Skip to main content

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

1nom.org Critical Risk
21 Nov 2026, 13:36 UTC · 61.5s ·v26.51.0-146-ge5892c0ab · SHA-3-512: 2495✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Archived ·Cross-Referenced
Engineer workspace · evidence preserved

Read the verdict first. Descend only as far as the incident requires.

This report keeps the complete technical record while separating decision, interpretation, evidence, and raw reproduction into a stable disclosure gradient.

L0PostureL1InterpretationL2EvidenceL3Raw & reproduce
Hurry path
KEYBOARD !1@2#3$4%5^6 jump to that section · esc back to the verdict
Sorted by severity — worst first
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Partially Signed
Certificate Control
Configured
Monitoring
Partial
DANE
Not Deployed
TRACE L0 · Brand Impersonation — Not Setup L1 · 04 · Brand & Trust · BIMI L3 · Reproduce commands
Action Required
DNSSEC validation is failing
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE
Recommended
Fix DNSSEC configuration or remove broken DS records
Configured
SPF, DMARC (reject), DKIM, CAA
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Moderate Risk
Critical Fix Broken DNSSEC

DNSSEC validation is failing for this domain. This can cause resolvers to reject all DNS responses, making your domain unreachable.

Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
Key-Systems GmbH
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Cloudflare Enterprise
Where DNS records are edited
01 Identity & policy · L1 Email Security Can this domain be impersonated by email? SPF DMARC DKIM MTA-STS TLS-RPT MX & Routing Protected
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Gold

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 mx ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC reject: the strongest compatible security stance, aligned with CISA and RFC guidance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Gold

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:postmaster@1nom.org;ruf=mailto:mail@1nom.org;
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
Forensic reporting (ruf) is published with aggregate reporting under a reject policy — deliberate forensic collection alongside full enforcement. This record pairs p=reject with both rua= and ruf=. DMARCbis (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) removed ruf= from the specification and the major providers do not honour it, so publishing ruf= here appears to be a deliberate request for per-message forensics from the receivers that still send them, accepted at a known PII cost (RFC 7489 §7.3). Enforcement is already at its strongest setting, so this tool does not recommend removing the tag on the strength of the record alone — the PII exposure in RFC 7489 §7.3 is the trade-off worth reviewing, not the enforcement posture. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Gold

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Weak Keys

Found 1 DKIM selector(s) with weak key(s) (below 2048-bit RSA)

1024-bit key (weak, upgrade to 2048)
mail._domainkey 1024-bit Weak
v=DKIM1;p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCybRA5F/0vtknowXbgtufARfdj0tIXoPMbtpYhP0NAzKKdB/WeoGWNgMzG1bFr7y6fcULvdSDNgcC3jdDPr0KrhDJ/XmZwbkAIca5TBvN4qNngHYfz4gZRJXnkYPQwrLkkuwDKFBYpEwBPyCzfhsvtVeUBwTskOrYLAyzpRxW9QwIDAQAB
RFC Stance: RFC 6376 (Internet Standard) defines the DKIM mechanism. DKIM selectors are not publicly enumerable — absence in a scan does not prove absence of signing.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Gold

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No valid MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Gold

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No valid TLS-RPT record found

02 Chain of authority · L1 Domain Security Can DNS answers and certificate issuance be trusted? DANE / TLSA CAA Delegation DNSSEC Operations DNSSEC & NS Partially Signed

DANE / TLSA Gold Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 2 MX hosts)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Gold Success

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only cloudflare.com, Sectigo, DigiCert, Let's Encrypt, cansignhttpexchanges=yes, ssl.com can issue certificates (wildcard issuance: DigiCert, Let's Encrypt, cansignhttpexchanges=yes, ssl.com, Sectigo per RFC 8659 §4.3)

Authorized CAs: cloudflare.com Sectigo DigiCert Let's Encrypt cansignhttpexchanges=yes ssl.com
0 issue "cloudflare.com"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Delegation Consistency 2 Issues

Delegation consistency: 2 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • DS records missing at parent — DNSSEC chain of trust is broken
  • NS TTL mismatch: parent=3600, child=86400 (drift=82800s)

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Misaligned

DNSKEY records without matching DS:
Key Tag: 2371, Flags: 257 (KSK)
Key Tag: 34505, Flags: 256

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
boyd.ns.cloudflare.com No N/A N/A OK
hadlee.ns.cloudflare.com No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Parent TTL: 3600s Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 82800s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

boyd.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.420733407e+09
hadlee.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.420733407e+09
DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue

DNSSEC operational notes: 1 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:
  • CDS/CDNSKEY automation present but only single KSK — pre-publish second KSK before rollover

DNSKEY Inventory 2 Keys

RoleKey TagAlgorithmKey Size
KSK 2371 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits
ZSK 34505 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits

RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures

No RRSIG records found.

Denial of Existence NSEC

NSEC records expose zone contents via ordered names (zone walking). Consider NSEC3 for zone enumeration protection.

Rollover Readiness Partial

Multiple KSKs:
CDS Published:
CDNSKEY Published:
Automation: full

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Yes DNSSEC validation is failing, DNS responses cannot be trusted

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Gold Partially Signed

DNSSEC partially configured - DNSKEY exists but DS record missing at registrar (absence confirmed at the parent's authoritative servers; we could not establish DNSSEC proof of the denial — common causes: unsigned parent or NSEC3 opt-out span)

DNSKEY exists but DS record not published at registrar. Add DS record to complete chain of trust.

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: boyd.ns.cloudflare.com hadlee.ns.cloudflare.com
Managed DNS
All 2 nameservers hosted by Cloudflare. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Cloudflare
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records

HTTPS / SVCB Records RFC 9460 Success HTTPS

HTTPS records found

PriorityTargetALPNECHRaw
1 1nom.org. — No 1nom.org. 300 IN HTTPS 1 1nom.org.

CDS / CDNSKEY (DNSSEC Automation) RFC 7344 Success CDS CDNSKEY

DNSSEC deletion signaled via CDS/CDNSKEY (RFC 8078 §4)

Key TagAlgorithmDigest TypeDigest
0 0
CDNSKEY Records:
FlagsProtocolAlgorithmPublic Key
0 3
03 Delivery path · L1 Transport Security Will mail transport resist downgrade and interception? STARTTLS MTA-STS policy TLS-RPT
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

No transport encryption policy detected — mail delivery relies on opportunistic TLS

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
What Is Measured: Our probe’s TLS 1.3 handshake offers the hybrid post-quantum group X25519MLKEM768 (X25519 combined with ML-KEM-768). The Key Exchange column reports the group each mail server actually negotiated — direct, observed evidence of its post-quantum readiness toward a hybrid-capable client.
Quantum-Safe Hybrid: The session key agreement combines classical X25519 with ML-KEM-768, standardized in FIPS 203 (final, August 2024). This protects the key exchange against “harvest now, decrypt later” collection by a future quantum adversary.
Classical: The server completed the handshake without selecting the offered hybrid group. This is not a deviation — no RFC currently requires post-quantum key exchange. The X25519MLKEM768 group is defined in draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem (Standards Track draft, not yet an RFC); the hybrid approach is described in draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design (IESG-approved Informational). Servers supporting only other hybrid groups also read as Classical here.
Transition Outlook: NIST’s draft transition guidance (NIST IR 8547) projects quantum-vulnerable algorithms being deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Hybrid key exchange requires TLS 1.3. This finding is informational and does not affect this domain’s grade.
04 Human-visible identity · L1 Brand & Trust Can this brand be convincingly faked? BIMI & VMC CAA · see Domain Security Not Setup

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4), but no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes without visual proof of authenticity

BIMI BIMI Spec Gold Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No valid BIMI record found

05 Ownership & attack surface · L1 Infrastructure Intelligence Who operates this domain, and what is exposed? Registrar / RDAP security.txt AI Surface Subdomains
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

Could not fetch security.txt

Fetch error: SSL error
A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.


AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No significant AI surface findings

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? No directives
No robots.txt found
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on boyd.ns.cloudflare.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: boyd.ns.cloudflare.com, hadlee.ns.cloudflare.com

Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for 1nom.org — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial Anycast Node
hadlee.ns.cloudflare.com 162.159.38.67
172.64.34.67
108.162.194.67
2a06:98c1:50::ac40:2243
2803:f800:50::6ca2:c243
2606:4700:50::a29f:2643
AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc.
2420733407 1279m5· 6ms
boyd.ns.cloudflare.com 172.64.33.75
173.245.59.75
108.162.193.75
2803:f800:50::6ca2:c14b
2606:4700:58::adf5:3b4b
2a06:98c1:50::ac40:214b
AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc.
2420733407 988m57· 5ms
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
6
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 6 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 0 unique ASN(s) across 2 IP address(es)

IPv4 Mappings:
92.90.183.132 → AS ()
IPv6 Mappings:
2a02:8424:5fe8:b901:ae7e:1e4c:32be:143e → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 1 service

Detected 1 SaaS verification record

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Google google-site-verification=e6sq0CGiZIJ8-z00Nae5gMbi34J2yi_HWeN7DpNG1I0
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

92.90.183.132
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2a02:8424:5fe8:b901:ae7e:1e4c:32be:143e
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 _dc-mx.22844dfa5513.1nom.org.
10 _dc-mx.8e495fb7812d.1nom.org.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 1 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 59 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
16 unique certificates 56 current 3 expired Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Certificate Authority Diversity (3 CAs observed across CT log history)
Certificate Authority Certs First Issued Last Issued Status
SSL Corporation 12 2024-06-19 2025-11-06 Historical
Let's Encrypt 3 2022-06-06 2022-10-21 Historical
ZeroSSL GmbH 1 2026-08-19 2026-08-19 Historical
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
abhishek674321.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
acn.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
adelys.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
alias.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
bestworldnewslink.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
blogcolor.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
blogcolour.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
blogedit.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
blogtest.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
buycollegeessay.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
car-repo.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
clic.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
cowcow.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
create-my-assignment.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
detiagumaragi.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
foundryoutdoors.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
free.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
google.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
imsicatcher.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
lakeviewblinds.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
lazarius.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
leleu.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
letterboxd.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
lion.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
loveravista.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
magic-print.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
mail.1nom.org DNS Current — — — —
moi.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
montot52.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
my.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
nous.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
ns.1nom.org DNS Current — — — —
oktopus.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
petites-annonces.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
postmaster.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
prashanth-factocert.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
pro.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
scottrichards080.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
site.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
site123.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
sophia.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
statvoo.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
unlock.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
wrswebsolutions.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
www.1nom.org CT Log Current — 17 2026-08-19T00:00:00 ZeroSSL GmbH, SSL Corporation
www.adelys.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
www.alias.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
www.blogcolor.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
www.blogcolour.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
www.imsicatcher.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
www.leleu.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
www.montot52.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
www.my.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
www.petites-annonces.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
www.site.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
xcams.1nom.org CT Log Current — — — —
secure06b.chasa.1nom.org CT Log Expired — 2 2022-10-21T09:20:23 Let's Encrypt
webok.1nom.org CT Log Expired — 2 2022-08-24T03:13:08 Let's Encrypt
donain.1nom.org CT Log Expired — 2 2022-06-06T16:26:08 Let's Encrypt
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
06 Raw records & reproducibility · L2–L3 Evidence & Verification Can another engineer reproduce every material claim? Analysis Confidence Intelligence Currency What changed Raw record diff Integrity seal Reproduce
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 63% Currency 74/100 Maturity gold
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Stale
ICuAE Details
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
A 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.
TXT 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.
NS 6 hours (21600s) 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
MX 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
CAA 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high CAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for 1nom.org
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: Cloudflare — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS boyd.ns.cloudflare.com
Serial 2420733407
Admin dns.cloudflare.com
Provider Cloudflare
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh10000s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry2400sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)1800s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s). Cloudflare's anycast architecture reduces the practical risk, but this value departs from the RFC recommendation.

Independent RFC compliance assessment for Cloudflare. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

SOA Expire below RFC 1912 recommendation RFC 1912 §2.2

Cloudflare sets SOA Expire to 604,800 seconds (7 days). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). This means secondary nameservers stop serving the zone sooner if the primary becomes unreachable. Cloudflare's position is that their anycast architecture makes traditional zone transfer semantics less relevant. SOA timers are not editable on Free, Pro, or Business plans.

Below RFC recommendation
Proxied record TTLs fixed at 300s RFC 2181 §5.2

Cloudflare overrides the zone administrator's TTL to 300 seconds for all proxied (orange-cloud) records. RFC 2181 §5.2 requires TTL uniformity within an RRset but does not mandate a specific value. As the authoritative server, Cloudflare is technically within its rights, but the administrator loses TTL control. This can affect ACME DNS-01 challenges and automation workflows that depend on rapid propagation.

Technically compliant, but overrides administrator intent
Non-standard SOA serial format RFC 1912 §2.2

RFC 1912 recommends YYYYMMDDNN format for SOA serial numbers (e.g., 2026022501). Cloudflare uses a proprietary serial number format that does not encode the date. RFC 1035 only requires the serial to increment on changes, so this is compliant with the mandatory standard but breaks the convention relied on by monitoring tools.

Compliant with RFC 1035, deviates from RFC 1912 convention
Negative cache TTL delays new records RFC 2308 §5

Cloudflare's SOA MINIMUM (negative cache TTL) is 1,800–3,600 seconds (30–60 minutes). This controls how long resolvers cache NXDOMAIN responses. Newly created DNS records — including ACME DNS-01 challenge TXT records for Let's Encrypt — may be invisible for up to 1 hour even after creation. This causes certificate issuance failures for automation tools like cert-manager and Traefik. Workaround: pre-create placeholder records before they're needed. This is RFC-compliant but aggressive compared to the 300–900 seconds common at other providers.

RFC-compliant, but causes real-world automation failures
Historical RFC 2181 §5.2 violation: TTL mismatch in CNAME RRsets RFC 2181 §5.2

In February 2022, Cloudflare's resolver (1.1.1.1) returned CNAME responses with mismatched TTLs within the same RRset — including cases where one TTL was zero and another was non-zero. RFC 2181 §5.2 explicitly states: 'the TTLs of all RRs in an RRSet must be the same.' systemd-resolved (used by Arch Linux, Ubuntu, Fedora, and most modern Linux distributions) correctly rejected these responses per the RFC, causing widespread DNS resolution failures. Cloudflare acknowledged the issue and it appears to have been fixed, but it demonstrated that Cloudflare's DNS infrastructure can deviate from RFC requirements in ways that break compliant resolver implementations.

Was a documented RFC violation — appears resolved
This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
92.90.183.132
92.90.183.132
AAAA Synchronized 1 / 1 records
2a02:8424:5fe8:b901:ae7e:1e4c:32be:143e
2a02:8424:5fe8:b901:ae7e:1e4c:32be:143e
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 11 / 11 records
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
0 issue "cloudflare.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "cloudflare.com"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
DMARC _dmarc.1nom.org RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:postmaster@1nom.org;ruf=mailto:mail@1nom.org;
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:postmaster@1nom.org;ruf=mailto:mail@1nom.org;
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
10 _dc-mx.22844dfa5513.1nom.org.
10 _dc-mx.8e495fb7812d.1nom.org.
10 _dc-mx.8e495fb7812d.1nom.org.
10 _dc-mx.22844dfa5513.1nom.org.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
boyd.ns.cloudflare.com.
boyd.ns.cloudflare.com.
hadlee.ns.cloudflare.com.
hadlee.ns.cloudflare.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
boyd.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2420733407 10000 2400 604800 1800
boyd.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2420733407 10000 2400 604800 1800
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
fe61d1198f3a7e904cc00b7349221085
fe61d1198f3a7e904cc00b7349221085
google-site-verification=e6sq0CGiZIJ8-z00Nae5gMbi34J2yi_HWeN7DpNG1I0
google-site-verification=e6sq0CGiZIJ8-z00Nae5gMbi34J2yi_HWeN7DpNG1I0
mnd-ver=tcujaqh9cv5zjia8ynpgkw
mnd-ver=tcujaqh9cv5zjia8ynpgkw
v=spf1 mx ~all
v=spf1 mx ~all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

