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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 12 Aug 2026, 13:29 UTC
Duration 26.9s
Version v26.50.05-119-g1c2a42874
Integrity 6b42dd87968497b9c78982b2dd83a1c5338af0952cac16fa6113d1ad557710719ea85dc7aa3049d5c490dd3e8fe24e0a5b80915c7cea1c66319cf49d44cd4c14
Subject Domain
nasa.gov

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

nasa.gov Low Risk
12 Aug 2026, 13:29 UTC · 26.9s ·v26.50.05-119-g1c2a42874 · SHA-3-512: 6b42✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Archived ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology Replay
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Engineer workspace · evidence preserved

Read the verdict first. Descend only as far as the incident requires.

This report keeps the complete technical record while separating decision, interpretation, evidence, and raw reproduction into a stable disclosure gradient.

L0PostureL1InterpretationL2EvidenceL3Raw & reproduce
Hurry path
MX & Routing Subdomains DNSSEC What changed
KEYBOARD !1@2#3$4%5^6 jump to that section · esc back to the verdict
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Confidence: MODERATE · 69/100
3 protocols configured, 5 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Enterprise DNS Posture: Akamai Edge DNS runs enterprise-grade DNS infrastructure — an unsigned DNSSEC chain here reads as a deliberate operator choice, not the gap it would be for a small operator. Network-layer compensating controls are not verifiable via DNS alone; see DNS-layer detail. Why we go beyond letter grades
Jump To: MTA-STS TLS-RPT BIMI DNSSEC CAA
Sorted by severity — worst first
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Enterprise
Certificate Control
Open
Monitoring
Partial
DANE
Unavailable on Provider
TRACE L0 · Brand Impersonation — Not Setup L1 · 04 · Brand & Trust · BIMI L3 · Reproduce commands
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DNSSEC, CAA
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (reject), DKIM
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Hardened
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

RFC 9495
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

RFC 8659
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
get.gov (Registrant: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY)
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Microsoft 365
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting INFERRED
Automattic (WordPress.com) (CDN)
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Akamai Edge DNS Enterprise
Where DNS records are edited
Footprint Akamai Edge DNS Microsoft 365 9 SaaS Services
01 Identity & policy · L1 Email Security Can this domain be impersonated by email? SPF DMARC DKIM MTA-STS TLS-RPT MX & Routing Protected
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Gold

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 9/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 9/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:_spf-4a.nasa.gov include:_spf-4b.nasa.gov include:_spf-4c.nasa.gov include:_spf-4d.nasa.gov include:_spf-4g.nasa.gov include:_spf-4m.nasa.gov include:_spf-4x.nasa.gov include:_spf-6a.nasa.gov include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
RFC 7489: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Gold

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarcmail@mail.nasa.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Gold

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

selector1._domainkey Microsoft 365 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCQHB769Mz6bm5ZUPbTebbhs8RZeJMEcBOOSeIdCFg/DqUZHfBuJ3WdMBEYOUfiukh1xtH80QFOrk88KpucmqQVKplvOUv2Q65piZAIkf2KHdi3GbzLkLHbPzyjmMMnLw5tuMdK4HFAnf7DCdxvCTelqOZ1fUdexJf8IqLK73dOSwIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Gold

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Gold

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Yes — all authorized
Success

All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov Authorized v=DMARC1
02 Chain of authority · L1 Domain Security Can DNS answers and certificate issuance be trusted? DANE / TLSA CAA Delegation DNSSEC & NS Open
DANE / TLSA Gold Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Microsoft 365

Microsoft 365 does not support DANE for inbound mail. Microsoft uses its own certificate pinning mechanism.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Gold Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Delegation Consistency 2 Issues

Delegation consistency: 2 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • DNSKEY records missing at child — DS records at parent have no matching keys
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Misaligned

Unmatched DS records (no corresponding DNSKEY):
Key Tag: 59470, Algorithm: 8
Key Tag: 65284, Algorithm: 8

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
a1-32.akam.net No N/A N/A OK
a12-64.akam.net No N/A N/A OK
a14-67.akam.net No N/A N/A OK
a5-66.akam.net No N/A N/A OK
a8-66.akam.net No N/A N/A OK
a9-64.akam.net No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 600s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

a1-32.akam.net: 2.02284197e+08
a12-64.akam.net: 2.02284197e+08
a14-67.akam.net: 2.02284197e+08
a5-66.akam.net: 2.02284197e+08
a8-66.akam.net: 2.02284197e+08
a9-64.akam.net: 2.02284197e+08
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Gold Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Alternative Security: Akamai Edge DNS provides enterprise-grade DNS with DDoS protection and monitoring.

NS Delegation Verified

6 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: a1-32.akam.net a12-64.akam.net a14-67.akam.net a5-66.akam.net a8-66.akam.net a9-64.akam.net
Managed DNS
All 6 nameservers hosted by Akamai. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Akamai
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
03 Delivery path · L1 Transport Security Will mail transport resist downgrade and interception? STARTTLS MTA-STS policy TLS-RPT
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Transport security inferred from 1 signal(s) — no enforcement policy active

Policy Assessment Primary
  • Microsoft 365 enforces TLS 1.2+ with DANE (GA Oct 2024) and valid certificates
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
What Is Measured: Our probe’s TLS 1.3 handshake offers the hybrid post-quantum group X25519MLKEM768 (X25519 combined with ML-KEM-768). The Key Exchange column reports the group each mail server actually negotiated — direct, observed evidence of its post-quantum readiness toward a hybrid-capable client.
Quantum-Safe Hybrid: The session key agreement combines classical X25519 with ML-KEM-768, standardized in FIPS 203 (final, August 2024). This protects the key exchange against “harvest now, decrypt later” collection by a future quantum adversary.
Classical: The server completed the handshake without selecting the offered hybrid group. This is not a deviation — no RFC currently requires post-quantum key exchange. The X25519MLKEM768 group is defined in draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem (Standards Track draft, not yet an RFC); the hybrid approach is described in draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design (IESG-approved Informational). Servers supporting only other hybrid groups also read as Classical here.
Transition Outlook: NIST’s draft transition guidance (NIST IR 8547) projects quantum-vulnerable algorithms being deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Hybrid key exchange requires TLS 1.3. This finding is informational and does not affect this domain’s grade.
04 Human-visible identity · L1 Brand & Trust Can this brand be convincingly faked? BIMI & VMC CAA · see Domain Security Not Setup
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors

BIMI BIMI Spec Gold Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

05 Ownership & attack surface · L1 Infrastructure Intelligence Who operates this domain, and what is exposed? Registrar / RDAP security.txt AI Surface Subdomains
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt View robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Not Checked

Nmap not available — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Not tested
Open Recursion Disabled Not tested
Nameserver Identity Hidden Not tested
Cache Snooping Protected Not tested
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 6 nameserver(s) for nasa.gov — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial Anycast Node
a1-32.akam.net 193.108.91.32 2600:1401:2::20 AS20940
Akamai International B.V. 		202284197 N/A
a14-67.akam.net 184.26.161.67 2600:1480:1800::43 AS21342 202284197 N/A
a8-66.akam.net 2.16.40.66 2600:1403:a::42 AS21342 202284197 N/A
a9-64.akam.net 184.85.248.64 2a02:26f0:117::40 AS21342 202284197 N/A
a5-66.akam.net 95.100.168.66 2600:1480:b000::42 AS21342 202284197 N/A
a12-64.akam.net 184.26.160.64 2600:1480:f000::40 AS21342 202284197 N/A
Unique ASNs
2
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
6
Diversity Score
Good

