DNS Tool

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Generated 17 Feb 2026, 18:26 UTC
Duration 16.4s
Version v26.19.22
Integrity 9883b7f80d9b10889609186d971263baf3629978c8a9daaad1c2c7911cb770fa9dfb3d9a122fde275bbeb2fd9f42d0255ddc9b662818eb6ad76e6bfdeed020bd

TLP:AMBER

Limited disclosure — recipients may share within their organization only

Subject Domain

nasa.gov

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

nasa.gov

17 Feb 2026, 18:26 UTC · 16.4s ·v26.19.22 · SHA-3-512: 9883✱✱✱✱ Verify

Executive Methodology

Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain

Footprint Microsoft 365

DNS Security & Trust Posture

Risk Level: Low Risk

4 protocols configured, 4 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Why we go beyond letter grades

1 monitoring

Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence

Based on 20 historical scans of this domain

Parameter	Current	Suggested	Severity	Rationale
timeout_seconds	`5s`	`8s`	low	Average scan duration is 50.3s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures. RFC 8767

Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.

Email Spoofing

Protected

Brand Impersonation

Not Setup

DNS Tampering

Protected

Certificate Control

Open

Monitoring

External domain mail.nasa.gov has not authorized nasa.gov to send DMARC reports (missing nasa.gov._report._dmarc.mail.nasa.gov TXT record)

Configured

SPF, DMARC (reject), DKIM, DNSSEC

Not Configured

MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA

Unavailable on Provider

DANE

Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Secure

Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

BIMI displays your verified brand logo next to your emails in supporting mail clients.

Field	Value
Type	`TXT`
Host	`default._bimi.nasa.gov` (BIMI default record)
Value	`v=BIMI1; l=https://nasa.gov/brand/logo.svg`

RFC 9495

Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.

Field	Value
Type	`CAA`
Host	`nasa.gov` (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value	`0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`

RFC 8659

Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.

Field	Value
Type	`TXT`
Host	`_smtp._tls.nasa.gov` (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Value	`v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@nasa.gov`

RFC 8460

Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

Field	Value
Type	`TXT`
Host	`_mta-sts.nasa.gov` (MTA-STS policy record)
Value	`v=STSv1; id=nasa.gov`

RFC 8461

Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE

get.gov (Registrant: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY)

Where domain was purchased

Email Service Provider

Unknown

Strongly Protected

Web Hosting

Unknown

Where website is hosted

DNS Hosting

Unknown

Where DNS records are edited

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes

Success -all 9/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 9/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:_spf-4a.nasa.gov include:_spf-4b.nasa.gov include:_spf-4c.nasa.gov include:_spf-4d.nasa.gov include:_spf-4g.nasa.gov include:_spf-4m.nasa.gov include:_spf-4x.nasa.gov include:_spf-6a.nasa.gov include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all

RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked

RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.

RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.

Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy

Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarcmail@mail.nasa.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov

Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed

No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing

No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. Many tools flag the absence of ruf= as a gap. It is not. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports

RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.

DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.

Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified

Found

Found DKIM records for 1 selector(s)

selector1._domainkey Microsoft 365

v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCQHB769Mz6bm5ZUPbTebbhs8RZeJMEcBOOSeIdCFg/DqUZHfBuJ3WdMBEYOUfiukh1xtH80QFOrk88KpucmqQVKplvOUv2Q65piZAIkf2KHdi3GbzLkLHbPzyjmMMnLw5tuMdK4HFAnf7DCdxvCTelqOZ1fUdexJf8IqLK73dOSwIDAQAB;

RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).

Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented

Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting

Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Authorization missing

Warning

1 of 2 external reporting domains missing authorization

External Domain	Authorization	Auth Record
`mail.nasa.gov`	Unauthorized	—
`dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov`	Authorized	`v=DMARC1`

External domain mail.nasa.gov has not authorized nasa.gov to send DMARC reports (missing nasa.gov._report._dmarc.mail.nasa.gov TXT record)

Third-Party Action Required

This authorization record must be created by the external reporting provider, not by you. Per RFC 7489 §7.1, the receiving domain must publish a TXT record to confirm it accepts DMARC reports from your domain.

