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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 16 Aug 2026, 00:11 UTC
Duration 68.1s
Version v26.51.0-59-g22ba9c56c
Integrity d884555bb3ad770aedeaf1b163379b710690bd06f5d37c3ae01462ea67b378cc0608025c475c0147a0c682e017ca9e5b1ea6197b72efe66d328979c54229eff1
Subject Domain
dns-evil-flicker.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

dns-evil-flicker.com Critical Risk
16 Aug 2026, 00:11 UTC · 68.1s ·v26.51.0-59-g22ba9c56c · SHA-3-512: d884✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Archived ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology Replay
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Engineer workspace · evidence preserved

Read the verdict first. Descend only as far as the incident requires.

This report keeps the complete technical record while separating decision, interpretation, evidence, and raw reproduction into a stable disclosure gradient.

L0PostureL1InterpretationL2EvidenceL3Raw & reproduce
Hurry path
MX & Routing Subdomains DNSSEC What changed
KEYBOARD !1@2#3$4%5^6 jump to that section · esc back to the verdict
Sorted by severity — worst first
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Inconclusive
DNS Tampering
Broken
Certificate Control
Inconclusive
Monitoring
Inconclusive
DANE
Not Deployed
TRACE L0 · DNS Tampering — Broken L1 · 02 · Domain Security · DNSSEC L3 · Reproduce commands
Action Required
DNSSEC validation is failing
Not Configured
DANE
Recommended
Fix DNSSEC configuration or remove broken DS records
Monitoring
MTA-STS could not be verified — the DNS lookup did not complete; re-run before concluding it is absent, TLS-RPT could not be verified — the DNS lookup did not complete; re-run before concluding it is absent, BIMI could not be verified — the DNS lookup did not complete; re-run before concluding it is absent, CAA could not be verified — the DNS lookup did not complete; re-run before concluding it is absent
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (reject), DKIM (not applicable — no-mail domain)
Priority Action Achievable posture: Low Risk
Critical Fix Broken DNSSEC

DNSSEC validation is failing for this domain. This can cause resolvers to reject all DNS responses, making your domain unreachable.

RFC 4035
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
Amazon Registrar, Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
No Mail Domain
No-Mail Domain — Fully Hardened
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Amazon Route 53 Enterprise
Where DNS records are edited
Footprint Amazon Route 53
01 Identity & policy · L1 Email Security Can this domain be impersonated by email? SPF DMARC DKIM MTA-STS TLS-RPT MX & Routing Protected
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No null MX indicates no-mail domain
No-Mail Domain — Fully Hardened 3/3 controls
This domain declares it does not send or receive email and has all three RFC-recommended controls in place: Null MX (RFC 7505), SPF -all (RFC 7208), and DMARC reject (RFC 7489).
DMARC reject (RFC 7489) Null MX (RFC 7505) SPF -all (RFC 7208)

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Gold

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all

Valid SPF (no mail allowed) - domain declares it sends no email

v=spf1 -all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Gold

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s
Alignment: SPF strict DKIM strict sp=reject
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Gold

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Weak Keys

All 81 discovered DKIM key(s) are revoked (v=DKIM1; p=, RFC 6376 §3.6.1) — outbound mail cannot be DKIM-verified.

Key revoked (p= empty)
All 81 discovered keys are revoked (v=DKIM1; p=, RFC 6376 §3.6.1) — one revocation stub repeated across the selector census. Per-selector rows and provider attributions carry no additional information, so the census is collapsed. With a no-mail posture this is deliberate DKIM lockdown.
RFC Stance: RFC 6376 (Internet Standard) defines the DKIM mechanism. DKIM selectors are not publicly enumerable — absence in a scan does not prove absence of signing.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Gold

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Inconclusive
Inconclusive

MTA-STS could not be verified: the DNS lookup did not complete (transient SERVFAIL/timeout/network error). This is not evidence that MTA-STS is absent — re-run before concluding it is unconfigured.