2 ASNs, 6 /24 prefixes across 6 nameservers

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 2 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS2635 Automattic, Inc. US
IPv4 Mappings:
192.0.66.108 → AS2635 (192.0.66.0/24)
IPv6 Mappings:
2a04:fa87:fffd::c000:426c → AS2635 (2a04:fa87:fffd::/48)

Edge / CDN Success Automattic (WordPress.com)

Domain is served through Automattic (WordPress.com)

Behind CDN Origin Visible
ASN 2635 is Automattic (WordPress.com)

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 9 services

Detected 9 SaaS verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Microsoft MS=ms93625004
Amazon SES amazonses:FXFVeQnEO3Wua+aY/H4aOIH3sSwteE+7YpGrwm8kF/s=
Apple apple-domain-verification=qw51K0kGzRHLbN9S
Atlassian atlassian-domain-verification=oNzRM7G9GIAL/LLP5c7sPOQiAHsHrQ1hKcU7GGZ0ADRZJFhUB/upe935/2RYq/jO
DocuSign docusign=4025560e-93c9-4920-bb13-849c6fc35d58
Google google-site-verification=BUxd0xTJY4ZjGohBwKDpNms-yOATz92Y54kgme4eKHs
OpenAI openai-domain-verification=dv-CO0ENDLO7EB9V5E4JnmE6pS8
Smartsheet smartsheet-site-validation=gnL11HAQqHlH1tQabmxKf12b5ZCNxJfx
Webex webexdomainverification.1YPST=f98a61ea-b92e-41f2-87aa-5651b2af43b8
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

192.0.66.108
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2a04:fa87:fffd::c000:426c
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

0 nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Microsoft 365

SRVServices

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 0 1 5061 sipfed.online.lync.com.
_sip._tls: 0 1 443 sipdir.online.lync.com.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 1 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: 2 endpoints
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 46 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962).
Re-Analyze to Retry CT Lookup
CT logs unavailable 46 current 0 expired 29 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
academy.nasa.gov DNS Current pows002.gsfc.nasa.gov — — —
alerts.nasa.gov DNS Current misspiggy.gsfc.nasa.gov — — —
api.nasa.gov DNS Current api-nasa-gov.domains.api.data.gov — — —
apm.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
apps.nasa.gov DNS Current ndmswspubvip.ndc.nasa.gov — — —
archives.nasa.gov DNS Current internal-atom-alb-blue-prod-pub-1433532940.us-east-1.elb.amazonaws.com — — —
auth.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
autodiscover.nasa.gov DNS Current autodiscover.outlook.com — — —
beta.nasa.gov DNS Current nasa-gov.go-vip.net — — —
calendar.nasa.gov DNS Current cloudfront-prod-01-redirects.nasawestprime.com — — —
chat.nasa.gov DNS Current nasachat-webapp-gabjbvfzhsa0a4d3.eastus-01.azurewebsites.net — — —
cms.nasa.gov DNS Current cms.nasawestprime.com — — —
code.nasa.gov DNS Current ae7d74e13cf454c498f23a04a30072c6-112ca135ee70404c.elb.us-east-1.amazonaws.com — — —
data.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
events.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
forms.nasa.gov DNS Current ndmswspubvip.ndc.nasa.gov — — —
go.nasa.gov DNS Current cname.bit.ly — — —
hq.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
hr.nasa.gov DNS Current ndmswbpvip.ndc.nasa.gov — — —
hris.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
id.nasa.gov DNS Current ndmswspubvip.ndc.nasa.gov — — —
images.nasa.gov DNS Current images.nasawestprime.com — — —
intranet.nasa.gov DNS Current cloudfront-prod-01-redirects.nasawestprime.com — — —
labs.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
mail.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
mobile.nasa.gov DNS Current cloudfront-prod-01-redirects.nasawestprime.com — — —
my.nasa.gov DNS Current my.nasa.gov.00dt0000000pnf8eao.live.siteforce.com — — —
ns1.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
ocsp.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
pki.nasa.gov DNS Current ndmswbpvip.ndc.nasa.gov — — —
privacy.nasa.gov DNS Current cloudfront-prod-01-redirects.nasawestprime.com — — —
scan.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
search.nasa.gov DNS Current cloudfront-prod-02-redirects.nasawestprime.com — — —
services.nasa.gov DNS Current ndmswspubvip.ndc.nasa.gov — — —
share.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
sso.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
support.nasa.gov DNS Current support.nasawestprime.com — — —
test.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
uploads.nasa.gov DNS Current uploads.nasawestprime.com — — —
utility.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
vendor.nasa.gov DNS Current ndmswbpvip.ndc.nasa.gov — — —
webmail.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
wiki.nasa.gov DNS Current wiki-prod.nasawestprime.com — — —
ws.nasa.gov DNS Current — — — —
www.nasa.gov DNS Current nasa-gov.go-vip.net — — —
www3.nasa.gov DNS Current www3.nasawestprime.com — — —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ Changes Detected: TXT Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
06 Raw records & reproducibility · L2–L3 Evidence & Verification Can another engineer reproduce every material claim? Analysis Confidence Intelligence Currency What changed Raw record diff Integrity seal Reproduce
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 63% Currency 75/100 Maturity gold
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
ICuAE Details
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
A 478s 1 hour (3600s) medium A TTL is below typical — observed 478s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT 335s 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 335s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 466s 1 day (86400s) high NS TTL is below typical — observed 466s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA 592s 1 hour (3600s) medium AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 592s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
MX 592s 1 hour (3600s) medium MX TTL is below typical — observed 592s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA 10 minutes (600s) 1 hour (3600s) medium SOA TTL is below typical — observed 10 minutes (600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for nasa.gov
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS a1-32.akam.net
Serial 202284197
Admin dns.nasa.gov
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh7200s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry900sFraction of Refresh
Expire1209600s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)300s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 34.3s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
192.0.66.108
192.0.66.108
AAAA Synchronized 1 / 1 records
2a04:fa87:fffd::c000:426c
2a04:fa87:fffd::c000:426c
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.nasa.gov RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarcmail@mail.nasa.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov
v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarcmail@mail.nasa.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
0 nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com.
0 nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 6 / 6 records
a1-32.akam.net.
a12-64.akam.net.
a12-64.akam.net.
a5-66.akam.net.
a14-67.akam.net.
a8-66.akam.net.
a5-66.akam.net.
a14-67.akam.net.
a8-66.akam.net.
a1-32.akam.net.
a9-64.akam.net.
a9-64.akam.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
a1-32.akam.net. dns.nasa.gov. 202284197 7200 900 1209600 300
a1-32.akam.net. dns.nasa.gov. 202284197 7200 900 1209600 300
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Propagating 21 / 4 records
1HqDXPHdt8JOt02qy6FB+l3+Z1zXScqcPxlE/faXjZLS9FRbVhHCUCHQE2bWofZt2TWKPchjjma3Pqli4FULFw==
n39n7frbwnkhcmky2nps779y4ttn61wl
HRlHXyx8jXo+9pIaJWFVBPOLVfeI2biAj3VT1woaTFpp05D5/q6AoD5KpUgws539/d2jl8wBJiEr58OEsRVugQ==
google-site-verification=BUxd0xTJY4ZjGohBwKDpNms-yOATz92Y54kgme4eKHs
MS=ms93625004
google-site-verification=ZKpcXLqaBX3jND8Fybkvr3MaaOpC_6MRjXBYm0XNkJQ
amazonses:FXFVeQnEO3Wua+aY/H4aOIH3sSwteE+7YpGrwm8kF/s=
webexdomainverification.1YPST=f98a61ea-b92e-41f2-87aa-5651b2af43b8
amazonses:PvUL7T41LO87xjr+2nfgxTu11i75NeT9HzY3xYv82Ko=
—
apple-domain-verification=qw51K0kGzRHLbN9S
—
atlassian-domain-verification=oNzRM7G9GIAL/LLP5c7sPOQiAHsHrQ1hKcU7GGZ0ADRZJFhUB/upe935/2RYq/jO
—
atlassian-sending-domain-verification=4730ddf4-d24e-4a91-9612-cb14998d0e47
—
docusign=4025560e-93c9-4920-bb13-849c6fc35d58
—
google-site-verification=BUxd0xTJY4ZjGohBwKDpNms-yOATz92Y54kgme4eKHs
—
google-site-verification=ZKpcXLqaBX3jND8Fybkvr3MaaOpC_6MRjXBYm0XNkJQ
—
mj8729pr7k44dx62wwtx5745xr5njzkn
—
n39n7frbwnkhcmky2nps779y4ttn61wl
—
nmh1f9tgxhmfmjkshg7qh595drdfgnf1
—
openai-domain-verification=dv-CO0ENDLO7EB9V5E4JnmE6pS8
—
openai-domain-verification=dv-Fbq5PVntP9qLelQPUBKniDjr
—
pvv8mevb6qrmqvqi8alhmreg42
—
smartsheet-site-validation=gnL11HAQqHlH1tQabmxKf12b5ZCNxJfx
—
uechcfoubh169akghg2214p54n
—
v=spf1 include:_spf-4a.nasa.gov include:_spf-4b.nasa.gov include:_spf-4c.nasa.gov include:_spf-4d.nasa.gov include:_spf-4g.nasa.gov include:_spf-4m.nasa.gov include:_spf-4x.nasa.gov include:_spf-6a.nasa.gov include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
—
webexdomainverification.1YPST=f98a61ea-b92e-41f2-87aa-5651b2af43b8
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

