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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 20 Apr 2026, 07:30 UTC
Duration 62.6s
Version v26.46.24
Integrity d8f1e85b82398453b594e510f66615011b5be55f95c584a4ae0bb6d300cb9278484663b73823bb4554a2f98ed5654b2296ae818c59cd29e0a01f102fa1e4521b
Subject Domain
leidos.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

leidos.com
20 Apr 2026, 07:30 UTC · 62.6s ·v26.46.24 · SHA-3-512: d8f1✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Proofpoint 9 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
3 protocols configured, 5 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Why we go beyond letter grades
1 monitoring
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 67% Currency 74/100 Maturity consistent
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
ICuAE Details
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
A 4 minutes (240s) 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 4 minutes (240s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 6 hours (21600s) 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA 4 hours (14400s) 1 hour (3600s) medium SOA TTL is above typical — observed 4 hours (14400s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance.
MX 10 minutes (600s) 1 hour (3600s) medium MX TTL is below typical — observed 10 minutes (600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT 4 hours (14400s) 1 hour (3600s) medium TXT TTL is above typical — observed 4 hours (14400s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for leidos.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS hidden.leidos.com
Serial 715567526
Admin domains.leidos.com
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh14400s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry3600sFraction of Refresh
Expire1209600s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)3600s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 10 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 37.2s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (reject), DKIM (inferred via Proofpoint)
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DNSSEC, CAA
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Secure
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

BIMI displays your verified brand logo next to your emails in supporting mail clients.
TypeTXT
Hostdefault._bimi.leidos.com (BIMI default record)
Valuev=BIMI1; l=https://leidos.com/brand/logo.svg
RFC 9495
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostleidos.com (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.leidos.com (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@leidos.com
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.leidos.com (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=leidos.com
RFC 8461
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
CSC Corporate Domains, Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Proofpoint
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Consistent

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 3/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 3/10 lookups

v=spf1 ip4:149.8.242.0/24 ip4:149.8.144.0/24 ip4:149.8.243.0/27 ip4:149.8.132.0/25 ip4:140.162.124.0/25 ip4:185.177.65.0/24 ip4:185.177.67.0/24 ip4:103.23.218.200/32 ip4:216.46.126.4/32 ip4:216.46.107.32/32 ip4:65.5.104.15/32 ip4:216.169.98.195/32 ip4:54.152.91.75/32 include:spf-00336402.gpphosted.com include:mktomail.com include:46166704.spf04.hubspotemail.net -all
RFC 7489: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Consistent

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; sp=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@leidos.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@leidos.com
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed sp=reject
Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Consistent

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Third-party only
Third-Party Only 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 8 selector(s) (2048-bit) but none for primary mail platform (Proofpoint)

DKIM verified for Campaign Monitor, HubSpot, MailChimp, SendGrid only — no DKIM found for primary mail platform (Proofpoint). The primary provider may use custom selectors not discoverable through standard checks. Try re-scanning with a custom DKIM selector if you know yours.
Know your DKIM selector? Re-scan with a custom selector to verify.
DKIM key management delegated — _domainkey.leidos.com NS records point to an external service (ns2.leidos.com, ns3.leidos.com, ns1.leidos.com). DKIM selectors are dynamically managed and may include keys for services beyond what static scanning discovers.
cm._domainkey Campaign Monitor 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDLRWjbXt2P3L1+kpcNFOOBX8zferkyRoiau1mcuNWWhmE/FgQPE0WrnFHIqE+Ld3VROkFKo4jv58Ae+jjOhDszltcGkbO5NNG31W+q2EQkKi/lnCQo+Pa5iVdUiKPP3GOHR1vBsBJec/ArKROwLfEIs5icy8FuH3kgQ6yZfd03iQIDAQAB
hs1._domainkey HubSpot 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa;t=s;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAqEAIK57SrSBy4u6A29+q46U7yEwKxk0A0OGCYEqN7VGoT0b0b9WFXxhSLZAjXEEXrUatMNlCB6CYECnQFUVXlxsncZ8QLF6lmDr7wDLAWVambO8TD5JrKCsjt386TRC7Zti1FggaHWPUfzvZft3s5W7s2Wuv0ouC9oPVbtuemCnngyKDNT8vs6HWFTjoFTwZSEl1aOwSrK5ndbl2oCUwyh5gIzWE2Gux6OhP/JXXDuLbsfPtpyqBNeKDymMKZhmDpIAp0xxQUvnI1J32GEY5CAVrJxmlNQnWDJ66vlu5lTAYr4aCWmUzdZMt95QpcaRwtNwEdpoONmZ62YXzJ6MIDwIDAQAB
hs2._domainkey HubSpot 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa;t=s;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA9XAV54iyZ4nTEH3bMaJCaJHv3MRa+FgcFOJhoqigEWB5CUO5tYS2/X804xRMTP2mw7NWVsTXIyFXhTityfEByDKJkACJa+JovxIfDNn5UGj7PhJJLLQp7fIYBWAAoz2PLwQUm7LlT2+FT7hYCSSIM0FzU5bK4DZGY0nlm4xVt6HYzKxTzp/8PKdEwmPnYwxa5KircV+zmS/AlAhw8nfYFeCYQNp/ZK8JVouiRklm4RvsyPhYlXJjgKXDt5GXIlFiNu0s6pOE37UsqX7AnuLrFSpCnvEr6i2nHarEFJkH4Ymeu0qitEgVCiwgQrqOHNMCvN4o8Xa9w9By3uKA9xidHQIDAQAB
k2._domainkey MailChimp 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAv2aC2KjGKLOwTweBY5A9RpjsxaBXR9r7OAU6U8/zn92ivImI75naUujWbItRI/QmL1jy5PWGqLwoUA0b90ObWaLDc+i9MtTNmGeWO009hr20fIxhGg6XBT2kjZ1DTThopSe1nAndsupmcBwlQ5Q6LJ+ZAxLcujnPIxM0ZBLmgpkv8u6RfY4eFP8OLvdAW3oSuB0DyLDigQX4Sj8wBO4YIdQH6AAmBeOsidsKAFNFUCpc3vCxtBDR12U+cBg724l3sBkMQ8evnz6idnqxq9QAVYh8k4kJ+RP+6cqTdy7LjIm8xY/bQNpQIpGUAuDo2DjLcCDun9DAI4Q/3z+Q0o9QuQIDAQAB;
k3._domainkey MailChimp 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAsYGiMSn7fsUqSvfSX40x9R1OlRtbNiCY80lHRIlcKx3XDIR7257aUx+q9CSIARdfTL6KCuLGNFx5g9TgVr6png4ajcieSQGtOehBgxnkDN8aAA5TX0FmFrcefJU0JoxLOF09EKgXxhSSHCk/ekVb0PXSboHXoZ9+EI404F1qhcwXXIgHXTaUthHTut2P6BBZhIXIgvDe/w49GchR7MRJqjNb7neEBbYHbgWuBTvvHCg7Gy6m6n9krYK+ROWq3dVvXy9plAGK3ygM+HtjIiMt7arRGMOF0WgDTz7YdN9BGpt6BvXxLnjiQcgS5T9n+cIyPZgiWzDMXNlaEEdKTEKxrwIDAQAB;
s1._domainkey SendGrid 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAt8nhPcYK//bgsiFTWdTinEnGny8Z6nOaDb9ul6ie/LYZDUol0LB7wC5ChGZjIDxv5CNQvM+Al08p7gFfrudyDGz/wDaSd8deKEUNcRcL2DAc38TBpGTE2ZPV80xcm6GXhK45htNalHj0Wwx3OnZqWte23ZejhdaAmAaqsDPFvA6j5/wEuRDGve40co+4yW5S13sndH2zds7hRP8yJ4Ap1rQ+1gcYEymKmIF9uICD1sk3k1c3pgSCuXIAhvl1IG8ARu+4Wt2R2vThp3+F0KXi5yU3z/uV9w86zFPnAJMoGAsmg8mCBNofZesnrsQMPE4rlwpO8nL52gy6u3jkpGM/xQIDAQAB
s2._domainkey SendGrid 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDG0pL6uB5KZ/qGEut1YoVIafNlsRiARLQVJT3I6PuxbLGxazWp5IU2HJme0cd1TXkz9Lwk9YXfdrtIuLTVuLvcS9jLsY6HZ9kKRVJyPUc4MALjLoyAPFehK9HcsBa4nQddKjMTNXghmidqpFYjc8HXfUwQLhnfFVuSzFwF+4dNkQIDAQAB
smtpapi._domainkey SendGrid 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDPtW5iwpXVPiH5FzJ7Nrl8USzuY9zqqzjE0D1r04xDN6qwziDnmgcFNNfMewVKN2D1O+2J9N14hRprzByFwfQW76yojh54Xu3uSbQ3JP0A7k8o8GutRF8zbFUA8n0ZH2y0cIEjMliXY4W4LwPA7m4q0ObmvSjhd63O9d8z1XkUBwIDAQAB
RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Consistent

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Consistent

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Consistent Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Proofpoint does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Proofpoint

Proofpoint is a security gateway with shared MX infrastructure. It does not publish per-customer TLSA records.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Proofpoint does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors

BIMI BIMI Spec Consistent Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Consistent Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt View robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns1.leidos.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: ns1.leidos.com, ns2.leidos.com, ns3.leidos.com

Delegation Consistency 4 Issues

Delegation consistency: 4 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • In-bailiwick NS ns1.leidos.com has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
  • In-bailiwick NS ns2.leidos.com has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
  • In-bailiwick NS ns3.leidos.com has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Incomplete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns1.leidos.com Missing
ns2.leidos.com Missing
ns3.leidos.com Missing

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns1.leidos.com: 7.15567526e+08
ns2.leidos.com: 7.15567526e+08
ns3.leidos.com: 7.15567526e+08
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 3 nameserver(s) for leidos.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns3.leidos.com 140.162.65.4 2620:11c:88fc:1810::4 AS19 715567526
ns2.leidos.com 205.153.240.4 2620:11c:80fc:3816::4 AS19 715567526
ns1.leidos.com 204.115.183.132 2620:11c:80fc:3814::132 AS19 715567526
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
3
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 3 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Transport security inferred from 1 signal(s) — no enforcement policy active

Policy Assessment Primary
  • Proofpoint enforces TLS on managed mail transport
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 0 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

IPv4 Mappings:
104.18.24.52 → AS ()
104.18.25.52 → AS ()
IPv6 Mappings:
2606:4700::6812:1834 → AS ()
2606:4700::6812:1934 → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 9 services

9 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Microsoft 365 MS=ms48477822
Adobe adobe-idp-site-verification=35f6139d624a8a4faf62e9ea0ac932c184a357134b3e3cd88ad8...
Amazon SES amazonses:3sEEfkAcJa/4coehCYouBzSei+ud74uA4L9RSiJrkF0=
Apple apple-domain-verification=2wuO3oOHDkX97Xp7
Cisco Umbrella cisco-ci-domain-verification=19ff04548182833ced8e92e55afc04dbfaf4cd7fc843b4206ba...
Facebook / Meta facebook-domain-verification=9k66wf0zazg26n30h4xko19eh16nu5
Google Workspace google-site-verification=4NImZ9b81TPYM_ppnEKXHKeObn_buZq0kSCakg-OWOU
Notion notion-domain-verification=L36qYNnzJQUGMXDyau7UXN8GSMI1hSwtTroRRwHpr5
Webex webexdomainverification.7SQ3S=ff82c8e4-684b-482d-87bb-d6137d59f2f3
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Consistent Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Enterprise DNS Context: DNSSEC is the only standardized, DNS-verifiable mechanism that cryptographically authenticates responses between authoritative servers and resolvers (RFC 4033 §2, RFC 4035). Without it, DNS responses are technically vulnerable to in-transit tampering. Enterprise operators may employ compensating controls (anycast, DDoS mitigation, private peering, TSIG) — however, these do not provide DNS-layer data authentication to third-party resolvers and are not verifiable via DNS alone.
Visibility: DNS-only — network-layer compensating controls cannot be observed or verified through DNS queries. This assessment reflects what is provable from the DNS evidence available.

NS Delegation Verified

3 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1.leidos.com ns2.leidos.com ns3.leidos.com
Enterprise DNS (Dedicated Infrastructure)
All 3 nameservers are leidos.com-branded, indicating organization-operated DNS infrastructure. This is typical of large enterprises, government agencies, and organizations that maintain full control of their DNS resolution chain.
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (1 difference found)
Resolver Differences:
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [MS=ms48477822 MS=ms61953769 MS=ms86864383 MS=ms98732825 a5a35780433e45e2a94799d99d9ac9ba amazonses:3sEEfkAcJa/4coehCYouBzSei+ud74uA4L9RSiJrkF0= amazonses:rViIgRFhomuueBUI/vL087ttEbwiKSXD1bs0tfMF/CY= apple-domain-verification=2wuO3oOHDkX97Xp7 openai-domain-verification=dv-i52SyvbUOa3n2nmfqtoY2muW traction-guest=88809048-1b58-446d-aa7d-a7bf40ea5488]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

104.18.24.52
104.18.25.52
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2606:4700::6812:1834
2606:4700::6812:1934
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com.
10 mxb-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Proofpoint

SRVServices

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 100 1 5061 sipfed.online.gov.skypeforbusiness.us.
_sip._tls: 100 1 443 sipdir.online.gov.skypeforbusiness.us.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: 2 endpoints
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? None found
How did we find these?

