Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Read the verdict first. Descend only as far as the incident requires.
This report keeps the complete technical record while separating decision, interpretation, evidence, and raw reproduction into a stable disclosure gradient.
DANE/TLSA records are present but DNSSEC is not enabled. DANE cannot function without DNSSEC validation.
Your DMARC policy is monitor-only (p=none). Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing reports to actively prevent spoofing.
DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.
01!1 Identity & policy · L1 Email Security Can this domain be impersonated by email? SPF DMARC DKIM MTA-STS TLS-RPT MX & Routing Partial
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC requests no enforcement (p=none)
SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Gold
SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 8/10 lookups
spf2.0/pra) from a Microsoft experiment circa 2006 that was never standardized. RFC 7208 §A explicitly deprecates it. No modern mail receiver processes this record. It is safe to delete.
DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Gold
DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement
pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Gold
Found DKIM for 2 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)
l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail),
weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3),
DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)
MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Gold
No MTA-STS record found
MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.
TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Gold
No TLS-RPT record found
DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1
All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized
| External Domain | Authorization | Auth Record |
|---|---|---|
forwardemail.net |
Authorized |
v=DMARC1;
|
02@2 Chain of authority · L1 Domain Security Can DNS answers and certificate issuance be trusted? DANE / TLSA CAA Delegation DNSSEC & NS Enterprise
DANE / TLSA Gold Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? Yes
DANE configured — TLSA records found for all 2 MX hosts
| MX Host | Usage | Selector | Match | Certificate Data |
|---|---|---|---|---|
mx1.forwardemail.net |
3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) | Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) | SHA-256 | 321f694ead3a2e733d857fd7e79d811fc79ca120cc5ccc7b6bcd072be35f1b6a |
mx1.forwardemail.net |
3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) | Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) | SHA-256 | 5e81da1af16df20b13e667ad6d9c2b65b95bfcd95150caffe7116c1707b4dd2c |
mx2.forwardemail.net |
3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) | Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) | SHA-256 | 321f694ead3a2e733d857fd7e79d811fc79ca120cc5ccc7b6bcd072be35f1b6a |
mx2.forwardemail.net |
3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) | Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) | SHA-256 | 5e81da1af16df20b13e667ad6d9c2b65b95bfcd95150caffe7116c1707b4dd2c |
Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:
- DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
- MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Gold Success IODEF
CAA configured - only Amazon, Let's Encrypt, Sectigo, DigiCert can issue certificates
Delegation Consistency 1 Issue
Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.
- Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone
DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned
Glue Record Completeness Complete
| Nameserver | In-Bailiwick | IPv4 Glue | IPv6 Glue | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
ns-1827.awsdns-36.co.uk |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
ns-193.awsdns-24.com |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
ns-738.awsdns-28.net |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
NS TTL Comparison Drift
SOA Serial Consistency Consistent
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org: 1ns-1827.awsdns-36.co.uk: 1ns-193.awsdns-24.com: 1ns-738.awsdns-28.net: 1Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Gold Unsigned
DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned
NS Delegation Verified
4 nameserver(s) configured
03#3 Delivery path · L1 Transport Security Will mail transport resist downgrade and interception? STARTTLS MTA-STS policy TLS-RPT
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification
Transport encryption enforced via DNS policy (1 signal(s))
Policy Assessment Primary
- DANE/TLSA records published — mail servers pin TLS certificates via DNSSEC (RFC 7672)
Telemetry
Live Probe Supplementary
X25519MLKEM768 (X25519 combined with ML-KEM-768). The Key Exchange column reports the group each mail server actually negotiated — direct, observed evidence of its post-quantum readiness toward a hybrid-capable client.X25519MLKEM768 group is defined in draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem (Standards Track draft, not yet an RFC); the hybrid approach is described in draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design (IESG-approved Informational). Servers supporting only other hybrid groups also read as Classical here.04$4 Human-visible identity · L1 Brand & Trust Can this brand be convincingly faked? BIMI & VMC CAA · see Domain Security Not Setup
05%5 Ownership & attack surface · L1 Infrastructure Intelligence Who operates this domain, and what is exposed? Registrar / RDAP security.txt AI Surface Subdomains
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116
No security.txt found
/.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities.
