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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 24 Apr 2026, 14:25 UTC
Duration 60.6s
Version v26.47.06
Integrity eea1819dfa3e8aa17679b792d51c69705245320252d768ad73a21461a3bcc6ee3fcbf359b54126c2c8a0ce2f0787cade4cc651b7a7fd532b4d14e346d242b5ba
Subject Domain
patagonia.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

patagonia.com
24 Apr 2026, 14:25 UTC · 60.6s ·v26.47.06 · SHA-3-512: eea1✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Microsoft 365 7 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Medium Risk
3 protocols configured, 5 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC monitoring phase with aggregate reporting enabled Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation 1 monitoring
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 69% Currency 70/100 Maturity consistent
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Stale
ICuAE Details
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
SOA 6 hours (21600s) 1 hour (3600s) high SOA TTL is above typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance.
MX 6 hours (21600s) 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is above typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance.
NS 21589s 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 21589s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 883s 1 hour (3600s) medium A TTL is below typical — observed 883s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT 20965s 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is above typical — observed 20965s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for patagonia.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS ha1.markmonitor.zone
Serial 2026042001
Admin hostmaster.markmonitor.com
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh3600s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry600sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)172800s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s).
RFC 1912 §2.2
Minimum (Negative Cache TTL): SOA MINIMUM (negative cache TTL) is 2 days (172800s). High values cause NXDOMAIN responses to be cached for extended periods, delaying visibility of newly created records.
RFC 2308 §5
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 16 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 33.7s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
Move DMARC policy from 'none' to 'quarantine' or 'reject'
Monitoring
DMARC record has configuration warnings — review recommended
Configured
SPF, DMARC (with warnings), DKIM
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DNSSEC, CAA
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Upgrade DMARC from p=none

Your DMARC policy is monitor-only (p=none). Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing reports to actively prevent spoofing.

A quarantine or reject policy instructs receivers to take action on failing mail.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.patagonia.com (DMARC policy record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@patagonia.com
RFC 7489 §6.3
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostpatagonia.com (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.patagonia.com (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@patagonia.com
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.patagonia.com (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=patagonia.com
RFC 8461
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
MarkMonitor Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Microsoft 365
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Consistent

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 5/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 5/10 lookups

v=spf1 ip4:216.245.185.197/32 ip4:20.66.44.240/30 ip4:98.152.10.66/32 ip4:151.106.133.162/32 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:smp.ne.jp include:_spf2.patagonia.com include:_spf.salesforce.com a:production.na02.patagonia.demandware.net ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain has DMARC p=none (monitoring only). Enforcing quarantine or reject is recommended to gain real protection.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Consistent

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Monitoring only
Warning p=none

DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:Reports.DMARC@patagonia.com
Policy p=none provides no protection - spoofed emails reach inboxes
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
Advanced cryptographic posture detected. Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC monitoring phase with aggregate reporting enabled
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Consistent

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Weak Keys 2048-bit

Found 7 DKIM selector(s) with weak key(s) (1024-bit)

1024-bit key (weak, upgrade to 2048)
cm._domainkey Campaign Monitor 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDSB3+ZQdghZEdcTPmGw8yCAOPQ82W7ksJ0fwZk6ViD9dXQbalxPeXmy8cYsTuYsYwthnbXAHjM0s33w2WSy/844TiTt0ZXslk3TagoLA540DI/CBpxfGA9hrn8swr0Oo/POJutsyIMnWp5T1h7jMMSB+We/mS/GE0PbwsJ+RHvyQIDAQAB
dk._domainkey ActiveCampaign 1024-bit Weak
v=DKIM1;p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDhkOo8s6fh 9Byz1uy69tfQ6eUnzi/5P22EWccwI1PdmCpiyNwZcq3vOS2MHbVYB+ZY6wbBl AFym8EHbZY9OTlJ3+dzt8qTUNW5olkNVl4ecDv3XO2ML8q5sxQL+dwQU6U AQiDAAC/ZRWwiXHrSsr90pqH1Q0vhB7Kp6DHrWYJquQIDAQAB
s1._domainkey SendGrid 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA4w6eQpkTmhsfp38/LSv37t/lCm7DK+x1LBf6X74IYaKDfsPXRCQysrPmyEt9tOGZi9lPCNN3n+B1uUM4jF7aEzEcNkiCv6Cqm4LgDORmvotO2ornGTli0DI1N1+gQCxByh75U62jZ3RZpsK6+HOSflsGUoOhaeVcjLfpdSugmcKD5RK99nrCeBnFWIcpBawIejFmjT7Mre7IedqBnKKUZCyF6Xv8SM85iaGsueUn8dW5bVcYU1LjZUd2prlND90mzqstMY9Kwv2RilvF5D2XvYFpQFCeAY3nTDLDqSa9r1SP+lqw7zL+N20Hk0wRHA3YvJEhCEbP//yH4H8IMoQjlwIDAQAB
s2._domainkey SendGrid 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA2AVEC4/+vILMoJ54zYflkyJa9RtDOOyXXYE0PVzZL+X48Pj31eXkRWfpLd+jqh1sYAz3xdrcc6XrKmxfKr4AZBDZZVhTTLvq9m4bkIvWeZBFw4ndXni4nnAYZaTE9rPgbr3cIzZh3NpLTJ0WtGOBSzD0bvwrvqlNFbkCveQ1WQ84X2BfUtCnoG5FL4AWhFJ86KXE+2Yzw18+2zBQ5ZGLJ7g+S+2PHKZtV01AR8GlaBlKGMDpTWHlBUnSOYM4/NnXDY78xZcfcxbCv2PraMGMtZMWDKn1m2jjoK9LDi5+liVwBTu3d07lVHLX26I/L7gOIHifUklrbGYTjm5xvJIqdQIDAQAB
salesforce._domainkey Salesforce 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCDj51k4AQWhHDm9YBjdI9Y66zpvzz7ifmUA3iqXPE1HoRlJ3oMu73InITufD+uCGejRiAkgetIdujMKIqNgXij53QtnSCcvdJxmLa4J3D3QQAnYzYlXWk4Z/G6qD9UcuD3iswivktfQ7N1kEttQLmpZCAlJPW2B3M4TAepLnSw1wIDAQAB
selector1._domainkey Microsoft 365 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAtnqsiuBLZyHHxGlu1ZoTih1n4Wvq02btJjsY966VCJfv1OdH/OdIWmTWkoiOy92EcpLl1wXhiv4PHTCTYMMsFsfn3Qe6GiIrxf7wB9L0mOiH4jQ+z1Ii8bNDPX/+GYzgvjgtCxcrZP73gUCq4DsxiybPxm4mCxEGU2O8JN28pxEpEp5iyqKXGyc4i76nIixhGt/pF4O0OqvvP+dkC9/zAlbK+sFCnCShAHdXP+Ev8E5aE50P1Y/JBY+LqGABU3qcWi9xk7K85QinnhgoVWqU6laQEG1FXTrRqAuONvS5ngPEeNdxbASfG6Tr6Lm3iILUBeEav1eWv/CZIMD58bHrMQIDAQAB;
selector2._domainkey Microsoft 365 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCkiLh7tPnHrNAOx41/i46XvN3AGaOQNM7KlfTmQlkamFYE156r0XC0SJz6eJaFbALGd3XtlmTTpv0iGdCPG5JZ4HHG/z/aXwqxReJJeqbuc+fFNw5D1+LCwL8idzFdfRh1hwwCWNbRtV/xEIwCGRTB5ihrdiWEKdmUGgx48lj2XwIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Consistent

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Consistent

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Consistent Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Microsoft 365

Microsoft 365 does not support DANE for inbound mail. Microsoft uses its own certificate pinning mechanism.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial

BIMI BIMI Spec Consistent Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Consistent Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Partial RFC 9116

security.txt found but missing required fields

Contact

Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.3)

Expires

Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.5)
Source: https://patagonia.com/.well-known/security.txt
Missing required Contact field (RFC 9116 §2.5.3)
Missing required Expires field (RFC 9116 §2.5.5)
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? Yes

AI governance signals observed

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? Yes
llms.txt found — domain provides structured context for LLMs View llms.txt
llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context) View llms-full.txt
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt View robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (3 items)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
llms_txt_found llms.txt file found providing structured LLM context info Observed
llms_full_txt_found llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context) info Observed
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ha3.markmonitor.zone — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Test inconclusive
Open Recursion Disabled Test inconclusive
Nameserver Identity Hidden Test inconclusive
Cache Snooping Protected Test inconclusive

Tested nameservers: ha3.markmonitor.zone, ha1.markmonitor.zone, ha2.markmonitor.zone, ha4.markmonitor.zone

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ha1.markmonitor.zone No N/A N/A OK
ha2.markmonitor.zone No N/A N/A OK
ha3.markmonitor.zone No N/A N/A OK
ha4.markmonitor.zone No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ha1.markmonitor.zone: 2.026042001e+09
ha2.markmonitor.zone: 2.026042001e+09
ha3.markmonitor.zone: 2.026042001e+09
ha4.markmonitor.zone: 2.026042001e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for patagonia.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ha4.markmonitor.zone 162.219.55.170 2620:10a:80ec::6b AS394354 2026042001
ha2.markmonitor.zone 162.219.54.170 2620:10a:80eb::6b AS55195 2026042001
ha1.markmonitor.zone 192.174.68.5 2001:67c:1bc::5 AS1921 2026042001
ha3.markmonitor.zone 176.97.158.5 2001:67c:10b8::5 AS1921 207021 2026042001
Unique ASNs
4
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
4
Diversity Score
Good

4 ASNs, 4 /24 prefixes across 4 nameservers

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Transport security inferred from 1 signal(s) — no enforcement policy active

Policy Assessment Primary
  • Microsoft 365 enforces TLS 1.2+ with DANE (GA Oct 2024) and valid certificates
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 0 unique ASN(s) across 1 IP address(es)

IPv4 Mappings:
40.78.19.250 → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 7 services

7 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Adobe adobe-idp-site-verification=0403b2ad-0cb1-4991-b487-b92e323e129e
Amazon SES amazonses:P94B+64/P2d8fF0tQAeXPITg8kHAf8vDw1HoMwOZOE4=
Apple apple-domain-verification=OHJ6GgcjdZ25JLfv
Atlassian atlassian-domain-verification=cyLuEbYEHOc8WCVIwV2p5ISVxlZjUCttorsktv8Z9GKEb1GWTr...
DocuSign docusign=20df15bb-437d-44f9-a5e0-5d1f7f594008
Google Workspace google-site-verification=XbrRE3XS_PCqziGiZzEhm3ruW1q5rcVEwy4SdXzfGgc
Miro miro-verification=a7e809122016f767f3409426152e4c9c8db16e45
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Consistent Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ha1.markmonitor.zone ha2.markmonitor.zone ha3.markmonitor.zone ha4.markmonitor.zone
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (1 difference found)
Resolver Differences:
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [00DA2000006HiNo=1TBA200000008s1 klaviyo-site-verification=LCsiXc klaviyo-site-verification=QWPkcC klaviyo-site-verification=R5nahS klaviyo-site-verification=ResBLx klaviyo-site-verification=U9u3Ce klaviyo-site-verification=V9jUQR klaviyo-site-verification=X4VMXR klaviyo-site-verification=XUvmHz klaviyo-site-verification=XV67QX]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

40.78.19.250
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

20 patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Microsoft 365

SRVServices

_autodiscover._tcp: 0 0 443 autodiscover.outlook.com.
_sipfederationtls._tcp: 100 1 5061 sipfed.online.lync.com.
_sip._tls: 100 1 443 sipdir.online.lync.com.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: 3 endpoints
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 111 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
213 unique certificates 111 current 0 expired 4 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Wildcard certificate detected: *.patagonia.com Active 1 cert 1 CA: DigiCert Inc
No explicit SANs found on wildcard certificates. Subdomains covered by this wildcard won't appear individually in CT logs (RFC 6962).
DNS probing and CNAME chain traversal were used to discover additional subdomains below.
Certificate Authority Diversity (5 CAs observed across CT log history)
Certificate Authority Certs First Issued Last Issued Status
Let's Encrypt 127 2026-01-24 2026-04-20 Active
DigiCert Inc 36 2025-04-24 2026-04-06 Active
Google Trust Services 25 2026-01-31 2026-04-08 Active
Amazon 24 2025-04-21 2026-03-31 Active
Sectigo Limited 1 2025-10-02 2025-10-02 Active
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
actionworks-i18n.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-04-12T16:19:54 Let's Encrypt
actionworks.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-01T16:01:35 Let's Encrypt
actionworks2.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-01T16:01:35 Let's Encrypt
annapurna.eu.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-03-11T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
autodiscover.patagonia.com DNS Current autodiscover.outlook.com 1 2025-09-15 DigiCert Inc
b2b.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-03-01T02:13:11 Google Trust Services
b2bsales.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-03-01T13:32:08 Google Trust Services
b2bsalesjp.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-03-01T16:01:32 Google Trust Services
blog.patagonia.com DNS Current patagonia.wpengine.com 1 2025-09-15 DigiCert Inc
blueheart.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-16T23:02:05 Google Trust Services
brandportal.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 6 2025-11-21T00:00:00 Amazon
careers.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-04-03T18:04:41 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
cl.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 7 2026-03-28T18:45:33 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services
click.email-actionworks.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-03T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
click.email.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-11-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
click.eu-email.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-11-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
click.jp-email.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-11-04T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
climbing-blog-europe.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 6 2026-04-05T02:27:03 Let's Encrypt
climbing-blog-japan.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 5 2026-04-18T14:27:26 Let's Encrypt
climbing-blog.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 5 2026-04-18T14:27:02 Let's Encrypt
content.patagonia.com DNS Current content.patagonia.com.edgesuite.net 1 2025-09-15 DigiCert Inc
cortex.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 5 2026-02-04T00:00:00 Amazon
datadog.patagonia.com DNS Current — 1 2025-09-15 DigiCert Inc
dealer.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-12-08T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
dealers.eu.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-03-16T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
development-ca2.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 8 2026-04-01T04:13:36 Let's Encrypt
development-eu2.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 8 2026-04-01T10:31:49 Let's Encrypt
development-jp2.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 8 2026-04-01T09:26:17 Let's Encrypt
development-jp3.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 8 2026-04-01T02:24:23 Let's Encrypt
development-us2.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 8 2026-04-01T00:36:01 Let's Encrypt
ec.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 7 2026-03-28T12:14:33 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services
email.patagonia.com DNS Current — 1 2025-09-15 DigiCert Inc
eu-preferences.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-02-23T21:15:49 Google Trust Services
eu.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 15 2026-04-13T14:07:01 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
eu.thecleanestline.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-04T18:53:00 Let's Encrypt
feedback.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-29T00:56:12 Let's Encrypt
fieldtesting.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-03-09T07:24:11 Google Trust Services
fileportal.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-04-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
fly-fishing-blog-europe.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 6 2026-04-20T10:28:04 Let's Encrypt
fly-fishing-blog-japan.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 5 2026-04-18T15:27:07 Let's Encrypt
fly-fishing-blog.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 5 2026-04-20T15:28:00 Let's Encrypt
footprint.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 3 2025-12-16T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
github.patagonia.com DNS Current — 1 2025-09-15 DigiCert Inc
gtm-stg.eu.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-10T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
help.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-10-23T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
hhfer.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-03-03T01:30:45 Google Trust Services
image.email-actionworks.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-31T00:00:00 Amazon, DigiCert Inc
image.email.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-31T00:00:00 Amazon, DigiCert Inc
image.eu-email.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-31T00:00:00 Amazon, DigiCert Inc
image.jp-email.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-31T00:00:00 Amazon, DigiCert Inc
images-eu.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-02T00:00:00 Amazon
images-jp.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-02T00:00:00 Amazon
images-paw.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-11-10T00:00:00 Amazon
images.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 4 2025-12-16T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc, Amazon
learn.patagonia.com DNS Current — 1 2025-09-15 DigiCert Inc
learning.patagonia.com DNS Current — 1 2025-09-15 DigiCert Inc
matterhorn-stg.eu.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-03-25T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
matterhorn.eu.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-12-30T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
mdm.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-30T00:00:00 Amazon
media.patagonia.com DNS Current media.patagonia.com.edgesuite.net 1 2025-09-15 DigiCert Inc
pages.email.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-11-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
pages.eu-email.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-11-05T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
pages.jp-email.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-11-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
peaks.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 3 2025-05-04T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
plm.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-02-18T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
plmtest.stage.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-01-21T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
podcast.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-06-14T00:00:00 Amazon
production-ca2.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-01-25T04:07:08 Let's Encrypt
production-eu2.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-01-24T21:13:57 Let's Encrypt
production-jp2.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 16 2026-04-03T08:27:59 Let's Encrypt
production-us2.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-01-24T21:58:12 Let's Encrypt
pub.jp-email.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-11-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
qr.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-04T00:00:00 Amazon
rent.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-02-21T18:12:02 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services
returns.eu.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-22T03:41:38 Let's Encrypt
routing.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-22T00:00:00 Amazon
sftp.patagonia.com DNS Current — 1 2025-09-15 DigiCert Inc
snow-blog-europe.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 5 2026-04-18T16:27:41 Let's Encrypt
snow-blog-japan.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 6 2026-04-02T19:27:35 Let's Encrypt
snow-blog.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 6 2026-04-18T14:27:21 Let's Encrypt
staging-ca2.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 8 2026-03-25T06:23:22 Let's Encrypt
staging-eu2.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 8 2026-03-24T19:40:18 Let's Encrypt
staging-gb2.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-04-14T22:36:13 Let's Encrypt
staging-jp2.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 8 2026-03-24T19:58:21 Let's Encrypt
staging-us2.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 8 2026-03-25T15:54:16 Let's Encrypt
stores.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-10-02T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited
support.patagonia.com DNS Current — 1 2025-09-15 DigiCert Inc
surfing-blog-europe.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 6 2026-04-02T17:27:17 Let's Encrypt
surfing-blog-japan.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 6 2026-04-03T22:27:16 Let's Encrypt
surfing-blog.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 5 2026-04-18T14:27:31 Let's Encrypt
talent.patagonia.com DNS Current — 1 2025-09-15 DigiCert Inc
tcl-jp.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-01T12:56:20 Let's Encrypt
tcl.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-04T12:37:28 Let's Encrypt
test.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 3 2025-12-16T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
trail-running-blog-europe.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 5 2026-04-18T14:27:06 Let's Encrypt
trail-running-blog-japan.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 6 2026-04-20T10:28:04 Let's Encrypt
trail-running-blog.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 6 2026-04-18T14:27:26 Let's Encrypt
training.patagonia.com DNS Current — 1 2025-09-15 DigiCert Inc
trk.actionworks-email.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-12-10T00:00:00 Amazon
trk.emea.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-12-07T00:00:00 Amazon
trk.eu.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-11-30T00:00:00 Amazon
trk.na.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-11-30T00:00:00 Amazon
uslsvrt1.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-03-10T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
usrnowm1.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-03-10T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
view.email-actionworks.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-03T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
view.email.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-11-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
view.eu-email.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-11-05T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
view.jp-email.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-11-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
wornwear.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 9 2026-04-20T08:53:34 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services
wornwearjapan.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 5 2026-04-19T04:27:42 Let's Encrypt
www.patagonia.com CT Log Current — 11 2026-04-13T22:06:40 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
40.78.19.250
40.78.19.250
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.patagonia.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:Reports.DMARC@patagonia.com
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:Reports.DMARC@patagonia.com
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
20 patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
20 patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
ha1.markmonitor.zone.
ha1.markmonitor.zone.
ha2.markmonitor.zone.
ha2.markmonitor.zone.
ha3.markmonitor.zone.
ha3.markmonitor.zone.
ha4.markmonitor.zone.
ha4.markmonitor.zone.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ha1.markmonitor.zone. hostmaster.markmonitor.com. 2026042001 3600 600 604800 172800
ha1.markmonitor.zone. hostmaster.markmonitor.com. 2026042001 3600 600 604800 172800
TXT RFC 7208 §4 37 / 0 records
00DA2000006HiNo=1TBA200000008s1
—
7F963B3B6BE2948D2233525932D3E7C3689E4501A03B4AE07BCBC81EAAFFB738
—
B3DF4AD3288D954530FAB876854DF70F6122A5B761425F3D293CAC96B542D649
—
ZOOM_verify_xf_VaYK0Rfy8ID8E6-0muw
—
adobe-idp-site-verification=0403b2ad-0cb1-4991-b487-b92e323e129e
—
amazonses:P94B+64/P2d8fF0tQAeXPITg8kHAf8vDw1HoMwOZOE4=
—
anthropic-domain-verification-pm4nn7=vsmXBd5uUIsrveKTzRYvsb2mo
—
apple-domain-verification=OHJ6GgcjdZ25JLfv
—
apple-domain-verification=YLl9xBiufX0i4jlPJsgEdgK7dvx9TvdU-CTn_qrKYRg
—
atlassian-domain-verification=cyLuEbYEHOc8WCVIwV2p5ISVxlZjUCttorsktv8Z9GKEb1GWTrqdDODHPmd2BIDu
—
atlassian-sending-domain-verification=4ea43bbb-7f41-4ea2-a837-16f2f9ff296f
—
docker-verification=f9447b03-e765-480b-94bb-cc02c69643fe
—
docusign=20df15bb-437d-44f9-a5e0-5d1f7f594008
—
docusign=788c695d-756e-4fc5-b186-1bec3d365594
—
google-site-verification=XbrRE3XS_PCqziGiZzEhm3ruW1q5rcVEwy4SdXzfGgc
—
google-site-verification=p7j6A-QzLTnzczXccmS_-yvSi2pKrWeIqz7oh-ayAAI
—
jamf-site-verification=sPOX_ylYYYapxx2D-wDzoQ
—
klaviyo-site-verification=LCsiXc
—
klaviyo-site-verification=QWPkcC
—
klaviyo-site-verification=R5nahS
—
klaviyo-site-verification=ResBLx
—
klaviyo-site-verification=U9u3Ce
—
klaviyo-site-verification=V9jUQR
—
klaviyo-site-verification=X4VMXR
—
klaviyo-site-verification=XUvmHz
—
klaviyo-site-verification=XV67QX
—
klaviyo-site-verification=XeUwAB
—
klaviyo-site-verification=YgU9me
—
lDH5Pvmg5oXzMZxCUX4hb/gjh0RQbRHv79o1KmMSgtFMct4C7NBmEZn2QO+H7Lp2o7TqQgTWsaCq1pJgji4vTw==
—
logmein-verification-code=6695d73b-237d-450c-9409-25e3d8c72228
—
mandrill_verify.nt4SdjH_hJnqMhIReoaR4A
—
miro-verification=a7e809122016f767f3409426152e4c9c8db16e45
—
nice.demo-9efb53b34600019@incontactemail.com
—
openai-domain-verification=dv-j8yN7YahiONx3eno1ZF1iwOs
—
patrootrediectprod.azurewebsites.net
—
shopify-verification-code=cvhEj0HmL80vFCoN1OJYqBOpwANKAg
—
v=spf1 ip4:216.245.185.197/32 ip4:20.66.44.240/30 ip4:98.152.10.66/32 ip4:151.106.133.162/32 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:smp.ne.jp include:_spf2.patagonia.com include:_spf.salesforce.com a:production.na02.patagonia.demandware.net ~all
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
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DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

eea1819dfa3e8aa17679b792d51c69705245320252d768ad73a21461a3bcc6ee3fcbf359b54126c2c8a0ce2f0787cade4cc651b7a7fd532b4d14e346d242b5ba
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 24 Apr 2026, 14:25 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3) Cross-Reference Verification

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-patagonia.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-patagonia.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-patagonia.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-patagonia.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/15886/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for patagonia.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short patagonia.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.patagonia.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'cm' RFC 6376 
dig +short cm._domainkey.patagonia.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dk' RFC 6376 
dig +short dk._domainkey.patagonia.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' RFC 6376 
dig +short s1._domainkey.patagonia.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' RFC 6376 
dig +short s2._domainkey.patagonia.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'salesforce' RFC 6376 
dig +short salesforce._domainkey.patagonia.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.patagonia.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.patagonia.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer patagonia.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd patagonia.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.patagonia.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.patagonia.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.patagonia.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.patagonia.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/patagonia.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.patagonia.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://patagonia.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://patagonia.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://patagonia.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 40.78.19.250 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 250.19.78.40.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine consistent · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Consistent 15107 runs
DKIM
Consistent 14884 runs
DMARC
Consistent 15088 runs
DANE/TLSA
Consistent 14866 runs
DNSSEC
Consistent 15065 runs
BIMI
Consistent 14881 runs
MTA-STS
Consistent 14902 runs
TLS-RPT
Consistent 14917 runs
CAA
Consistent 14914 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short patagonia.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.patagonia.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'cm' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short cm._domainkey.patagonia.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dk' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short dk._domainkey.patagonia.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s1._domainkey.patagonia.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s2._domainkey.patagonia.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'salesforce' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short salesforce._domainkey.patagonia.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.patagonia.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.patagonia.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer patagonia.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd patagonia.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.patagonia.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.patagonia.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.patagonia.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.patagonia.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer patagonia.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/patagonia.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername patagonia-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.patagonia.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://patagonia.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://patagonia.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://patagonia.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 40.78.19.250 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 250.19.78.40.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

0s

Running Real-Time Scan Telemetry

Most scans complete in less than one minute. Some may take longer.

Markers represent known resolver locations. Anycast routing selects the nearest node — exact routing is internal to each provider.

Pipeline nodes reflect live data as each analysis phase completes.

Telemetry Log 0 polls