What to do: Contact your DMARC reporting provider and ask them to publish the authorization TXT record shown above. If you use a managed DMARC service (e.g., Ondmarc, Dmarcian, Valimail), this is typically handled during onboarding — reach out to their support if the record is missing.

Impact if unresolved: Compliant receivers may silently discard aggregate or forensic reports destined for the unauthorized address, reducing your DMARC visibility.

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No

RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Microsoft 365

Microsoft 365 does not support DANE for inbound mail. Microsoft uses its own certificate pinning mechanism.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).

This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Unlikely DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing, but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction — visual and certificate-based brand faking remains possible

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org

Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No

No llms.txt found

No llms-full.txt found

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked

No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured

No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.

Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No

No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No

No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected

Evidence Log (1 item)

Type	Detail	Severity	Confidence
`robots_txt_no_ai_blocks`	robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives	low	Observed

Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.

What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Transport security inferred from 1 signal(s) — no enforcement policy active

Policy Assessment Primary

Microsoft 365 enforces TLS 1.2+ with DANE (GA Oct 2024) and valid certificates

Telemetry

TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders

Live Probe Supplementary

Skipped — SMTP probe skipped — outbound TCP port 25 is blocked by cloud hosting provider. This is standard for all major cloud platforms (AWS, GCP, Azure, Replit) as an anti-spam measure. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records above, which is the standards-aligned primary method per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 2 IP address(es)

ASN	Name	Country
`AS2635`	Automattic, Inc.	US

IPv4 Mappings:

192.0.66.108 → AS2635 (192.0.66.0/24)

IPv6 Mappings:

2a04:fa87:fffd::c000:426c → AS2635 (2a04:fa87:fffd::/48)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS services detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed RSA/SHA-256

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.

AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures

DS Record (at registrar):

65284 8 2 5A316253A39AA4A00F5763CBF9225624B731DF7027FB61E043D1193E50176ABF

NS Delegation Verified

6 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: a1-32.akam.net a12-64.akam.net a14-67.akam.net a5-66.akam.net a8-66.akam.net a9-64.akam.net

Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (1 difference found)

Resolver Differences:

TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [MS=ms93625004 amazonses:FXFVeQnEO3Wua+aY/H4aOIH3sSwteE+7YpGrwm8kF/s= amazonses:PvUL7T41LO87xjr+2nfgxTu11i75NeT9HzY3xYv82Ko= apple-domain-verification=qw51K0kGzRHLbN9S docusign=4025560e-93c9-4920-bb13-849c6fc35d58 mj8729pr7k44dx62wwtx5745xr5njzkn n39n7frbwnkhcmky2nps779y4ttn61wl nmh1f9tgxhmfmjkshg7qh595drdfgnf1 pvv8mevb6qrmqvqi8alhmreg42 uechcfoubh169akghg2214p54n]

This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

192.0.66.108

Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2a04:fa87:fffd::c000:426c

IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

0 nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com.

Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 0 1 5061 sipfed.online.lync.com.

_sip._tls: 0 1 443 sipdir.online.lync.com.

SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints

Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 1 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: 2 endpoints

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 26 subdomains discovered

How did we find these?

Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962).

Re-Analyze to Retry CT Lookup

CT logs unavailable 26 current 0 expired 18 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence

Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.

Subdomain	Source	Status	Provider / CNAME	Certificates	First Seen	Issuer(s)
`academy.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`pows002.gsfc.nasa.gov`	—	—	—
`alerts.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`misspiggy.gsfc.nasa.gov`	—	—	—
`api.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`api-nasa-gov.domains.api.data.gov`	—	—	—
`apps.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`ndmswspubvip.ndc.nasa.gov`	—	—	—
`auth.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`autodiscover.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`autodiscover.outlook.com`	—	—	—
`beta.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`nasa-gov.go-vip.net`	—	—	—
`calendar.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`cloudfront-prod-01-redirects.nasawestprime.com`	—	—	—
`chat.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`nasachat-webapp-gabjbvfzhsa0a4d3.eastus-01.azurewebsites.net`	—	—	—
`hr.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`ndmswbpvip.ndc.nasa.gov`	—	—	—
`id.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`ndmswspubvip.ndc.nasa.gov`	—	—	—
`images.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`images.nasawestprime.com`	—	—	—
`intranet.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`cloudfront-prod-01-redirects.nasawestprime.com`	—	—	—
`mail.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`mobile.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`cloudfront-prod-01-redirects.nasawestprime.com`	—	—	—
`ns1.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`scan.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`search.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`cloudfront-prod-02-redirects.nasawestprime.com`	—	—	—
`share.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`sso.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`support.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`support.nasawestprime.com`	—	—	—
`test.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`webmail.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	—	—	—	—
`wiki.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`wiki-prod.nasawestprime.com`	—	—	—
`www.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`nasa-gov.go-vip.net`	—	—	—
`www3.nasa.gov`	DNS	Current	`www3.nasawestprime.com`	—	—	—

