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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 17 Jun 2026, 22:15 UTC
Duration 65.4s
Version v26.50.01
Integrity 8404e84f38518796305db07c48543a22d013a427e634aa5234273d9c303c85c59c7603ac8aa35952c10abe60cda05d054d561f8a8d6b380bc62375284c876bc6
Subject Domain
mailbox.org

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

mailbox.org
17 Jun 2026, 22:15 UTC · 65.4s ·v26.50.01 · SHA-3-512: 8404✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Archived ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
DNS Security & Trust Posture Risk Level: Low Risk
Confidence: MODERATE · 63/100
7 protocols configured, 2 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
What’s Wrong DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Jump To: BIMI DANE
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Configured
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Configured
SPF, DMARC (reject), DKIM (inferred via Unknown), MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, DNSSEC, CAA
Not Configured
BIMI, DANE
Priority Actions Achievable posture: Secure
Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

BIMI displays your verified brand logo next to your emails in supporting mail clients.
TypeTXT
Hostdefault._bimi.mailbox.org (BIMI default record)
Valuev=BIMI1; l=https://mailbox.org/brand/logo.svg
RFC 9495
Low Add DANE/TLSA Records

DNSSEC is active — adding TLSA records enables DANE, which cryptographically binds your mail server certificates to DNS and prevents certificate-based MITM attacks.

TLSA pins your mail server's TLS certificate in DNS, verified via DNSSEC.
TypeTLSA
Host_25._tcp.mail.yourdomain.com (TLSA record for primary MX — generate hash from your server certificate)
Value3 1 1 <certificate-sha256-hash>
RFC 7672
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
CPS-Datensysteme GmbH
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Footprint 2 SaaS Services
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Gold

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 ip4:213.203.238.0/25 ip4:195.10.208.0/24 ip4:91.198.250.0/24 ip4:80.241.56.0/21 ip6:2001:67c:2050::/48 mx ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC reject: the strongest compatible security stance, aligned with CISA and RFC guidance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Gold

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=r; aspf=r; pct=100; rua=mailto:abuse+arf@heinlein-support.de; rf=afrf; fo=1;
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Gold

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Not Discoverable

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Gold

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced
Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 7 mail server(s)

v=STSv1;id=20261606010000
Policy Details:
  • Mode: enforce
  • Max Age: 28 days (2419200 seconds)
  • MX Patterns: *.mailbox.org, mx1.mailbox.org, mx2.mailbox.org, mx3.mailbox.org, mx4.mailbox.org, mxtls1.mailbox.org, mxtls2.mailbox.org

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Gold

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1;rua=mailto:abuse@heinlein-support.de

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Could not verify
Unverified

Could not verify 1 of 1 external reporting domains — DNS lookup did not complete

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
heinlein-support.de Unverified —
Could not verify external reporting authorization for heinlein-support.de — the DNS lookup for mailbox.org._report._dmarc.heinlein-support.de did not complete. Treated as unverified, not a finding; re-run to confirm.

Why "unverified": The authorization TXT record could not be resolved this scan (a transient DNS failure, not a confirmed absence). We do not report it as missing, because asserting absence from a failed lookup would be a false finding. Re-run the scan to confirm.

Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 56% Currency 71/100 Maturity gold
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Stale
ICuAE Details
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
NS 5 minutes (300s) 1 day (86400s) high NS TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
MX 1643s 1 hour (3600s) medium MX TTL is below typical — observed 1643s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 274s 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 274s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA 85s 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 85s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA 15 minutes (900s) 1 hour (3600s) medium SOA TTL is below typical — observed 15 minutes (900s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
CAA 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high CAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for mailbox.org
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS ns.jpberlin.de
Serial 2014141425
Admin root.jpberlin.de
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh40000s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry7200sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)86400s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s).
RFC 1912 §2.2
Suggested Scanner Configuration Medium Confidence
Based on 4 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 38.1s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
DANE / TLSA Gold Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? Could Not Verify
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Inconclusive

DANE could not be verified — TLSA lookups for 5 of 5 MX hosts did not complete (transient resolver failure). This is not evidence that DANE is absent (RFC 6698 §1).

