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Organizational domain for com could not be determined — the Public Suffix List compiled into this build does not recognize the suffix. Email-security scope below is not determinable; this is not a finding that the domain is or is not a subdomain. Re-run when the PSL snapshot is updated.
Registry Zone Health Intelligence — com is a shared registry suffix.
This report focuses on zone infrastructure health: DNSSEC signing, nameserver diversity, certificate authority policy, and delegation security. Email authentication protocols (SPF, DMARC, DKIM) are not applicable to registry suffixes — they apply to domains registered under this zone.
Registry operators, ICANN, and ccTLD authorities can use this view to assess zone security posture.
DNS Tool
Registry Zone Health Report
Generated 9 Apr 2026, 20:49 UTC
Duration 2.8s
Version v26.43.08
Integrity f5ad04287c2b1ee7570a8589ebb019dc259558b3004f72b1864f684079132a870f8faa0d9c7387abfc5d32fbb143e1a48dcf489256a4a2256bcc5fb7b8588f0c
Subject Domain
com

Registry Zone Health Report

com
9 Apr 2026, 20:49 UTC · 2.8s ·v26.43.08 · SHA-3-512: f5ad✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Archived ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology Replay
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Engineer workspace · evidence preserved

Read the verdict first. Descend only as far as the incident requires.

This report keeps the complete technical record while separating decision, interpretation, evidence, and raw reproduction into a stable disclosure gradient.

L0PostureL1InterpretationL2EvidenceL3Raw & reproduce
Hurry path
MX & Routing Subdomains DNSSEC What changed
KEYBOARD !1@2#3$4%5^6 jump to that section · esc back to the verdict
Sorted by severity — worst first
Email Spoofing
N/A — Registry
Brand Impersonation
N/A — Registry
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
N/A — Registry
Monitoring
N/A — Registry
DANE
N/A — Registry
TRACE L0 · Email Spoofing — N/A — Registry L1 · 01 · Email Security · SPF/DMARC L3 · Reproduce commands
Configured
DNSSEC
Registrar (RESTRICTED) LIVE
Registry Restricted
.com restricts public WHOIS
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Unprotected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Footprint
01 Identity & policy · L1 Email Security Can this domain be impersonated by email? SPF DMARC DKIM MTA-STS TLS-RPT MX & Routing N/A — Registry
02 Chain of authority · L1 Domain Security Can DNS answers and certificate issuance be trusted? DANE / TLSA CAA Delegation DNSSEC Operations DNSSEC & NS N/A — Registry

CAA RFC 8659 §4 N/A

CAA records on a TLD zone do not constrain certificate issuance for domains registered under this suffix. Per RFC 8659 §3, CAs process CAA by climbing the DNS tree from the requested FQDN — a CAA record on the TLD itself would only affect certificates for the bare TLD, not for child domains like example.com. No major TLD publishes CAA records.

Delegation Consistency 4 Issues

Delegation consistency: 4 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone
  • SOA serial 1775767717 seen on: d.gtld-servers.net, a.gtld-servers.net, c.gtld-servers.net, j.gtld-servers.net, e.gtld-servers.net, m.gtld-servers.net, b.gtld-servers.net, f.gtld-servers.net
  • SOA serial 1775767732 seen on: l.gtld-servers.net, g.gtld-servers.net, h.gtld-servers.net, k.gtld-servers.net, i.gtld-servers.net
  • SOA serial inconsistency indicates zone data may not be fully synchronized across nameservers

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

DS Key TagDS AlgorithmDNSKEY Key TagDNSKEY Algorithm
19718 13 19718 13

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
a.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
b.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
c.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
d.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
e.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
f.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
g.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
h.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
i.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
j.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
k.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
l.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK
m.gtld-servers.net No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 172800s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency 2 Unique Serials

a.gtld-servers.net: 1.775767717e+09
b.gtld-servers.net: 1.775767717e+09
c.gtld-servers.net: 1.775767717e+09
d.gtld-servers.net: 1.775767717e+09
e.gtld-servers.net: 1.775767717e+09
f.gtld-servers.net: 1.775767717e+09
g.gtld-servers.net: 1.775767732e+09
h.gtld-servers.net: 1.775767732e+09
i.gtld-servers.net: 1.775767732e+09
j.gtld-servers.net: 1.775767717e+09
k.gtld-servers.net: 1.775767732e+09
l.gtld-servers.net: 1.775767732e+09
m.gtld-servers.net: 1.775767717e+09
DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 4 Issues

DNSSEC operational notes: 4 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:
  • RRSIG for SOA (key tag 35511) expires in less than 7 days
  • RRSIG for NSEC3PARAM (key tag 35511) expires in less than 7 days
  • RRSIG for NS (key tag 35511) expires in less than 7 days
  • Single KSK with no CDS/CDNSKEY automation — manual rollover required

DNSKEY Inventory 2 Keys

RoleKey TagAlgorithmKey Size
ZSK 35511 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits
KSK 19718 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits

RRSIG Signatures 4 Signatures

TypeKey TagExpiryStatus
SOA 35511 2026-04-16T20:48:52Z Expiring Soon
NSEC3PARAM 35511 2026-04-13T00:26:20Z Expiring Soon
DNSKEY 19718 2026-04-22T14:02:35Z Active
NS 35511 2026-04-13T00:26:20Z Expiring Soon

Denial of Existence NSEC3

Iterations: 0
Salt Length: 0 bytes
Hash Algorithm: 1 (SHA-1)

Rollover Readiness Not_ready

Multiple KSKs:
CDS Published:
CDNSKEY Published:
Automation: none
Zone Signing & DNSSEC Methodology Is this zone cryptographically signed? YES DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Gold Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 Modern

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 — MUST implement, recommended default (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are cryptographically authenticated and tamper-evident.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
19718 13 2 8ACBB0CD28F41250A80A491389424D341522D946B0DA0C0291F2D3D771D7805A

NS Delegation Verified

13 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: a.gtld-servers.net b.gtld-servers.net c.gtld-servers.net d.gtld-servers.net e.gtld-servers.net f.gtld-servers.net g.gtld-servers.net h.gtld-servers.net i.gtld-servers.net j.gtld-servers.net k.gtld-servers.net l.gtld-servers.net m.gtld-servers.net
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
03 Delivery path · L1 Transport Security Will mail transport resist downgrade and interception? STARTTLS MTA-STS policy TLS-RPT
04 Human-visible identity · L1 Brand & Trust Can this brand be convincingly faked? BIMI & VMC CAA · see Domain Security N/A — Registry
05 Ownership & attack surface · L1 Infrastructure Intelligence Who operates this domain, and what is exposed? Registrar / RDAP security.txt AI Surface Subdomains
DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on l.gtld-servers.net — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Test inconclusive
Open Recursion Disabled Test inconclusive
Nameserver Identity Hidden Test inconclusive
Cache Snooping Protected Test inconclusive

Tested nameservers: l.gtld-servers.net, k.gtld-servers.net, j.gtld-servers.net, c.gtld-servers.net, e.gtld-servers.net, f.gtld-servers.net, d.gtld-servers.net, a.gtld-servers.net, i.gtld-servers.net, g.gtld-servers.net, b.gtld-servers.net, h.gtld-servers.net, m.gtld-servers.net

Nameserver Fleet Matrix 2 Issues

Analyzed 13 nameserver(s) for com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Findings:
  • SOA serial 1775767732 on: e.gtld-servers.net, h.gtld-servers.net, a.gtld-servers.net, k.gtld-servers.net, f.gtld-servers.net
  • SOA serial 1775767717 on: m.gtld-servers.net, j.gtld-servers.net, d.gtld-servers.net, g.gtld-servers.net, c.gtld-servers.net, l.gtld-servers.net, b.gtld-servers.net, i.gtld-servers.net
Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial Anycast Node
e.gtld-servers.net 192.12.94.30 2001:502:1ca1::30 AS396549 396555 1775767732 N/A
m.gtld-servers.net 192.55.83.30 2001:501:b1f9::30 AS19836 22547 396566 397195 1775767717 N/A
j.gtld-servers.net 192.48.79.30 2001:502:7094::30 AS19836 22547 396566 397195 1775767717 N/A
h.gtld-servers.net 192.54.112.30 2001:502:8cc::30 AS36631 397197 397203 1775767732 N/A
d.gtld-servers.net 192.31.80.30 2001:500:856e::30 AS396549 396555 1775767717 N/A
g.gtld-servers.net 192.42.93.30 2001:503:eea3::30 AS36631 397197 397203 1775767717 N/A
a.gtld-servers.net 192.5.6.30 2001:503:a83e::2:30 AS396549 396555 1775767732 N/A
k.gtld-servers.net 192.52.178.30 2001:503:d2d::30 AS19836 22547 396566 397195 1775767732 N/A
c.gtld-servers.net 192.26.92.30 2001:503:83eb::30 AS396549 396555 1775767717 N/A
f.gtld-servers.net 192.35.51.30 2001:503:d414::30 AS36631 397197 397203 1775767732 N/A
l.gtld-servers.net 192.41.162.30 2001:500:d937::30 AS19836 22547 396566 397195 1775767717 N/A
b.gtld-servers.net 192.33.14.30 2001:503:231d::2:30 AS36617 396659 396661 396707 396737 396747 396751 1775767717 N/A
i.gtld-servers.net 192.43.172.30 2001:503:39c1::30 AS36631 397197 397203 1775767717 N/A
Unique ASNs
4
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
13
Diversity Score
Good

4 ASNs, 13 /24 prefixes across 13 nameservers

Subdomain Discovery Not Applicable
Certificate Transparency subdomain enumeration is not applicable for registry suffixes. For com, CT logs would show registered domains under this zone rather than organizational subdomains. To analyze a specific domain's exposure, scan a registrable domain like example.com.
Δ Changes Detected: SOA Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
06 Raw records & reproducibility · L2–L3 Evidence & Verification Can another engineer reproduce every material claim? Analysis Confidence Intelligence Currency What changed Raw record diff Integrity seal Reproduce
Significant disagreement between resolvers undermines confidence in the analysis results.
Accuracy 21% Currency 68/100 Maturity consistent
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Stale Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
ICuAE Details
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
SOA 297s 1 hour (3600s) high SOA TTL is below typical — observed 297s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 6 hours (21600s) 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics)
Primary NS a.gtld-servers.net
Serial 1775767132
Admin nstld.verisign-grs.com
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh1800s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry900sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)900s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s).
RFC 1912 §2.2
Registry Zone Health
DNSSEC: Success 13 Nameservers
Zone infrastructure protocols applicable to registry suffixes
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 13 / 13 records
g.gtld-servers.net.
f.gtld-servers.net.
i.gtld-servers.net.
h.gtld-servers.net.
a.gtld-servers.net.
e.gtld-servers.net.
h.gtld-servers.net.
l.gtld-servers.net.
b.gtld-servers.net.
b.gtld-servers.net.
e.gtld-servers.net.
k.gtld-servers.net.
d.gtld-servers.net.
a.gtld-servers.net.
f.gtld-servers.net.
m.gtld-servers.net.
c.gtld-servers.net.
c.gtld-servers.net.
l.gtld-servers.net.
i.gtld-servers.net.
j.gtld-servers.net.
j.gtld-servers.net.
k.gtld-servers.net.
g.gtld-servers.net.
m.gtld-servers.net.
d.gtld-servers.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Propagating 1 / 1 records
a.gtld-servers.net. nstld.verisign-grs.com. 1775767132 1800 900 604800 900
a.gtld-servers.net. nstld.verisign-grs.com. 1775767732 1800 900 604800 900
TXT RFC 7208 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

f5ad04287c2b1ee7570a8589ebb019dc259558b3004f72b1864f684079132a870f8faa0d9c7387abfc5d32fbb143e1a48dcf489256a4a2256bcc5fb7b8588f0c
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 9 Apr 2026, 20:49 UTC.
Internet Archive — Permanent Record Wayback Machine Can this analysis be independently verified? Archived

This analysis has been automatically submitted to the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, creating a tamper-evident, third-party-hosted snapshot of the DNS security posture at analysis time. This archived copy is independent of DNS Tool — it provides an independently verifiable record of the analysis at this point in time. Combined with the SHA-3-512 integrity hash, this creates a verifiable chain of evidence for domain security state.

View Archived Snapshot
Snapshot preserved at https://web.archive.org/web/20260409205023/https://dnstool.it-help.tech/analysis/11138/view/E
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3) Cross-Reference Verification

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/11138/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd com A @1.1.1.1

Brand & Trust

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine consistent · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Gold 15673 runs
DKIM
Gold 15463 runs
DMARC
Gold 15654 runs
DANE/TLSA
Gold 15445 runs
DNSSEC
Gold 15632 runs
BIMI
Gold 15460 runs
MTA-STS
Gold 15481 runs
TLS-RPT
Gold 15496 runs
CAA
Gold 15493 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd com A @1.1.1.1

Brand & Trust

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

0s

Running Real-Time Scan Telemetry

Most scans complete in less than one minute. Some may take longer.

Markers represent known resolver locations. Anycast routing selects the nearest node — exact routing is internal to each provider.

Pipeline nodes reflect live data as each analysis phase completes.

Telemetry Log 0 polls