Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Read the verdict first. Descend only as far as the incident requires.
This report keeps the complete technical record while separating decision, interpretation, evidence, and raw reproduction into a stable disclosure gradient.
DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.
Your DMARC policy is set to quarantine. Upgrade to p=reject for maximum protection — reject instructs receivers to discard spoofed mail entirely rather than quarantining it.
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.
01!1 Identity & policy · L1 Email Security Can this domain be impersonated by email? SPF DMARC DKIM MTA-STS TLS-RPT MX & Routing Protected
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Partly SPF and DMARC are enforced at p=quarantine, 100% (RFC 7489 §6.3) — receivers accept failing mail and set it aside, so a spoofed message still reaches the mailbox in spam or junk rather than being refused
SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Gold
SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups
DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Gold
DMARC policy quarantine (100%) - good protection
pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Gold
Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)
l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail),
weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3),
DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)
MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Gold
No MTA-STS record found
MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.
TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Gold
No TLS-RPT record found
DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1
All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized
| External Domain | Authorization | Auth Record |
|---|---|---|
onsecureserver.net |
Authorized |
v=DMARC1
|
02@2 Chain of authority · L1 Domain Security Can DNS answers and certificate issuance be trusted? DANE / TLSA CAA Delegation DNSSEC & NS Open
DANE / TLSA Gold Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
DANE not available — Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure
Google Workspace supports DANE for outbound mail verification but does not publish TLSA records for its MX hosts.
Recommended alternative: MTA-STS
Note: Google Workspace does validate DANE/TLSA when sending mail to DANE-enabled recipients (outbound DANE).
Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:
- DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
- MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Gold Warning
No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates
Delegation Consistency 1 Issue
Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.
- Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone
DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned
Glue Record Completeness Complete
| Nameserver | In-Bailiwick | IPv4 Glue | IPv6 Glue | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
neil.ns.cloudflare.com |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
rosalie.ns.cloudflare.com |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
NS TTL Comparison Drift
SOA Serial Consistency Consistent
neil.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.412016383e+09rosalie.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.412016383e+09Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Gold Unsigned
DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned
NS Delegation Verified
2 nameserver(s) configured
HTTPS / SVCB Records RFC 9460 Success HTTPS HTTP/3
HTTPS records found, HTTP/3 supported
| Priority | Target | ALPN | ECH | Raw |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | . |
h3, h2 | No | mallplus.ph. 290 IN HTTPS 1 . alpn="h3,h2" ipv4hint="104.20.40.136,172.66.166.10" ipv6hint="2606:4700:10::6814:2888,2606:4700:10::ac42:a60a" |
03#3 Delivery path · L1 Transport Security Will mail transport resist downgrade and interception? STARTTLS MTA-STS policy TLS-RPT
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
Transport security inferred from 1 signal(s) — no enforcement policy active
Policy Assessment Primary
- Google Workspace enforces TLS 1.2+ with valid certificates on all inbound/outbound mail
Telemetry
Live Probe Supplementary
X25519MLKEM768 (X25519 combined with ML-KEM-768). The Key Exchange column reports the group each mail server actually negotiated — direct, observed evidence of its post-quantum readiness toward a hybrid-capable client.X25519MLKEM768 group is defined in draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem (Standards Track draft, not yet an RFC); the hybrid approach is described in draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design (IESG-approved Informational). Servers supporting only other hybrid groups also read as Classical here.04$4 Human-visible identity · L1 Brand & Trust Can this brand be convincingly faked? BIMI & VMC CAA · see Domain Security Not Setup
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC quarantine flags but does not reject spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3) — no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) leave brand impersonation largely unaddressed
05%5 Ownership & attack surface · L1 Infrastructure Intelligence Who operates this domain, and what is exposed? Registrar / RDAP security.txt AI Surface Subdomains
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116
No security.txt found
/.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities.
See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No
No significant AI surface findings
llms.txt llmstxt.org
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it.
Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No
No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.
What type of scan is this?
This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.
Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.
Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.
DNS Server Security Not Checked
Nmap not available — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.
| Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Zone Transfer (AXFR) | Denied | Not tested |
| Open Recursion | Disabled | Not tested |
| Nameserver Identity | Hidden | Not tested |
| Cache Snooping | Protected | Not tested |
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy
Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for mallplus.ph — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.
| Nameserver | IPv4 | IPv6 | ASN / Operator | UDP | TCP | AA | SOA Serial | Anycast Node |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
neil.ns.cloudflare.com |
172.64.33.211 173.245.59.211 108.162.193.211 |
2803:f800:50::6ca2:c1d3 2a06:98c1:50::ac40:21d3 2606:4700:58::adf5:3bd3 |
AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. |
2412016383 | N/A | |||
rosalie.ns.cloudflare.com |
162.159.38.57 108.162.194.57 172.64.34.57 |
2a06:98c1:50::ac40:2239 2803:f800:50::6ca2:c239 2606:4700:50::a29f:2639 |
AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. |
2412016383 | N/A |
1 ASN(s), 6 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct
ASN / Network Success
Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)
| ASN | Name | Country |
|---|---|---|
AS13335 |
Cloudflare, Inc. | US |
104.20.40.136 → AS13335 (104.20.32.0/20)172.66.166.10 → AS13335 (172.66.160.0/20)2606:4700:10::6814:2888 → AS13335 (2606:4700:10::/44)2606:4700:10::ac42:a60a → AS13335 (2606:4700:10::/44)Edge / CDN Success Cloudflare
Domain is served through Cloudflare
SaaS TXT Footprint Success 1 service
Detected 1 SaaS verification record
Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.
| Service | Verification Record |
|---|---|
google-site-verification=3csO21BMxsmwJHpQnDQr9VCEdRMQ93uZieJwpAhRJ-c |
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?
AIPv4 Address
AAAAIPv6 Address
MXMail Servers
SRVServices
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 14 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?| Subdomain | Source | Status | Provider / CNAME | Certificates | First Seen | Issuer(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
admin.mallplus.ph
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
api.mallplus.ph
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
auth.mallplus.ph
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
cdn.mallplus.ph
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
console.mallplus.ph
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
dev.mallplus.ph
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
gitlab.mallplus.ph
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
k8s.mallplus.ph
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
mail.mallplus.ph
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
nagios.mallplus.ph
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
registry.mallplus.ph
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
staging.mallplus.ph
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
uat.mallplus.ph
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
www.mallplus.ph
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
06^6 Raw records & reproducibility · L2–L3 Evidence & Verification Can another engineer reproduce every material claim? Analysis Confidence Intelligence Currency What changed Raw record diff Integrity seal Reproduce
The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.
| Record Type | Observed TTL | Typical TTL | Severity | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 290s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | A TTL is below typical — observed 290s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| SOA | 1790s |
1 hour (3600s) |
medium |
SOA TTL is below typical — observed 1790s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: Cloudflare manages SOA timers automatically. Free/Pro/Business plans cannot modify SOA values. Observed TTL (1790s) is set by Cloudflare, not the zone administrator. See RFC 1912 §2.2 for recommended SOA timer values.
|
| TXT | 290s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | TXT TTL is below typical — observed 290s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| AAAA | 290s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 290s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| NS | 21590s |
1 day (86400s) |
medium | NS TTL is below typical — observed 21590s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
Big Picture Questions
- How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
- Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
- Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
- Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
neil.ns.cloudflare.com
2412016383
dns.cloudflare.com
| Timer | Value | RFC 1912 Range |
|---|---|---|
| Refresh | 10000s | 1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs) |
| Retry | 2400s | Fraction of Refresh |
| Expire | 604800s | 1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days) |
| Minimum (Neg. Cache) | 1800s | 300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day) |
Independent RFC compliance assessment for Cloudflare. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.
