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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 18 Apr 2026, 13:04 UTC
Duration 27.5s
Version v26.46.19
Integrity b2b424773863bd96138f989ef21649970b01201382bc27f144acd6135a86b36b0bc0607035c7927580f43e19ed03465ff79172b4bee4d91c24fc41374044983e
Subject Domain
freebsd.org

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

freebsd.org High Risk
18 Apr 2026, 13:04 UTC · 27.5s ·v26.46.19 · SHA-3-512: b2b4✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Archived ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology Replay
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Engineer workspace · evidence preserved

Read the verdict first. Descend only as far as the incident requires.

This report keeps the complete technical record while separating decision, interpretation, evidence, and raw reproduction into a stable disclosure gradient.

L0PostureL1InterpretationL2EvidenceL3Raw & reproduce
Hurry path
MX & Routing Subdomains DNSSEC What changed
KEYBOARD !1@2#3$4%5^6 jump to that section · esc back to the verdict
Sorted by severity — worst first
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Configured
Monitoring
Not Setup
DANE
Unconfirmed
TRACE L0 · Email Spoofing — Partial L1 · 01 · Email Security · SPF/DMARC L3 · Reproduce commands
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI
Recommended
Move DMARC policy from 'none' to 'quarantine' or 'reject', Enable DMARC aggregate reporting (rua) for authentication visibility
Monitoring
DMARC record has configuration warnings — review recommended
Configured
SPF, DMARC (with warnings), DKIM, DANE, DNSSEC, CAA
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Upgrade DMARC from p=none

Your DMARC policy is monitor-only (p=none). Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing reports to actively prevent spoofing.

RFC 7489 §6.3
Medium Add DMARC Aggregate Reporting

Add a rua= tag to receive aggregate DMARC reports. Without reporting, you cannot monitor authentication failures.

RFC 7489 §7.1
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

Your domain has DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest email transport security available. TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

RFC 8460
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
Gandi SAS
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Footprint 2 SaaS Services
01 Identity & policy · L1 Email Security Can this domain be impersonated by email? SPF DMARC DKIM MTA-STS TLS-RPT MX & Routing Partial
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Gold

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups (via redirect: _spf.freebsd.org)

v=spf1 redirect=_spf.freebsd.org
SPF Redirect Chain RFC 7208 §6.1
This SPF record delegates policy via redirect= — the effective policy comes from the target domain.
_spf.freebsd.org
v=spf1 ip4:96.47.72.81 ip6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:2 ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain has DMARC p=none (monitoring only). Enforcing quarantine or reject is recommended to gain real protection.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Gold

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Monitoring only
Warning p=none

DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement

v=DMARC1; p=none
Policy p=none provides no protection - spoofed emails reach inboxes
No aggregate reporting (rua) configured — you won't receive reports about authentication results and potential abuse
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Gold

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

dkim._domainkey 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAy46C+GD7Y5L4nk7hCMeOJfHf4EA8P/j9UoQRAQx9TQ2+xCCGNhZIoqfn8aQl+q0rSntr1X1dKKNjzJxxa9UX8cubpX4vAIPSvM8xXZ03wbVXoTSJ/YpRwMABLHAKR5OE2X4jLK/O6AXKrMMKj8EcPQofgWwnsub6I/PjXpPrXGbrMLpCh0umE2ViF3RV5qX9bz5el3tt/rQfV+rtahzo5V6xeXwLjJxNY5tKRb3fHheijrprzBFkczFwOCAjORh6zwPKfvpJtbe2Fch9MOMaPS4Hr/jJ1jyweFJWUtQOLxesWl6H+y71sK+Fs91op9pG1ThHaDLEV6K1i1W9YISkmwIDAQAB
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Gold

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Gold

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

02 Chain of authority · L1 Domain Security Can DNS answers and certificate issuance be trusted? DANE / TLSA CAA Delegation DNSSEC Operations DNSSEC & NS Protected
DANE / TLSA Gold Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? Yes
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 1/2 MX

DANE partially configured — TLSA records on 1/2 MX hosts

MX Host Usage Selector Match Certificate Data
mx1.freebsd.org 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 0a7e2f469913ea64ca98af1f31bbbcaf51920d8df90d2972a9dc02bf7c37f404
Missing DANE for: mx66.freebsd.org
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest cryptographic transport security. DANE binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, creating a verifiable chain of trust from root to mail server (RFC 7672 §1.3). MTA-STS could complement this for senders that don't validate DNSSEC, but DANE alone provides the highest level of protection available.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Gold Success

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only Sectigo, Let's Encrypt can issue certificates

Authorized CAs: Sectigo Let's Encrypt
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Delegation Consistency 7 Issues

Delegation consistency: 7 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • DNSKEY records missing at child — DS records at parent have no matching keys
  • In-bailiwick NS ns1.freebsd.org has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
  • In-bailiwick NS ns2.freebsd.org has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone
  • SOA serial 2026041812 seen on: ns5.he.net, ns4.he.net, ns3.he.net
  • SOA serial 2026041813 seen on: ns2.freebsd.org, ns1.freebsd.org
  • SOA serial inconsistency indicates zone data may not be fully synchronized across nameservers

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Misaligned

Unmatched DS records (no corresponding DNSKEY):
Key Tag: 33175, Algorithm: 8

Glue Record Completeness Incomplete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns1.freebsd.org Missing
ns2.freebsd.org Missing
ns3.he.net No N/A N/A OK
ns4.he.net No N/A N/A OK
ns5.he.net No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 3600s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency 2 Unique Serials

ns1.freebsd.org: 2.026041813e+09
ns2.freebsd.org: 2.026041813e+09
ns3.he.net: 2.026041812e+09
ns4.he.net: 2.026041812e+09
ns5.he.net: 2.026041812e+09
DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue

DNSSEC operational notes: 1 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:
  • Single KSK with no CDS/CDNSKEY automation — manual rollover required

DNSKEY Inventory 2 Keys

RoleKey TagAlgorithmKey Size
ZSK 46966 RSA/SHA-256 2088 bits
KSK 33175 RSA/SHA-256 2088 bits

RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures

No RRSIG records found.

Denial of Existence none

No NSEC or NSEC3 records detected.

Rollover Readiness Not_ready

Multiple KSKs:
CDS Published:
CDNSKEY Published:
Automation: none
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Gold Signed RSA/SHA-256 Adequate

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: RSA/SHA-256 — MUST implement, widely deployed (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are cryptographically authenticated and tamper-evident.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
33175 8 2 BCFE5919C2E253EFD990C2E3BC88A45BEA9F4474821D193B2D7272A6951B01AF

NS Delegation Verified

5 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1.freebsd.org ns2.freebsd.org ns3.he.net ns4.he.net ns5.he.net
Enterprise DNS (Mixed Configuration)
2 of 5 nameservers are dedicated (freebsd.org-branded), 3 use external provider(s). This pattern is common in large organizations using split-horizon DNS or maintaining redundancy across internal and external infrastructure.
Dedicated (organization-branded): ns1.freebsd.org ns2.freebsd.org External provider: ns3.he.net ns4.he.net ns5.he.net
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
03 Delivery path · L1 Transport Security Will mail transport resist downgrade and interception? STARTTLS MTA-STS policy TLS-RPT
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification

All 2 server(s) verified: encrypted transport confirmed via direct SMTP probe and DNS policy

Policy Assessment Primary
  • DANE/TLSA records published — mail servers pin TLS certificates via DNSSEC (RFC 7672)
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
MX Host STARTTLS TLS Version Cipher Key Exchange Certificate
mx66.freebsd.org TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 N/A Invalid
Certificate invalid: tls: failed to verify certificate: x509: certificate is valid for mx1.freebsd.org, not mx66.freebsd.
mx1.freebsd.org TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 N/A Valid
Expires: 2026-07-16 (89 days)
Issuer: Let's Encrypt
Multi-Vantage Probe Results
Split verdict 2 probes, 1 responded
US-East (Boston) observed
Partial TLS support
France - EU skipped
What Is Measured: Our probe’s TLS 1.3 handshake offers the hybrid post-quantum group X25519MLKEM768 (X25519 combined with ML-KEM-768). The Key Exchange column reports the group each mail server actually negotiated — direct, observed evidence of its post-quantum readiness toward a hybrid-capable client.
Quantum-Safe Hybrid: The session key agreement combines classical X25519 with ML-KEM-768, standardized in FIPS 203 (final, August 2024). This protects the key exchange against “harvest now, decrypt later” collection by a future quantum adversary.
Classical: The server completed the handshake without selecting the offered hybrid group. This is not a deviation — no RFC currently requires post-quantum key exchange. The X25519MLKEM768 group is defined in draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem (Standards Track draft, not yet an RFC); the hybrid approach is described in draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design (IESG-approved Informational). Servers supporting only other hybrid groups also read as Classical here.
Transition Outlook: NIST’s draft transition guidance (NIST IR 8547) projects quantum-vulnerable algorithms being deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Hybrid key exchange requires TLS 1.3. This finding is informational and does not affect this domain’s grade.
04 Human-visible identity · L1 Brand & Trust Can this brand be convincingly faked? BIMI & VMC CAA · see Domain Security Not Setup
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial

BIMI BIMI Spec Gold Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

05 Ownership & attack surface · L1 Infrastructure Intelligence Who operates this domain, and what is exposed? Registrar / RDAP security.txt AI Surface Subdomains
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt View robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
Sources scanned (1)
  • https://freebsd.org/
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns2.freebsd.org — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Test inconclusive
Open Recursion Disabled Test inconclusive
Nameserver Identity Hidden Test inconclusive
Cache Snooping Protected Test inconclusive

Tested nameservers: ns2.freebsd.org, ns5.he.net, ns1.freebsd.org, ns3.he.net, ns4.he.net

Nameserver Fleet Matrix 2 Issues

Analyzed 5 nameserver(s) for freebsd.org — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Findings:
  • SOA serial 2026041813 on: ns2.freebsd.org, ns1.freebsd.org
  • SOA serial 2026041812 on: ns4.he.net, ns3.he.net, ns5.he.net
Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial Anycast Node
ns2.freebsd.org 163.237.210.233 2001:4978:10ae:aba:ca:daba:0:233 AS13331 19255 2026041813 N/A
ns4.he.net 216.66.1.2 2001:470:400::2 AS6939
Hurricane Electric LLC 		2026041812 N/A
ns3.he.net 216.218.132.2 2001:470:300::2 AS6939
Hurricane Electric LLC 		2026041812 N/A
ns1.freebsd.org 163.237.210.11 2001:4978:10ae:aba:ca:daba:0:11 AS13331 19255 2026041813 N/A
ns5.he.net 216.66.80.18 2001:470:500::2 AS6939
Hurricane Electric LLC 		2026041812 N/A
Unique ASNs
2
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
4
Diversity Score