Export Recon (CSV)

Δ Changes Detected: TXT Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)

Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL

DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)

Authoritative Records (Source of truth)

A Synchronized 1 / 1 records

192.0.66.108

AAAA Synchronized 1 / 1 records

2a04:fa87:fffd::c000:426c

CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records

No records

DMARC _dmarc.nasa.gov RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarcmail@mail.nasa.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov

MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

0 nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com.

NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 6 / 6 records

a5-66.akam.net.

a8-66.akam.net.

a12-64.akam.net.

a8-66.akam.net.

a14-67.akam.net.

a1-32.akam.net.

a9-64.akam.net.

a5-66.akam.net.

SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

a1-32.akam.net. dns.nasa.gov. 202207638 7200 900 1209600 300

TXT RFC 7208 §4 Propagating 21 / 4 records

nmh1f9tgxhmfmjkshg7qh595drdfgnf1

amazonses:PvUL7T41LO87xjr+2nfgxTu11i75NeT9HzY3xYv82Ko=

1HqDXPHdt8JOt02qy6FB+l3+Z1zXScqcPxlE/faXjZLS9FRbVhHCUCHQE2bWofZt2TWKPchjjma3Pqli4FULFw==

mj8729pr7k44dx62wwtx5745xr5njzkn

HRlHXyx8jXo+9pIaJWFVBPOLVfeI2biAj3VT1woaTFpp05D5/q6AoD5KpUgws539/d2jl8wBJiEr58OEsRVugQ==

amazonses:FXFVeQnEO3Wua+aY/H4aOIH3sSwteE+7YpGrwm8kF/s=

uechcfoubh169akghg2214p54n

apple-domain-verification=qw51K0kGzRHLbN9S

openai-domain-verification=dv-CO0ENDLO7EB9V5E4JnmE6pS8

—

google-site-verification=ZKpcXLqaBX3jND8Fybkvr3MaaOpC_6MRjXBYm0XNkJQ

—

docusign=4025560e-93c9-4920-bb13-849c6fc35d58

—

_pki-validation.nasa.gov; dg5McbORFfQtQhy3ef7HIMVx9Wc:FA2B-9D14-D761-16A8-4A09-DC08-F804-D6B9

—

v=spf1 include:_spf-4a.nasa.gov include:_spf-4b.nasa.gov include:_spf-4c.nasa.gov include:_spf-4d.nasa.gov include:_spf-4g.nasa.gov include:_spf-4m.nasa.gov include:_spf-4x.nasa.gov include:_spf-6a.nasa.gov include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all

—

MS=ms93625004

—

google-site-verification=BUxd0xTJY4ZjGohBwKDpNms-yOATz92Y54kgme4eKHs

—

amazonses:FXFVeQnEO3Wua+aY/H4aOIH3sSwteE+7YpGrwm8kF/s=

—

mj8729pr7k44dx62wwtx5745xr5njzkn

—

openai-domain-verification=dv-Fbq5PVntP9qLelQPUBKniDjr

—

apple-domain-verification=qw51K0kGzRHLbN9S

—

amazonses:PvUL7T41LO87xjr+2nfgxTu11i75NeT9HzY3xYv82Ko=

—

pvv8mevb6qrmqvqi8alhmreg42

—

atlassian-sending-domain-verification=4730ddf4-d24e-4a91-9612-cb14998d0e47

—

atlassian-domain-verification=oNzRM7G9GIAL/LLP5c7sPOQiAHsHrQ1hKcU7GGZ0ADRZJFhUB/upe935/2RYq/jO

—

webexdomainverification.1YPST=f98a61ea-b92e-41f2-87aa-5651b2af43b8

—

n39n7frbwnkhcmky2nps779y4ttn61wl

—

DNS History Timeline BETA

Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

9883b7f80d9b10889609186d971263baf3629978c8a9daaad1c2c7911cb770fa9dfb3d9a122fde275bbeb2fd9f42d0255ddc9b662818eb6ad76e6bfdeed020bd

Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 17 Feb 2026, 18:26 UTC.

Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL)

cat dns-intelligence-nasa.gov.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-nasa.gov.json

Python 3 (cross-platform)

python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-nasa.gov.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"

sha3sum (coreutils 9+)

sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-nasa.gov.json

Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/1335/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for nasa.gov. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov A

Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov AAAA

Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov MX

Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov NS

Query TXT records RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208

dig +short nasa.gov TXT | grep -i spf

Check DMARC policy RFC 7489

dig +short _dmarc.nasa.gov TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376

dig +short selector1._domainkey.nasa.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035

dig +dnssec +noall +answer nasa.gov DNSKEY

Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov DS

Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035

dig +dnssec +cd nasa.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com RFC 7672

dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA

Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 6698

openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates

Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461

dig +short _mta-sts.nasa.gov TXT

Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461

curl -sL https://mta-sts.nasa.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt

Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460

dig +short _smtp._tls.nasa.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft

dig +short default._bimi.nasa.gov TXT

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083

curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/nasa.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 3207

openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962

curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.nasa.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20

Check security.txt RFC 9116

curl -sL https://nasa.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt

curl -sI https://nasa.gov/llms.txt | head -5

Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules

curl -s https://nasa.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 192.0.66.108 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 108.66.0.192.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.

Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated

How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.

SPF

Verified 4851 runs

DKIM

Verified 4670 runs

DMARC

Verified 4835 runs

DANE/TLSA

Verified 4654 runs

DNSSEC

Verified 4832 runs

BIMI

Verified 4669 runs

MTA-STS

Verified 4672 runs

TLS-RPT

Verified 4674 runs

CAA

Verified 4666 runs

Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov A

Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov AAAA

Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov MX

Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov NS

Query TXT records (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208)

dig +short nasa.gov TXT | grep -i spf

Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489)

dig +short _dmarc.nasa.gov TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short selector1._domainkey.nasa.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035)

dig +dnssec +noall +answer nasa.gov DNSKEY

Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035)

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov DS

Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035)

dig +dnssec +cd nasa.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com (RFC 7672)

dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA

Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 6698)

openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates

Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461)

dig +short _mta-sts.nasa.gov TXT

Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461)

curl -sL https://mta-sts.nasa.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt

Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460)

dig +short _smtp._tls.nasa.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft)

dig +short default._bimi.nasa.gov TXT

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659)

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460)

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344)

dig +noall +answer nasa.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083)

curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/nasa.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 3207)

openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername nasa-gov.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962)

curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.nasa.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20

Check security.txt (RFC 9116)

curl -sL https://nasa.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt

curl -sI https://nasa.gov/llms.txt | head -5

Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules

curl -s https://nasa.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 192.0.66.108 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 108.66.0.192.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Unlikely DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing, but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction — visual and certificate-based brand faking remains possible

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

llms.txt llmstxt.org

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Evidence Log (1 item)

Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Policy Assessment Primary

Telemetry

Live Probe Supplementary

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 26 subdomains discovered

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

DNS History Timeline BETA

Intelligence Sources

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

Download & Verify Intelligence SHA-3-512

Reproduce the Evidence Transparency Source-Verifiable

Appendix: Verification Commands

Rules of Engagement

What You May Do

What You May Not Do

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Intelligence Dissemination

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Unlikely DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing, but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction — visual and certificate-based brand faking remains possible

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

llms.txt llmstxt.org

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Evidence Log (1 item)

Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Policy Assessment Primary

Telemetry

Live Probe Supplementary

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 26 subdomains discovered

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

DNS History Timeline BETA

Intelligence Sources

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

Download & Verify Intelligence SHA-3-512

Reproduce the Evidence Transparency Source-Verifiable

Appendix: Verification Commands

RFC Reference