See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No
No AI governance measures detected
llms.txt llmstxt.org
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it.
Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Evidence Log (1 item)
| Type | Detail | Severity | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks |
robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives | low | Observed |
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? Yes — 1 found
1 potential secret(s) found in publicly accessible source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.
| Severity | Type | Location | Redacted Value | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| high | Google API Key | red.com/RedSuiteCentric/SCA-Kilimanjaro/shopping.environment.ssp?lang=en_US&c... | AIza********17C8 | high |
Sources scanned (5)
- https://red.com/
- https://red.com/RedSuiteCentric/SCA-Kilimanjaro/shopping.environment.ssp?lang=en_US&cur=null&X-SC-Touchpoint=shopping&t=1785359977959
- https://red.com/RedSuiteCentric/SCA-Kilimanjaro/languages/shopping_en_US.js?t=1785359977959
- https://red.com/RedSuiteCentric/SCA-Kilimanjaro/shopping-templates.js?t=1785359977959
- https://red.com/RedSuiteCentric/SCA-Kilimanjaro/javascript/shopping.js?t=1785359977959
What type of scan is this?
This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.
Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.
Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.
DNS Server Security Not Checked
Nmap not available — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.
| Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Zone Transfer (AXFR) | Denied | Not tested |
| Open Recursion | Disabled | Not tested |
| Nameserver Identity | Hidden | Not tested |
| Cache Snooping | Protected | Not tested |
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy
Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for red.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.
| Nameserver | IPv4 | IPv6 | ASN / Operator | UDP | TCP | AA | SOA Serial | Anycast Node |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ns-1827.awsdns-36.co.uk |
205.251.199.35 | 2600:9000:5307:2300::1 |
AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. |
1 | N/A | |||
ns-193.awsdns-24.com |
205.251.192.193 | 2600:9000:5300:c100::1 |
AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. |
1 | N/A | |||
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org |
205.251.197.169 | 2600:9000:5305:a900::1 |
AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. |
1 | N/A | |||
ns-738.awsdns-28.net |
205.251.194.226 | 2600:9000:5302:e200::1 |
AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. |
1 | N/A |
1 ASN(s), 4 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct
ASN / Network Success
Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 12 IP address(es)
| ASN | Name | Country |
|---|---|---|
AS16509 |
Amazon.com, Inc. | US |
18.161.6.104 → AS16509 (18.161.0.0/21)18.161.6.115 → AS16509 (18.161.0.0/21)18.161.6.6 → AS16509 (18.161.0.0/21)18.161.6.93 → AS16509 (18.161.0.0/21)2600:9000:2475:1200:b:6af6:b080:93a1 → AS ()2600:9000:2475:4800:b:6af6:b080:93a1 → AS ()2600:9000:2475:5400:b:6af6:b080:93a1 → AS ()2600:9000:2475:a00:b:6af6:b080:93a1 → AS ()2600:9000:2475:ac00:b:6af6:b080:93a1 → AS ()2600:9000:2475:c200:b:6af6:b080:93a1 → AS ()2600:9000:2475:cc00:b:6af6:b080:93a1 → AS ()2600:9000:2475:d800:b:6af6:b080:93a1 → AS ()Edge / CDN Success Amazon CloudFront
Domain is served through Amazon CloudFront
SaaS TXT Footprint Success 7 services
Detected 7 SaaS verification records
Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.
| Service | Verification Record |
|---|---|
| 1Password | 1password-site-verification=FL35IRPJAZA45EMAHJE3DM2P34 |
| Microsoft | MS=ms90467680 |
| Apple | apple-domain-verification=lrease1jj5yhKu1A |
| Atlassian | atlassian-domain-verification=fecVuukmD7HYkotOSHJeZj7bwwPi2KkUXN61uckFqkF4es9wozestIp1cmelFdUo |
| Dropbox | dropbox-domain-verification=9i3l1qna33qy |
facebook-domain-verification=i6l6p5krhuto4im0f98mvx3pbjfhvi |
|
google-site-verification=URKywT9Orj6_nk93ayvDWupzAH39Xci8dOxAsAuJgI0 |
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?
