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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 30 Apr 2026, 18:09 UTC
Duration 60.9s
Version v26.47.10
Integrity 8e8dacbb16780f249b5928c0215d6e3fe2e9725b8b32019e541e2e44ad8d87250ae48ea1da9597445cdee1985465bf9c5b7c151fa752f9cbb66a0d4220129043
Subject Domain
den9s.dk

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

den9s.dk
30 Apr 2026, 18:09 UTC · 60.9s ·v26.47.10 · SHA-3-512: 8e8d✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: High Risk
2 protocols configured, 7 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation 1 monitoring
Some DNS data may be stale or incomplete, limiting confidence. Resolver agreement and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 66% Currency 65/100 Maturity consistent
Limiting factor: Data currency is degraded — some records may be stale, incomplete, or inconsistent with authoritative sources
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Stale
ICuAE Details
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions
Enterprise Traffic Engineering Detected DNS-based Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB)

This domain uses short TTLs across 3 record types (A record at 60s), consistent with DNS-based traffic management (GSLB). Enterprises operating large anycast networks intentionally use short TTLs to enable rapid failover, geographic steering, and load distribution. This is a deliberate infrastructure choice, not a misconfiguration. RFC 1035 §3.2.1 permits any TTL value the zone administrator selects. The findings below reflect deviation from typical values for reference, not necessarily actionable recommendations for this class of infrastructure.

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from typical values. For domains using DNS-based traffic management, short TTLs are expected and intentional.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
TXT 1 minute (60s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 1 minute (60s) 1 day (86400s) high NS TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA 1 minute (60s) 1 hour (3600s) high SOA TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 1 minute (60s) 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • This domain runs short TTLs across multiple record types. Does it operate a global anycast network where DNS-based traffic steering justifies the query volume?
  • Are the short TTLs enabling active failover, geographic routing, or load distribution — or are they leftover from a migration that was never reverted?
  • Enterprise-grade DNS infrastructure (sub-5ms authoritative response times, globally distributed nameservers) absorbs short-TTL query volume. Would your authoritative DNS handle the same load?
Tune TTL for den9s.dk
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS ns1.dns.services
Serial 2026020765
Admin post.dns.services
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh10800s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry3600sFraction of Refresh
Expire1814400s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)7200s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
Publish a DMARC record starting with p=none and rua reporting
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Configured
SPF, DKIM (inferred via Unknown)
Not Configured
DMARC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, DNSSEC, CAA
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Add DMARC Reject for No-Mail Domain

This domain has no MX records and appears to be a website-only domain. A DMARC reject policy tells receiving mail servers to reject any email claiming to be from your domain.

Instructs receiving servers to reject all email from this domain — no legitimate mail is expected.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.den9s.dk
Valuev=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s;
RFC 7489
High Lock Down SPF for No-Mail Domain

This domain has no MX records and appears to be a website-only domain. Publishing a strict SPF record explicitly declares that no servers are authorized to send email, preventing attackers from spoofing your domain.

Explicitly declares no servers are authorized to send email from this domain.
TypeTXT
Hostden9s.dk
Valuev=spf1 -all
RFC 7208
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostden9s.dk (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
Unknown
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Limited Protection
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Likely SPF alone cannot prevent spoofing

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Consistent

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 mx ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Consistent

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? No policy published
Warning

No DMARC record found

RFC Stance: RFC 7489 is classified as Informational (not Standards Track). DMARC is a widely adopted industry practice but is not an IETF-mandated standard.
Operational Security: Without DMARC, receiving mail servers have no policy for handling SPF/DKIM failures. Spoofed messages may be delivered to recipients.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Consistent

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Not Discoverable

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Consistent

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Consistent

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Consistent Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No MX records available — DANE check skipped

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Yes No DMARC policy (RFC 7489) — attackers can send email appearing to be from this domain with no sender-authentication barrier

BIMI BIMI Spec Consistent Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Consistent Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

Could not fetch security.txt

Fetch error: SSL error
A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? Yes

AI governance signals observed

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? Yes
llms.txt found — domain provides structured context for LLMs View llms.txt
llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context) View llms-full.txt
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? No directives
No robots.txt found
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (2 items)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
llms_txt_found llms.txt file found providing structured LLM context info Observed
llms_full_txt_found llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context) info Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
Sources scanned (1)
  • http://den9s.dk/
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns2.dns.services — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Test inconclusive
Open Recursion Disabled Test inconclusive
Nameserver Identity Hidden Test inconclusive
Cache Snooping Protected Test inconclusive

Tested nameservers: ns2.dns.services, ns3.dns.services, ns1.dns.services

Delegation Consistency 2 Issues

Delegation consistency: 2 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • DS records missing at parent — DNSSEC chain of trust is broken
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Misaligned

DNSKEY records without matching DS:
Key Tag: 49979, Flags: 257 (KSK)

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns1.dns.services No N/A N/A OK
ns2.dns.services No N/A N/A OK
ns3.dns.services No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 60s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns1.dns.services: 2.026020765e+09
ns2.dns.services: 2.026020765e+09
ns3.dns.services: 2.026020765e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 3 nameserver(s) for den9s.dk — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns2.dns.services 62.69.152.37 2a00:1b18:2:3:3::2 AS47527 2026020765
ns3.dns.services 185.55.197.53 None AS60153 2026020765
ns1.dns.services 195.242.131.6 2001:67c:564:ffff::11 AS62121 2026020765
Unique ASNs
3
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
3
Diversity Score
Good

3 ASNs, 3 /24 prefixes across 3 nameservers

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 2 Issues

DNSSEC operational notes: 2 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:
  • Single KSK with no CDS/CDNSKEY automation — manual rollover required
  • No separate ZSK found — single-key signing scheme (CSK) detected

DNSKEY Inventory 1 Key

RoleKey TagAlgorithmKey Size
KSK 49979 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits

RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures

No RRSIG records found.

Denial of Existence NSEC

NSEC records expose zone contents via ordered names (zone walking). Consider NSEC3 for zone enumeration protection.

Rollover Readiness Not_ready

Multiple KSKs:
CDS Published:
CDNSKEY Published:
Automation: none
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

No MX records found

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — No MX records found for this domain
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 0 unique ASN(s) across 1 IP address(es)

IPv4 Mappings:
185.27.134.55 → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS services detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Consistent Unsigned

DNSSEC partially configured - DNSKEY exists but DS record missing at registrar

DNSKEY exists but DS record not published at registrar. Add DS record to complete chain of trust.

NS Delegation Verified

3 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1.dns.services ns2.dns.services ns3.dns.services
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

185.27.134.55
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

No MX records
Domain cannot receive email

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: Not configured Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 15 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
15 unique certificates 15 current 0 expired 2 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Certificate Authority Diversity (1 CA observed across CT log history)
Certificate Authority Certs First Issued Last Issued Status
Let's Encrypt 15 2026-02-08 2026-04-20 Active
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
a.den9s.dk CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-20T01:08:41 Let's Encrypt
b.den9s.dk CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-26T18:07:59 Let's Encrypt
c.den9s.dk CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-26T18:08:09 Let's Encrypt
ftp.den9s.dk DNS Current — — — —
s.den9s.dk CT Log Current — 4 2026-04-03T13:09:13 Let's Encrypt
s2.den9s.dk CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-07T19:07:50 Let's Encrypt
smarttube.den9s.dk CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-21T22:07:54 Let's Encrypt
speedtest.den9s.dk CT Log Current — 4 2026-04-20T11:49:41 Let's Encrypt
sql.den9s.dk DNS Current sql311.infinityfree.com — — —
su.den9s.dk CT Log Current — 2 2026-04-18T15:09:25 Let's Encrypt
syn.den9s.dk CT Log Current — 2 2026-04-04T13:08:59 Let's Encrypt
t.den9s.dk CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-26T17:08:12 Let's Encrypt
tv.den9s.dk CT Log Current — 1 2026-04-19T18:09:25 Let's Encrypt
webmail.den9s.dk CT Log Current — 4 2026-04-09T14:14:32 Let's Encrypt
www.den9s.dk DNS Current den9s.dk — — —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
185.27.134.55
185.27.134.55
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 3 / 3 records
ns1.dns.services.
ns3.dns.services.
ns2.dns.services.
ns2.dns.services.
ns3.dns.services.
ns1.dns.services.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns1.dns.services. post.dns.services. 2026020765 10800 3600 1814400 7200
ns1.dns.services. post.dns.services. 2026020765 10800 3600 1814400 7200
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=spf1 mx ~all
v=spf1 mx ~all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

8e8dacbb16780f249b5928c0215d6e3fe2e9725b8b32019e541e2e44ad8d87250ae48ea1da9597445cdee1985465bf9c5b7c151fa752f9cbb66a0d4220129043
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 30 Apr 2026, 18:09 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3) Cross-Reference Verification

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-den9s.dk.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-den9s.dk.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-den9s.dk.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-den9s.dk.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/17785/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for den9s.dk. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short den9s.dk TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.den9s.dk TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.den9s.dk TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.den9s.dk TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.den9s.dk TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.den9s.dk TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer den9s.dk DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd den9s.dk A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.den9s.dk TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.den9s.dk/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.den9s.dk TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.den9s.dk TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/den9s.dk' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.den9s.dk&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://den9s.dk/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://den9s.dk/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://den9s.dk/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 185.27.134.55 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 55.134.27.185.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine consistent · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Consistent 15106 runs
DKIM
Consistent 14883 runs
DMARC
Consistent 15087 runs
DANE/TLSA
Consistent 14865 runs
DNSSEC
Consistent 15064 runs
BIMI
Consistent 14880 runs
MTA-STS
Consistent 14901 runs
TLS-RPT
Consistent 14916 runs
CAA
Consistent 14913 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short den9s.dk TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.den9s.dk TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.den9s.dk TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.den9s.dk TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.den9s.dk TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.den9s.dk TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer den9s.dk DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd den9s.dk A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.den9s.dk TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.den9s.dk/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.den9s.dk TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.den9s.dk TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer den9s.dk CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/den9s.dk' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.den9s.dk&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://den9s.dk/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://den9s.dk/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://den9s.dk/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 185.27.134.55 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 55.134.27.185.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

0s

Running Real-Time Scan Telemetry

Most scans complete in less than one minute. Some may take longer.

Markers represent known resolver locations. Anycast routing selects the nearest node — exact routing is internal to each provider.

Pipeline nodes reflect live data as each analysis phase completes.

Telemetry Log 0 polls