Indeterminate TLSA lookup for: mx3.mailbox.org, mx4.mailbox.org, mx1.mailbox.org — re-run before drawing a conclusion
DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses MTA-STS without DANE. MTA-STS provides transport security through HTTPS-based policy (RFC 8461), but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use. Adding DANE (RFC 7672) would provide cryptographic certificate pinning independent of certificate authorities.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4), but no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes without visual proof of authenticity

BIMI BIMI Spec Gold Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No valid BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Gold Success IODEF

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only DigiCert, swisssign.com, Let's Encrypt can issue certificates

Authorized CAs: DigiCert swisssign.com Let's Encrypt
0 issue "digicert.com"
0 issue "swisssign.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 iodef "mailto:security@heinlein-support.de"
0 iodef "mailto:mail@heinlein-support.de"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Yes RFC 9116

security.txt properly configured

Contact

mailto:ciso@heinlein-support.de

Expires

unparseable Valid

Encryption

https://keys.openpgp.org/vks/v1/by-fingerprint/4BD9CBE5E4A7E5B8EDC6EB3E22FCF26B0AF35944
PGP Signed de, en Canonical URL Hiring
Source: https://mailbox.org/.well-known/security.txt
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt View robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
Sources scanned (9)
  • https://mailbox.org/
  • https://mailbox.org/modules/contrib/minify_assets/src/async-css.js
  • https://mailbox.org/modules/contrib/minify_assets/src/async-css.js
  • https://mailbox.org/modules/contrib/minify_assets/src/async-css.js
  • https://mailbox.org/modules/contrib/minify_assets/src/async-css.js
  • https://mailbox.org/modules/contrib/minify_assets/src/async-css.js
  • https://mailbox.org/modules/contrib/minify_assets/src/async-css.js
  • https://mailbox.org/modules/contrib/minify_assets/src/async-css.js
  • https://mailbox.org/modules/contrib/minify_assets/src/async-css.js
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on dns3.cloudns.net — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: dns3.cloudns.net, ns2.jpberlin.de, dns4.cloudns.net, ns.jpberlin.de, ns3.jpberlin.de

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

DS Key TagDS AlgorithmDNSKEY Key TagDNSKEY Algorithm
38499 7 38499 7

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
dns3.cloudns.net No N/A N/A OK
dns4.cloudns.net No N/A N/A OK
ns.jpberlin.de No N/A N/A OK
ns2.jpberlin.de No N/A N/A OK
ns3.jpberlin.de No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 300s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

dns3.cloudns.net: 2.014141425e+09
dns4.cloudns.net: 2.014141425e+09
ns.jpberlin.de: 2.014141425e+09
ns2.jpberlin.de: 2.014141425e+09
ns3.jpberlin.de: 2.014141425e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 5 nameserver(s) for mailbox.org — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
dns4.cloudns.net 185.136.97.88 2a06:fb00:1::2:88 AS203391 2014141425
ns3.jpberlin.de 88.198.52.15 2a01:4f8:221:4381::1 AS24940
Hetzner Online GmbH 		2014141425
dns3.cloudns.net 185.136.96.88 2a06:fb00:1::1:88 AS203391 2014141425
ns.jpberlin.de 91.198.250.3 2001:67c:2050:1::53:1 AS199118 2014141425
ns2.jpberlin.de 194.150.191.56 None AS62313 2014141425
Unique ASNs
4
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
5
Diversity Score
Good

4 ASNs, 5 /24 prefixes across 5 nameservers

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue

DNSSEC operational notes: 1 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:
  • Single KSK with no CDS/CDNSKEY automation — manual rollover required

DNSKEY Inventory 3 Keys

RoleKey TagAlgorithmKey Size
ZSK 5719 RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 1080 bits
ZSK 48028 RSA/SHA-512 1080 bits
KSK 38499 RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 1056 bits

RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures

No RRSIG records found.

Denial of Existence none

No NSEC or NSEC3 records detected.

Rollover Readiness Not_ready

Multiple KSKs:
CDS Published:
CDNSKEY Published:
Automation: none
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery

Transport encryption enforced via DNS policy (2 signal(s))

Policy Assessment Primary
  • MTA-STS policy in enforce mode requires encrypted transport (RFC 8461)
  • TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures (RFC 8460)
Telemetry
TLS-RPT configured — domain receives reports about TLS delivery failures from sending mail servers (RFC 8460)
Reporting to: mailto:abuse@heinlein-support.de
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 0 unique ASN(s) across 2 IP address(es)

IPv4 Mappings:
185.97.174.35 → AS ()
IPv6 Mappings:
2001:67c:2050:b100:1:443:0:184 → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 2 services

Detected 2 SaaS verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Google google-site-verification=bCdtsEmyfsVIfzBgWZpEvCf3TeJgpw0f6x5miXGwakY
Have I Been Pwned have-i-been-pwned-verification=aa98600469e4f52f5b4c8e6952a0927d
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed; a validating resolver confirmed the cryptographic chain of trust via the AD flag (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Gold Signed Algorithm 3463 Adequate

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: Algorithm 3463 — not classified in RFC 8624
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are cryptographically authenticated and tamper-evident.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
mailbox.org. 3463 IN DS 38499 7 2 574F226E410BFBD86BDE1FD276EC9E88D778449A65BBDCF1F218E4D19F851312

NS Delegation Verified

5 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: dns3.cloudns.net dns4.cloudns.net ns.jpberlin.de ns2.jpberlin.de ns3.jpberlin.de
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (1 difference found)
Resolver Differences:
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [google-site-verification=bCdtsEmyfsVIfzBgWZpEvCf3TeJgpw0f6x5miXGwakY google-site-verification=ojrG-cXIWNDWMmRomplDCsZknBUmg2PO32SffP1Xy2E have-i-been-pwned-verification=aa98600469e4f52f5b4c8e6952a0927d mailru-verification: 0c2c482975b1fc2f swisssign-check=1tuXIQOBa4NZh2EIQI5nFD8fbJW2EvxB6W8rYhAoQ5]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.

HTTPS / SVCB Records RFC 9460 Success HTTPS

HTTPS records found

PriorityTargetALPNECHRaw
1 . http/1.1 No mailbox.org. 3600 IN HTTPS 1 . alpn="http/1.1"
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

185.97.174.35
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2001:67c:2050:b100:1:443:0:184
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 mx1.mailbox.org.
10 mx2.mailbox.org.
10 mx3.mailbox.org.
10 mx4.mailbox.org.
50 mx-n.mailbox.org.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

_caldavs._tcp: 10 1 443 dav.mailbox.org.
_carddavs._tcp: 10 1 443 dav.mailbox.org.
_xmpp-client._tcp: 0 5 5222 xmpp.mailbox.org.
_autodiscover._tcp: 0 0 443 auto.mailbox.org.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 1 IPv6) Mail: 5 servers Services: 4 endpoints
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 90 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
12 unique certificates 90 current 0 expired 4 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Wildcard certificate detected: *.mailbox.org Active 1 cert 1 CA:
No explicit SANs found on wildcard certificates. Subdomains covered by this wildcard won't appear individually in CT logs (RFC 6962).
DNS probing and CNAME chain traversal were used to discover additional subdomains below.
Certificate Authority Diversity (1 CA observed across CT log history)
Certificate Authority Certs First Issued Last Issued Status
12 2025-10-27 2026-06-10 Active
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
account.mailbox.org DNS Current keycloak.heinlein-support.de 1 2026-05-18 —
api.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
app-share.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
app.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
archive-staging.mailbox.org CT Log Current — 2 2026-06-05T10:39:57Z
archive.mailbox.org CT Log Current — 1 2025-12-19T00:00:00Z
auth.mailbox.org DNS Current traefik.mailbox.org 1 2026-05-18 —
auto.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
autoconfig.mailbox.org DNS Current auto.mailbox.org 1 2026-05-18 —
autodiscover.mailbox.org DNS Current auto.mailbox.org 1 2026-05-18 —
avatar.opentalk.mailbox.org CT Log Current — 2 2026-04-10T13:07:39Z
betatest.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
businessadmin.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
chat.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
conference.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
console.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
controller.opentalk-staging.mailbox.org CT Log Current — 1 2025-10-27T00:00:00Z
controller.opentalk.mailbox.org CT Log Current — 1 2026-04-28T23:28:44Z
converse.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
dav-bl.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
dav-sso.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
dav.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
db.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
dev2018.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
drupal.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
eas.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
erlkoenig.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
etherpad.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
evac-console.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
feedback.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
form.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
framadate.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
go2.mailbox.org CT Log Current go2.heinlein.group 1 2026-05-11T07:52:56Z
grafana.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
help.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
id4me.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
imap-bl.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
imap.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
jitsibridge-12.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
jitsibridge-13.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
jitsibridge-a10.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
jitsibridge-a11.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
kb.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
kong.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
lb1.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
lb2.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
lists.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
login.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
lotp.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
mailout01.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
mailout02.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
mailout21.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
mailout22.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
mailout41.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
mailout42.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
manage-sso.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
manage.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
meet.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
mout-b-105.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
mout-b-110.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
mout-b-112.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
mout-b-206.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
mout-b-210.mailbox.org CT Log Current — — — —
mx1.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
mx2.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
mx3.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
mx4.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
office.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
opentalk.mailbox.org CT Log Current — 1 2026-04-28T23:28:53Z
pop.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
pop3.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
prometheus.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
proxy.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
register.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
secure.mailbox.org CT Log Current — 1 2026-02-19T00:00:00Z
share.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
smtp.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
smtp1.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
smtp2.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
solr.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
stage.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
staging.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
status.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
support.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
test.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
upload.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
whiteboard.opentalk.mailbox.org CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-26T11:30:23Z
www.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
www1.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
www2.mailbox.org DNS Current — 1 2026-05-18 —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ Changes Detected: TXT Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
185.97.174.35
185.97.174.35
AAAA Synchronized 1 / 1 records
2001:67c:2050:b100:1:443:0:184
2001:67c:2050:b100:1:443:0:184
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 5 / 5 records
0 iodef "mailto:security@heinlein-support.de"
0 issue "digicert.com"
0 issue "swisssign.com"
0 issue "swisssign.com"
0 issue "digicert.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 iodef "mailto:mail@heinlein-support.de"
0 iodef "mailto:mail@heinlein-support.de"
0 iodef "mailto:security@heinlein-support.de"
DMARC _dmarc.mailbox.org RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=r; aspf=r; pct=100; rua=mailto:abuse+arf@heinlein-support.de; rf=afrf; fo=1;
v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=r; aspf=r; pct=100; rua=mailto:abuse+arf@heinlein-support.de; rf=afrf; fo=1;
MTA-STS _mta-sts.mailbox.org RFC 8461 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=STSv1;id=20261606010000
v=STSv1;id=20261606010000
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 5 / 5 records
10 mx1.mailbox.org.
10 mx4.mailbox.org.
10 mx2.mailbox.org.
10 mx3.mailbox.org.
10 mx3.mailbox.org.
10 mx2.mailbox.org.
10 mx4.mailbox.org.
50 mx-n.mailbox.org.
50 mx-n.mailbox.org.
10 mx1.mailbox.org.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 5 / 5 records
dns3.cloudns.net.
dns4.cloudns.net.
dns4.cloudns.net.
ns.jpberlin.de.
ns.jpberlin.de.
ns3.jpberlin.de.
ns2.jpberlin.de.
ns2.jpberlin.de.
ns3.jpberlin.de.
dns3.cloudns.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns.jpberlin.de. root.jpberlin.de. 2014141425 40000 7200 604800 86400
ns.jpberlin.de. root.jpberlin.de. 2014141425 40000 7200 604800 86400
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.mailbox.org RFC 8460 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=TLSRPTv1;rua=mailto:abuse@heinlein-support.de
v=TLSRPTv1;rua=mailto:abuse@heinlein-support.de
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Propagating 6 / 5 records
google-site-verification=bCdtsEmyfsVIfzBgWZpEvCf3TeJgpw0f6x5miXGwakY
google-site-verification=ojrG-cXIWNDWMmRomplDCsZknBUmg2PO32SffP1Xy2E
google-site-verification=ojrG-cXIWNDWMmRomplDCsZknBUmg2PO32SffP1Xy2E
have-i-been-pwned-verification=aa98600469e4f52f5b4c8e6952a0927d
have-i-been-pwned-verification=aa98600469e4f52f5b4c8e6952a0927d
mailru-verification: 0c2c482975b1fc2f
mailru-verification: 0c2c482975b1fc2f
swisssign-check=1tuXIQOBa4NZh2EIQI5nFD8fbJW2EvxB6W8rYhAoQ5
swisssign-check=1tuXIQOBa4NZh2EIQI5nFD8fbJW2EvxB6W8rYhAoQ5
google-site-verification=bCdtsEmyfsVIfzBgWZpEvCf3TeJgpw0f6x5miXGwakY
v=spf1 ip4:213.203.238.0/25 ip4:195.10.208.0/24 ip4:91.198.250.0/24 ip4:80.241.56.0/21 ip6:2001:67c:2050::/48 mx ~all
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

8404e84f38518796305db07c48543a22d013a427e634aa5234273d9c303c85c59c7603ac8aa35952c10abe60cda05d054d561f8a8d6b380bc62375284c876bc6
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 17 Jun 2026, 22:15 UTC.
Internet Archive — Permanent Record Wayback Machine Can this analysis be independently verified? Archived

This analysis has been automatically submitted to the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, creating a tamper-evident, third-party-hosted snapshot of the DNS security posture at analysis time. This archived copy is independent of DNS Tool — it provides an independently verifiable record of the analysis at this point in time. Combined with the SHA-3-512 integrity hash, this creates a verifiable chain of evidence for domain security state.

View Archived Snapshot
Snapshot preserved at https://web.archive.org/web/20260617221531/https://dnstool.it-help.tech/analysis/17890/view/E
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3) Cross-Reference Verification

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-mailbox.org.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-mailbox.org.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-mailbox.org.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-mailbox.org.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/17890/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for mailbox.org. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short mailbox.org TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.mailbox.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.mailbox.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.mailbox.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.mailbox.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.mailbox.org TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer mailbox.org DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd mailbox.org A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx1.mailbox.org RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx1.mailbox.org TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx2.mailbox.org RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx2.mailbox.org TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx3.mailbox.org RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx3.mailbox.org TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx4.mailbox.org RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx4.mailbox.org TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx-n.mailbox.org RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-n.mailbox.org TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx1.mailbox.org) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx1.mailbox.org:25 -servername mx1.mailbox.org 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.mailbox.org TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.mailbox.org/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.mailbox.org TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.mailbox.org TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/mailbox.org' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx1.mailbox.org) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx1.mailbox.org:25 -servername mx1.mailbox.org </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.mailbox.org&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://mailbox.org/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://mailbox.org/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://mailbox.org/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 185.97.174.35 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 35.174.97.185.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine gold · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Gold 15236 runs
DKIM
Gold 15013 runs
DMARC
Gold 15217 runs
DANE/TLSA
Gold 14995 runs
DNSSEC
Gold 15194 runs
BIMI
Gold 15010 runs
MTA-STS
Gold 15031 runs
TLS-RPT
Gold 15046 runs
CAA
Gold 15043 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short mailbox.org TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.mailbox.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.mailbox.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.mailbox.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.mailbox.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.mailbox.org TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer mailbox.org DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd mailbox.org A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx1.mailbox.org (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx1.mailbox.org TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx2.mailbox.org (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx2.mailbox.org TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx3.mailbox.org (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx3.mailbox.org TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx4.mailbox.org (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx4.mailbox.org TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx-n.mailbox.org (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-n.mailbox.org TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx1.mailbox.org) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx1.mailbox.org:25 -servername mx1.mailbox.org 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.mailbox.org TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.mailbox.org/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.mailbox.org TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.mailbox.org TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer mailbox.org CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/mailbox.org' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx1.mailbox.org) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx1.mailbox.org:25 -servername mx1.mailbox.org </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.mailbox.org&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://mailbox.org/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://mailbox.org/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://mailbox.org/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 185.97.174.35 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 35.174.97.185.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

0s

Running Real-Time Scan Telemetry

Most scans complete in less than one minute. Some may take longer.

Markers represent known resolver locations. Anycast routing selects the nearest node — exact routing is internal to each provider.

Pipeline nodes reflect live data as each analysis phase completes.

Telemetry Log 0 polls