Cloudflare sets SOA Expire to 604,800 seconds (7 days). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). This means secondary nameservers stop serving the zone sooner if the primary becomes unreachable. Cloudflare's position is that their anycast architecture makes traditional zone transfer semantics less relevant. SOA timers are not editable on Free, Pro, or Business plans.
Cloudflare overrides the zone administrator's TTL to 300 seconds for all proxied (orange-cloud) records. RFC 2181 §5.2 requires TTL uniformity within an RRset but does not mandate a specific value. As the authoritative server, Cloudflare is technically within its rights, but the administrator loses TTL control. This can affect ACME DNS-01 challenges and automation workflows that depend on rapid propagation.
RFC 1912 recommends YYYYMMDDNN format for SOA serial numbers (e.g., 2026022501). Cloudflare uses a proprietary serial number format that does not encode the date. RFC 1035 only requires the serial to increment on changes, so this is compliant with the mandatory standard but breaks the convention relied on by monitoring tools.
Cloudflare's SOA MINIMUM (negative cache TTL) is 1,800–3,600 seconds (30–60 minutes). This controls how long resolvers cache NXDOMAIN responses. Newly created DNS records — including ACME DNS-01 challenge TXT records for Let's Encrypt — may be invisible for up to 1 hour even after creation. This causes certificate issuance failures for automation tools like cert-manager and Traefik. Workaround: pre-create placeholder records before they're needed. This is RFC-compliant but aggressive compared to the 300–900 seconds common at other providers.
In February 2022, Cloudflare's resolver (1.1.1.1) returned CNAME responses with mismatched TTLs within the same RRset — including cases where one TTL was zero and another was non-zero. RFC 2181 §5.2 explicitly states: 'the TTLs of all RRs in an RRSet must be the same.' systemd-resolved (used by Arch Linux, Ubuntu, Fedora, and most modern Linux distributions) correctly rejected these responses per the RFC, causing widespread DNS resolution failures. Cloudflare acknowledged the issue and it appears to have been fixed, but it demonstrated that Cloudflare's DNS infrastructure can deviate from RFC requirements in ways that break compliant resolver implementations.
| Parameter | Current | Suggested | Severity | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| timeout_seconds | 5s |
8s |
low | Average scan duration is 30.6s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures. RFC 8767 |
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
104.20.40.136
172.66.166.10
172.66.166.10
104.20.40.136
2606:4700:10::6814:2888
2606:4700:10::6814:2888
2606:4700:10::ac42:a60a
2606:4700:10::ac42:a60a
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net;
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net;
1 aspmx.l.google.com.
1 aspmx.l.google.com.
10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com.
10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com.
10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com.
10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com.
neil.ns.cloudflare.com.
neil.ns.cloudflare.com.
rosalie.ns.cloudflare.com.
rosalie.ns.cloudflare.com.
neil.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2412016383 10000 2400 604800 1800
neil.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2412016383 10000 2400 604800 1800
google-site-verification=3csO21BMxsmwJHpQnDQr9VCEdRMQ93uZieJwpAhRJ-c
google-site-verification=3csO21BMxsmwJHpQnDQr9VCEdRMQ93uZieJwpAhRJ-c
google-site-verification=rKJtkE5w99VB8H-OMU-fj3V9BsUvtnFCgsdpX-9ws6A
google-site-verification=rKJtkE5w99VB8H-OMU-fj3V9BsUvtnFCgsdpX-9ws6A
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
DNS History Timeline BETA
When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?
Confirm Your Email Configuration
This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.
DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY
All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.
Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.
