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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 29 Apr 2026, 13:07 UTC
Duration 62.4s
Version v26.47.10
Integrity b9367e0e0330b5a0a7108b5406a5904b352ffcade6a8480e7dea60efa467a442097eb16e8f4fdcb85146d0c765e0eddb0be1e70773a825fa8ebfb6c1a4cd7b30
Subject Domain
google.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

google.com
29 Apr 2026, 13:07 UTC · 62.4s ·v26.47.10 · SHA-3-512: b936✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Google Workspace 6 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
6 protocols configured, 2 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Why we go beyond letter grades
1 monitoring
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 62% Currency 69/100 Maturity consistent
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Stale
ICuAE Details
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
TXT 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
CAA 18282s 1 hour (3600s) high CAA TTL is above typical — observed 18282s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance.
AAAA 70s 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 70s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
MX 46s 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is below typical — observed 46s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 6 hours (21600s) 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA 49s 1 hour (3600s) high SOA TTL is below typical — observed 49s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for google.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: Google Cloud DNS — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS ns1.google.com
Serial 906860327
Admin dns-admin.google.com
Provider Google Cloud DNS
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh900s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry900sFraction of Refresh
Expire1800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)60s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 30 minutes (1800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 30 minutes (1800s).
RFC 1912 §2.2
Refresh: SOA Refresh is 15 minutes (900s), below the RFC 1912 recommended minimum of 1,200 seconds.
RFC 1912 §2.2
Expire vs Refresh+Retry: If Expire is not greater than Refresh + Retry, secondary nameservers may stop serving the zone before they've had a chance to retry the primary.
RFC 1912 §2.2
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Configured
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Configured
SPF, DMARC (reject), DKIM (inferred via Google Workspace), MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, CAA
Not Configured
BIMI, DNSSEC
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Priority Actions Achievable posture: Secure
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

BIMI displays your verified brand logo next to your emails in supporting mail clients.
TypeTXT
Hostdefault._bimi.google.com (BIMI default record)
Valuev=BIMI1; l=https://google.com/brand/logo.svg
RFC 9495
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
MarkMonitor Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Google Workspace
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Google Cloud DNS
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Consistent

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC reject: the strongest compatible security stance, aligned with CISA and RFC guidance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Consistent

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Consistent

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Provider-managed
Provider Verified

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

Google Workspace detected as primary mail platform — DKIM signing is managed by the provider. The primary provider may use custom selectors not discoverable through standard checks.
Know your DKIM selector? Re-scan with a custom selector to verify.
RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Consistent

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced
Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 3 mail server(s)

v=STSv1; id=20210803T010101;
Policy Details:
  • Mode: enforce
  • Max Age: 1 days (86400 seconds)
  • MX Patterns: smtp.google.com, aspmx.l.google.com, *.aspmx.l.google.com

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Consistent

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1;rua=mailto:sts-reports@google.com
DANE / TLSA Consistent Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Google Workspace

Google Workspace supports DANE for outbound mail verification but does not publish TLSA records for its MX hosts.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS (already configured)

Note: Google Workspace does validate DANE/TLSA when sending mail to DANE-enabled recipients (outbound DANE).

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses MTA-STS — the best available option for Google Workspace. Since Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE, MTA-STS is the strongest transport security this domain can deploy. MTA-STS enforces TLS via HTTPS-based policy, protecting against downgrade attacks (RFC 8461).

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4), but no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes without visual proof of authenticity

BIMI BIMI Spec Consistent Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Consistent Success

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only pki.goog can issue certificates

Authorized CAs: pki.goog
0 issue "pki.goog"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Yes RFC 9116

security.txt properly configured

Contact

https://g.co/vulnz
mailto:security@google.com

Expires

unparseable Valid

Encryption

https://services.google.com/corporate/publickey.txt

Policy

https://g.co/vrp
Hiring Acknowledgments
Source: https://google.com/.well-known/security.txt
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt View robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns2.google.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Test inconclusive
Open Recursion Disabled Test inconclusive
Nameserver Identity Hidden Test inconclusive
Cache Snooping Protected Test inconclusive

Tested nameservers: ns2.google.com, ns1.google.com, ns4.google.com, ns3.google.com

Delegation Consistency 5 Issues

Delegation consistency: 5 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • In-bailiwick NS ns1.google.com has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
  • In-bailiwick NS ns2.google.com has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
  • In-bailiwick NS ns3.google.com has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
  • In-bailiwick NS ns4.google.com has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Incomplete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns1.google.com Missing
ns2.google.com Missing
ns3.google.com Missing
ns4.google.com Missing

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 345600s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns1.google.com: 9.06860327e+08
ns2.google.com: 9.06860327e+08
ns3.google.com: 9.06860327e+08
ns4.google.com: 9.06860327e+08
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for google.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns4.google.com 216.239.38.10 2001:4860:4802:38::a AS15169
Google LLC 		906860327
ns1.google.com 216.239.32.10 2001:4860:4802:32::a AS15169
Google LLC 		906860327
ns2.google.com 216.239.34.10 2001:4860:4802:34::a AS15169
Google LLC 		906860327
ns3.google.com 216.239.36.10 2001:4860:4802:36::a AS15169
Google LLC 		906860327
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
4
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 4 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery

Transport encryption enforced via DNS policy (3 signal(s))

Policy Assessment Primary
  • MTA-STS policy in enforce mode requires encrypted transport (RFC 8461)
  • TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures (RFC 8460)
  • Google Workspace enforces TLS 1.2+ with valid certificates on all inbound/outbound mail
Telemetry
TLS-RPT configured — domain receives reports about TLS delivery failures from sending mail servers (RFC 8460)
Reporting to: mailto:sts-reports@google.com
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 0 unique ASN(s) across 10 IP address(es)

IPv4 Mappings:
74.125.202.100 → AS ()
74.125.202.101 → AS ()
74.125.202.102 → AS ()
74.125.202.113 → AS ()
74.125.202.138 → AS ()
74.125.202.139 → AS ()
IPv6 Mappings:
2607:f8b0:4001:c0f::64 → AS ()
2607:f8b0:4001:c0f::66 → AS ()
2607:f8b0:4001:c0f::71 → AS ()
2607:f8b0:4001:c0f::8b → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 6 services

6 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Microsoft 365 MS=E4A68B9AB2BB9670BCE15412F62916164C0B20BB
Apple apple-domain-verification=30afIBcvSuDV2PLX
Cisco Umbrella cisco-ci-domain-verification=47c38bc8c4b74b7233e9053220c1bbe76bcc1cd33c7acf7acd3...
DocuSign docusign=05958488-4752-4ef2-95eb-aa7ba8a3bd0e
Facebook / Meta facebook-domain-verification=22rm551cu4k0ab0bxsw536tlds4h95
Google Workspace google-site-verification=4ibFUgB-wXLQ_S7vsXVomSTVamuOXBiVAzpR5IZ87D0
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Consistent Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Enterprise DNS Context: DNSSEC is the only standardized, DNS-verifiable mechanism that cryptographically authenticates responses between authoritative servers and resolvers (RFC 4033 §2, RFC 4035). Without it, DNS responses are technically vulnerable to in-transit tampering. Enterprise operators may employ compensating controls (anycast, DDoS mitigation, private peering, TSIG) — however, these do not provide DNS-layer data authentication to third-party resolvers and are not verifiable via DNS alone.
Visibility: DNS-only — network-layer compensating controls cannot be observed or verified through DNS queries. This assessment reflects what is provable from the DNS evidence available.

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1.google.com ns2.google.com ns3.google.com ns4.google.com
Managed DNS
All 4 nameservers hosted by Google Cloud DNS. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Google Cloud DNS
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (5 differences found)
Resolver Differences:
A: Google returned different results: [108.177.121.100 108.177.121.101 108.177.121.102 108.177.121.113 108.177.121.138 108.177.121.139]
A: Quad9 returned different results: [142.250.217.110]
A: OpenDNS returned different results: [74.125.202.100 74.125.202.101 74.125.202.102 74.125.202.113 74.125.202.138 74.125.202.139]
A: DNS4EU returned different results: [142.251.39.206]
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [MS=E4A68B9AB2BB9670BCE15412F62916164C0B20BB apple-domain-verification=30afIBcvSuDV2PLX docusign=05958488-4752-4ef2-95eb-aa7ba8a3bd0e docusign=1b0a6754-49b1-4db5-8540-d2c12664b289 facebook-domain-verification=22rm551cu4k0ab0bxsw536tlds4h95 onetrust-domain-verification=0d477fe608074e6f9c12bca7826035cc v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.

HTTPS / SVCB Records RFC 9460 Success HTTPS HTTP/3

HTTPS records found, HTTP/3 supported

PriorityTargetALPNECHRaw
1 . h2, h3 No google.com. 11769 IN HTTPS 1 . alpn="h2,h3"
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

74.125.202.100
74.125.202.101
74.125.202.102
74.125.202.113
74.125.202.138
74.125.202.139
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2607:f8b0:4001:c0f::64
2607:f8b0:4001:c0f::66
2607:f8b0:4001:c0f::71
2607:f8b0:4001:c0f::8b
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 smtp.google.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Google Workspace

SRVServices

_caldavs._tcp: 5 0 443 calendar.google.com.
_carddavs._tcp: 5 0 443 google.com.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (6 IPv4, 4 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: 2 endpoints
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? None found
How did we find these?

No subdomains found via Certificate Transparency logs, DNS probing, or CNAME chain traversal for this domain. No TLS certificates have been issued and no common service names resolve for subdomains of google.com.

Δ Changes Detected: A AAAA TXT Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Propagating 6 / 6 records
74.125.202.100
142.251.184.101
74.125.202.101
142.251.184.100
74.125.202.102
142.251.184.113
74.125.202.113
142.251.184.102
74.125.202.138
142.251.184.138
74.125.202.139
142.251.184.139
AAAA Propagating 4 / 4 records
2607:f8b0:4001:c0f::64
2607:f8b0:4001:c66::66
2607:f8b0:4001:c0f::66
2607:f8b0:4001:c66::65
2607:f8b0:4001:c0f::71
2607:f8b0:4001:c66::71
2607:f8b0:4001:c0f::8b
2607:f8b0:4001:c66::8a
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
0 issue "pki.goog"
0 issue "pki.goog"
DMARC _dmarc.google.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com
MTA-STS _mta-sts.google.com RFC 8461 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=STSv1; id=20210803T010101;
v=STSv1; id=20210803T010101;
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
10 smtp.google.com.
10 smtp.google.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
ns1.google.com.
ns4.google.com.
ns2.google.com.
ns1.google.com.
ns3.google.com.
ns3.google.com.
ns4.google.com.
ns2.google.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns1.google.com. dns-admin.google.com. 906860327 900 900 1800 60
ns1.google.com. dns-admin.google.com. 906860327 900 900 1800 60
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.google.com RFC 8460 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=TLSRPTv1;rua=mailto:sts-reports@google.com
v=TLSRPTv1;rua=mailto:sts-reports@google.com
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Propagating 13 / 7 records
MS=E4A68B9AB2BB9670BCE15412F62916164C0B20BB
globalsign-smime-dv=CDYX+XFHUw2wml6/Gb8+59BsH31KzUr6c1l2BPvqKX8=
apple-domain-verification=30afIBcvSuDV2PLX
MS=E4A68B9AB2BB9670BCE15412F62916164C0B20BB
cisco-ci-domain-verification=47c38bc8c4b74b7233e9053220c1bbe76bcc1cd33c7acf7acd36cd6a5332004b
docusign=05958488-4752-4ef2-95eb-aa7ba8a3bd0e
docusign=05958488-4752-4ef2-95eb-aa7ba8a3bd0e
onetrust-domain-verification=6d685f1d41a94696ad7ef771f68993e0
docusign=1b0a6754-49b1-4db5-8540-d2c12664b289
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
facebook-domain-verification=22rm551cu4k0ab0bxsw536tlds4h95
apple-domain-verification=30afIBcvSuDV2PLX
globalsign-smime-dv=CDYX+XFHUw2wml6/Gb8+59BsH31KzUr6c1l2BPvqKX8=
google-site-verification=4ibFUgB-wXLQ_S7vsXVomSTVamuOXBiVAzpR5IZ87D0
google-site-verification=4ibFUgB-wXLQ_S7vsXVomSTVamuOXBiVAzpR5IZ87D0
—
google-site-verification=TV9-DBe4R80X4v0M4U_bd_J9cpOJM0nikft0jAgjmsQ
—
google-site-verification=wD8N7i1JTNTkezJ49swvWW48f8_9xveREV4oB-0Hf5o
—
onetrust-domain-verification=0d477fe608074e6f9c12bca7826035cc
—
onetrust-domain-verification=6d685f1d41a94696ad7ef771f68993e0
—
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
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DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

b9367e0e0330b5a0a7108b5406a5904b352ffcade6a8480e7dea60efa467a442097eb16e8f4fdcb85146d0c765e0eddb0be1e70773a825fa8ebfb6c1a4cd7b30
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 29 Apr 2026, 13:07 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3) Cross-Reference Verification

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-google.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-google.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-google.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-google.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/16956/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for google.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer google.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer google.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer google.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer google.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer google.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short google.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.google.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.google.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.google.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.google.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.google.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer google.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer google.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd google.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for smtp.google.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.smtp.google.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (smtp.google.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect smtp.google.com:25 -servername smtp.google.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.google.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.google.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.google.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.google.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer google.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer google.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer google.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/google.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (smtp.google.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect smtp.google.com:25 -servername smtp.google.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.google.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://google.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://google.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://google.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 74.125.202.100 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 100.202.125.74.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 74.125.202.101 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 101.202.125.74.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine consistent · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Consistent 15106 runs
DKIM
Consistent 14883 runs
DMARC
Consistent 15087 runs
DANE/TLSA
Consistent 14865 runs
DNSSEC
Consistent 15064 runs
BIMI
Consistent 14880 runs
MTA-STS
Consistent 14901 runs
TLS-RPT
Consistent 14916 runs
CAA
Consistent 14913 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer google.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer google.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer google.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer google.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer google.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short google.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.google.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.google.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.google.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.google.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.google.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer google.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer google.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd google.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for smtp.google.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.smtp.google.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (smtp.google.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect smtp.google.com:25 -servername smtp.google.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.google.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.google.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.google.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.google.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer google.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer google.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer google.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/google.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (smtp.google.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect smtp.google.com:25 -servername smtp.google.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.google.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://google.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://google.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://google.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 74.125.202.100 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 100.202.125.74.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 74.125.202.101 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 101.202.125.74.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

0s

Running Real-Time Scan Telemetry

Most scans complete in less than one minute. Some may take longer.

Markers represent known resolver locations. Anycast routing selects the nearest node — exact routing is internal to each provider.

Pipeline nodes reflect live data as each analysis phase completes.

Telemetry Log 0 polls