AIPv4 Address
AAAAIPv6 Address
MXMail Servers
SRVServices
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 24 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?| Subdomain | Source | Status | Provider / CNAME | Certificates | First Seen | Issuer(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
autodiscover.red.com
|
DNS | Current |
autodiscover.outlook.com
|
— | — | — |
cms.red.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
csc.red.com
|
CT Log | Current | — | — | — | — |
db1.red.com
|
DNS | Current |
production-database.ca3bitgm863b.us-west-2.rds.amazonaws.com
|
— | — | — |
docs.red.com
|
DNS | Current |
d251ynbmdsa2xe.cloudfront.net
|
— | — | — |
downloads.red.com
|
DNS | Current |
dzltzf5dsesf6.cloudfront.net
|
— | — | — |
eu.red.com
|
DNS | Current |
d8qd7ihwepkly.cloudfront.net
|
— | — | — |
firmware.red.com
|
CT Log | Current | — | — | — | — |
iconises01.red.com
|
CT Log | Current | — | — | — | — |
images.red.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
lassises01.red.com
|
CT Log | Current | — | — | — | — |
mail.red.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
netsuite.red.com
|
CT Log | Current | — | — | — | — |
owa.red.com
|
DNS | Current |
webmail.red.com
|
— | — | — |
partners.red.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
rdcmetadata.red.com
|
CT Log | Current |
capi.rdc.services
|
— | — | — |
support.red.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
ui.red.com
|
CT Log | Current | — | — | — | — |
videos.red.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
vpn.red.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
vpn2.red.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
webmail.red.com
|
DNS | Current |
mail.office365.com
|
— | — | — |
webphapi.red.com
|
CT Log | Current | — | — | — | — |
www.red.com
|
DNS | Current | — | — | — | — |
06^6 Raw records & reproducibility · L2–L3 Evidence & Verification Can another engineer reproduce every material claim? Analysis Confidence Intelligence Currency What changed Raw record diff Integrity seal Reproduce
This domain uses short TTLs across 3 record types (A record at 60s), consistent with DNS-based traffic management (GSLB). Enterprises operating large anycast networks intentionally use short TTLs to enable rapid failover, geographic steering, and load distribution. This is a deliberate infrastructure choice, not a misconfiguration. RFC 1035 §3.2.1 permits any TTL value the zone administrator selects. The findings below reflect deviation from typical values for reference, not necessarily actionable recommendations for this class of infrastructure.
The following DNS record TTLs deviate from typical values. For domains using DNS-based traffic management, short TTLs are expected and intentional.
| Record Type | Observed TTL | Typical TTL | Severity | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SOA | 15 minutes (900s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
medium | SOA TTL is below typical — observed 15 minutes (900s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| MX | 291s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | MX TTL is below typical — observed 291s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| NS | 21591s |
1 day (86400s) |
medium | NS TTL is below typical — observed 21591s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| A | 1 minute (60s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high |
A TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: AWS Route 53 alias records have a fixed TTL of 60 seconds when pointing to AWS resources (ELB, CloudFront, S3). This is an AWS-specific extension, not part of DNS RFCs. To set a custom TTL, use a standard A/AAAA record or CNAME instead of an alias — but note this loses automatic IP tracking.
|
| AAAA | 1 minute (60s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high |
AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: AWS Route 53 alias records have a fixed TTL of 60 seconds when pointing to AWS resources (ELB, CloudFront, S3). This is an AWS-specific extension, not part of DNS RFCs. To set a custom TTL, use a standard A/AAAA record or CNAME instead of an alias — but note this loses automatic IP tracking.
|
| CAA | 5 minutes (300s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | CAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
Big Picture Questions
- This domain runs short TTLs across multiple record types. Does it operate a global anycast network where DNS-based traffic steering justifies the query volume?
- Are the short TTLs enabling active failover, geographic routing, or load distribution — or are they leftover from a migration that was never reverted?
- Enterprise-grade DNS infrastructure (sub-5ms authoritative response times, globally distributed nameservers) absorbs short-TTL query volume. Would your authoritative DNS handle the same load?
