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Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

caolt.ro High Risk
24 Apr 2026, 08:02 UTC · 62.7s ·v26.47.06 · SHA-3-512: 421c✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Archived ·Cross-Referenced
Engineer workspace · evidence preserved

Read the verdict first. Descend only as far as the incident requires.

This report keeps the complete technical record while separating decision, interpretation, evidence, and raw reproduction into a stable disclosure gradient.

L0PostureL1InterpretationL2EvidenceL3Raw & reproduce
Hurry path
KEYBOARD !1@2#3$4%5^6 jump to that section · esc back to the verdict
Sorted by severity — worst first
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Monitoring
Not Setup
DANE
Not Deployed
TRACE L0 · DNS Tampering — Unsigned L1 · 02 · Domain Security · DNSSEC L3 · Reproduce commands
Not Configured
SPF, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, DNSSEC, CAA
Recommended
Publish an SPF record to authorize legitimate mail senders, Add DMARC aggregate reporting (rua) for visibility into email authentication
Configured
DMARC (reject), DKIM
Priority Actions 7 total Achievable posture: Moderate Risk
Critical Publish SPF Record

Add an SPF record to authorize mail servers for this domain.

Medium Add DMARC Aggregate Reporting

Add a rua= tag to receive aggregate DMARC reports. Without reporting, you cannot monitor authentication failures.

Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
Unknown
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Limited Protection
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Footprint
01 Identity & policy · L1 Email Security Can this domain be impersonated by email? SPF DMARC DKIM MTA-STS TLS-RPT MX & Routing Partial
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Partially DMARC present but no SPF

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Gold

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Misconfigured
Error

Multiple SPF records found - this causes SPF to fail (RFC 7208)

v=spf1 include:amazonses.com ~all
v=spf1 include:relay.romarg.net -all
Multiple SPF records (hard fail)
RFC 7208 Deviation: This SPF record deviates from RFC 7208 requirements.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Gold

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; adkim=s; aspf=s
Alignment: SPF strict DKIM strict
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
No aggregate reporting (rua) configured — you won't receive reports about authentication results and potential abuse
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Gold

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

default._domainkey 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAzuJDBCCH8gDxShrluAVh6soiiUKAwzqdy0YnUc4CkEPB9ZblkHWfF0b8+VzXtkqo0u0cwYEFZd+C8/5w4SMZVt2LJDGKvQ36TGBIELasrcM1iwtsvcy0G+pXfzSvsABmiyA4tGEII2oFfhVt8iV5Gsne7B3iqjSioKWVmljL1/dBXARgg19I3BJQBSNAbeN1kFPYf65Szd4WkAhnu3dsosPZnFHVzCWRwdnvhJHUWYIc2Wk0E/rMKns6SZRupyqgCIy+AyP1txiTiYNL2Os86fYpmK2QgWPTxN2w4dwvZNytPzXnWoLcTKAD8TUiXJqYpIgPuH+0udwZ+heluzQtVQIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Gold

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented