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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 12 Aug 2026, 13:14 UTC
Duration 37.6s
Version v26.50.05-119-g1c2a42874
Integrity e49773065219a752a9265d0c7d4d3223bdcef134b31e78870fa8269b867ffb1f2d93e7db72b7360552758f73ccf1b4b1e6b4d0862c7588a66a1205bcb16271fb
Subject Domain
google.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

google.com Low Risk
12 Aug 2026, 13:14 UTC · 37.6s ·v26.50.05-119-g1c2a42874 · SHA-3-512: e497✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Archived ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology Replay
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Engineer workspace · evidence preserved

Read the verdict first. Descend only as far as the incident requires.

This report keeps the complete technical record while separating decision, interpretation, evidence, and raw reproduction into a stable disclosure gradient.

L0PostureL1InterpretationL2EvidenceL3Raw & reproduce
Hurry path
MX & Routing Subdomains DNSSEC What changed
KEYBOARD !1@2#3$4%5^6 jump to that section · esc back to the verdict
Golden-fixture baseline domain. This domain is part of the golden-fixture corpus: its recorded scan snapshot is the tool's regression baseline. A scan of it reproducing the snapshot is the baseline returning its own value — expected agreement, not independent validation.
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Confidence: MODERATE · 66/100
6 protocols configured, 2 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Enterprise DNS Posture: Google Cloud DNS runs enterprise-grade DNS infrastructure — an unsigned DNSSEC chain here reads as a deliberate operator choice, not the gap it would be for a small operator. Network-layer compensating controls are not verifiable via DNS alone; see DNS-layer detail. Why we go beyond letter grades
What’s Wrong DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Jump To: BIMI DNSSEC
Sorted by severity — worst first
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Enterprise
Certificate Control
Configured
Monitoring
Configured
DANE
Unavailable on Provider
TRACE L0 · Brand Impersonation — Not Setup L1 · 04 · Brand & Trust · BIMI L3 · Reproduce commands
Not Configured
BIMI, DNSSEC
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Configured
SPF, DMARC (reject), DKIM (inferred via Google Workspace), MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, CAA
Priority Actions Achievable posture: Hardened
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

RFC 9495
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
MarkMonitor Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Google Workspace
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Google Cloud
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Google Cloud DNS Enterprise
Where DNS records are edited
Footprint Google Cloud DNS Google Workspace 6 SaaS Services
01 Identity & policy · L1 Email Security Can this domain be impersonated by email? SPF DMARC DKIM MTA-STS TLS-RPT MX & Routing Protected
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Gold

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC reject: the strongest compatible security stance, aligned with CISA and RFC guidance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Gold

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Gold

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Provider-managed
Provider Verified

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

Google Workspace detected as primary mail platform — DKIM signing is managed by the provider. The primary provider may use custom selectors not discoverable through standard checks.
Know your DKIM selector? Re-scan with a custom selector to verify.
RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Gold

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced
Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 3 mail server(s)

v=STSv1; id=20210803T010101;
Policy Details:
  • Mode: enforce
  • Max Age: 1 days (86400 seconds)
  • MX Patterns: smtp.google.com, aspmx.l.google.com, *.aspmx.l.google.com

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Gold

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1;rua=mailto:sts-reports@google.com
02 Chain of authority · L1 Domain Security Can DNS answers and certificate issuance be trusted? DANE / TLSA CAA Delegation DNSSEC & NS Enterprise
DANE / TLSA Gold Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Google Workspace

Google Workspace supports DANE for outbound mail verification but does not publish TLSA records for its MX hosts.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS (already configured)

Note: Google Workspace does validate DANE/TLSA when sending mail to DANE-enabled recipients (outbound DANE).

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses MTA-STS — the best available option for Google Workspace. Since Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE, MTA-STS is the strongest transport security this domain can deploy. MTA-STS enforces TLS via HTTPS-based policy, protecting against downgrade attacks (RFC 8461).

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Gold Success

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only pki.goog can issue certificates

Authorized CAs: pki.goog
0 issue "pki.goog"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Delegation Consistency 5 Issues

Delegation consistency: 5 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • In-bailiwick NS ns1.google.com has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
  • In-bailiwick NS ns2.google.com has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
  • In-bailiwick NS ns3.google.com has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
  • In-bailiwick NS ns4.google.com has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Incomplete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns1.google.com Missing
ns2.google.com Missing
ns3.google.com Missing
ns4.google.com Missing

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 345600s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns1.google.com: 9.62678449e+08
ns2.google.com: 9.62678449e+08
ns3.google.com: 9.62678449e+08
ns4.google.com: 9.62678449e+08
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Gold Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Alternative Security: Google Cloud DNS provides enterprise-grade DNS with DDoS protection and monitoring.
CAA records configured

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1.google.com ns2.google.com ns3.google.com ns4.google.com
Enterprise DNS (Dedicated Infrastructure)
All 4 nameservers are google.com-branded, indicating organization-operated DNS infrastructure. This is typical of large enterprises, government agencies, and organizations that maintain full control of their DNS resolution chain.
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (3 differences found)
Resolver Differences:
A: Google returned different results: [142.251.46.78]
A: OpenDNS returned different results: [142.250.73.142]
A: Cloudflare returned different results: [172.253.117.100 172.253.117.101 172.253.117.102 172.253.117.113 172.253.117.138 172.253.117.139]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.

HTTPS / SVCB Records RFC 9460 Success HTTPS HTTP/3

HTTPS records found, HTTP/3 supported

PriorityTargetALPNECHRaw
1 . h2, h3 No google.com. 14535 IN HTTPS 1 . alpn="h2,h3"
03 Delivery path · L1 Transport Security Will mail transport resist downgrade and interception? STARTTLS MTA-STS policy TLS-RPT
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery

Transport encryption enforced via DNS policy (3 signal(s))

Policy Assessment Primary
  • MTA-STS policy in enforce mode requires encrypted transport (RFC 8461)
  • TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures (RFC 8460)
  • Google Workspace enforces TLS 1.2+ with valid certificates on all inbound/outbound mail
Telemetry
TLS-RPT configured — domain receives reports about TLS delivery failures from sending mail servers (RFC 8460)
Reporting to: mailto:sts-reports@google.com
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
What Is Measured: Our probe’s TLS 1.3 handshake offers the hybrid post-quantum group X25519MLKEM768 (X25519 combined with ML-KEM-768). The Key Exchange column reports the group each mail server actually negotiated — direct, observed evidence of its post-quantum readiness toward a hybrid-capable client.
Quantum-Safe Hybrid: The session key agreement combines classical X25519 with ML-KEM-768, standardized in FIPS 203 (final, August 2024). This protects the key exchange against “harvest now, decrypt later” collection by a future quantum adversary.
Classical: The server completed the handshake without selecting the offered hybrid group. This is not a deviation — no RFC currently requires post-quantum key exchange. The X25519MLKEM768 group is defined in draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem (Standards Track draft, not yet an RFC); the hybrid approach is described in draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design (IESG-approved Informational). Servers supporting only other hybrid groups also read as Classical here.
Transition Outlook: NIST’s draft transition guidance (NIST IR 8547) projects quantum-vulnerable algorithms being deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Hybrid key exchange requires TLS 1.3. This finding is informational and does not affect this domain’s grade.
04 Human-visible identity · L1 Brand & Trust Can this brand be convincingly faked? BIMI & VMC CAA · see Domain Security Not Setup
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4), but no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes without visual proof of authenticity

BIMI BIMI Spec Gold Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

05 Ownership & attack surface · L1 Infrastructure Intelligence Who operates this domain, and what is exposed? Registrar / RDAP security.txt AI Surface Subdomains
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Yes RFC 9116

security.txt properly configured

Contact

https://g.co/vulnz
mailto:security@google.com

Expires

unparseable Valid

Encryption

https://services.google.com/corporate/publickey.txt

Policy

https://g.co/vrp
Hiring Acknowledgments
Source: https://google.com/.well-known/security.txt
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt View robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Not Checked

Nmap not available — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Not tested
Open Recursion Disabled Not tested
Nameserver Identity Hidden Not tested
Cache Snooping Protected Not tested
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for google.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial Anycast Node
ns2.google.com 216.239.34.10 2001:4860:4802:34::a AS15169
Google LLC 		962678449 N/A
ns3.google.com 216.239.36.10 2001:4860:4802:36::a AS15169
Google LLC 		962678449 N/A
ns4.google.com 216.239.38.10 2001:4860:4802:38::a AS15169
Google LLC 		962678449 N/A
ns1.google.com 216.239.32.10 2001:4860:4802:32::a AS15169
Google LLC 		962678449 N/A
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
4
Diversity Score