DNS Tool

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Generated 20 Apr 2026, 01:57 UTC
Duration 60.5s
Version v26.46.24
Integrity 5813f83ef1076ac75912118ad17b3287d2037256c23c3b820c5ad488060404162256be99b86ced9dfb93475810e3dde0096f90c827e5cd4c18b49cf34997c955

TLP:AMBER

Limited disclosure — recipients may share within their organization only

Subject Domain

abc.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

abc.com

20 Apr 2026, 01:57 UTC · 60.5s ·v26.46.24 · SHA-3-512: 5813✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Archived ·Cross-Referenced

Executive Topology

Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain

Footprint Microsoft 365 8 SaaS Services

DNS Security & Trust Posture

Risk Level: Medium Risk

3 protocols configured, 5 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC monitoring phase with aggregate reporting enabled Why we go beyond letter grades

1 recommendation 2 monitoring

Some DNS data may be stale or incomplete, limiting confidence. Resolver agreement and system maturity are adequate.

Accuracy 68% Currency 67/100 Maturity consistent

Limiting factor: Data currency is degraded — some records may be stale, incomplete, or inconsistent with authoritative sources

Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Stale

ICuAE Details

DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type	Observed TTL	Typical TTL	Severity	Context
MX	`47s`	`1 hour (3600s)`	high	MX TTL is below typical — observed 47s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS	`5 minutes (300s)`	`1 day (86400s)`	high	NS TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A	`1 minute (60s)`	`1 hour (3600s)`	high	A TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. Provider Note: AWS Route 53 alias records have a fixed TTL of 60 seconds when pointing to AWS resources (ELB, CloudFront, S3). This is an AWS-specific extension, not part of DNS RFCs. To set a custom TTL, use a standard A/AAAA record or CNAME instead of an alias — but note this loses automatic IP tracking.
SOA	`15 minutes (900s)`	`1 hour (3600s)`	medium	SOA TTL is below typical — observed 15 minutes (900s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT	`5 minutes (300s)`	`1 hour (3600s)`	high	TXT TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.

Tune TTL for abc.com

Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: AWS Route 53 — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.

Primary NS ns-318.awsdns-39.com

Serial 1

Admin awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com

Provider AWS Route 53

Timer	Value	RFC 1912 Range
Refresh	`7200s`	1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry	`900s`	Fraction of Refresh
Expire	`1209600s`	1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)	`86400s`	300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)

All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.

Independent RFC compliance assessment for AWS Route 53. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

Alias record TTLs fixed at 60s RFC 1035 §3.2.1

AWS Route 53 alias records pointing to AWS resources (ELB, CloudFront, S3, API Gateway) have a fixed TTL of 60 seconds that cannot be modified. Route 53 alias records are an AWS-specific extension — not part of standard DNS RFCs. They solve the CNAME-at-apex problem (RFC prohibits CNAME at zone apex) by appearing as A/AAAA records to resolvers. The 60-second TTL ensures fast failover but removes administrator TTL control.

Proprietary extension — not covered by DNS RFCs

This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.

Email Spoofing

Partial

Brand Impersonation

Not Setup

DNS Tampering

Unsigned

Certificate Control

Open

Recommended

Move DMARC policy from 'none' to 'quarantine' or 'reject'

Monitoring

DMARC record has configuration warnings — review recommended, External domain disney.com has not authorized abc.com to send DMARC reports (missing abc.com._report._dmarc.disney.com TXT record)

Configured

SPF (hard fail), DMARC (with warnings), DKIM

Not Configured

MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DNSSEC, CAA

Unavailable on Provider

DANE

Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Low Risk

High Upgrade DMARC from p=none

Your DMARC policy is monitor-only (p=none). Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing reports to actively prevent spoofing.

A quarantine or reject policy instructs receivers to take action on failing mail.

Field	Value
Type	`TXT`
Host	`_dmarc.abc.com` (DMARC policy record)
Value	`v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@abc.com`

RFC 7489 §6.3

Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035

Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.

Field	Value
Type	`CAA`
Host	`abc.com` (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value	`0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`

RFC 8659

Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.

Field	Value
Type	`TXT`
Host	`_smtp._tls.abc.com` (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Value	`v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@abc.com`

RFC 8460

Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

Field	Value
Type	`TXT`
Host	`_mta-sts.abc.com` (MTA-STS policy record)
Value	`v=STSv1; id=abc.com`

RFC 8461

Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records

Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE

CSC Corporate Domains, Inc.

Where domain was purchased

Email Service Provider INFERRED

Microsoft 365

Moderately Protected

Web Hosting

Unknown

Where website is hosted

DNS Hosting OBSERVED

Amazon Route 53

Where DNS records are edited

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Consistent

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes

Success -all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:spf.disney.com -all

RFC 7489: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked

RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.

RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.

Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is monitoring only (p=none). -all provides some SPF-level protection, but DMARC isn't enforcing. Adding p=reject and considering ~all for compatibility would be far more effective.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Consistent

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Monitoring only

Warning p=none

DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement

v=DMARC1;p=none;fo=1;rua=mailto:Corp.Dmarc_RUA@disney.com;ruf=mailto:Corp.Dmarc_RUF@disney.com

Policy p=none provides no protection - spoofed emails reach inboxes

Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports

Advanced cryptographic posture detected. Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC monitoring phase with aggregate reporting enabled

RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.

DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.

Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Consistent

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified

Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

selector1._domainkey Microsoft 365 2048-bit Adequate

v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA4seCxZF4kMEmjomBmlkm6ux2yPSXN6Plgh6me9RWnI4esuEKEKeIZIPN2EhCaCD7ojPVaJYhoLH39E9cqUZYMnaXF5PGxMKhRpBzcMwpD93/NsVEpPZJPSaN/F8Hvp3dD6F5cwUPmwZptAXyih+qAiuGSZM+9teV5V/eTNXFDmc3ZycaCyy4VPq3j5oYDjZw9RJvwNEKeR8l3B3He0eaZDLqK6j0UrHEEK9cdPvIm543BwHJEycqNOt3K9Sae8QQJKdl3m7ZDugPAEAzEX8cBE3dsipCYdaG31TYz1E05z7FI7o4gcXeirna9+fkdQ9mYzs89VmR6kLlnZvsokOcyQIDAQAB;

RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).

Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Consistent

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented

Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Consistent

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting

Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Authorization missing

Warning

1 of 1 external reporting domains missing authorization

External Domain	Authorization	Auth Record
`disney.com`	Unauthorized	—

External domain disney.com has not authorized abc.com to send DMARC reports (missing abc.com._report._dmarc.disney.com TXT record)

Third-Party Action Required

This authorization record must be created by the external reporting provider, not by you. Per RFC 7489 §7.1, the receiving domain must publish a TXT record to confirm it accepts DMARC reports from your domain.

What to do: Contact your DMARC reporting provider and ask them to publish the authorization TXT record shown above. If you use a managed DMARC service (e.g., Ondmarc, Dmarcian, Valimail), this is typically handled during onboarding — reach out to their support if the record is missing.

Impact if unresolved: Compliant receivers may silently discard aggregate or forensic reports destined for the unauthorized address, reducing your DMARC visibility.

DANE / TLSA Consistent Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No

RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Microsoft 365

Microsoft 365 does not support DANE for inbound mail. Microsoft uses its own certificate pinning mechanism.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).

This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial

BIMI BIMI Spec Consistent Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Consistent Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org

Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No

No llms.txt found

No llms-full.txt found

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked

No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt View robots.txt

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured

No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.

Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No

No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No

No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected

Evidence Log (1 item)

Type	Detail	Severity	Confidence
`robots_txt_no_ai_blocks`	robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives	low	Observed

Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.

What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns-318.awsdns-39.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check	Result	Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR)	Denied	Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion	Disabled	Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity	Hidden	No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping	Protected	Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: ns-318.awsdns-39.com, ns-1869.awsdns-41.co.uk, ns-736.awsdns-28.net, ns-1368.awsdns-43.org

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:

Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

Nameserver	In-Bailiwick	IPv4 Glue	IPv6 Glue	Status
`ns-1368.awsdns-43.org`	No	N/A	N/A	OK
`ns-1869.awsdns-41.co.uk`	No	N/A	N/A	OK
`ns-318.awsdns-39.com`	No	N/A	N/A	OK
`ns-736.awsdns-28.net`	No	N/A	N/A	OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 300s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns-1368.awsdns-43.org: 1

ns-1869.awsdns-41.co.uk: 1

ns-318.awsdns-39.com: 1

ns-736.awsdns-28.net: 1

Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for abc.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver	IPv4	IPv6	ASN / Operator	SOA Serial
`ns-1368.awsdns-43.org`	205.251.197.88	2600:9000:5305:5800::1	AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc.	1
`ns-736.awsdns-28.net`	205.251.194.224	2600:9000:5302:e000::1	AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc.	1
`ns-318.awsdns-39.com`	205.251.193.62	2600:9000:5301:3e00::1	AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc.	1
`ns-1869.awsdns-41.co.uk`	205.251.199.77	2600:9000:5307:4d00::1	AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc.	1

Unique ASNs

Unique Operators

Unique /24 Prefixes

Diversity Score

Fair

1 ASN(s), 4 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Transport security inferred from 1 signal(s) — no enforcement policy active

Policy Assessment Primary

Microsoft 365 enforces TLS 1.2+ with DANE (GA Oct 2024) and valid certificates

Telemetry

TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders

Live Probe Supplementary

Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 0 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

IPv4 Mappings:

18.154.185.106 → AS ()

18.154.185.15 → AS ()

18.154.185.31 → AS ()

18.154.185.97 → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 8 services

8 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Service	Verification Record
Microsoft 365	`MS=ms24761496`
Adobe	`adobe-idp-site-verification=012b7d24aff9766444b9232173abb52ef026139e50aac77c49e0...`
Apple	`apple-domain-verification=pSxAase3tgjHfXBE`
Atlassian	`atlassian-domain-verification=5lqJwtfJPMHqC/aGvT/7s2BR53IHCs9P6vFjCQYA5nkQ4mvoHK...`
Canva	`canva-site-verification=mQci1SnoC4Y-iJQpirTu6Q`
Cisco Umbrella	`cisco-ci-domain-verification=4b0af123fd61d9b672e3d23654d753d00150aec9b4c32ff0673...`
DocuSign	`docusign=12a35007-299f-4d83-bd45-4f1963b4e234`
Google Workspace	`google-site-verification=9KrlZfA2rYO7_JUgB6G6PzmIzp5C0aMcAgiODVFOXL4`

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Consistent Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Enterprise DNS Context: DNSSEC is the only standardized, DNS-verifiable mechanism that cryptographically authenticates responses between authoritative servers and resolvers (RFC 4033 §2, RFC 4035). Without it, DNS responses are technically vulnerable to in-transit tampering. Enterprise operators may employ compensating controls (anycast, DDoS mitigation, private peering, TSIG) — however, these do not provide DNS-layer data authentication to third-party resolvers and are not verifiable via DNS alone.

Visibility: DNS-only — network-layer compensating controls cannot be observed or verified through DNS queries. This assessment reflects what is provable from the DNS evidence available.

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns-1368.awsdns-43.org ns-1869.awsdns-41.co.uk ns-318.awsdns-39.com ns-736.awsdns-28.net

Managed DNS

All 4 nameservers hosted by Amazon Route 53. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.

DNS provider(s): Amazon Route 53

Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (3 differences found)

Resolver Differences:

A: Cloudflare returned different results: [18.164.96.126 18.164.96.16 18.164.96.24 18.164.96.78]

A: DNS4EU returned different results: [18.164.52.25 18.164.52.63 18.164.52.75 18.164.52.91]

TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [42357818 MS=ms24761496 apple-domain-verification=pSxAase3tgjHfXBE canva-site-verification=mQci1SnoC4Y-iJQpirTu6Q docusign=12a35007-299f-4d83-bd45-4f1963b4e234 docusign=53e074c1-b80d-41a1-be73-d444698c3a91 nintex.5f22e1f0a5ad340038cdb208 smartsheet-site-validation=o821NYtWlw35E2By_1h2gMDN-nAgTRqB v=spf1 include:spf.disney.com -all]

This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

18.154.185.106

18.154.185.15

18.154.185.31

18.154.185.97

Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records

IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

5 abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.

Priority + mail server for email delivery

Microsoft 365

SRVServices

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 0 10 5061 ocim.disney.com.

_sip._tls: 0 10 5061 ocim.disney.com.

SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints

Web: Reachable (4 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: 2 endpoints

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 180 subdomains discovered

How did we find these?

70 unique certificates 180 current 0 expired 6 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence

Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.

Wildcard certificate detected: *.abc.com Active 5 certs 1 CA: Amazon

No explicit SANs found on wildcard certificates. Subdomains covered by this wildcard won't appear individually in CT logs (RFC 6962).

DNS probing and CNAME chain traversal were used to discover additional subdomains below.

Certificate Authority Diversity (7 CAs observed across CT log history)

Certificate Authority	Certs	First Issued	Last Issued	Status
`Amazon`	32	2025-04-15	2026-03-16	Active
`Sectigo Limited`	18	2025-09-12	2026-04-01	Active
`Let's Encrypt`	7	2026-02-09	2026-03-23	Active
`GlobalSign nv-sa`	6	2025-04-27	2026-02-28	Active
`COMODO CA Limited`	4	2025-05-21	2025-06-26	Active
`DigiCert Inc`	2	2025-07-13	2025-07-13	Active
`Google Trust Services`	1	2026-02-22	2026-02-22	Active

Subdomain	Source	Status	Provider / CNAME	Certificates	First Seen	Issuer(s)
`a.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2026-03-19T10:46:16	Let's Encrypt
`abcnyprod01.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`abcnyprod02.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`akarmi.abc.com.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`altavault01.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`api.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	7	2026-03-16T00:00:00	Amazon
`api.partners.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	15	2026-03-16T00:00:00	Amazon
`api2.abc.com`	DNS	Current	`prod-abc-msh.aws.seabc.go.com`	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`asperaconsole.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`autodiscover.abc.com`	DNS	Current	—	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`autolink.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`autolink.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`baton.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2026-03-14T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited
`beta.abc.com`	DNS	Current	—	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`blogs.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`boesfx.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`bpl-emg-rcheng1.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`bvl-mit-graf01.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`cd.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	1	2025-07-08T00:00:00	Amazon
`cdn.mktg.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2026-02-09T08:25:57	Let's Encrypt
`cdn.video.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2026-03-19T10:44:20	Let's Encrypt
`connect.abc.com`	DNS	Current	`socialize.gigya.com`	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`dashboard.abc.com`	DNS	Current	—	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`deploy.splunk.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`dev.abc.com`	DNS	Current	—	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`dev.cd.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	1	2025-07-08T00:00:00	Amazon
`dev.galaxy.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2025-10-01T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited
`dev.netbox.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`dev.stratodesk.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`dev.sweepstakes.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`developer.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`devemx.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`devemx.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`doctorodysseysweepstakes.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2026-03-13T20:42:37	Let's Encrypt
`download.abc.com`	DNS	Current	—	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`dtcipr-qapw01.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`dwtsvote-live-test.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`dwtsvote-live.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2025-11-10T21:00:23	GlobalSign nv-sa
`dwtsvote-test.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	4	2026-02-28T18:35:16	GlobalSign nv-sa
`dwtsvote.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	1	2025-11-10T21:00:22	GlobalSign nv-sa
`emdesign-stage.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2025-09-17T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited
`emdesign.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2025-10-28T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited
`emindex.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	6	2026-03-10T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited, COMODO CA Limited
`emindexdb.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2026-01-13T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited
`emmedia.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`emreach-staging.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`emreach.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`emsetup.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	4	2026-03-10T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited, COMODO CA Limited
`emsoundminerdev.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`emvault.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`emwebapps.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	4	2026-03-10T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited, COMODO CA Limited
`emx.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`emx.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`ets.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`etsdev.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`faspex.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`fcast.cdn.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2026-02-22T11:58:37	Let's Encrypt
`fcast.qa.cdn.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2026-02-22T13:33:48	Let's Encrypt
`filemaker01.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2025-10-28T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited
`filemaker03.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2025-09-17T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited
`fonts.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`ftp1.abc.com`	DNS	Current	`ftp3.abc.com`	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`ftp2.abc.com`	DNS	Current	—	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`galaxy.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2025-09-30T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited
`gambit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	1	2026-02-14T00:00:00	Amazon
`gist.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`gitlab.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`gksrv.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`haivision.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`hmgw1.haivision.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`hmgw2.haivision.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`hmgw3.haivision.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`icom.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`idolvote-test.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	1	2025-11-10T21:00:22	GlobalSign nv-sa
`idolvote.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2025-11-10T21:00:23	GlobalSign nv-sa
`jss.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`ll.media.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2026-03-23T15:43:41	Let's Encrypt
`m.abc.com`	DNS	Current	—	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`manage.splunk.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`marketingops.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2026-01-21T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited
`mc-aprimo.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`mc.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	4	2026-03-10T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited, COMODO CA Limited
`media.abc.com`	DNS	Current	`media.abc.go.com`	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`mediapulsepoc2.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`mediascreening.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`monitor.splunk.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`mpowr-aprimo.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`mydisney.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	10	2026-03-04T00:00:00	Amazon
`myproject.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`netbox.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`newsmam.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`newsmamdev.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`nyoffair.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`origin.vp2.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`partners.abc.com`	DNS	Current	`matterhorn.disney.com`	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`prod.cd.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	1	2025-07-08T00:00:00	Amazon
`proxy.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`proxy1.abc.com`	DNS	Current	—	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`qa.api.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`qa.cd.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	1	2025-07-08T00:00:00	Amazon
`r.abc.com`	DNS	Current	—	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`redirect.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2025-09-12T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited
`register.abc.com`	DNS	Current	—	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`remotesupport.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`reset.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`rogue.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`rstudio-stgngvm.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`scalari6k.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`search.abc.com`	DNS	Current	—	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`secure.cdn.media.oscar.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`secureaccess.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`services.abc.com`	DNS	Current	—	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`sgadmin.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`sip.abc.com`	DNS	Current	—	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`slingshot.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`slingshotdev.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`solarwinds.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`soundminer.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`splunk.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`spotfinder-akstest.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2025-12-11T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited
`spotfinder.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2025-12-11T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited
`stage.cd.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	1	2025-07-08T00:00:00	Amazon
`storefront.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`storefrontdev.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`stories.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`stratodesk.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`support.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	2	2026-02-03T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited
`sw88.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	3	2025-07-13T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`sweepstakes.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`test.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`test.sweepstakes.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`test2.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`tools.abc.com`	DNS	Current	—	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`tower.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`transfer.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`uag.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`ugw.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`vdigate.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`vdigate1.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`vdigate1qa.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`vdigate2.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`vdigate2qa.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`vdigate3.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`vdigate3qa.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`vdigate4.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`vdigate4qa.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`vdigate5.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`vdigate5qa.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`vdigate6.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`vdigate6qa.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`vdigateqa.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`w88.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`webapp.abc.com`	DNS	Current	—	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`workspaces.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.abc.com`	DNS	Current	`d2iwv1xxkqpmiz.cloudfront.net`	5	2025-05-21	Amazon
`www.abcnyprod01.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.abcnyprod02.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.akarmi.abc.com.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.autolink.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.autolink.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.boesfx.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.emindexdb.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.emreach-staging.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.emreach.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.emsoundminerdev.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.emvault.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.faspex.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.gist.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.haivision.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.marketingops.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.newsmamdev.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.remotesupport.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.secure.cdn.media.oscar.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.solarwinds.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.test.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.vdigate.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`www.xvl-mit-trnsfr2.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`xkm-emg-pautlnk.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`xkm-emg-qautlnk.net.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—
`xvl-mit-trnsfr2.mit.abc.com`	CT Log	Current	—	—	—	—

Export Recon (CSV)

Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.

DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)

Authoritative Records (Source of truth)

A Synchronized 4 / 4 records

18.154.185.106

18.154.185.15

18.154.185.97

18.154.185.31

18.154.185.15

18.154.185.97

18.154.185.31

AAAA 0 / 0 records

No records

CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records

No records

DMARC _dmarc.abc.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

v=DMARC1;p=none;fo=1;rua=mailto:Corp.Dmarc_RUA@disney.com;ruf=mailto:Corp.Dmarc_RUF@disney.com

MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

5 abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.

NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records

ns-1368.awsdns-43.org.

ns-1869.awsdns-41.co.uk.

ns-318.awsdns-39.com.

ns-736.awsdns-28.net.

SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

ns-318.awsdns-39.com. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400

TXT RFC 7208 §4 19 / 0 records

42357818

—

Dynatrace-site-verification=f8c987df-9919-467d-80cf-05c74781a94e__j7ut0lc17ppaoqaqo4hm9dbq23

—

ECZjYXSxe4CRnyGjS8E1nRw2keq1hV77Z66acQb6JhwQk14sk4ZGwLt61w4aZhtOdmqIJUj1fNCxo6721F0pfg==

—

MS=ms24761496

—

adobe-idp-site-verification=012b7d24aff9766444b9232173abb52ef026139e50aac77c49e02bd5d0dc3916

—

anthropic-domain-verification-dfbjfj=cItiODp4D19q3YKkyJLoZsKXZ

—

apple-domain-verification=pSxAase3tgjHfXBE

—

atlassian-domain-verification=5lqJwtfJPMHqC/aGvT/7s2BR53IHCs9P6vFjCQYA5nkQ4mvoHKTqNTW7gucscGW7

—

canva-site-verification=mQci1SnoC4Y-iJQpirTu6Q

—

cisco-ci-domain-verification=4b0af123fd61d9b672e3d23654d753d00150aec9b4c32ff0673f0f1b7801edab

—

docusign=12a35007-299f-4d83-bd45-4f1963b4e234

—

docusign=53e074c1-b80d-41a1-be73-d444698c3a91

—

google-site-verification=9KrlZfA2rYO7_JUgB6G6PzmIzp5C0aMcAgiODVFOXL4

—

google-site-verification=RcEUU_s2q7QWyysoeXd4Y0W3IE3QSpeu2lh2OFGRiJA

—

intersight=e61370b3eacaf63c12b058d9c7b287aa1a9fdbc17d6958aaf1036e5c54f90502

—

jumpdesktop=12d076284350363e1df1806a94f0096dc18aed9d3a58a4e35376c09ce886

—

nintex.5f22e1f0a5ad340038cdb208

—

smartsheet-site-validation=o821NYtWlw35E2By_1h2gMDN-nAgTRqB

—

v=spf1 include:spf.disney.com -all

—

DNS History Timeline BETA

Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

5813f83ef1076ac75912118ad17b3287d2037256c23c3b820c5ad488060404162256be99b86ced9dfb93475810e3dde0096f90c827e5cd4c18b49cf34997c955

Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 20 Apr 2026, 01:57 UTC.

Internet Archive — Permanent Record Wayback Machine Can this analysis be independently verified? Archived

This analysis has been automatically submitted to the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, creating a tamper-evident, third-party-hosted snapshot of the DNS security posture at analysis time. This archived copy is independent of DNS Tool — it provides an independently verifiable record of the analysis at this point in time. Combined with the SHA-3-512 integrity hash, this creates a verifiable chain of evidence for domain security state.

View Archived Snapshot

Snapshot preserved at https://web.archive.org/web/20260420015828/https://dnstool.it-help.tech/analysis/14410/view/E

Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3) Cross-Reference Verification

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL)

cat dns-intelligence-abc.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-abc.com.json

Python 3 (cross-platform)

python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-abc.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"

sha3sum (coreutils 9+)

sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-abc.com.json

Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/14410/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for abc.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer abc.com A

Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer abc.com AAAA

Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer abc.com MX

Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer abc.com NS

Query TXT records RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer abc.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208

dig +short abc.com TXT | grep -i spf

Check DMARC policy RFC 7489

dig +short _dmarc.abc.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376

dig +short selector1._domainkey.abc.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035

dig +dnssec +noall +answer abc.com DNSKEY

Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035

dig +noall +answer abc.com DS

Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035

dig +dnssec +cd abc.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com RFC 7672

dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA

Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 6698

openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates

Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461

dig +short _mta-sts.abc.com TXT

Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461

curl -sL https://mta-sts.abc.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt

Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460

dig +short _smtp._tls.abc.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft

dig +short default._bimi.abc.com TXT

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659

dig +noall +answer abc.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460

dig +noall +answer abc.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344

dig +noall +answer abc.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083

curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/abc.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 3207

openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962

curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.abc.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20

Check security.txt RFC 9116

curl -sL https://abc.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt

curl -sI https://abc.com/llms.txt | head -5

Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules

curl -s https://abc.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 18.154.185.106 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 106.185.154.18.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

ASN lookup for 18.154.185.15 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 15.185.154.18.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.

Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine consistent · 9/9 Evaluated

How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.

SPF

Consistent 15106 runs

DKIM

Consistent 14883 runs

DMARC

Consistent 15087 runs

DANE/TLSA

Consistent 14865 runs

DNSSEC

Consistent 15064 runs

BIMI

Consistent 14880 runs

MTA-STS

Consistent 14901 runs

TLS-RPT

Consistent 14916 runs

CAA

Consistent 14913 runs

Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer abc.com A

Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer abc.com AAAA

Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer abc.com MX

Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer abc.com NS

Query TXT records (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer abc.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208)

dig +short abc.com TXT | grep -i spf

Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489)

dig +short _dmarc.abc.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short selector1._domainkey.abc.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035)

dig +dnssec +noall +answer abc.com DNSKEY

Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035)

dig +noall +answer abc.com DS

Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035)

dig +dnssec +cd abc.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com (RFC 7672)

dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA

Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 6698)

openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates

Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461)

dig +short _mta-sts.abc.com TXT

Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461)

curl -sL https://mta-sts.abc.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt

Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460)

dig +short _smtp._tls.abc.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft)

dig +short default._bimi.abc.com TXT

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659)

dig +noall +answer abc.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460)

dig +noall +answer abc.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344)

dig +noall +answer abc.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083)

curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/abc.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 3207)

openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername abc-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962)

curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.abc.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20

Check security.txt (RFC 9116)

curl -sL https://abc.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt

curl -sI https://abc.com/llms.txt | head -5

Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules

curl -s https://abc.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 18.154.185.106 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 106.185.154.18.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

ASN lookup for 18.154.185.15 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 15.185.154.18.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)

DANE / TLSA Consistent Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

llms.txt llmstxt.org

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Evidence Log (1 item)

Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

DNS Server Security Hardened

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Policy Assessment Primary

Telemetry

Live Probe Supplementary

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 180 subdomains discovered

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

DNS History Timeline BETA

Intelligence Sources

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

Internet Archive — Permanent Record Wayback Machine Can this analysis be independently verified? Archived

Download & Verify Intelligence SHA-3-512

Reproduce the Evidence Transparency Source-Verifiable

Appendix: Verification Commands

Rules of Engagement

What You May Do

What You May Not Do

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Intelligence Dissemination

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)

DANE / TLSA Consistent Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

llms.txt llmstxt.org

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Evidence Log (1 item)

Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

DNS Server Security Hardened

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Policy Assessment Primary

Telemetry

Live Probe Supplementary

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 180 subdomains discovered

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

DNS History Timeline BETA

Intelligence Sources

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

Internet Archive — Permanent Record Wayback Machine Can this analysis be independently verified? Archived

Download & Verify Intelligence SHA-3-512

Reproduce the Evidence Transparency Source-Verifiable

Appendix: Verification Commands

RFC Reference