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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 27 Jul 2026, 06:29 UTC
Duration 67.0s
Version v26.50.05-409-g73f79445e
Integrity 57aae5dd7826a4b3b37bd07d84d4c6df3875667de08da696af4259747728fa29679295df5ed6659dcf6d0e214c0c75528356a38f0154b7a920e3abba588afefe
Subject Domain
kiit.ac.in

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

kiit.ac.in High Risk
27 Jul 2026, 06:29 UTC · 67.0s ·v26.50.05-409-g73f79445e · SHA-3-512: 57aa✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Archived ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology Replay
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Engineer workspace · evidence preserved

Read the verdict first. Descend only as far as the incident requires.

This report keeps the complete technical record while separating decision, interpretation, evidence, and raw reproduction into a stable disclosure gradient.

L0PostureL1InterpretationL2EvidenceL3Raw & reproduce
Hurry path
MX & Routing Subdomains DNSSEC What changed
KEYBOARD !1@2#3$4%5^6 jump to that section · esc back to the verdict
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Confidence: MODERATE · 64/100
2 protocols configured, 7 not configured Enterprise DNS Posture: Cloudflare runs enterprise-grade DNS infrastructure — an unsigned DNSSEC chain here reads as a deliberate operator choice, not the gap it would be for a small operator. Network-layer compensating controls are not verifiable via DNS alone; see DNS-layer detail. Why we go beyond letter grades
What’s Wrong Publish a DMARC record starting with p=none and rua reporting
Jump To: DMARC MTA-STS TLS-RPT BIMI DANE DNSSEC CAA
Sorted by severity — worst first
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Enterprise
Certificate Control
Open
Monitoring
Not Setup
DANE
Inconclusive
TRACE L0 · Email Spoofing — Partial L1 · 01 · Email Security · SPF/DMARC L3 · Reproduce commands
Not Configured
DMARC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, DNSSEC, CAA
Recommended
Publish a DMARC record starting with p=none and rua reporting
Configured
SPF, DKIM
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Moderate Risk
Critical Publish DMARC Record

Add a DMARC record to protect your domain against email spoofing and receive authentication reports.

RFC 7489 §6.3
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

RFC 8659
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
ERNET India
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Google Workspace
Limited Protection
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Cloudflare Enterprise
Where DNS records are edited
Footprint Cloudflare Google Workspace 4 SaaS Services
01 Identity & policy · L1 Email Security Can this domain be impersonated by email? SPF DMARC DKIM MTA-STS TLS-RPT MX & Routing Partial
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Likely SPF alone cannot prevent spoofing

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Gold

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. No DMARC record found. Without DMARC, SPF alone cannot prevent domain spoofing. Adding a DMARC policy is strongly recommended.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Gold

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? No policy published
Error

Multiple DMARC records found — receivers must treat this as no DMARC (RFC 7489 §6.6.3)

v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=1;
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.brevo.com
Multiple DMARC records cause PermError — only one record permitted per RFC 7489
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Gold

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 4 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

google._domainkey Google Workspace 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAo88Qfc+ZHyDMM5S5f1qlxA+RNee+gpeP99xl+39+7ydlc8S+X4UWZXV1/eOPitg8212/QGv3mVUtBlx0TMDkOOz9FOtHJFVnVSN1GQnQtt35UZuQY/Yw8bLASqa2ElhsRwv95uJWbXfOwi0QWJexzzICy3CDTzXepPYnm3ty4frfU8dTQWZ71N+N8mmF28+BD11Ro8+6kAhKaPNBu7FVIk+nWnn4MytbSK8RuGgplMKG2m2OAZh9x1FW4BjGFSkVn8Z4IqJAf6HyODrThKT8vLMoblzeIzB4moQmQ4xyVxUQaSl8Q7tpv9hcO7dEqRbX+mO4w97Y/6Qq+iZrmhmtfQIDAQAB
mail._domainkey 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa;p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDeMVIzrCa3T14JsNY0IRv5/2V1/v2itlviLQBwXsa7shBD6TrBkswsFUToPyMRWC9tbR/5ey0nRBH0ZVxp+lsmTxid2Y2z+FApQ6ra2VsXfbJP3HE6wAO0YTVEJt1TmeczhEd2Jiz/fcabIISgXEdSpTYJhb0ct0VJRxcg4c8c7wIDAQAB
s1._domainkey SendGrid 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyx/VwNOUcpw4TQRpL18fs0LM6/j6TWJgYN/nlkac9RryHSCFyQeR7Jb5ehwWKC/CLb7YubH625LMHSmZ4GCrnLQYzb23FPk6ht+R1cGCNi1lMuVaanyDZLi6Hxg87qnG1uAKMcqcheX6dFyEZOv55XVRFhgbpP3wXgQ4aJwRbMSs4yBVAlouDhDTBlnd2sZpRsEoW++Pn5O4d8TDpLWMTqxpp2y3bXNCI/lqRpKYlNJAkFGJdaoNjtOXpC5ZfVUMAhg7AE5/s4qiEmXTrJvhDWmFuxiLbQWDMNa+Wp6iBOv5SERIBu2EbffkdUX13tMV7jk7LD1oLG0sgsftBXq0KwIDAQAB
s2._domainkey SendGrid 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCbIKcWC+nI1u/KOpQMbfVjwWvNX8K2s2QfWy2GQcUc9PtluWahArB9qYWfTDt4uwlimg2D80t7LhSIbzAOvx88bipazi5xsK38pk4uqEGOnCL0pbCvXd629uQzLJAEjNuPvmvkPX1Y0t8hhSY8cpcpMS76lqv8I7EpuPTFicV3uwIDAQAB
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Gold

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Gold

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

02 Chain of authority · L1 Domain Security Can DNS answers and certificate issuance be trusted? DANE / TLSA CAA Delegation DNSSEC & NS Open
DANE / TLSA Gold Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? Could Not Verify
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Inconclusive

DANE could not be verified — TLSA lookups for 5 of 5 MX hosts did not complete (transient resolver failure). This is not evidence that DANE is absent (RFC 6698 §1).

Indeterminate TLSA lookup for: alt2.aspmx.l.google.com, aspmx.l.google.com, alt3.aspmx.l.google.com — re-run before drawing a conclusion
DANE not deployable on Google Workspace

Google Workspace supports DANE for outbound mail verification but does not publish TLSA records for its MX hosts.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Note: Google Workspace does validate DANE/TLSA when sending mail to DANE-enabled recipients (outbound DANE).

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Gold Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ken.ns.cloudflare.com No N/A N/A OK
zara.ns.cloudflare.com No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ken.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.410374557e+09
zara.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.410374557e+09
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Gold Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Alternative Security: Cloudflare provides enterprise-grade DNS with DDoS protection and monitoring.

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ken.ns.cloudflare.com zara.ns.cloudflare.com
Managed DNS
All 2 nameservers hosted by Cloudflare. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Cloudflare
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records

HTTPS / SVCB Records RFC 9460 Success HTTPS HTTP/3

HTTPS records found, HTTP/3 supported

PriorityTargetALPNECHRaw
1 . h3, h2 No kiit.ac.in. 300 IN HTTPS 1 . alpn="h3,h2" ipv4hint="104.26.2.120,104.26.3.120,172.67.75.3" ipv6hint="2606:4700:20::681a:278,2606:4700:20::681a:378,2606:4700:20::ac43:4b03"
03 Delivery path · L1 Transport Security Will mail transport resist downgrade and interception? STARTTLS MTA-STS policy TLS-RPT
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Transport security inferred from 1 signal(s) — no enforcement policy active

Policy Assessment Primary
  • Google Workspace enforces TLS 1.2+ with valid certificates on all inbound/outbound mail
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
What Is Measured: Our probe’s TLS 1.3 handshake offers the hybrid post-quantum group X25519MLKEM768 (X25519 combined with ML-KEM-768). The Key Exchange column reports the group each mail server actually negotiated — direct, observed evidence of its post-quantum readiness toward a hybrid-capable client.
Quantum-Safe Hybrid: The session key agreement combines classical X25519 with ML-KEM-768, standardized in FIPS 203 (final, August 2024). This protects the key exchange against “harvest now, decrypt later” collection by a future quantum adversary.
Classical: The server completed the handshake without selecting the offered hybrid group. This is not a deviation — no RFC currently requires post-quantum key exchange. The X25519MLKEM768 group is defined in draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem (Standards Track draft, not yet an RFC); the hybrid approach is described in draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design (IESG-approved Informational). Servers supporting only other hybrid groups also read as Classical here.
Transition Outlook: NIST’s draft transition guidance (NIST IR 8547) projects quantum-vulnerable algorithms being deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Hybrid key exchange requires TLS 1.3. This finding is informational and does not affect this domain’s grade.
04 Human-visible identity · L1 Brand & Trust Can this brand be convincingly faked? BIMI & VMC CAA · see Domain Security Not Setup
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Yes No DMARC policy (RFC 7489) — attackers can send email appearing to be from this domain with no sender-authentication barrier

BIMI BIMI Spec Gold Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

05 Ownership & attack surface · L1 Infrastructure Intelligence Who operates this domain, and what is exposed? Registrar / RDAP security.txt AI Surface Subdomains
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt View robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on zara.ns.cloudflare.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: zara.ns.cloudflare.com, ken.ns.cloudflare.com

Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for kiit.ac.in — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial Anycast Node
zara.ns.cloudflare.com 172.64.32.148
108.162.192.148
173.245.58.148 		2a06:98c1:50::ac40:2094
2606:4700:50::adf5:3a94
2803:f800:50::6ca2:c094 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2410374557 N/A
ken.ns.cloudflare.com 108.162.193.127
173.245.59.127
172.64.33.127 		2a06:98c1:50::ac40:217f
2606:4700:58::adf5:3b7f
2803:f800:50::6ca2:c17f 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2410374557 N/A
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
6
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 6 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 0 unique ASN(s) across 6 IP address(es)

IPv4 Mappings:
104.26.2.120 → AS ()
104.26.3.120 → AS ()
172.67.75.3 → AS ()
IPv6 Mappings:
2606:4700:20::681a:278 → AS ()
2606:4700:20::681a:378 → AS ()
2606:4700:20::ac43:4b03 → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 4 services

Detected 4 SaaS verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Brevo (Sendinblue) brevo-code:7a88b5ea5ca2e41a988e7f1ca7379ad1
Cisco Umbrella cisco-ci-domain-verification=656f2ada5297a66db09e57c438f0cbfe948e3f8f6ef542cb71f7874bd3e44d47
Facebook facebook-domain-verification=6z0xmb1v84ogc6nz48e56hakgeuwk1
Google google-site-verification=0Ot-j_0wX7odYUdlec5FPp_guOGtcO96MIJe06tJM5A
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

104.26.2.120
104.26.3.120
172.67.75.3
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2606:4700:20::681a:278
2606:4700:20::681a:378
2606:4700:20::ac43:4b03
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

1 aspmx.l.google.com.
10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com.
10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Google Workspace

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (3 IPv4, 3 IPv6) Mail: 5 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 152 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
242 unique certificates 152 current 0 expired 1 CNAME Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Wildcard certificate detected: *.kiit.ac.in Active 8 certs 3 CAs: Google Trust Services, Sectigo Limited, eMudhra Technologies Limited
No explicit SANs found on wildcard certificates. Subdomains covered by this wildcard won't appear individually in CT logs (RFC 6962).
DNS probing and CNAME chain traversal were used to discover additional subdomains below.
Certificate Authority Diversity (6 CAs observed across CT log history)
Certificate Authority Certs First Issued Last Issued Status
Let's Encrypt 226 2026-04-28 2026-07-24 Active
Google Trust Services 6 2026-05-30 2026-07-24 Active
DigiCert Inc 4 2026-02-06 2026-06-18 Active
Amazon 2 2025-10-26 2026-05-20 Active
Sectigo Limited 2 2026-05-16 2026-05-16 Active
eMudhra Technologies Limited 2 2025-10-10 2025-10-10 Active
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
72aicc.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T17:39:47 Let's Encrypt
adm.digital.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — — — —
adm2.digital.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — — — —
advancedskills.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T10:39:38 Let's Encrypt
aespc.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T20:38:58 Let's Encrypt
alumni.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-05T12:06:13 Let's Encrypt
alumniregister.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — — — —
as2024.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T17:40:47 Let's Encrypt
asar.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-05-29T02:38:57 Let's Encrypt
assets.kiit.ac.in DNS Current — 8 2025-10-10 Google Trust Services, Sectigo Limited, eMudhra Technologies Limited
azura.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — — — —
backup.kiit.ac.in DNS Current — 8 2025-10-10 Google Trust Services, Sectigo Limited, eMudhra Technologies Limited
beta.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — — — —
biotech.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T17:26:52 Let's Encrypt
caas.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — — — —
ccg.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-01T01:48:16 Let's Encrypt
cdn.kiit.ac.in DNS Current — 8 2025-10-10 Google Trust Services, Sectigo Limited, eMudhra Technologies Limited
celcomm.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — — — —
centreofexcellence.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — — — —
cert.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-13T16:39:25 Let's Encrypt
chemical.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-11T07:26:41 Let's Encrypt
chimera.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-05T22:32:55 Let's Encrypt
civil.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-04T22:26:41 Let's Encrypt
climatecompass.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-06-30T07:39:07 Let's Encrypt
coe.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-06-16T05:57:55 Let's Encrypt
coir.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-04T22:41:18 Let's Encrypt
convocation.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-16T05:38:50 Let's Encrypt
core.digital.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-24T13:16:44 Let's Encrypt
courses.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T15:39:42 Let's Encrypt
crf.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 6 2026-06-17T05:08:11 Let's Encrypt
crfnew.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-16T15:03:26 Let's Encrypt
cse.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T23:26:40 Let's Encrypt
delivery.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 3 2026-07-24T14:41:02 Google Trust Services
digital.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T10:39:48 Let's Encrypt
dms-admin.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-06T01:25:42 Let's Encrypt
dms-uat-admin.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — — — —
dms-uat.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — — — —
dms.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-03T20:10:41 Let's Encrypt
educationforall.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T17:40:00 Let's Encrypt
elearning.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 5 2026-07-06T09:06:09 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
electrical.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-05T04:26:38 Let's Encrypt
electronics.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T17:26:40 Let's Encrypt
empepr.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — — — —
event.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-07T06:38:52 Let's Encrypt
events.kids.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T10:39:29 Let's Encrypt
events.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T15:39:52 Let's Encrypt
exam.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-11T11:39:04 Let's Encrypt
faculty.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-06-16T11:26:17 Let's Encrypt
fashion.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-06-16T03:58:56 Let's Encrypt
filedata.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-11T15:38:57 Let's Encrypt
film.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 14 2026-06-20T04:42:31 Let's Encrypt
finearts.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T12:38:56 Let's Encrypt
form.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-06-20T06:31:17 Let's Encrypt
forms.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T15:40:02 Let's Encrypt
ftp.kiit.ac.in DNS Current — 8 2025-10-10 Google Trust Services, Sectigo Limited, eMudhra Technologies Limited
git.kiit.ac.in DNS Current — 8 2025-10-10 Google Trust Services, Sectigo Limited, eMudhra Technologies Limited
hrcon.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-13T16:39:44 Let's Encrypt
iccacfd.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-11T11:39:40 Let's Encrypt
iccysy.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-05-31T08:39:20 Let's Encrypt
icdcit.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T17:41:00 Let's Encrypt
icetp.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-19T08:39:46 Let's Encrypt
icidds.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-11T11:39:49 Let's Encrypt
icidea.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-11T11:40:10 Let's Encrypt
icpee.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-11T06:39:37 Let's Encrypt
icrdsi.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T20:39:18 Let's Encrypt
ideathon.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T17:41:25 Let's Encrypt
ijfes.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T17:40:36 Let's Encrypt
img.kiit.ac.in DNS Current — 8 2025-10-10 Google Trust Services, Sectigo Limited, eMudhra Technologies Limited
international.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 1 2025-10-26T00:00:00 Amazon
iqac.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-16T01:31:14 Let's Encrypt
iro.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-22T08:40:28 Let's Encrypt
iti.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T12:39:07 Let's Encrypt
k1000.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-15T21:37:48 Let's Encrypt
k3hrms.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-18T13:01:57 Let's Encrypt
kaa.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 6 2026-06-16T06:04:40 Let's Encrypt
kaya.cse.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-06-30T15:04:48 Let's Encrypt
keystone.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-19T09:39:44 Let's Encrypt
kids.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-12T06:38:49 Let's Encrypt
kie.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-11T11:40:30 Let's Encrypt
kiitee.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-13T21:16:42 Let's Encrypt
kiitfm.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-09T03:38:55 Let's Encrypt
kiitle.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-27T04:50:42 Let's Encrypt
kiitx.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 3 2026-02-27T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
kims.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 16 2026-06-16T06:43:08 Let's Encrypt
kimshospital.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-11T11:39:30 Let's Encrypt
kins.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 6 2026-06-16T08:49:42 Let's Encrypt
kls.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T07:39:39 Let's Encrypt
klsmcs.kls.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-17T07:38:58 Let's Encrypt
koc.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T17:40:12 Let's Encrypt
konfluence.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T04:39:21 Let's Encrypt
konnexions.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-14T22:16:38 Let's Encrypt
kp.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T12:39:35 Let's Encrypt
kritarth.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-16T19:43:04 Let's Encrypt
kritiutsav.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-25T09:37:53 Let's Encrypt
krs.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-10T03:49:50 Let's Encrypt
ksac.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 10 2026-06-24T03:38:46 Let's Encrypt
ksae.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 6 2026-06-23T03:20:59 Let's Encrypt
ksams.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-14T17:38:50 Let's Encrypt
ksap.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T23:26:52 Let's Encrypt
ksas.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 8 2026-06-23T05:10:19 Let's Encrypt
ksca.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T17:27:04 Let's Encrypt
ksec.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-06-17T09:05:05 Let's Encrypt
ksht.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T19:39:33 Let's Encrypt
kslr.law.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-05-25T13:39:02 Let's Encrypt
ksls.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T12:39:54 Let's Encrypt
ksmc.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 8 2026-06-19T08:53:02 Let's Encrypt
ksod.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 10 2026-06-23T10:07:32 Let's Encrypt
ksoft.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 6 2026-06-16T03:56:52 Let's Encrypt
ksoh.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 6 2026-06-22T12:55:35 Let's Encrypt
ksol.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 10 2026-06-24T07:26:14 Let's Encrypt
ksp.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 8 2026-06-19T04:12:25 Let's Encrypt
ksph.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 12 2026-06-16T10:06:49 Let's Encrypt
kspt.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-11T01:39:24 Let's Encrypt
ksrm.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T15:40:21 Let's Encrypt
law.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-06-17T03:19:26 Let's Encrypt
library.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-06-22T05:00:01 Let's Encrypt
mail.kiit.ac.in DNS Current ghs.google.com 8 2025-10-10 Google Trust Services, Sectigo Limited, eMudhra Technologies Limited
masterchef.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-04T10:39:43 Let's Encrypt
mechanical.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-05-29T21:26:38 Let's Encrypt
medical.digital.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T10:25:39 Let's Encrypt
mgnt.digital.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T11:23:38 Let's Encrypt
mun.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-12T13:38:45 Let's Encrypt
ncc.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T15:40:12 Let's Encrypt
news.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-04T06:16:41 Let's Encrypt
newschool.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-11T08:39:04 Let's Encrypt
nisp.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-11T11:39:22 Let's Encrypt
nsida.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T15:40:42 Let's Encrypt
nss.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-11T11:39:13 Let's Encrypt
olympiads.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-11T01:39:14 Let's Encrypt
payment.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T20:39:27 Let's Encrypt
publicpolicy.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T12:40:02 Let's Encrypt
schools.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T15:39:33 Let's Encrypt
shephalee.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-25T02:38:52 Let's Encrypt
skills.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T17:39:38 Let's Encrypt
sld.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T12:39:43 Let's Encrypt
sldnew.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-14T03:38:56 Let's Encrypt
sot.digital.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-24T06:26:39 Let's Encrypt
souvenir.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-12T05:38:54 Let's Encrypt
sports.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-13T16:39:33 Let's Encrypt
staging.kiit.ac.in DNS Current — 8 2025-10-10 Google Trust Services, Sectigo Limited, eMudhra Technologies Limited
static.kiit.ac.in DNS Current — 8 2025-10-10 Google Trust Services, Sectigo Limited, eMudhra Technologies Limited
studyonline.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-05-20T00:00:00 Amazon
sustainability.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-23T03:40:49 Let's Encrypt
tec.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T15:40:30 Let's Encrypt
tnlc2024.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-07-12T03:39:28 Let's Encrypt
udghosh.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-08T07:47:42 Let's Encrypt
web.digital.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 4 2026-06-27T09:39:19 Let's Encrypt
web.kiit.ac.in DNS Current — 8 2025-10-10 Google Trust Services, Sectigo Limited, eMudhra Technologies Limited
web2.digital.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — — — —
www.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-10T14:16:46 Let's Encrypt
www.ksoft.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-16T03:56:52 Let's Encrypt
yoga.kiit.ac.in CT Log Current — 8 2026-06-22T03:38:11 Let's Encrypt
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
06 Raw records & reproducibility · L2–L3 Evidence & Verification Can another engineer reproduce every material claim? Analysis Confidence Intelligence Currency What changed Raw record diff Integrity seal Reproduce
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 56% Currency 73/100 Maturity gold
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
ICuAE Details
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
TXT 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
MX 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.
A 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.
NS 6 hours (21600s) 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for kiit.ac.in
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: Cloudflare — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS ken.ns.cloudflare.com
Serial 2410374557
Admin dns.cloudflare.com
Provider Cloudflare
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh10000s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry2400sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)1800s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s). Cloudflare's anycast architecture reduces the practical risk, but this value departs from the RFC recommendation.
RFC 1912 §2.2

Independent RFC compliance assessment for Cloudflare. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

SOA Expire below RFC 1912 recommendation RFC 1912 §2.2

Cloudflare sets SOA Expire to 604,800 seconds (7 days). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). This means secondary nameservers stop serving the zone sooner if the primary becomes unreachable. Cloudflare's position is that their anycast architecture makes traditional zone transfer semantics less relevant. SOA timers are not editable on Free, Pro, or Business plans.

Below RFC recommendation
Proxied record TTLs fixed at 300s RFC 2181 §5.2

Cloudflare overrides the zone administrator's TTL to 300 seconds for all proxied (orange-cloud) records. RFC 2181 §5.2 requires TTL uniformity within an RRset but does not mandate a specific value. As the authoritative server, Cloudflare is technically within its rights, but the administrator loses TTL control. This can affect ACME DNS-01 challenges and automation workflows that depend on rapid propagation.

Technically compliant, but overrides administrator intent
Non-standard SOA serial format RFC 1912 §2.2

RFC 1912 recommends YYYYMMDDNN format for SOA serial numbers (e.g., 2026022501). Cloudflare uses a proprietary serial number format that does not encode the date. RFC 1035 only requires the serial to increment on changes, so this is compliant with the mandatory standard but breaks the convention relied on by monitoring tools.

Compliant with RFC 1035, deviates from RFC 1912 convention
Negative cache TTL delays new records RFC 2308 §5

Cloudflare's SOA MINIMUM (negative cache TTL) is 1,800–3,600 seconds (30–60 minutes). This controls how long resolvers cache NXDOMAIN responses. Newly created DNS records — including ACME DNS-01 challenge TXT records for Let's Encrypt — may be invisible for up to 1 hour even after creation. This causes certificate issuance failures for automation tools like cert-manager and Traefik. Workaround: pre-create placeholder records before they're needed. This is RFC-compliant but aggressive compared to the 300–900 seconds common at other providers.

RFC-compliant, but causes real-world automation failures
Historical RFC 2181 §5.2 violation: TTL mismatch in CNAME RRsets RFC 2181 §5.2

In February 2022, Cloudflare's resolver (1.1.1.1) returned CNAME responses with mismatched TTLs within the same RRset — including cases where one TTL was zero and another was non-zero. RFC 2181 §5.2 explicitly states: 'the TTLs of all RRs in an RRSet must be the same.' systemd-resolved (used by Arch Linux, Ubuntu, Fedora, and most modern Linux distributions) correctly rejected these responses per the RFC, causing widespread DNS resolution failures. Cloudflare acknowledged the issue and it appears to have been fixed, but it demonstrated that Cloudflare's DNS infrastructure can deviate from RFC requirements in ways that break compliant resolver implementations.

Was a documented RFC violation — appears resolved
This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 3 / 3 records
104.26.2.120
104.26.2.120
104.26.3.120
172.67.75.3
172.67.75.3
104.26.3.120
AAAA Synchronized 3 / 3 records
2606:4700:20::681a:278
2606:4700:20::ac43:4b03
2606:4700:20::681a:378
2606:4700:20::681a:378
2606:4700:20::ac43:4b03
2606:4700:20::681a:278
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 5 / 5 records
1 aspmx.l.google.com.
1 aspmx.l.google.com.
10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com.
10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com.
10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com.
10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
ken.ns.cloudflare.com.
ken.ns.cloudflare.com.
zara.ns.cloudflare.com.
zara.ns.cloudflare.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ken.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2410374557 10000 2400 604800 1800
ken.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2410374557 10000 2400 604800 1800
TXT RFC 7208 §4 8 / 0 records
5A5197E3E9DE245C1B830002C552AD9D
—
Sendinblue-code:2c17d339363b2089218f777011663e84
—
brevo-code:7a88b5ea5ca2e41a988e7f1ca7379ad1
—
brevo-code:9c92ca55e793b6b55ab98582cac6b3ab
—
cisco-ci-domain-verification=656f2ada5297a66db09e57c438f0cbfe948e3f8f6ef542cb71f7874bd3e44d47
—
facebook-domain-verification=6z0xmb1v84ogc6nz48e56hakgeuwk1
—
google-site-verification=0Ot-j_0wX7odYUdlec5FPp_guOGtcO96MIJe06tJM5A
—
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

57aae5dd7826a4b3b37bd07d84d4c6df3875667de08da696af4259747728fa29679295df5ed6659dcf6d0e214c0c75528356a38f0154b7a920e3abba588afefe
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 27 Jul 2026, 06:29 UTC.
Internet Archive — Permanent Record Wayback Machine Can this analysis be independently verified? Archived

This analysis has been automatically submitted to the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, creating a tamper-evident, third-party-hosted snapshot of the DNS security posture at analysis time. This archived copy is independent of DNS Tool — it provides an independently verifiable record of the analysis at this point in time. Combined with the SHA-3-512 integrity hash, this creates a verifiable chain of evidence for domain security state.

View Archived Snapshot
Snapshot preserved at https://web.archive.org/web/20260727062907/https://dnstool.it-help.tech/analysis/18098/view/E
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3) Cross-Reference Verification

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-kiit.ac.in.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-kiit.ac.in.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-kiit.ac.in.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-kiit.ac.in.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/18098/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for kiit.ac.in. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short kiit.ac.in TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.kiit.ac.in TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.kiit.ac.in TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mail' RFC 6376 
dig +short mail._domainkey.kiit.ac.in TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' RFC 6376 
dig +short s1._domainkey.kiit.ac.in TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' RFC 6376 
dig +short s2._domainkey.kiit.ac.in TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer kiit.ac.in DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd kiit.ac.in A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for aspmx.l.google.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt3.aspmx.l.google.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt3.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt4.aspmx.l.google.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt4.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt1.aspmx.l.google.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt1.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt2.aspmx.l.google.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt2.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (aspmx.l.google.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect aspmx.l.google.com:25 -servername aspmx.l.google.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.kiit.ac.in TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.kiit.ac.in/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.kiit.ac.in TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.kiit.ac.in TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/kiit.ac.in' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (aspmx.l.google.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect aspmx.l.google.com:25 -servername aspmx.l.google.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.kiit.ac.in&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://kiit.ac.in/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://kiit.ac.in/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://kiit.ac.in/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.26.2.120 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 120.2.26.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 104.26.3.120 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 120.3.26.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine gold · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Gold 15673 runs
DKIM
Gold 15463 runs
DMARC
Gold 15654 runs
DANE/TLSA
Gold 15445 runs
DNSSEC
Gold 15632 runs
BIMI
Gold 15460 runs
MTA-STS
Gold 15481 runs
TLS-RPT
Gold 15496 runs
CAA
Gold 15493 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short kiit.ac.in TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.kiit.ac.in TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.kiit.ac.in TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mail' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mail._domainkey.kiit.ac.in TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s1._domainkey.kiit.ac.in TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s2._domainkey.kiit.ac.in TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer kiit.ac.in DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd kiit.ac.in A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for aspmx.l.google.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt3.aspmx.l.google.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt3.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt4.aspmx.l.google.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt4.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt1.aspmx.l.google.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt1.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt2.aspmx.l.google.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt2.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (aspmx.l.google.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect aspmx.l.google.com:25 -servername aspmx.l.google.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.kiit.ac.in TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.kiit.ac.in/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.kiit.ac.in TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.kiit.ac.in TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer kiit.ac.in CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/kiit.ac.in' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (aspmx.l.google.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect aspmx.l.google.com:25 -servername aspmx.l.google.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.kiit.ac.in&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://kiit.ac.in/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://kiit.ac.in/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://kiit.ac.in/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.26.2.120 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 120.2.26.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 104.26.3.120 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 120.3.26.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

0s

Running Real-Time Scan Telemetry

Most scans complete in less than one minute. Some may take longer.

Markers represent known resolver locations. Anycast routing selects the nearest node — exact routing is internal to each provider.

Pipeline nodes reflect live data as each analysis phase completes.

Telemetry Log 0 polls