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Gold

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Inconclusive
Inconclusive

TLS-RPT could not be verified: the DNS lookup did not complete (transient SERVFAIL/timeout/network error). This is not evidence that TLS-RPT is absent — re-run before concluding it is unconfigured.

02 Chain of authority · L1 Domain Security Can DNS answers and certificate issuance be trusted? DANE / TLSA CAA Delegation DNSSEC & NS Broken
DANE / TLSA Gold Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No valid MX hosts — DANE check skipped

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
MTA-STS could not be verified. The MTA-STS DNS lookup did not complete (transient resolver failure), so its presence is inconclusive. Per RFC 8461 §3.1, absence can only be asserted from an authoritative answer — this is not a finding that MTA-STS is absent. DANE was likewise not detected on this domain. Re-run once resolution is stable to confirm transport policy.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Gold Inconclusive

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Inconclusive

CAA could not be verified: the DNS lookup did not complete (transient SERVFAIL/timeout/network error). This is not evidence that CAA is absent — re-run before concluding it is unconfigured.

Delegation Consistency 3 Issues

Delegation consistency: 3 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • DNSKEY records missing at child — DS records at parent have no matching keys
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from either parent or child
  • Could not retrieve SOA serial from any nameserver

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Misaligned

Unmatched DS records (no corresponding DNSKEY):
Key Tag: 47478, Algorithm: 13

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Yes DNSSEC validation is failing, DNS responses cannot be trusted

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Gold Broken Algorithm 86400 Adequate

DNSSEC configured (DNSKEY + DS records present) but validation failed — the chain of trust is broken (RFC 4033 §5: bogus is signaled via SERVFAIL / RCODE=2).

Algorithm Observation: Algorithm 86400 — not classified in RFC 8624
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
DNSSEC is configured (DNSKEY + DS records present) but validation failed — the chain of trust is broken (RFC 4033 §5: bogus). A validating resolver returned SERVFAIL, so the signatures or DS record are invalid or stale.
DS Record (at registrar):
dns-evil-flicker.com. 86400 IN DS 47478 13 2 0269B818ABADECB4A01B0A732B739D402DE929002CFB60D0E22FA84E8EC802B4

NS Delegation Check Failed Mismatch

Could not retrieve NS records

NS records at domain differ from parent zone delegation. May indicate recent DNS migration still propagating.
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
03 Delivery path · L1 Transport Security Will mail transport resist downgrade and interception? STARTTLS MTA-STS policy TLS-RPT
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Unknown Mail transport security could not be verified — the MTA-STS DNS lookup did not complete; a TLS-RPT record alone does not enforce TLS, so this is not evidence enforcement is absent. Re-run before concluding transport encryption is unenforced

No MX records found

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — No MX records found for this domain
What Is Measured: Our probe’s TLS 1.3 handshake offers the hybrid post-quantum group X25519MLKEM768 (X25519 combined with ML-KEM-768). The Key Exchange column reports the group each mail server actually negotiated — direct, observed evidence of its post-quantum readiness toward a hybrid-capable client.
Quantum-Safe Hybrid: The session key agreement combines classical X25519 with ML-KEM-768, standardized in FIPS 203 (final, August 2024). This protects the key exchange against “harvest now, decrypt later” collection by a future quantum adversary.
Classical: The server completed the handshake without selecting the offered hybrid group. This is not a deviation — no RFC currently requires post-quantum key exchange. The X25519MLKEM768 group is defined in draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem (Standards Track draft, not yet an RFC); the hybrid approach is described in draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design (IESG-approved Informational). Servers supporting only other hybrid groups also read as Classical here.
Transition Outlook: NIST’s draft transition guidance (NIST IR 8547) projects quantum-vulnerable algorithms being deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Hybrid key exchange requires TLS 1.3. This finding is informational and does not affect this domain’s grade.
04 Human-visible identity · L1 Brand & Trust Can this brand be convincingly faked? BIMI & VMC CAA · see Domain Security Inconclusive
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but BIMI could not be verified (a DNS lookup did not complete — re-run before concluding) and CAA could not be verified (a DNS lookup did not complete — re-run before concluding) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors

BIMI BIMI Spec Gold Inconclusive

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? Inconclusive

BIMI could not be verified: the DNS lookup did not complete (transient SERVFAIL/timeout/network error). This is not evidence that BIMI is absent — re-run before concluding it is unconfigured.

05 Ownership & attack surface · L1 Infrastructure Intelligence Who operates this domain, and what is exposed? Registrar / RDAP security.txt AI Surface Subdomains
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

Could not fetch security.txt

Fetch error: Connection failed
A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No significant AI surface findings

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? No directives
No robots.txt found
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Not Checked

No nameservers found — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Not tested
Open Recursion Disabled Not tested
Nameserver Identity Hidden Not tested
Cache Snooping Protected Not tested
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Info

No IP addresses to look up

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS verification records detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

No A records
Domain may use AAAA (IPv6) only or CNAME

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

0 .
Null MX RFC 7505
Domain explicitly does not accept email

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: No direct IP Mail: Null MX (no mail) Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? None found
How did we find these?

No subdomains found via Certificate Transparency logs, DNS probing, or CNAME chain traversal for this domain. No TLS certificates have been issued and no common service names resolve for subdomains of dns-evil-flicker.com.

Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
06 Raw records & reproducibility · L2–L3 Evidence & Verification Can another engineer reproduce every material claim? Analysis Confidence Intelligence Currency What changed Raw record diff Integrity seal Reproduce
Some DNS data may be stale or incomplete, limiting confidence. Resolver agreement and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 92% Currency 40/100 Maturity gold
Limiting factor: Data currency is degraded — some records may be stale, incomplete, or inconsistent with authoritative sources
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Adequate Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Stale TTL Relevance Degraded
ICuAE Details
DNS data currency is degraded — re-scan recommended before making security decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
MX 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA 15 minutes (900s) 1 hour (3600s) medium SOA TTL is below typical — observed 15 minutes (900s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 6 hours (21600s) 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for dns-evil-flicker.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: AWS Route 53 — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS ns-39.awsdns-04.com
Serial 1
Admin awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com
Provider AWS Route 53
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh7200s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry900sFraction of Refresh
Expire1209600s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)86400s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.

Independent RFC compliance assessment for AWS Route 53. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

Alias record TTLs fixed at 60s RFC 1035 §3.2.1

AWS Route 53 alias records pointing to AWS resources (ELB, CloudFront, S3, API Gateway) have a fixed TTL of 60 seconds that cannot be modified. Route 53 alias records are an AWS-specific extension — not part of standard DNS RFCs. They solve the CNAME-at-apex problem (RFC prohibits CNAME at zone apex) by appearing as A/AAAA records to resolvers. The 60-second TTL ensures fast failover but removes administrator TTL control.

Proprietary extension — not covered by DNS RFCs
This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 11 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
resolver_set 5 resolvers, 0% agreement Add additional resolvers or replace low-agreement ones high Resolver agreement rate is 0.0%, below the 70% threshold. Low agreement indicates potential DNS propagation issues or resolver-specific caching behavior. Adding diverse resolvers improves measurement confidence.
NIST SP 800-53 SI-7
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 66.5s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.dns-evil-flicker.com RFC 7489 §6.3 1 / 0 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s
—
MX RFC 5321 1 / 0 records
0 .
—
NS RFC 1035 4 / 0 records
ns-1361.awsdns-42.org.
—
ns-2039.awsdns-62.co.uk.
—
ns-39.awsdns-04.com.
—
ns-684.awsdns-21.net.
—
SOA RFC 1035 1 / 0 records
ns-39.awsdns-04.com. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
—
TXT RFC 7208 §4 1 / 0 records
v=spf1 -all
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

d884555bb3ad770aedeaf1b163379b710690bd06f5d37c3ae01462ea67b378cc0608025c475c0147a0c682e017ca9e5b1ea6197b72efe66d328979c54229eff1
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 16 Aug 2026, 00:11 UTC.
Internet Archive — Permanent Record Wayback Machine Can this analysis be independently verified? Archived

This analysis has been automatically submitted to the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, creating a tamper-evident, third-party-hosted snapshot of the DNS security posture at analysis time. This archived copy is independent of DNS Tool — it provides an independently verifiable record of the analysis at this point in time. Combined with the SHA-3-512 integrity hash, this creates a verifiable chain of evidence for domain security state.

