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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 14 Oct 2026, 16:25 UTC
Duration 20.4s
Version v26.51.0-144-g385ba8783
Integrity 0e9fad891f69ec3be5267b86e97de52d83d69db57476f5305dc9e892f7a9c51429633fd8a7b9e490ea6be7184dacf862145328bab1310b426442db5ea6a8fc1c
Subject Domain
uska.ch

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

uska.ch Low Risk
14 Oct 2026, 16:25 UTC · 20.4s ·v26.51.0-144-g385ba8783 · SHA-3-512: 0e9f✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Archived ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology Replay
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Engineer workspace · evidence preserved

Read the verdict first. Descend only as far as the incident requires.

This report keeps the complete technical record while separating decision, interpretation, evidence, and raw reproduction into a stable disclosure gradient.

L0PostureL1InterpretationL2EvidenceL3Raw & reproduce
Hurry path
MX & Routing Subdomains DNSSEC What changed
KEYBOARD !1@2#3$4%5^6 jump to that section · esc back to the verdict
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Confidence: MODERATE · 68/100
5 protocols configured, 4 not configured DMARC quarantine is fully enforced (100%) with aggregate reporting (RFC 7489 §6.3). Unlike p=reject, which refuses unauthenticated mail at delivery, quarantine still accepts it for inspection. This is not a default configuration: the record also carries forensic reporting (ruf=), which DMARCbis removed and most large receivers no longer honour, and the domain separately deploys a validating DNSSEC chain and an SPF -all hard fail. It's possible this organization values that retained message-level visibility over pure rejection. What this means if you receive mail from this domain: messages that fail authentication are still delivered — typically to a spam or junk folder — not refused. A domain at p=quarantine is not a domain from which spoofed mail cannot reach you. p=reject remains the strongest anti-spoofing posture if message-level inspection is not a deliberate requirement; aggregate reporting is unaffected by either policy. Why we go beyond letter grades
What’s Wrong Upgrade DMARC policy from quarantine to reject (p=reject) for maximum spoofing protection DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Jump To: MTA-STS TLS-RPT BIMI CAA
Sorted by severity — worst first
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Monitoring
Partial
DANE
Unconfirmed
TRACE L0 · Brand Impersonation — Not Setup L1 · 04 · Brand & Trust · BIMI L3 · Reproduce commands
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Recommended
Upgrade DMARC policy from quarantine to reject (p=reject) for maximum spoofing protection
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (quarantine, 100%), DKIM (inferred via Unknown), DANE, DNSSEC
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Hardened
Medium Upgrade DMARC to Reject

Your DMARC policy is set to quarantine. Upgrade to p=reject for maximum protection — reject instructs receivers to discard spoofed mail entirely rather than quarantining it.

RFC 7489 §6.3
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

Your domain has DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest email transport security available. TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

RFC 8460
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (NS INFERENCE) INFERRED LIVE
Hostpoint
Inferred from NS records
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Footprint 1 SaaS Service
01 Identity & policy · L1 Email Security Can this domain be impersonated by email? SPF DMARC DKIM MTA-STS TLS-RPT MX & Routing Protected
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Partly SPF and DMARC are enforced at p=quarantine, 100% (RFC 7489 §6.3) — receivers accept failing mail and set it aside, so a spoofed message still reaches the mailbox in spam or junk rather than being refused

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Gold

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 1/10 lookups (via redirect: spf.mail.hostpoint.ch)

v=spf1 redirect=spf.mail.hostpoint.ch
SPF Redirect Chain RFC 7208 §6.1
This SPF record delegates policy via redirect= — the effective policy comes from the target domain.
spf.mail.hostpoint.ch
v=spf1 +ip4:217.26.49.128/25 +ip6:2a00:d70:0:e::/64 +ip4:217.26.63.0/24 +ip6:2a00:d70:0:12::/64 +ip4:217.26.50.0/23 +ip4:217.26.52.0/23 +ip4:217.26.54.0/23 +ip4:217.26.58.0/23 +ip6:2a00:d70:0:b::/64 -all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC enforcement is partial (quarantine). -all may preempt DKIM/DMARC evaluation at some receivers. Consider p=reject for full enforcement; ~all is more DMARC-compatible.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Gold

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Quarantined, not rejected
Success p=quarantine

DMARC policy quarantine (100%) - good protection

v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:webmaster@uska.ch; ruf=mailto:webmaster@uska.ch; adkim=r; aspf=r
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
Forensic reporting (ruf) is published with aggregate reporting under a quarantine policy — a combination consistent with deliberate intelligence collection. This record pairs p=quarantine with both rua= and ruf=, which is not a default configuration. DMARCbis (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) removed ruf= from the specification, and Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests, so publishing it collects from a minority of receivers at a known PII cost (RFC 7489 §7.3). Analysis of alternatives: the conventional reading is incomplete enforcement, but a competing hypothesis fits this evidence at least as well — the operator may value visibility into spoofing attempts over maximal blocking. Quarantine keeps failing mail inside the delivery path (RFC 7489 §6.3) rather than refusing it, and returns no SMTP failure to the sender, so a spoofing campaign is not told it has been caught and continues to run — and continues to be reported through rua=. This tool cannot observe intent and does not assert it; it reports that the configuration is consistent with deliberate collection, and on that basis does not recommend removing ruf= or raising the policy from the record alone. What this means if you receive mail from this domain: under quarantine, messages that fail DMARC are still delivered — typically to a spam or junk folder — not refused. A domain at p=quarantine is not a domain from which spoofed mail cannot reach you. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
Advanced cryptographic posture detected. DMARC quarantine is fully enforced (100%) with aggregate reporting (RFC 7489 §6.3). Unlike p=reject, which refuses unauthenticated mail at delivery, quarantine still accepts it for inspection. This is not a default configuration: the record also carries forensic reporting (ruf=), which DMARCbis removed and most large receivers no longer honour, and the domain separately deploys a validating DNSSEC chain and an SPF -all hard fail. It's possible this organization values that retained message-level visibility over pure rejection. What this means if you receive mail from this domain: messages that fail authentication are still delivered — typically to a spam or junk folder — not refused. A domain at p=quarantine is not a domain from which spoofed mail cannot reach you. p=reject remains the strongest anti-spoofing posture if message-level inspection is not a deliberate requirement; aggregate reporting is unaffected by either policy.
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
Monitoring Posture Note: Quarantine sequesters authentication failures while preserving full DMARC forensic telemetry (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain quarantine rather than reject as a deliberate monitoring strategy — failed messages are processed and reported but sequestered from the inbox. See NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1 for enforcement tradeoffs.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Gold

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Not Discoverable

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Gold

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Gold

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

02 Chain of authority · L1 Domain Security Can DNS answers and certificate issuance be trusted? DANE / TLSA CAA Delegation DNSSEC Operations DNSSEC & NS Open
DANE / TLSA Gold Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? Yes
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 2/2 MX

DANE configured — TLSA records found for all 2 MX hosts

MX Host Usage Selector Match Certificate Data
mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 ba882d724c29013cfc5609fe4129ccc0464810d2c05f8cd400aafa213f97f2d6
mx2.mail.hostpoint.ch 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 ba882d724c29013cfc5609fe4129ccc0464810d2c05f8cd400aafa213f97f2d6
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest cryptographic transport security. DANE binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, creating a verifiable chain of trust from root to mail server (RFC 7672 §1.3). MTA-STS could complement this for senders that don't validate DNSSEC, but DANE alone provides the highest level of protection available.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Gold Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • DS records missing at parent — DNSSEC chain of trust is broken

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Misaligned

DNSKEY records without matching DS:
Key Tag: 35349, Flags: 257 (KSK)

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns.hostpoint.ch No N/A N/A OK
ns2.hostpoint.ch No N/A N/A OK
ns3.hostpoint.ch No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Match

Parent TTL: 3600s Child TTL: 3600s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns.hostpoint.ch: 1.791659275e+09
ns2.hostpoint.ch: 1.791659275e+09
ns3.hostpoint.ch: 1.791659275e+09
DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 2 Issues

DNSSEC operational notes: 2 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:
  • Single KSK with no CDS/CDNSKEY automation — manual rollover required
  • No separate ZSK found — single-key signing scheme (CSK) detected

DNSKEY Inventory 1 Key

RoleKey TagAlgorithmKey Size
KSK 35349 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits

RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures

No RRSIG records found.

Denial of Existence NSEC3

Iterations: 0
Salt Length: 0 bytes
Hash Algorithm: 1 (SHA-1)

Rollover Readiness Not_ready

Multiple KSKs:
CDS Published:
CDNSKEY Published:
Automation: none
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed; a validating resolver confirmed the cryptographic chain of trust via the AD flag (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Gold Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 Modern

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by validating resolvers confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 — MUST implement, recommended default (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are cryptographically authenticated and tamper-evident.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (Cloudflare) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
35349 13 2 128F5938BD6256F5CC881783A119B58C81044C75C0C1DEC6F8AA9203CF7BCD38
35349 13 4 392B2524D5F08DAEA2F9A1FF68BBAED6286E6AD4EFBB2D930761B7AB77691B668E6465A35A73340A5D8FAC84E2898206

NS Delegation Verified

3 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns.hostpoint.ch ns2.hostpoint.ch ns3.hostpoint.ch
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
03 Delivery path · L1 Transport Security Will mail transport resist downgrade and interception? STARTTLS MTA-STS policy TLS-RPT
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification

All 2 server(s) verified: encrypted transport confirmed via direct SMTP probe and DNS policy

Policy Assessment Primary
  • DANE/TLSA records published — mail servers pin TLS certificates via DNSSEC (RFC 7672)
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
MX Host STARTTLS TLS Version Cipher Key Exchange Certificate
mx2.mail.hostpoint.ch TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 N/A Valid
Expires: 2027-01-27 (105 days)
Issuer: Sectigo Limited
mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 N/A Valid
Expires: 2027-01-27 (105 days)
Issuer: Sectigo Limited
Multi-Vantage Probe Results
Unanimous: TLS verified 3 probes, 1 responded
US-East (Virginia) skipped
4.119s
APAC (Singapore) skipped
4.457s
EU (Paris) observed
All servers support TLS
12.257713888s
What Is Measured: Our probe’s TLS 1.3 handshake offers the hybrid post-quantum group X25519MLKEM768 (X25519 combined with ML-KEM-768). The Key Exchange column reports the group each mail server actually negotiated — direct, observed evidence of its post-quantum readiness toward a hybrid-capable client.
Quantum-Safe Hybrid: The session key agreement combines classical X25519 with ML-KEM-768, standardized in FIPS 203 (final, August 2024). This protects the key exchange against “harvest now, decrypt later” collection by a future quantum adversary.
Classical: The server completed the handshake without selecting the offered hybrid group. This is not a deviation — no RFC currently requires post-quantum key exchange. The X25519MLKEM768 group is defined in draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem (Standards Track draft, not yet an RFC); the hybrid approach is described in draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design (IESG-approved Informational). Servers supporting only other hybrid groups also read as Classical here.
Transition Outlook: NIST’s draft transition guidance (NIST IR 8547) projects quantum-vulnerable algorithms being deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Hybrid key exchange requires TLS 1.3. This finding is informational and does not affect this domain’s grade.
04 Human-visible identity · L1 Brand & Trust Can this brand be convincingly faked? BIMI & VMC CAA · see Domain Security Not Setup
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC quarantine flags but does not reject spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3) — no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) leave brand impersonation largely unaddressed

BIMI BIMI Spec Gold Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

05 Ownership & attack surface · L1 Infrastructure Intelligence Who operates this domain, and what is exposed? Registrar / RDAP security.txt AI Surface Subdomains
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt View robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
Sources scanned (9)
  • https://uska.ch/
  • https://uska.ch/wp-includes/js/jquery/jquery.min.js?ver=3.7.1
  • https://uska.ch/wp-includes/js/jquery/jquery-migrate.min.js?ver=3.4.1
  • https://uska.ch/wp-content/plugins/download-manager/assets/modal/wpdm-modal.min.js?ver=3.3.68
  • https://uska.ch/wp-content/plugins/download-manager/assets/js/wpdm.min.js?ver=7.1.3
  • https://uska.ch/wp-content/plugins/download-manager/assets/js/front.min.js?ver=3.3.68
  • https://uska.ch/wp-content/plugins/the-events-calendar/common/build/js/user-agent.js?ver=da75d0bdea6dde3898df
  • https://uska.ch/wp-content/mu-plugins/uska-search.js?ver=2.1.1791995111
  • https://uska.ch/wp-includes/js/dist/hooks.min.js?ver=f0f188028580e8dc1255
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns3.hostpoint.ch — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: ns3.hostpoint.ch, ns2.hostpoint.ch, ns.hostpoint.ch

Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 3 nameserver(s) for uska.ch — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial Anycast Node
ns3.hostpoint.ch 217.26.60.250 2a00:d70:0:b::b AS29097 1791659275 auth01.ext.dns.hostpoint.internal· 153ms
ns.hostpoint.ch 217.26.51.254 2a00:d70:0:b::d AS29097 1791659275 auth06.ext.dns.hostpoint.internal· 153ms
ns2.hostpoint.ch 217.26.53.254 2a00:d70:0:b::1d AS29097 1791659275 auth04.ext.dns.hostpoint.internal· 153ms
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
3
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 3 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 2 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS29222 CH
IPv4 Mappings:
83.228.241.92 → AS29222 (83.228.192.0/18)
IPv6 Mappings:
2001:1600:18:103::2cc → AS29222 (2001:1600::/32)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 1 service

Detected 1 SaaS verification record

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Google google-site-verification=E-8Kcg-E2LBFTfx_JQGKWxIqWheI9r6Tuxh3BYSxrPk
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

83.228.241.92
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2001:1600:18:103::2cc
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch.
10 mx2.mail.hostpoint.ch.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 1 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 535 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 535 current 0 expired 2 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
50ohm.uska.ch CT Log Current — 1 2026-09-11T03:51:21Z
a.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
academy.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
account.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
accounting.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
accounts.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ad.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
adfs.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
admin.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
admin1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
admin2.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
alert.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
alerts.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
alpha.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
analytics.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ap-south.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ap.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
apac.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
api.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
api1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
api2.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
api3.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
apigw.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
apis.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
apm.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
app.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
app1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
app2.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
appointments.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
apps.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
archive.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
archives.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
asia.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
assets.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
atom.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
auth.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
auth0.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
autoconfig.uska.ch DNS Current autoconfig.mail.hostpoint.ch — — —
autodiscover.uska.ch DNS Current autoconfig-nonssl.mail.hostpoint.ch — — —
b.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
backup.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
backup1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
backup2.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
beta.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
bi.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
bigdata.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
billing.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
bitbucket.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
blob.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
blog.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
booking.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
broker.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
bucket.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
build.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
builds.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
c.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ca.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
cache.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
cal.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
calendar.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
campaign.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
campaigns.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
careers.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
cart.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
catalog.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
cd.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
cdn.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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cert.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
certs.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
chat.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
checkout.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ci.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
client.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
clients.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
cloud.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
cms.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
cname.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
code.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
community.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
compliance.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
conference.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
config.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
configuration.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
confluence.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
connect.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
console.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
containers.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
content.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
contestlog.uska.ch CT Log Current — 1 2026-09-11T18:00:43Z
corp.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
corporate.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
courses.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
cpanel.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
crl.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
crm.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
d.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
dashboard.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
data.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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datadog.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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dedicated.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
demo.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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deployment.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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develop.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
developer.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
developers.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
devices.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
devops.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
directory.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
discuss.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
discussions.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
dns.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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dnscheck.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
dnstool.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
doc.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
docker.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
docs.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
documentation.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
download.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
downloads.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
drupal.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
e.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ecommerce.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
edge.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
edge1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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education.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
elastic.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
elasticsearch.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
email.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
emea.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
endpoint.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
erp.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
es.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
etl.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
eu-west.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
eu.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
event.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
events.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
exchange.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ext.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
f.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
faq.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
feed.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
feedback.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
feeds.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
file.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
files.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
finance.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
firewall.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
forms.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
forum.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
forums.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ftp.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ftp1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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fw.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
gateway.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
geo.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
gis.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
git.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
github.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
gitlab.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
go.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
grafana.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
graphql.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
gw.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
gw1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
gw2.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
hamgroups.uska.ch CT Log Current — — — —
haproxy.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
hb9o.uska.ch CT Log Current — — — —
health.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
healthcheck.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
help.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
helpdesk.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
hiring.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
host.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
hosting.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
hq.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
hr.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
hris.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
htc.uska.ch CT Log Current — — — —
hub.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
id.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
identity.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
image.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
images.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
imap.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
img.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
int.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
internal.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
intranet.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
inventory.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
investor.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
investors.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
invoice.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ir.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
it.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
itsm.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
itsupport.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
jahrestreffen.uska.ch CT Log Current — — — —
jenkins.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
jira.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
jobs.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
jugend.uska.ch CT Log Current — — — —
k8s.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
kafka.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
kb.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
kibana.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
kong.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
kubernetes.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
kurs.uska.ch CT Log Current — — — —
lab.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
labs.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
lan.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
lb.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ldap.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
learn.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
learning.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
legal.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
link.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
links.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
live.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
lms.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
loadbalancer.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
location.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
log.uska.ch CT Log Current — — — —
login.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
logs.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
lookup.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
m.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
mail.help.uska.ch CT Log Current — — — —
mail.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
mail1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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mail3.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
mailgw.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
mailhost.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
mailrelay.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
mailserver.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
manage.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
management.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
manager.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
map.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
maps.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
marketing.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
mdm.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
media.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
meet.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
meeting.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
memcached.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
metrics.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
microservices.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
mobile.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
mongo.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
mongodb.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
monitor.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
monitoring.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
mq.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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mx.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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mxtoolbox.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
my.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
myaccount.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
mysql.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
na.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
nagios.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
net.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
netadmin.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
nettool.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
nettools.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
network.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
new.uska.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-07-20T05:01:29Z
news.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
nginx.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
nmd.uska.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-07-20T21:30:19Z
node1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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node3.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
notifications.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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ns.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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o365.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
oauth.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
object.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ocsp.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
office.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
okta.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
old.uska.ch CT Log Current — 1 2026-09-16T13:40:57Z
order.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
orders.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
origin.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
origin1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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panel.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
partner.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
partners.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
pay.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
payment.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
payments.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
payroll.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
pbx.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
phone.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
photos.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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pki.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
plesk.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
policies.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
policy.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
pop.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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portal.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
portal2.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
postgres.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
pre.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
preprod.uska.ch CT Log Current — 4 2026-09-07T07:33:11Z
press.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
preview.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
primary.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
print.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
printer.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
privacy.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
private.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
product.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
products.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
profile.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
prometheus.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
promo.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
proxy.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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public.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
qa.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
queue.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
r.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ra.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
rabbitmq.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
rancher.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
realtime.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
recruit.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
redirect.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
redis.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
register.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
registry.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
relay.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
relay1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
releases.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
remote.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
repeater.uska.ch CT Log Current — — — —
repo.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
report.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
reporting.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
reports.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
repos.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
reservations.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
rest.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
rss.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
rt.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
s3.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
sandbox.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
sandbox1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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scan.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
scanner.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
schedule.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
scp.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
search.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
secondary.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
secrets.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
secure.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
server.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
server1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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server3.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
service.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
servicedesk.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
services.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
sftp.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
share.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
shop.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
signin.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
signup.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
sip.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
slack.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
smtp.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
smtp1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
smtp2.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
socket.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
solr.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
sonderrufzeichen.uska.ch CT Log Current — — — —
speedtest.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
sql.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
srv.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
srv1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
srv2.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ssh.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ssl.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
sso.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
stage.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
staging.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
static.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
static1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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statistics.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
stats.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
status.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
statuspage.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
stg.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
storage.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
store.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
stream.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
streaming.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
support.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
support2.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
survey.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
surveys.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
svc.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
svn.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
swift.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
sysadmin.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
syslog.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
talent.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
teams.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
techsupport.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
tel.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
telecom.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
terms.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
test.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
test1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
test2.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
test4.uska.ch CT Log Current — — — —
testing.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ticket.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
tickets.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
tls.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
tool.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
tools.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
trace.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
tracing.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
tracking.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
training.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
uat.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
upload.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
uploads.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
uptime.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
url.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
us-east.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
us-west.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
us.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
utility.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
varnish.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
vault.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
vendor.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
vendors.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
verwaltung.uska.ch CT Log Current — — — —
video.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
videos.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
voip.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
vpn.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
vpn1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
vpn2.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
vpn3.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
vps.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
waf.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
wan.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
warehouse.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
web.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
web1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
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webapi.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
webapp.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
webex.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
webhost.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
webinar.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
webinars.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
webmail.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
webmaster.uska.ch CT Log Current — — — —
webproxy.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
webserver.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
websocket.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
webtool.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
webtools.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
whm.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
whois.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
wiki.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
wordpress.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
work.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
worker.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
worker1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
worker2.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
workspace.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
wp.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
ws.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
www.contestlog.uska.ch CT Log Current — 1 2026-09-11T17:55:41Z
www.hb9o.uska.ch CT Log Current — — — —
www.help.uska.ch CT Log Current — — — —
www.new.uska.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-07-20T05:01:29Z
www.old.uska.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-09-16T13:41:02Z
www.preprod.uska.ch CT Log Current — 3 2026-09-07T07:34:36Z
www.uska.ch CT Log Current — 3 2026-08-05T02:48:43Z
www.verwaltung.uska.ch CT Log Current — — — —
www1.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
www2.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
www3.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
xml.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
zabbix.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
zoom.uska.ch DNS Current — — — —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
06 Raw records & reproducibility · L2–L3 Evidence & Verification Can another engineer reproduce every material claim? Analysis Confidence Intelligence Currency What changed Raw record diff Integrity seal Reproduce
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 61% Currency 75/100 Maturity gold
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
ICuAE Details
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
A 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 1 hour (3600s) 1 day (86400s) high NS TTL is below typical — observed 1 hour (3600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for uska.ch
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS ns.hostpoint.ch
Serial 1791659275
Admin hostmaster.hostpoint.ch
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh86400s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry7200sFraction of Refresh
Expire3628800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)3600s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
83.228.241.92
83.228.241.92
AAAA Synchronized 1 / 1 records
2001:1600:18:103::2cc
2001:1600:18:103::2cc
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.uska.ch RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:webmaster@uska.ch; ruf=mailto:webmaster@uska.ch; adkim=r; aspf=r
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:webmaster@uska.ch; ruf=mailto:webmaster@uska.ch; adkim=r; aspf=r
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
10 mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch.
10 mx2.mail.hostpoint.ch.
10 mx2.mail.hostpoint.ch.
10 mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 3 / 3 records
ns.hostpoint.ch.
ns3.hostpoint.ch.
ns2.hostpoint.ch.
ns.hostpoint.ch.
ns3.hostpoint.ch.
ns2.hostpoint.ch.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns.hostpoint.ch. hostmaster.hostpoint.ch. 1791659275 86400 7200 3628800 3600
ns.hostpoint.ch. hostmaster.hostpoint.ch. 1791659275 86400 7200 3628800 3600
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
google-site-verification=E-8Kcg-E2LBFTfx_JQGKWxIqWheI9r6Tuxh3BYSxrPk
v=spf1 redirect=spf.mail.hostpoint.ch
v=spf1 redirect=spf.mail.hostpoint.ch
google-site-verification=E-8Kcg-E2LBFTfx_JQGKWxIqWheI9r6Tuxh3BYSxrPk
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

0e9fad891f69ec3be5267b86e97de52d83d69db57476f5305dc9e892f7a9c51429633fd8a7b9e490ea6be7184dacf862145328bab1310b426442db5ea6a8fc1c
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 14 Oct 2026, 16:25 UTC.
Internet Archive — Permanent Record Wayback Machine Can this analysis be independently verified? Archived

This analysis has been automatically submitted to the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, creating a tamper-evident, third-party-hosted snapshot of the DNS security posture at analysis time. This archived copy is independent of DNS Tool — it provides an independently verifiable record of the analysis at this point in time. Combined with the SHA-3-512 integrity hash, this creates a verifiable chain of evidence for domain security state.

View Archived Snapshot
Snapshot preserved at https://web.archive.org/web/20261014162544/https://dnstool.it-help.tech/analysis/19146/view/E
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3) Cross-Reference Verification

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-uska.ch.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-uska.ch.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-uska.ch.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-uska.ch.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/19146/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for uska.ch. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short uska.ch TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.uska.ch TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.uska.ch TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.uska.ch TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.uska.ch TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.uska.ch TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer uska.ch DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd uska.ch A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx2.mail.hostpoint.ch RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx2.mail.hostpoint.ch TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch:25 -servername mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.uska.ch TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.uska.ch/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.uska.ch TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.uska.ch TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/uska.ch' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch:25 -servername mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.uska.ch&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://uska.ch/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://uska.ch/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://uska.ch/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 83.228.241.92 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 92.241.228.83.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine gold · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Gold 15673 runs
DKIM
Gold 15463 runs
DMARC
Gold 15654 runs
DANE/TLSA
Gold 15445 runs
DNSSEC
Gold 15632 runs
BIMI
Gold 15460 runs
MTA-STS
Gold 15481 runs
TLS-RPT
Gold 15496 runs
CAA
Gold 15493 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short uska.ch TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.uska.ch TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.uska.ch TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.uska.ch TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.uska.ch TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.uska.ch TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer uska.ch DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd uska.ch A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx2.mail.hostpoint.ch (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx2.mail.hostpoint.ch TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch:25 -servername mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.uska.ch TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.uska.ch/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.uska.ch TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.uska.ch TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer uska.ch CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/uska.ch' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch:25 -servername mx1.mail.hostpoint.ch </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.uska.ch&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://uska.ch/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://uska.ch/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://uska.ch/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 83.228.241.92 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 92.241.228.83.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

0s

Running Real-Time Scan Telemetry

Most scans complete in less than one minute. Some may take longer.

Markers represent known resolver locations. Anycast routing selects the nearest node — exact routing is internal to each provider.

Pipeline nodes reflect live data as each analysis phase completes.

Telemetry Log 0 polls