No subdomains found via Certificate Transparency logs, DNS probing, or CNAME chain traversal for this domain. No TLS certificates have been issued and no common service names resolve for subdomains of leidos.com.

Δ Changes Detected: TXT Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 2 / 2 records
104.18.24.52
104.18.24.52
104.18.25.52
104.18.25.52
AAAA Synchronized 2 / 2 records
2606:4700::6812:1834
2606:4700::6812:1934
2606:4700::6812:1934
2606:4700::6812:1834
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.leidos.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; sp=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@leidos.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@leidos.com
v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; sp=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@leidos.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@leidos.com
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
10 mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com.
10 mxb-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com.
10 mxb-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com.
10 mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 3 / 3 records
ns1.leidos.com.
ns1.leidos.com.
ns2.leidos.com.
ns3.leidos.com.
ns3.leidos.com.
ns2.leidos.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
hidden.leidos.com. domains.leidos.com. 715567526 14400 3600 1209600 3600
hidden.leidos.com. domains.leidos.com. 715567526 14400 3600 1209600 3600
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Propagating 33 / 7 records
Dynatrace-site-verification=ed2bdcd3-13ba-4588-8c7c-d492c9edbd3a__7cr3iprp6kqcln3r6t0r307bvo
amazonses:rViIgRFhomuueBUI/vL087ttEbwiKSXD1bs0tfMF/CY=
MS=ms48477822
webexdomainverification.89NKC=02e4cd1f-5621-4477-83f3-140ffbfcb0b7
MS=ms61953769
box-domain-verification=b3dd4f44036c96e36bfb2ac6bba0d28ba1e4c0e18cf4b641c6f6dd0c6df4cc3f
MS=ms86864383
MS=ms98732825
MS=ms98732825
MS=ms61953769
_elastic_domain_challenge.au.leidos.com=e1fa30f87c1407a710abdd159eb76db8da534247e96b0abfb652b58e805ccd80
j9F3+f/HO69AxksBWNmqoO4iK/MpMEctiPl43V7nVYQKRBVDh+SqbvCwyxvxvW6XogBnMQqesTAMOoj6NaaaMA==
a5a35780433e45e2a94799d99d9ac9ba
identrust_validation=Jsfw0a7S5gunXbaoSStMV66RuagRp0YIe4YFElxNF+6r
adobe-idp-site-verification=35f6139d624a8a4faf62e9ea0ac932c184a357134b3e3cd88ad83086219e155f
—
adobe-idp-site-verification=b59ab640f04bce7bc291847369a30541094386fa0e492e1d3e0353a4b55fc8dd
—
amazonses:3sEEfkAcJa/4coehCYouBzSei+ud74uA4L9RSiJrkF0=
—
amazonses:rViIgRFhomuueBUI/vL087ttEbwiKSXD1bs0tfMF/CY=
—
anthropic-domain-verification-r6m1wm=iYptj3VIWfj4jJARiuUtYSB8h
—
apple-domain-verification=2wuO3oOHDkX97Xp7
—
box-domain-verification=aaab159f5eba749afcfbe22e9bdb7162465f19947d098d7e9c59a6eb0e375a0d
—
box-domain-verification=b3dd4f44036c96e36bfb2ac6bba0d28ba1e4c0e18cf4b641c6f6dd0c6df4cc3f
—
cisco-ci-domain-verification=19ff04548182833ced8e92e55afc04dbfaf4cd7fc843b4206ba339ada55c46c3
—
duo_sso_verification=GLXKtc9vwBelNRwxSxafaFzWR7XyG6jKNMZQpI1A9VB4rbTQyMLnVlS1Ov5R6pZi
—
facebook-domain-verification=9k66wf0zazg26n30h4xko19eh16nu5
—
figma-domain-verification=7751541c5d7abb78a67fbcb24afd5eb80418322c5a02aee1f886a77163340819-1769618391
—
google-site-verification=4NImZ9b81TPYM_ppnEKXHKeObn_buZq0kSCakg-OWOU
—
google-site-verification=OCM936SBYDQEbMkQRg1ejJj0YheOVH3yMWGUMh9IYhA
—
identrust_validation=Jsfw0a7S5gunXbaoSStMV66RuagRp0YIe4YFElxNF+6r
—
identrust_validation=eGqKvt9B5YF3moiqcmDZTkPX9sjik5rzDWO2oySqUeg7
—
identrust_validation=iGY9GS+Uzd6kcprVfVhaCqEY5q4cucg/IRW3+UoWgSN+
—
j9F3+f/HO69AxksBWNmqoO4iK/MpMEctiPl43V7nVYQKRBVDh+SqbvCwyxvxvW6XogBnMQqesTAMOoj6NaaaMA==
—
notion-domain-verification=L36qYNnzJQUGMXDyau7UXN8GSMI1hSwtTroRRwHpr5
—
openai-domain-verification=dv-i52SyvbUOa3n2nmfqtoY2muW
—
traction-guest=88809048-1b58-446d-aa7d-a7bf40ea5488
—
twilio-domain-verification=04aeafc9b943f2bbef144542c3ab3a26
—
v=spf1 ip4:149.8.242.0/24 ip4:149.8.144.0/24 ip4:149.8.243.0/27 ip4:149.8.132.0/25 ip4:140.162.124.0/25 ip4:185.177.65.0/24 ip4:185.177.67.0/24 ip4:103.23.218.200/32 ip4:216.46.126.4/32 ip4:216.46.107.32/32 ip4:65.5.104.15/32 ip4:216.169.98.195/32 ip4:54.152.91.75/32 include:spf-00336402.gpphosted.com include:mktomail.com include:46166704.spf04.hubspotemail.net -all
—
webexdomainverification.7SQ3S=ff82c8e4-684b-482d-87bb-d6137d59f2f3
—
webexdomainverification.7TABZ=63095fb4-4966-41fe-a52b-e2ba75e6e469
—
webexdomainverification.89NKC=02e4cd1f-5621-4477-83f3-140ffbfcb0b7
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
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DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

d8f1e85b82398453b594e510f66615011b5be55f95c584a4ae0bb6d300cb9278484663b73823bb4554a2f98ed5654b2296ae818c59cd29e0a01f102fa1e4521b
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 20 Apr 2026, 07:30 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3) Cross-Reference Verification

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-leidos.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-leidos.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-leidos.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-leidos.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/14538/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for leidos.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short leidos.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.leidos.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'cm' RFC 6376 
dig +short cm._domainkey.leidos.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'hs1' RFC 6376 
dig +short hs1._domainkey.leidos.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'hs2' RFC 6376 
dig +short hs2._domainkey.leidos.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' RFC 6376 
dig +short k2._domainkey.leidos.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k3' RFC 6376 
dig +short k3._domainkey.leidos.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' RFC 6376 
dig +short s1._domainkey.leidos.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' RFC 6376 
dig +short s2._domainkey.leidos.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'smtpapi' RFC 6376 
dig +short smtpapi._domainkey.leidos.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer leidos.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd leidos.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mxb-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxb-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com:25 -servername mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.leidos.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.leidos.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.leidos.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.leidos.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/leidos.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com:25 -servername mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.leidos.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://leidos.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://leidos.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://leidos.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.18.24.52 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 52.24.18.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 104.18.25.52 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 52.25.18.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine consistent · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Consistent 15107 runs
DKIM
Consistent 14884 runs
DMARC
Consistent 15088 runs
DANE/TLSA
Consistent 14866 runs
DNSSEC
Consistent 15065 runs
BIMI
Consistent 14881 runs
MTA-STS
Consistent 14902 runs
TLS-RPT
Consistent 14917 runs
CAA
Consistent 14914 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short leidos.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.leidos.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'cm' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short cm._domainkey.leidos.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'hs1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short hs1._domainkey.leidos.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'hs2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short hs2._domainkey.leidos.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k2._domainkey.leidos.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k3' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k3._domainkey.leidos.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s1._domainkey.leidos.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s2._domainkey.leidos.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'smtpapi' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short smtpapi._domainkey.leidos.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer leidos.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd leidos.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mxb-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxb-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com:25 -servername mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.leidos.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.leidos.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.leidos.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.leidos.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer leidos.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/leidos.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com:25 -servername mxa-00336402.gslb.gpphosted.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.leidos.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://leidos.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://leidos.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://leidos.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.18.24.52 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 52.24.18.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 104.18.25.52 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 52.25.18.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

0s

Running Real-Time Scan Telemetry

Most scans complete in less than one minute. Some may take longer.

Markers represent known resolver locations. Anycast routing selects the nearest node — exact routing is internal to each provider.

Pipeline nodes reflect live data as each analysis phase completes.

Telemetry Log 0 polls