Intelligence Sources
This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below
This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.
c7f92a6c24a67a0a9175c469786e40eecfa7a1a3e679da3e9e9a33fbc329beee897100597489cf9354b4e254e6481296f96b029b0c50a818bbaae29625135a47
Internet Archive — Permanent Record Wayback Machine Can this analysis be independently verified? Archived
This analysis has been automatically submitted to the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, creating a tamper-evident, third-party-hosted snapshot of the DNS security posture at analysis time. This archived copy is independent of DNS Tool — it provides an independently verifiable record of the analysis at this point in time. Combined with the SHA-3-512 integrity hash, this creates a verifiable chain of evidence for domain security state.
https://web.archive.org/web/20260812130804/https://dnstool.it-help.tech/analysis/18185/view/E
Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.
After downloading, verify with any of these commands:
Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).
cat dns-intelligence-mallplus.ph.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-mallplus.ph.jsonpython3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-mallplus.ph.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-mallplus.ph.json.sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/18185/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).
Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for mallplus.ph. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer mallplus.ph Adig +noall +answer mallplus.ph AAAAdig +noall +answer mallplus.ph MXdig +noall +answer mallplus.ph NSdig +noall +answer mallplus.ph TXTEmail Authentication
dig +short mallplus.ph TXT | grep -i spfdig +short _dmarc.mallplus.ph TXTdig +short google._domainkey.mallplus.ph TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer mallplus.ph DNSKEYdig +noall +answer mallplus.ph DSdig +dnssec +cd mallplus.ph A @1.1.1.1Transport Security
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.aspmx.l.google.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt3.aspmx.l.google.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt4.aspmx.l.google.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt1.aspmx.l.google.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt2.aspmx.l.google.com TLSAopenssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect aspmx.l.google.com:25 -servername aspmx.l.google.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -datesdig +short _mta-sts.mallplus.ph TXTcurl -sL https://mta-sts.mallplus.ph/.well-known/mta-sts.txtdig +short _smtp._tls.mallplus.ph TXTBrand & Trust
dig +short default._bimi.mallplus.ph TXTdig +noall +answer mallplus.ph CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer mallplus.ph HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer mallplus.ph CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/mallplus.ph' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50Transport Security
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect aspmx.l.google.com:25 -servername aspmx.l.google.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5Infrastructure Intelligence
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.mallplus.ph&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20curl -sL https://mallplus.ph/.well-known/security.txt | head -20AI Surface
curl -sI https://mallplus.ph/llms.txt | head -5curl -s https://mallplus.ph/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'Infrastructure Intelligence
dig +short 136.40.20.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig +short 10.166.66.172.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Appendix: Verification Commands
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer mallplus.ph Adig +noall +answer mallplus.ph AAAAdig +noall +answer mallplus.ph MXdig +noall +answer mallplus.ph NSdig +noall +answer mallplus.ph TXTEmail Authentication
dig +short mallplus.ph TXT | grep -i spfdig +short _dmarc.mallplus.ph TXTdig +short google._domainkey.mallplus.ph TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer mallplus.ph DNSKEYdig +noall +answer mallplus.ph DSdig +dnssec +cd mallplus.ph A @1.1.1.1Transport Security
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.aspmx.l.google.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt3.aspmx.l.google.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt4.aspmx.l.google.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt1.aspmx.l.google.com TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt2.aspmx.l.google.com TLSAopenssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect aspmx.l.google.com:25 -servername aspmx.l.google.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -datesdig +short _mta-sts.mallplus.ph TXTcurl -sL https://mta-sts.mallplus.ph/.well-known/mta-sts.txtdig +short _smtp._tls.mallplus.ph TXTBrand & Trust
dig +short default._bimi.mallplus.ph TXTdig +noall +answer mallplus.ph CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer mallplus.ph HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer mallplus.ph CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/mallplus.ph' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50Transport Security
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect aspmx.l.google.com:25 -servername aspmx.l.google.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5Infrastructure Intelligence
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.mallplus.ph&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20curl -sL https://mallplus.ph/.well-known/security.txt | head -20AI Surface
curl -sI https://mallplus.ph/llms.txt | head -5curl -s https://mallplus.ph/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'Infrastructure Intelligence
dig +short 136.40.20.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig +short 10.166.66.172.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT