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Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

scfcv.ro
17 Feb 2026, 14:24 UTC · 47.1s ·v26.19.21 · SHA-3-512: a92a✱✱✱✱ Verify
Recon ModeRecon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: High Risk
3 protocols configured, 6 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 12 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 55.2s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
Move DMARC policy from 'none' to 'quarantine' or 'reject', Enable DMARC aggregate reporting (rua) for authentication visibility
Monitoring
DMARC record has configuration warnings — review recommended
Configured
SPF, DMARC (with warnings), DKIM
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, DNSSEC, CAA
Priority Actions 6 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Upgrade DMARC from p=none

Your DMARC policy is monitor-only (p=none). Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing reports to actively prevent spoofing.

A quarantine or reject policy instructs receivers to take action on failing mail.
FieldValue
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.scfcv.ro (DMARC policy record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@scfcv.ro
Medium Add DMARC Aggregate Reporting

Add a rua= tag to receive aggregate DMARC reports. Without reporting, you cannot monitor authentication failures.

Aggregate reports show who is sending mail as your domain and whether it passes authentication.
FieldValue
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.scfcv.ro (add to existing DMARC record)
Valuerua=mailto:dmarc-reports@scfcv.ro
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
FieldValue
TypeCAA
Hostscfcv.ro (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
FieldValue
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.scfcv.ro (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@scfcv.ro
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
FieldValue
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.scfcv.ro (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=scfcv.ro
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
Unknown
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 2/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 2/10 lookups

v=spf1 +a +mx +ip4:188.241.51.11 include:_spf.deepstorage.ro ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain has DMARC p=none (monitoring only). Enforcing quarantine or reject is recommended to gain real protection.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Monitoring only
Warning p=none

DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement

v=DMARC1; p=none;
Policy p=none provides no protection - spoofed emails reach inboxes
No aggregate reporting (rua) configured — you won't receive reports about authentication results and potential abuse
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. Many tools flag the absence of ruf= as a gap. It is not. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found

Found DKIM records for 1 selector(s)

default._domainkey
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAxvN29DDzKa1dCOku0Ui+egmvLBplAa6NEDkrHUjGoIcFbggZJn+25ACAJYy6CyCAoQMwNp8LPiWM9Of/WIFjsvqaqEuok/TkyIgBqg6Tk7Y6kMgkEaVL6DydQW2L+SE2NQWrGSvfRVe7/pyQfbW1SSSMN129jmXA0inuTGOtmB69YkKrWQX7HLkSGP+toY343rEemnndDVY7Kv0Y46TEzaoDMPpMWzCczZTAMRB9hZpvvVIOVswp0HBq6UOP1Be7xwOq9HOuEy15/JXxoEuPLxAJ7lL0JNAaVux1t98dZ6iICFKNq40d6NxJY5hmzcPF7TnQgCUO7tJHi0siqPWGTQIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found


DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 1 MX host)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).


Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC is monitor-only (p=none) — spoofed mail is not blocked

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

No transport encryption policy detected — mail delivery relies on opportunistic TLS

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — SMTP probe skipped — outbound TCP port 25 is blocked by cloud hosting provider. This is standard for all major cloud platforms (AWS, GCP, Azure, Replit) as an anti-spam measure. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records above, which is the standards-aligned primary method per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 1 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS12842 RO
IPv4 Mappings:
188.241.51.11AS12842 (188.241.51.0/24)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS verification records detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.


Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

3 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1.deepstorage.ro ns2.deepstorage.ro ns3.deepstorage.ro
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 4 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

188.241.51.11
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

0 mail.scfcv.ro.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

_autodiscover._tcp: 0 0 443 cpanelemaildiscovery.cpanel.net.
_caldavs._tcp: 0 0 2080 scfcv.ro.
_carddavs._tcp: 0 0 2080 scfcv.ro.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: 3 endpoints
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 9 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962).
CT logs unavailable 9 current 0 expired 1 CNAME Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
autoconfig.scfcv.ro DNS Current
autodiscover.scfcv.ro DNS Current
cpanel.scfcv.ro DNS Current
ftp.scfcv.ro DNS Current
mail.scfcv.ro DNS Current
mobile.scfcv.ro DNS Current
portal.scfcv.ro DNS Current
webmail.scfcv.ro DNS Current
www.scfcv.ro DNS Current scfcv.ro
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
188.241.51.11
188.241.51.11
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.scfcv.ro RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=none;
v=DMARC1; p=none;
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
0 mail.scfcv.ro.
0 mail.scfcv.ro.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 3 / 3 records
ns2.deepstorage.ro.
ns3.deepstorage.ro.
ns3.deepstorage.ro.
ns2.deepstorage.ro.
ns1.deepstorage.ro.
ns1.deepstorage.ro.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns1.deepstorage.ro. tech.deepstorage.ro. 2026012501 3600 1800 1209600 86400
ns1.deepstorage.ro. tech.deepstorage.ro. 2026012501 3600 1800 1209600 86400
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=spf1 +a +mx +ip4:188.241.51.11 include:_spf.deepstorage.ro ~all
v=spf1 +a +mx +ip4:188.241.51.11 include:_spf.deepstorage.ro ~all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

a92ac02fbd52fbc7dfb20f077c52990e604207ee46a6037b510c9da3c23dbf6e6685757be9eae6b212e1328268396f2cd3039b9c03b3be682e96178203fe5c38
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 17 Feb 2026, 14:24 UTC.

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL)
cat dns-intelligence-scfcv.ro.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-scfcv.ro.json
Python 3 (cross-platform)
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-scfcv.ro.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+)
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-scfcv.ro.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/1236/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for scfcv.ro. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer scfcv.ro A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer scfcv.ro AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer scfcv.ro MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer scfcv.ro NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer scfcv.ro TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208
dig +short scfcv.ro TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489
dig +short _dmarc.scfcv.ro TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376
dig +short default._domainkey.scfcv.ro TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +noall +answer scfcv.ro DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035
dig +noall +answer scfcv.ro DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +cd scfcv.ro A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mail.scfcv.ro RFC 7672
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail.scfcv.ro TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mail.scfcv.ro) RFC 6698
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail.scfcv.ro:25 -servername mail.scfcv.ro 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461
dig +short _mta-sts.scfcv.ro TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461
curl -sL https://mta-sts.scfcv.ro/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460
dig +short _smtp._tls.scfcv.ro TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft
dig +short default._bimi.scfcv.ro TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659
dig +noall +answer scfcv.ro CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460
dig +noall +answer scfcv.ro HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344
dig +noall +answer scfcv.ro CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/scfcv.ro' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mail.scfcv.ro) RFC 3207
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail.scfcv.ro:25 -servername mail.scfcv.ro </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.scfcv.ro&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116
curl -sL https://scfcv.ro/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt
curl -sI https://scfcv.ro/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules
curl -s https://scfcv.ro/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 188.241.51.11 (Team Cymru)
dig +short 11.51.241.188.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4853 runs
DKIM
Verified 4672 runs
DMARC
Verified 4837 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4656 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4834 runs
BIMI
Verified 4671 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4674 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4676 runs
CAA
Verified 4668 runs
Maturity: Development Verified Consistent Gold Gold Master
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

scfcv.ro

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.