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org
1
awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com
| Timer | Value | RFC 1912 Range |
|---|---|---|
| Refresh | 7200s | 1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs) |
| Retry | 900s | Fraction of Refresh |
| Expire | 1209600s | 1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days) |
| Minimum (Neg. Cache) | 86400s | 300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day) |
Independent RFC compliance assessment for AWS Route 53. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.
AWS Route 53 alias records pointing to AWS resources (ELB, CloudFront, S3, API Gateway) have a fixed TTL of 60 seconds that cannot be modified. Route 53 alias records are an AWS-specific extension — not part of standard DNS RFCs. They solve the CNAME-at-apex problem (RFC prohibits CNAME at zone apex) by appearing as A/AAAA records to resolvers. The 60-second TTL ensures fast failover but removes administrator TTL control.
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
18.161.6.104
18.161.6.93
18.161.6.115
18.161.6.6
18.161.6.6
18.161.6.115
18.161.6.93
18.161.6.104
2600:9000:2475:1200:b:6af6:b080:93a1
2600:9000:2475:5a00:b:6af6:b080:93a1
2600:9000:2475:4800:b:6af6:b080:93a1
2600:9000:2475:3a00:b:6af6:b080:93a1
2600:9000:2475:5400:b:6af6:b080:93a1
2600:9000:2475:8800:b:6af6:b080:93a1
2600:9000:2475:a00:b:6af6:b080:93a1
2600:9000:2475:a200:b:6af6:b080:93a1
2600:9000:2475:ac00:b:6af6:b080:93a1
2600:9000:2475:4600:b:6af6:b080:93a1
2600:9000:2475:c200:b:6af6:b080:93a1
2600:9000:2475:c000:b:6af6:b080:93a1
2600:9000:2475:cc00:b:6af6:b080:93a1
2600:9000:2475:3800:b:6af6:b080:93a1
2600:9000:2475:d800:b:6af6:b080:93a1
2600:9000:2475:6400:b:6af6:b080:93a1
0 iodef "mailto:iodef@red.com"
0 iodef "mailto:iodef@red.com"
0 issue "sectigo.com"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "www.digicert.com"
0 issue "sectigo.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "www.digicert.com"
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-68b7843f04d9df0d350c2996@forwardemail.net
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-68b7843f04d9df0d350c2996@forwardemail.net
10 mx1.forwardemail.net.
10 mx1.forwardemail.net.
10 mx2.forwardemail.net.
10 mx2.forwardemail.net.
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org.
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org.
ns-1827.awsdns-36.co.uk.
ns-1827.awsdns-36.co.uk.
ns-193.awsdns-24.com.
ns-193.awsdns-24.com.
ns-738.awsdns-28.net.
ns-738.awsdns-28.net.
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
1password-site-verification=FL35IRPJAZA45EMAHJE3DM2P34
MS=ms90467680
_m42h676p7k4b3h9fqw5ogb6m3empi48
apple-domain-verification=lrease1jj5yhKu1A
atlassian-domain-verification=fecVuukmD7HYkotOSHJeZj7bwwPi2KkUXN61uckFqkF4es9wozestIp1cmelFdUo
dropbox-domain-verification=9i3l1qna33qy
facebook-domain-verification=i6l6p5krhuto4im0f98mvx3pbjfhvi
forward-email-site-verification=IFdNp6eOx3
fub7Jg8wns9rH4Byn/ymd3bVcq7z9ufxhBkZWZjgJNDTRUiRYT8uM/QAvHZJMbLpHys5LwcZxFkbqWySIFHd9A==
google-site-verification=URKywT9Orj6_nk93ayvDWupzAH39Xci8dOxAsAuJgI0
google-site-verification=V4yoSBiET77_9lNFGziBaIrPkhAGJdTjnJ70bmaMH28
google-site-verification=rfoESIAfF6youN2T4_L_jsIdPbKG_k8abtuxZF2Eyv8
google-site-verification=wWF7PHkVbQ_Rxb2kv8-dUHz8-AwzLEEV33V9cCNr_hM
klaviyo-site-verification=SHA5cE
mdq267gx87p93v5k76fcg7s86xh7j1kg
p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDDIyp3V1j2XAo4c9eEIaNpO/W31jONArkhj3L7ttWF8BqCFfLfkB/QYWTIUvItbj3ZiVA5ODPW4/w7Rax7EW15uvs1y/oLT+kyKhTx8DGBWXCpaDOUfjOoSzb+Z/CsaBWBU2vd69lG/76O+I1xFW+6eQ24/fpr3k5mSrtVCrn2awIDAQAB
traction-guest=0ca160cd-40d1-4986-8f39-6e435152eec5
v=spf1 mx include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:mail.zendesk.com a:outboundips.netsuite.com include:rp.oracleemaildelivery.com include:eu.rp.oracleemaildelivery.com include:ap.rp.oracleemaildelivery.com include:sendgrid.net ip4:70.183.25.226 ip4:70.183.25.233 ip4:12.215.166.253 ip4:46.61.187.62 ip4:216.194.106.13 ip4:149.20.194.55 ip4:148.62.51.171 ip4:23.21.109.197 ip4:23.21.109.212 ip4:147.160.167.14 ip4:147.160.167.15 ip4:52.49.235.189 ip4:52.49.201.246 ~all
v=spf2.0/pra a mx include:radicaepost.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:mailsenders.netsuite.com include:sent-via.netsuite.com ~all
DNS History Timeline BETA
When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?
Confirm Your Email Configuration
This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.
DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY
All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.
Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.
Intelligence Sources
This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below
This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.
cc883ddafc9c13e54915ee851b93adb7835880f8330f5fc49c0de18cf39ad724c3dbc54b78ad0de0363262786880fd53871a7ca0d999f603a2291bbf5d3a9643
Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.
After downloading, verify with any of these commands:
Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).
cat dns-intelligence-red.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-red.com.jsonpython3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-red.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-red.com.json.sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/18182/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).
Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for red.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer red.com Adig +noall +answer red.com AAAAdig +noall +answer red.com MXdig +noall +answer red.com NSdig +noall +answer red.com TXTEmail Authentication
dig +short red.com TXT | grep -i spfdig +short _dmarc.red.com TXTdig +short mail._domainkey.red.com TXTdig +short selector2._domainkey.red.com TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer red.com DNSKEYdig +noall +answer red.com DSdig +dnssec +cd red.com A @1.1.1.1Transport Security
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx1.forwardemail.net TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx2.forwardemail.net TLSAopenssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx1.forwardemail.net:25 -servername mx1.forwardemail.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -datesdig +short _mta-sts.red.com TXTcurl -sL https://mta-sts.red.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txtdig +short _smtp._tls.red.com TXTBrand & Trust
dig +short default._bimi.red.com TXTdig +noall +answer red.com CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer red.com HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer red.com CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/red.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50Transport Security
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx1.forwardemail.net:25 -servername mx1.forwardemail.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5Infrastructure Intelligence
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.red.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20curl -sL https://red.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20AI Surface
curl -sI https://red.com/llms.txt | head -5curl -s https://red.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'Infrastructure Intelligence
dig +short 104.6.161.18.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig +short 115.6.161.18.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Appendix: Verification Commands
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer red.com Adig +noall +answer red.com AAAAdig +noall +answer red.com MXdig +noall +answer red.com NSdig +noall +answer red.com TXTEmail Authentication
dig +short red.com TXT | grep -i spfdig +short _dmarc.red.com TXTdig +short mail._domainkey.red.com TXTdig +short selector2._domainkey.red.com TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer red.com DNSKEYdig +noall +answer red.com DSdig +dnssec +cd red.com A @1.1.1.1Transport Security
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx1.forwardemail.net TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx2.forwardemail.net TLSAopenssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx1.forwardemail.net:25 -servername mx1.forwardemail.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -datesdig +short _mta-sts.red.com TXTcurl -sL https://mta-sts.red.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txtdig +short _smtp._tls.red.com TXTBrand & Trust
dig +short default._bimi.red.com TXTdig +noall +answer red.com CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer red.com HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer red.com CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/red.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50Transport Security
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx1.forwardemail.net:25 -servername mx1.forwardemail.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5Infrastructure Intelligence
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.red.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20curl -sL https://red.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20AI Surface
curl -sI https://red.com/llms.txt | head -5curl -s https://red.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'Infrastructure Intelligence
dig +short 104.6.161.18.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig +short 115.6.161.18.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT