Registry Zone Health Report
The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.
| Record Type | Observed TTL | Typical TTL | Severity | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SOA | 3 hours (10800s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
medium | SOA TTL is above typical — observed 3 hours (10800s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. |
| NS | 10762s |
1 day (86400s) |
medium | NS TTL is below typical — observed 10762s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
Big Picture Questions
- How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
- Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
- Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
- Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
localhost
1
nobody.invalid
| Timer | Value | RFC 1912 Range |
|---|---|---|
| Refresh | 600s | 1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs) |
| Retry | 1200s | Fraction of Refresh |
| Expire | 604800s | 1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days) |
| Minimum (Neg. Cache) | 10800s | 300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day) |
DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.
DNS Server Security Hardened
No DNS server misconfigurations found on localhost — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.
| Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Zone Transfer (AXFR) | Denied | Zone transfer denied (correct configuration) |
| Open Recursion | Disabled | Recursion disabled (correct configuration) |
| Nameserver Identity | Hidden | No nameserver identity information disclosed |
| Cache Snooping | Protected | Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration) |
Tested nameserver: localhost
Delegation Consistency 2 Issues
Delegation consistency: 2 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.
- Could not retrieve NS TTL from either parent or child
- Could not retrieve SOA serial from any nameserver
DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned
Glue Record Completeness Complete
| Nameserver | In-Bailiwick | IPv4 Glue | IPv6 Glue | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
localhost |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
NS TTL Comparison Drift
SOA Serial Consistency Consistent
Nameserver Fleet Matrix 3 Issues
Analyzed 1 nameserver(s) for test — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.
- localhost: UDP unreachable on port 53
- localhost: TCP unreachable on port 53
- Low nameserver diversity — all nameservers in a single ASN/prefix
| Nameserver | IPv4 | IPv6 | ASN / Operator | UDP | TCP | AA | SOA Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
localhost |
127.0.0.1 | ::1 | N/A |
All 1 nameservers in a single ASN and /24 prefix — single point of failure risk
Zone Signing & DNSSEC Methodology Is this zone cryptographically signed? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Consistent Unsigned
DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned
NS Delegation Verified
1 nameserver(s) configured
Subdomain Discovery Not Applicable
example.test.
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
localhost.
localhost. nobody.invalid. 1 600 1200 604800 10800
DNS History Timeline BETA
When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?
DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY
All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.
Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.
Intelligence Sources
This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below
This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.
3160a364bc6f396f65c40128879a72cf79ae88db153f5f088df7757cedc082bee3fb8cd92f7d232a751fdb7550f146a9c851cb5c6743071bfcd544fd5e61877d
Internet Archive — Permanent Record Wayback Machine Can this analysis be independently verified? Archived
This analysis has been automatically submitted to the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, creating a tamper-evident, third-party-hosted snapshot of the DNS security posture at analysis time. This archived copy is independent of DNS Tool — it provides an independently verifiable record of the analysis at this point in time. Combined with the SHA-3-512 integrity hash, this creates a verifiable chain of evidence for domain security state.
https://web.archive.org/web/20260420035802/https://dnstool.it-help.tech/analysis/14480/view/E
Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.
After downloading, verify with any of these commands:
Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).
cat dns-intelligence-test.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-test.jsonpython3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-test.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-test.json.sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/14480/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).
Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for test. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer test Adig +noall +answer test AAAAdig +noall +answer test MXdig +noall +answer test NSdig +noall +answer test TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer test DNSKEYdig +noall +answer test DSdig +dnssec +cd test A @1.1.1.1Brand & Trust
dig +noall +answer test CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer test HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer test CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/test' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Appendix: Verification Commands
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer test Adig +noall +answer test AAAAdig +noall +answer test MXdig +noall +answer test NSdig +noall +answer test TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer test DNSKEYdig +noall +answer test DSdig +dnssec +cd test A @1.1.1.1Brand & Trust
dig +noall +answer test CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer test HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer test CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/test' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50