24953eb0d6b5fc1409dcde428fa2d45e9aa3667f51d92cda495930d38702ccb03693ac351c55d75952d35935aa382a2f01939f6c72cd7006bf8fe3177ddb0b7b
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 21 Nov 2026, 13:36 UTC.
Internet Archive — Permanent Record Wayback Machine Can this analysis be independently verified? Archived

This analysis has been automatically submitted to the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, creating a tamper-evident, third-party-hosted snapshot of the DNS security posture at analysis time. This archived copy is independent of DNS Tool — it provides an independently verifiable record of the analysis at this point in time. Combined with the SHA-3-512 integrity hash, this creates a verifiable chain of evidence for domain security state.

Snapshot preserved at https://web.archive.org/web/20261121133634/https://dnstool.it-help.tech/analysis/19529/view/E

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL)
cat dns-intelligence-1nom.org.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-1nom.org.json
Python 3 (cross-platform)
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-1nom.org.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+)
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-1nom.org.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/19529/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for 1nom.org. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer 1nom.org A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer 1nom.org AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer 1nom.org MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer 1nom.org NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer 1nom.org TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208
dig +short 1nom.org TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489
dig +short _dmarc.1nom.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mail' RFC 6376
dig +short mail._domainkey.1nom.org TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +noall +answer 1nom.org DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035
dig +noall +answer 1nom.org DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +cd 1nom.org A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for _dc-mx.22844dfa5513.1nom.org RFC 7672
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp._dc-mx.22844dfa5513.1nom.org TLSA
Check TLSA record for _dc-mx.8e495fb7812d.1nom.org RFC 7672
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp._dc-mx.8e495fb7812d.1nom.org TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (_dc-mx.22844dfa5513.1nom.org) RFC 6698
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect _dc-mx.22844dfa5513.1nom.org:25 -servername _dc-mx.22844dfa5513.1nom.org 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461
dig +short _mta-sts.1nom.org TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461
curl -sL https://mta-sts.1nom.org/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460
dig +short _smtp._tls.1nom.org TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft
dig +short default._bimi.1nom.org TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659
dig +noall +answer 1nom.org CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460
dig +noall +answer 1nom.org HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344
dig +noall +answer 1nom.org CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/1nom.org' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (_dc-mx.22844dfa5513.1nom.org) RFC 3207
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect _dc-mx.22844dfa5513.1nom.org:25 -servername _dc-mx.22844dfa5513.1nom.org </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.1nom.org&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116
curl -sL https://1nom.org/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt
curl -sI https://1nom.org/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules
curl -s https://1nom.org/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 92.90.183.132 (Team Cymru)
dig +short 132.183.90.92.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine gold · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Gold 15673 runs
DKIM
Gold 15463 runs
DMARC
Gold 15654 runs
DANE/TLSA
Gold 15445 runs
DNSSEC
Gold 15632 runs
BIMI
Gold 15460 runs
MTA-STS
Gold 15481 runs
TLS-RPT
Gold 15496 runs
CAA
Gold 15493 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

0s

Running Real-Time Scan Telemetry

Most scans complete in less than one minute. Some may take longer.

Markers represent known resolver locations. Anycast routing selects the nearest node — exact routing is internal to each provider.

Pipeline nodes reflect live data as each analysis phase completes.

Telemetry Log 0 polls