.145
198.49.23.145
198.49.23.144
198.185.159.145
198.185.159.145
198.185.159.144
198.185.159.144
198.49.23.144
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s; pct=100; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=86400; rua=mailto:26f7866a@in.mailhardener.com; ruf=mailto:26f7866a@in.mailhardener.com
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s; pct=100; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=86400; rua=mailto:26f7866a@in.mailhardener.com; ruf=mailto:26f7866a@in.mailhardener.com
v=STSv1; id=20190601000000Z
natashabedingfield.com._mta-sts.mailhardener.com.
1 ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
5 ALT1.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
5 ALT1.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
10 ALT4.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
15 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com.
10 ALT3.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
10 ALT3.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
1 ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
10 ALT4.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
5 ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
5 ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
15 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com.
ns0.directnic.com.
ns0.directnic.com.
ns2.directnic.com.
ns2.directnic.com.
ns3.directnic.com.
ns3.directnic.com.
ns1.directnic.com.
ns1.directnic.com.
ns0.directnic.com. hostmaster.directnic.com. 2014011513 28800 14400 604800 600
ns0.directnic.com. hostmaster.directnic.com. 2014011513 28800 14400 604800 600
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tlsrpt@in.mailhardener.com
natashabedingfield.com._smtp._tls.mailhardener.com.
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
DNS History Timeline BETA
When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?
Confirm Your Email Configuration
This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.
DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY
All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.
Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.
Intelligence Sources
This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below
This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.
a3ffc031e39788a661a128b0d68b578a403945b2df18b7e8364daee335861d10135aff6a5cdb3e53429851e6bf1aaadd812be12b52bfadede832bcf094d1f89d
Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.
After downloading, verify with any of these commands:
Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).
cat dns-intelligence-natashabedingfield.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-natashabedingfield.com.jsonpython3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-natashabedingfield.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-natashabedingfield.com.json.sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/1983/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).
Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for natashabedingfield.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com Adig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com AAAAdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com MXdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com NSdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com TXTEmail Authentication
dig +short natashabedingfield.com TXT | grep -i spfdig +short _dmarc.natashabedingfield.com TXTdig +short default._domainkey.natashabedingfield.com TXTdig +short google._domainkey.natashabedingfield.com TXTdig +short selector1._domainkey.natashabedingfield.com TXTdig +short selector2._domainkey.natashabedingfield.com TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com DNSKEYdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com DSdig +dnssec +cd natashabedingfield.com A @1.1.1.1Transport Security
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ALT1.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ALT3.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ALT4.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSAopenssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com:25 -servername ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -datesdig +short _mta-sts.natashabedingfield.com TXTcurl -sL https://mta-sts.natashabedingfield.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txtdig +short _smtp._tls.natashabedingfield.com TXTBrand & Trust
dig +short default._bimi.natashabedingfield.com TXTdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/natashabedingfield.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50Transport Security
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com:25 -servername ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5Infrastructure Intelligence
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.natashabedingfield.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20curl -sL https://natashabedingfield.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20AI Surface
curl -sI https://natashabedingfield.com/llms.txt | head -5curl -s https://natashabedingfield.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'Infrastructure Intelligence
dig +short 145.23.49.198.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig +short 144.23.49.198.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Appendix: Verification Commands
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com Adig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com AAAAdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com MXdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com NSdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com TXTEmail Authentication
dig +short natashabedingfield.com TXT | grep -i spfdig +short _dmarc.natashabedingfield.com TXTdig +short default._domainkey.natashabedingfield.com TXTdig +short google._domainkey.natashabedingfield.com TXTdig +short selector1._domainkey.natashabedingfield.com TXTdig +short selector2._domainkey.natashabedingfield.com TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com DNSKEYdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com DSdig +dnssec +cd natashabedingfield.com A @1.1.1.1Transport Security
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ALT1.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ALT3.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ALT4.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSAopenssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com:25 -servername ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -datesdig +short _mta-sts.natashabedingfield.com TXTcurl -sL https://mta-sts.natashabedingfield.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txtdig +short _smtp._tls.natashabedingfield.com TXTBrand & Trust
dig +short default._bimi.natashabedingfield.com TXTdig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/natashabedingfield.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50Transport Security
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com:25 -servername ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5Infrastructure Intelligence
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.natashabedingfield.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20curl -sL https://natashabedingfield.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20AI Surface
curl -sI https://natashabedingfield.com/llms.txt | head -5curl -s https://natashabedingfield.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'Infrastructure Intelligence
dig +short 145.23.49.198.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig +short 144.23.49.198.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT