Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
TLP:AMBER
Limited disclosure — recipients may share within their organization only
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
sjv.ro
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level:
High Risk
3 protocols configured, 6 not configured
Why we go beyond letter grades
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 66%
Currency 75/100
Maturity consistent
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Currentness Excellent
TTL Compliance Excellent
Completeness Degraded
Source Credibility Excellent
TTL Relevance Degraded
ICuAE Details
The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.
| Record Type | Observed TTL | Typical TTL | Severity | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NS | 10 minutes (600s) |
1 day (86400s) |
high | NS TTL is below typical — observed 10 minutes (600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| TXT | 10 minutes (600s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
medium | TXT TTL is below typical — observed 10 minutes (600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| A | 10 minutes (600s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
medium | A TTL is below typical — observed 10 minutes (600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| MX | 589s |
1 hour (3600s) |
medium | MX TTL is below typical — observed 589s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| SOA | 589s |
1 hour (3600s) |
medium | SOA TTL is below typical — observed 589s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
Big Picture Questions
- How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
- Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
- Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
- Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Primary NS
ns1.stsisp.ro
Serial
2026013001
Admin
root.stsisp.ro
Provider
Unknown
| Timer | Value | RFC 1912 Range |
|---|---|---|
| Refresh | 10800s | 1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs) |
| Retry | 3600s | Fraction of Refresh |
| Expire | 604800s | 1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days) |
| Minimum (Neg. Cache) | 86400s | 300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day) |
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s).
Suggested Scanner Configuration
High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
| Parameter | Current | Suggested | Severity | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| timeout_seconds | 5s |
8s |
low | Average scan duration is 61.6s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures. RFC 8767 |
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
Move DMARC policy from 'none' to 'quarantine' or 'reject', Enable DMARC aggregate reporting (rua) for authentication visibility
Monitoring
DMARC record has configuration warnings — review recommended
Configured
SPF, DMARC (with warnings), DKIM
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, DNSSEC, CAA
Priority Actions
6 total
Achievable posture: Low Risk
High
Upgrade DMARC from p=none
Your DMARC policy is monitor-only (p=none). Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing reports to actively prevent spoofing.
A quarantine or reject policy instructs receivers to take action on failing mail.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _dmarc.sjv.ro (DMARC policy record) |
| Value | v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@sjv.ro |
Medium
Add DMARC Aggregate Reporting
Add a rua= tag to receive aggregate DMARC reports. Without reporting, you cannot monitor authentication failures.
Aggregate reports show who is sending mail as your domain and whether it passes authentication.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _dmarc.sjv.ro (add to existing DMARC record) |
| Value | rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@sjv.ro |
Medium
Enable DNSSEC
DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.
Low
Add CAA Records
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.
CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | CAA |
| Host | sjv.ro (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider) |
| Value | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" |
Low
Add TLS-RPT Reporting
TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.
TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _smtp._tls.sjv.ro (SMTP TLS reporting record) |
| Value | v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@sjv.ro |
Low
Deploy MTA-STS
MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.
MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _mta-sts.sjv.ro (MTA-STS policy record) |
| Value | v=STSv1; id=sjv.ro |
Registrar (RDAP)
LIVE
Unknown
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)
SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Consistent
Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf?
Yes
Success
~all
2/10 lookups
SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 2/10 lookups
v=spf1 mx ip4:193.151.29.160/27 include:stsmail.ro ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs:
CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing),
CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation),
CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard.
Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made.
This domain has DMARC p=none (monitoring only). Enforcing quarantine or reject is recommended to gain real protection.
DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Consistent
Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined?
Monitoring only
Warning
p=none
DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement
v=DMARC1; p=none
Policy p=none provides no protection - spoofed emails reach inboxes
No aggregate reporting (rua) configured — you won't receive reports about authentication results and potential abuse
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct.
The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice.
RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace
pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.Related CVEs:
CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing),
CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)
DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Consistent
Are outbound emails cryptographically signed?
Yes — verified
Found
2048-bit
Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)
dkim._domainkey
2048-bit
Adequate
v=DKIM1; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAvRYCucrQvPt5jYuxCXNZpyPALuA4OPpvKQVSf16eINOl7rnHzfBMBAktCQXo2emVyxTaIv9niJuiorLBrmalzoXPzROGXxXYuwmQse26kcXM9xg73F4KOSj95aAeun6OzzBS4fokWE2fnfUEaYufc8hpyQaIE7imX1rqGgj/tetXEQVPZJ8pNNJ9/7YnvKLIRb5MIEURWBYJjHdzn9UZmysD/9z63lzEPcjH5mSnku34xosZf2Z7pl6HhWyxeXwtbD7Lu2uHXx1lLjC8wXfWZkERqDNbZHviAcld1nl0LEkcxqic3Y9KypWz7A5J2QaGvbr/D8iCUYBSutvwFT9jtQIDAQAB
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities:
DKIM
l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail),
weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3),
DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)