View Archived Snapshot
Snapshot preserved at https://web.archive.org/web/20260816001106/https://dnstool.it-help.tech/analysis/18400/view/E
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3) Cross-Reference Verification

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-dns-evil-flicker.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-dns-evil-flicker.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-dns-evil-flicker.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-dns-evil-flicker.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/18400/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for dns-evil-flicker.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short dns-evil-flicker.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'amazonses' RFC 6376 
dig +short amazonses._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'barracuda' RFC 6376 
dig +short barracuda._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'brevo' RFC 6376 
dig +short brevo._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'cisco' RFC 6376 
dig +short cisco._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'cm' RFC 6376 
dig +short cm._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'ctct1' RFC 6376 
dig +short ctct1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'ctct2' RFC 6376 
dig +short ctct2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'customerio' RFC 6376 
dig +short customerio._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dk' RFC 6376 
dig +short dk._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim' RFC 6376 
dig +short dkim._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim1' RFC 6376 
dig +short dkim1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim2' RFC 6376 
dig +short dkim2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim3' RFC 6376 
dig +short dkim3._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'drip' RFC 6376 
dig +short drip._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'em' RFC 6376 
dig +short em._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'email' RFC 6376 
dig +short email._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'everlytickey1' RFC 6376 
dig +short everlytickey1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'everlytickey2' RFC 6376 
dig +short everlytickey2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'fm1' RFC 6376 
dig +short fm1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'fm2' RFC 6376 
dig +short fm2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'fm3' RFC 6376 
dig +short fm3._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'freshdesk' RFC 6376 
dig +short freshdesk._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google2048' RFC 6376 
dig +short google2048._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'hornet' RFC 6376 
dig +short hornet._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'hs1' RFC 6376 
dig +short hs1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'hs2' RFC 6376 
dig +short hs2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'hubspot' RFC 6376 
dig +short hubspot._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'intercom' RFC 6376 
dig +short intercom._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' RFC 6376 
dig +short k1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' RFC 6376 
dig +short k2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k3' RFC 6376 
dig +short k3._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'key1' RFC 6376 
dig +short key1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'key2' RFC 6376 
dig +short key2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'klaviyo' RFC 6376 
dig +short klaviyo._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mail' RFC 6376 
dig +short mail._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mailchimp' RFC 6376 
dig +short mailchimp._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mailer' RFC 6376 
dig +short mailer._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mailgun' RFC 6376 
dig +short mailgun._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mailjet' RFC 6376 
dig +short mailjet._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mandrill' RFC 6376 
dig +short mandrill._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mandrill2' RFC 6376 
dig +short mandrill2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mc' RFC 6376 
dig +short mc._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mimecast' RFC 6376 
dig +short mimecast._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'ml' RFC 6376 
dig +short ml._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mta' RFC 6376 
dig +short mta._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mta1' RFC 6376 
dig +short mta1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mta2' RFC 6376 
dig +short mta2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mx' RFC 6376 
dig +short mx._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'postmark' RFC 6376 
dig +short postmark._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'proofpoint' RFC 6376 
dig +short proofpoint._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail' RFC 6376 
dig +short protonmail._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail2' RFC 6376 
dig +short protonmail2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail3' RFC 6376 
dig +short protonmail3._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' RFC 6376 
dig +short s1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' RFC 6376 
dig +short s2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's3' RFC 6376 
dig +short s3._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'salesforce' RFC 6376 
dig +short salesforce._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector3' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector3._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sendgrid' RFC 6376 
dig +short sendgrid._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sendgrid2' RFC 6376 
dig +short sendgrid2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sendinblue' RFC 6376 
dig +short sendinblue._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sf1' RFC 6376 
dig +short sf1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sf2' RFC 6376 
dig +short sf2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sig1' RFC 6376 
dig +short sig1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sig2' RFC 6376 
dig +short sig2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'smtp' RFC 6376 
dig +short smtp._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'smtpapi' RFC 6376 
dig +short smtpapi._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sparkpost' RFC 6376 
dig +short sparkpost._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sq' RFC 6376 
dig +short sq._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'square' RFC 6376 
dig +short square._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'squareup' RFC 6376 
dig +short squareup._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'turbo-smtp' RFC 6376 
dig +short turbo-smtp._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk1' RFC 6376 
dig +short zendesk1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk2' RFC 6376 
dig +short zendesk2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zmail' RFC 6376 
dig +short zmail._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zoho' RFC 6376 
dig +short zoho._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zohomail' RFC 6376 
dig +short zohomail._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd dns-evil-flicker.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.dns-evil-flicker.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/dns-evil-flicker.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.dns-evil-flicker.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://dns-evil-flicker.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://dns-evil-flicker.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://dns-evil-flicker.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine gold · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Gold 15673 runs
DKIM
Gold 15463 runs
DMARC
Gold 15654 runs
DANE/TLSA
Gold 15445 runs
DNSSEC
Gold 15632 runs
BIMI
Gold 15460 runs
MTA-STS
Gold 15481 runs
TLS-RPT
Gold 15496 runs
CAA
Gold 15493 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short dns-evil-flicker.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'amazonses' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short amazonses._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'barracuda' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short barracuda._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'brevo' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short brevo._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'cisco' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short cisco._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'cm' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short cm._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'ctct1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short ctct1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'ctct2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short ctct2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'customerio' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short customerio._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dk' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short dk._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short dkim._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short dkim1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short dkim2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim3' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short dkim3._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'drip' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short drip._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'em' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short em._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'email' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short email._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'everlytickey1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short everlytickey1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'everlytickey2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short everlytickey2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'fm1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short fm1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'fm2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short fm2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'fm3' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short fm3._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'freshdesk' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short freshdesk._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google2048' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google2048._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'hornet' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short hornet._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'hs1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short hs1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'hs2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short hs2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'hubspot' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short hubspot._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'intercom' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short intercom._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k3' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k3._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'key1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short key1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'key2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short key2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'klaviyo' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short klaviyo._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mail' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mail._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mailchimp' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mailchimp._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mailer' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mailer._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mailgun' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mailgun._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mailjet' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mailjet._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mandrill' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mandrill._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mandrill2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mandrill2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mc' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mc._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mimecast' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mimecast._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'ml' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short ml._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mta' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mta._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mta1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mta1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mta2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mta2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mx' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mx._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'postmark' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short postmark._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'proofpoint' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short proofpoint._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short protonmail._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short protonmail2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail3' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short protonmail3._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's3' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s3._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'salesforce' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short salesforce._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector3' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector3._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sendgrid' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short sendgrid._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sendgrid2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short sendgrid2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sendinblue' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short sendinblue._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sf1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short sf1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sf2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short sf2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sig1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short sig1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sig2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short sig2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'smtp' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short smtp._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'smtpapi' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short smtpapi._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sparkpost' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short sparkpost._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sq' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short sq._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'square' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short square._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'squareup' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short squareup._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'turbo-smtp' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short turbo-smtp._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short zendesk1._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short zendesk2._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zmail' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short zmail._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zoho' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short zoho._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zohomail' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short zohomail._domainkey.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd dns-evil-flicker.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.dns-evil-flicker.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.dns-evil-flicker.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer dns-evil-flicker.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/dns-evil-flicker.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.dns-evil-flicker.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://dns-evil-flicker.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://dns-evil-flicker.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://dns-evil-flicker.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

0s

Running Real-Time Scan Telemetry

Most scans complete in less than one minute. Some may take longer.

Markers represent known resolver locations. Anycast routing selects the nearest node — exact routing is internal to each provider.

Pipeline nodes reflect live data as each analysis phase completes.

Telemetry Log 0 polls