6b42dd87968497b9c78982b2dd83a1c5338af0952cac16fa6113d1ad557710719ea85dc7aa3049d5c490dd3e8fe24e0a5b80915c7cea1c66319cf49d44cd4c14
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 12 Aug 2026, 13:29 UTC.
Internet Archive — Permanent Record Wayback Machine Can this analysis be independently verified? Archived

This analysis has been automatically submitted to the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, creating a tamper-evident, third-party-hosted snapshot of the DNS security posture at analysis time. This archived copy is independent of DNS Tool — it provides an independently verifiable record of the analysis at this point in time. Combined with the SHA-3-512 integrity hash, this creates a verifiable chain of evidence for domain security state.

View Archived Snapshot
Snapshot preserved at https://web.archive.org/web/20260812132924/https://dnstool.it-help.tech/analysis/18331/view/E
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3) Cross-Reference Verification

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-nasa.gov.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-nasa.gov.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-nasa.gov.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-nasa.gov.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/18331/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for nasa.gov. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short nasa.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.nasa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.nasa.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer nasa.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd nasa.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.nasa.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.nasa.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.nasa.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.nasa.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/nasa.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.nasa.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://nasa.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://nasa.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://nasa.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 192.0.66.108 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 108.66.0.192.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine gold · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Gold 15673 runs
DKIM
Gold 15463 runs
DMARC
Gold 15654 runs
DANE/TLSA
Gold 15445 runs
DNSSEC
Gold 15632 runs
BIMI
Gold 15460 runs
MTA-STS
Gold 15481 runs
TLS-RPT
Gold 15496 runs
CAA
Gold 15493 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short nasa.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.nasa.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.nasa.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer nasa.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd nasa.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.nasa.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.nasa.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.nasa.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.nasa.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer nasa.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/nasa.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.nasa.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://nasa.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://nasa.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://nasa.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 192.0.66.108 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 108.66.0.192.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

0s

Running Real-Time Scan Telemetry

Most scans complete in less than one minute. Some may take longer.

Markers represent known resolver locations. Anycast routing selects the nearest node — exact routing is internal to each provider.

Pipeline nodes reflect live data as each analysis phase completes.

Telemetry Log 0 polls